

Who Wants to Go Where? Regional Variations in Emigration Intention in Nigeria

Tunde Alabi¹ and Bamidele Olajide²

Received 04 November 2022 / Accepted 03 April 2023 / Published 30 April 2023

Abstract

There has been an increase in the number of Nigerians desperately leaving the country. In the absence of accurate data on the rate of actual emigration, this study investigated emigration intention in Nigeria, and how it varies between northern and southern Nigeria – two regions with perennial sociocultural differences that have been neglected in migration research. The study also investigated the factors associated with emigration intention. It utilized secondary data from the Afrobarometer survey, including 1,600 Nigerian adults aged 18 and above. Logistic regression models were fitted to address the study objectives. The study found that the emigration intention rate in Nigeria was 35.5%, but it varied from 30.3% in the north to 40.3% in the south. The rate ranged from 26% in the north-east to 46.4% in the south-eastern part of the country. The most preferred destination for northern Nigerians was another country in Africa (32.4%), but it was North America for southerners (43.2%). At the multivariate level, the study found that living in the south, being educated, using the internet frequently, having tolerance for homosexuals, and participating in politics increased the likelihood of emigration intention. However, being old, employed and having religious tolerance reduced the odds of emigration intention. The regional models revealed notable differences in the influence of age, education, employment, tolerance, and political participation. The study discusses the implications of the findings.

Keywords: migration intention, Afrobarometer survey, regional and cultural differences, “japa”

¹ University of Lagos, Nigeria. Corresponding author ✉ taalabi@unilag.edu.ng

² University of Lagos, Nigeria.

INTRODUCTION

Migration is one of the important factors in population change. While migration of Africans to the West has been on the increase, there is also evidence that many Africans migrate within the African continent and to other countries in the Global South (see Crawley et al., 2022). Despite the increase in intra-African migration, many young Africans are still yearning to migrate to Europe. This is to the extent that some Africans risk their lives to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe despite regular media reports of loss of lives on such journeys. The United Nations' 2019 World Population Prospects shows that the net migration rate in Africa is negative, indicating that more people are leaving the continent than those coming in (United Nations, 2019). Eight of the top 15 refugee-sending countries in the world are from Africa, including Nigeria (Milasi, 2020). With the increasing social unrest, youth unemployment, and political corruption, there is a likelihood that more persons will emigrate upon the slightest opportunity, and this has implications for inequality and development of Nigeria and the African continent. To be clear, this is not to say that migration is a negative phenomenon. Migration has been part of human history (Harzig and Hoerder, 2013), and it has numerous advantages (such as cultural exchange) for the countries of origin and destination. However, the circumstances under which many Nigerians emigrate are concerning. These include the selling of their assets to meet visa costs and other travel expenses (Nwosu et al., 2022; Aina, 2023) and irregular migration as a means of survival (Ikuteyijo, 2020).

Local jargon used to connote the desperation to emigrate in Nigeria is “japa.” Although the jargon is yet to be well used in academic literature, it has attracted the attention of local and international media. “Japa” is a Yoruba term, which literally means to escape or flee from danger or unpleasant situations. According to Bernard (2023), the jargon became popular in Nigeria after it was used by a hip-hop artist in his musical video to connote fleeing police arrest and running into different cities and countries. In the context of migration, it is used to mean emigrating by all means possible to escape the hopeless situations of insecurity and economic turmoil in Nigeria, according to a CNN report (see Madowo et al., 2023). Despite the exodus of young Nigerians, there is lack of reliable and accurate data on the actual number of people who have emigrated, considering that a number of persons emigrate through unconventional routes and are undocumented.

The lack of accurate data on actual migration has drawn the attention of researchers to emigration intention because migration intention may help predict actual migration behavior (Wanner, 2021). In addition, migration intention, to a considerable extent, may be useful in determining future migration trends (Tjaden et al., 2019). Investigations of migration intention have taken different forms, from the use of large global data such as the Gallup World Poll (Migali and Scipioni, 2019; Tjaden et al., 2019; Milasi, 2020) to the collection of primary data among college students within and among countries (Santric-Milicevic et al., 2014; Abuosi and Abor, 2015; He et al., 2016). The choice of the study population in the latter could have been

informed by the emigration of fresh graduates in developing countries to the West. However, there has also been an increase in the emigration of skilled professionals, including those in the health sector. The attraction of Nigerian health workers by countries such as the United Kingdom (UK) during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic is an example. Hence, studies on emigration intention in the country are now focusing on medical doctors and other health workers (Oluwatunmise et al., 2020; Adebayo and Akinyemi, 2022; Adeniyi et al., 2022; Akinwumi et al., 2022; Onah et al., 2022; Yakubu et al., 2023).

The studies that used the global data show evidence of variations in emigration intention rate across continents (Migali and Scipioni, 2019; Milasi, 2020). Evidence of variation also exists across countries within regions. For example, Afrobarometer Data (2017) shows that in Africa, the emigration intention rate ranges from 13.1% in Madagascar, to 30.9% in Mozambique, to 58.4% in Sierra Leone. This suggests the importance of understanding emigration intention within the local context of each country. Recent studies in Nigeria investigated factors associated with emigration intention in Nigeria (Obi et al., 2020; Adebayo and Akinyemi, 2022; Adeniyi et al., 2022; Akinwumi et al., 2022; Onah et al., 2022; Yakubu et al., 2023). However, there is little emphasis on (1) the regional differences on the rate of emigration intentions between northern and southern Nigeria; and (2) the regional variations in the influence of the factors. Meanwhile, the northern and southern regions have distinct sociocultural differences that shape their views, behaviors, and reactions toward phenomena. For example, there is empirical evidence that the two regions significantly differ in their political behaviors (Alabi, 2023), health behaviors (Alabi et al., 2022; Adejoh et al., 2023) and social behaviors (Alabi and Ramsden, 2022). But such differences have not been well established in the area of migration intentions in the country. This study investigates regional variations in emigration intentions in Nigeria, with a focus on the northern and southern parts of the country. The study also explores regional differences in the preferred countries of destination. Importantly, the study investigates the influence of socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, religion, and employment), perceived level of corruption, internet use, out-group tolerance, and political participation on emigration intention and how the influence varies between the northern and southern parts of the country.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In Nigeria, there is evidence that emigration intentions vary by geographical location and among social groups (Adeniyi et al., 2022; Akinwumi et al., 2022; Onah et al., 2022; Yakubu et al., 2023). Although the study by Yakubu et al. (2023) did not attempt a detailed investigation of north-south differences in Nigeria, the authors found that the south-south geopolitical zone recorded the highest rate of emigration intention (67%), while the south-east recorded the least (43%). However, their study comprised a small sample of fewer than 300 people and focused only on health workers. There is also evidence that the preferred countries of destination for intending migrants

in Nigeria are diverse. In Onah et al.'s (2022) study, the most preferred country of destination was the UK (40%), followed by Canada (17.6%), United States of America (USA) (15.7%), Australia (13.4%), and Saudi Arabia (13.1%). In the study by Adeniyi et al. (2022), Canada was the most preferred country of destination (39.9%), followed by the UK (25.2%), USA (20.3%), and South Africa (6.6%).

Earlier studies documented the influence of socio-demographic factors on emigration intention. Regarding gender, traditionally, the finding has been that males have a higher tendency than females to intend emigrating (Chort, 2014; Burrone et al., 2018; Dibeh et al., 2018; Migali and Scipioni, 2019; Milasi, 2020). However, there has been an increase in the rate of female migration. Hence, the study by Adeniyi et al. (2022) in Nigeria did not find a significant association between gender and emigration intention. The study by Yakubu et al. (2023) found that 61% of women in their study sample have emigration intention compared to 54% of men. Similarly, a report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2022) shows that women and girls constitute the majority of migrants in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. A reason for this is the search for economic equality (Kenny and O'Donnell, 2016; IOM, 2022).

While global data and large data sources within countries have reported an inverse relationship between age and migration intention (Hoti, 2009; Migali and Scipioni, 2019), a survey of 938 first- and fifth-year medical students with a mean age of 19 and 24 respectively in Serbia shows a positive association between age and emigration intention (Santric-Milicevic et al., 2014). In Nigeria, there is evidence that young people have significantly higher migration intention than older people (Obi et al., 2020; Akinwumi et al., 2022; Onah et al., 2022; Yakubu et al., 2023).

Research findings are consistent in that intentions to migrate increase with the level of education (Dako-Gyeke, 2016; Obi et al., 2020; Gevrek et al., 2021). Educated people are more aware of the differences between the ideal opportunities abroad and the current economic and political situation in their country of origin, which may trigger emigration intention (Dako-Gyeke, 2016; Gevrek et al., 2021). In addition, major receiving countries are becoming increasingly restrictive and are more likely to allow the entry of those who are more educated. Studies on the influence of religion on emigration intention are scarce. But earlier studies have shown that religious affiliation may be associated with actual migration. For example, Connor (2012) found that Christians constitute almost half (49%) of international migrants worldwide, compared to 27% of Muslims and 9% of religiously unaffiliated people. In addition, the study by Akinwumi et al. (2022) in Nigeria reveals that Christians reported emigration intention more than Muslims. Also, a report by Pew Research Center (2012) shows that destinations for international migrants may vary by religion.

Regarding employment status, there is evidence that unemployment and underemployment may trigger emigration intention (Adebayo and Akinyemi, 2022; Nwosu et al., 2022; Yakubu et al., 2023). Nwosu et al. (2022) note that unemployment and poverty leave young Nigerians with few options but to embark on irregular

migration because they are unable to afford the cost of regular migration. In addition, underemployment, poor remuneration, and unfair working conditions are the reasons why some skilled workers want to leave the country (Adebayo and Akinyemi, 2022; Yakubu et al., 2023).

The internet and social media may facilitate young people's knowledge of different places within and outside their country. An empirical study by Iwana et al. (2022) found a positive association between internet usage and migration intention. This may be because the internet and social media facilitate communication between young people and migration networks and migration brokers (Dekker et al., 2016; Obi et al., 2020), thereby increasing intentions to migrate. With access to the internet, young people are able to see some differences between their own living conditions and those of their counterparts in other locations. Consequently, intention to migrate may be motivated by an awareness of better opportunities elsewhere observed through the internet, communication with online friends, and access to information about the country of destination (Vilhelmson and Thulin, 2013; Dekker et al., 2016).

The literature is in agreement on the influence of corruption on emigration intention. Poprawe (2015) notes that there is a growing connection between corruption and emigration. Frouws and Brenner (2019) report that corruption motivates regular emigration in at least two ways. One, persistent corruption and poor governance fuel emigration by suggesting failure and hopelessness to educated elites who may migrate to escape the negative consequences happening in their home country. Two, corruption triggers irregular migration – especially in Africa – through bribery of government officials. Directly related to emigration intention is an empirical study by Crisan et al. (2019) who found a positive association between perceived level of corruption and migration intention. The authors report that “Romanian employees who perceive a high level of corruption in the country, have a low level of career satisfaction, and want to find another job are disposed toward migration rather than finding another job in Romania” (Crisan et al., 2019: 1).

Political participation may be an important political driver of emigration. Studies in this regard have not directly linked political participation to emigration intention but in other interesting ways. For instance, Umpierrez de Reguero and Finn (2023) investigated how international migration affects voter turnouts in both sending and receiving countries. Interestingly, they found that the higher the interest in politics, the higher the intention to vote in both sending and receiving countries. From another perspective, Hiskey et al. (2014) found that the quality of the democratic system drives emigration desires in young people. This resonates with what happened in Nigeria after the national elections held in February and March 2023. Many young people alleged that the electoral process was not free and fair and that political thugs openly intimidated perceived opponents and stopped them from voting. This was followed by expressions of hopelessness on social media and the consequent trending of #japa on Twitter.

Studies on the link between tolerance and emigration intention are rare. This study views tolerance from three dimensions: tolerance for homosexual persons, people of other religions, and foreign nationals. Studies in this regard have focused on migrants' attitudes toward members of out-groups in the host countries and migrants' adjustment to tolerance of behaviors that are deemed unacceptable in the country of origin (Röder and Lubbers, 2016; Röder and Spierings, 2022). Homosexuality is proscribed in Nigeria. In addition, Nigeria is a religious country. Therefore, people who have favorable attitudes toward homosexuality may desire to emigrate to another country where homosexuality is allowed.

Some lessons and gaps from the literature review, include: (a) most studies conducted in Nigeria did not use nationally representative data; hence, it is not easy to generalize their findings to the entire country; (b) recent studies on emigration intention in Nigeria tend to focus on health workers, and their explanatory variables are limited to socio-demographic characteristics and push-pull analyses; (c) there is little empirical evidence to establish the roles of perceived corruption, tolerance, and political participation on emigration intention in Nigeria; and (d) to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate Nigerian north-south differences in emigration intention, preferred places of destination, and associated factors.

METHODS

Data and population

The study utilized the 2017 (i.e., the seventh round of) Afrobarometer survey in Nigeria. Afrobarometer collects survey data across 34 countries in Africa, including Nigeria.³ Afrobarometer survey data are nationally representative, and they have been analyzed in academic papers, including doctoral theses (Isbell, 2022) and journal articles (Diallo, 2022). Afrobarometer collects data on a range of issues, including perception of democracy and governance, political participation, and economic outlook, among others. In Nigeria, the latest round of Afrobarometer (round 8) survey was conducted in 2021 and released in 2022. However, the latest round did not capture issues around emigration intention in Nigeria.⁴ Hence, this study analyzed the 2017 (round 7) Afrobarometer survey data.

The survey is nationally representative and samples all 36 states in Nigeria plus the federal capital territory (FCT). The 36 states and the FCT are subdivided into 6 geopolitical zones, namely: North East, North Central, North West, South East, South South, and South West. This study groups all 36 states and the FCT into north or south. Figure 1 shows the map of Nigeria with all the states in each of the two regions. In all, the northern region houses 19 states and the FCT, while the south is comprised of 17 states.

³ See <https://www.afrobarometer.org/>

⁴ https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/afrobarometer_questionnaire_nig_r8_en_2019-11-01.pdf

Figure 1: Map of Nigeria showing the states in northern and southern regions

Operationalization of variables

The main dependent variable is emigration intention measured by whether a respondent is considering relocating to another country. Respondents were asked, “How much, if at all, have you considered moving to another country to live?” with response options like, “not at all,” “a little bit,” “somewhat,” “a lot,” and “don’t know.” The responses were categorized into two, with “not at all” recoded as “0” and labeled “no emigration intention,” while “a little bit,” “somewhat,” and “a lot” were recoded as “1” referring to respondents with emigration intention. Respondents were also asked about the preferred destination countries. The question was: “If you were to move to another country, where would you be most likely to go?” The options included countries within and outside Africa. Respondents were also asked about the actual plans they made toward migration, reasons for possible emigration, and preferred destination country.

There are nine independent variables that comprise five socio-demographic variables: gender, age, education, religion, and employment. The four other variables are: perceived level of corruption, frequency of internet use, tolerance (from three dimensions) and political participation. Age, which was captured at ratio level, was categorized according to the World Health Organization’s standard age groups, into “less than 30,” “30–44,” and “45 and above” (Ahmad et al., 2001). Education was recoded into four categories in line with the Nigerian education system. The

categories are: “no formal education,” “primary education,” “secondary education,” and “tertiary education.” Religion was recoded into the two popular religions in the country – Christianity and Islam. Other smaller categories were not considered for analysis in this study. Regarding employment, respondents were asked whether they have a job that pays cash income, with options like, “No (not looking),” “no (looking),” “yes, part-time,” and “yes, full-time.” The first two options were treated as being unemployed, and the other two as being employed. For the perceived level of corruption, respondents were asked: “In your opinion, over the past year, has the level of corruption in this country increased, decreased, or stayed the same?” There were five options: “increased a lot,” “increased somewhat,” “stayed the same,” “decreased somewhat,” and “decreased a lot,” which were recoded into three categories: “increased,” “the same,” and “decreased.” Similarly, the options to the question on frequency of internet use were: “never,” “less than a month,” “a few times a month,” “a few times a week,” and “every day.” The first and last options remained the same, while the second to fourth options were treated as “sometimes.”

Regarding out-group tolerance, there were three variables, namely: tolerance of “people of a different religion,” “homosexuals,” and “immigrants or foreign workers.” Respondents were asked, “Please tell me whether you would like having people from this group as neighbors, dislike it, or not care.” Those who would dislike having them were treated as “intolerant;” those who would not care were regarded as “neutral;” while those who would like to have them were regarded as “tolerant.” Regarding political participation, the study adopted the earlier operationalization used by Dim and Asomah (2019). Respondents were asked if they had done any of the following things during the past year: “Join others in your community to request action from the government;” “contact the media;” “contact a government official for help;” and “attend a demonstration or a protest march.” The response format was: “No = 0;” “No, but would do if had the chance = 1;” “Yes, once or twice = 2;” “Yes, several times = 3;” and “Yes, often = 4.” The responses were summed and treated as a scale variable at the inferential level of analysis, and recoded accordingly (i.e., 0–1 as “No” and 2–4 as “Yes”) where necessary in the analysis.

Data analysis

The analysis began from the descriptive level where we presented the frequency distribution of all the variables by regions (i.e., north and south) as shown in Table 1. The study used simple frequencies, percentages, mean, standard deviation, and column and bar charts to present graphical illustrations of results at the univariate level. At the inferential level, we computed a series of logistic regression (LR) models. First, we ran bivariate logistic regression to show how each of the nine predicting factors are associated with emigration intention. In addition, we put all nine independent variables in a single model to observe effects of covariates at the multivariate level. The results of bivariate and multivariate regression are presented in Table 2. Later, we computed two separate multivariate models (i.e., one for each

region); these results are presented in Table 3. We ran the correlation matrix to test for multicollinearity but found no evidence of such, as no correlation coefficient was up to 0.7. The LR models were fitted at 95% level of significance. In Table 4, we present a summary of all the results to enhance clarity.

RESULTS

Findings from descriptive analyses

Table 1: Frequency distribution of all variables

	North (779)		South (822)	
Gender	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Male	391	50.2	411	50.0
Female	388	49.8	411	50.0
Age				
Less than 30	390	50.2	408	49.6
30-44	253	32.6	264	32.2
45 and above	134	17.2	149	18.2
	Mean age: 33.8; SD: 37.856		Mean age: 32.9 SD: 13.025	
Education				
No formal education	212	27.4	18	2.2
Primary education	119	15.3	96	11.8
Secondary education	239	30.8	461	56.2
Tertiary education	206	26.5	245	29.8
Religion				
Christianity	188	25.1	689	86.6
Islam	559	74.9	107	13.4
Employment				
Unemployed	454	58.2	358	43.5
Employed	325	41.8	464	56.5
Perceived level of corruption				
Increased	193	25.0	491	60.0
The same	98	12.6	126	15.4
Reduced	483	62.4	202	24.6
Frequency of internet use				
Never	489	62.7	336	41.1
Sometimes	147	18.8	243	29.7
Everyday	144	18.4	239	29.2
Religious tolerance				
No	159	20.7	119	14.6
Neutral	145	18.9	165	20.2
Yes	464	60.4	536	65.3

(continued)


(continued)

Tolerance of homosexuals				
No	703	91.0	754	92.0
Neutral	39	5.0	42	5.2
Yes	30	3.9	23	2.8
Tolerance of immigrants/foreign workers				
No	157	20.4	80	9.8
Neutral	209	27.2	186	22.7
Yes	403	52.4	552	67.5
Political participation				
Join others to request for government action	262	33.7	196	23.8
Contacted the media	182	23.6	189	23.0
Contacted a government official	220	28.3	166	20.3
Attended a protest	137	17.7	149	18.2
Emigration intention				
No	540	69.7	489	59.7
Yes	235	30.3	330	40.3
Planning/preparation for emigration*				
Currently making any specific plans or preparations	124	53.2	172	52.2
Planning to move in the next year or two but not yet making preparations	86	36.7	114	34.8
Currently making preparations to move, like getting a visa	33	10.0	43	13.0

* Not inclusive of those who have no intention to emigrate

Source: Authors' own calculation from Afrobarometer Data, 2017.


There is evidence of considerable regional differences in the variables. The rate of emigration intention in Nigeria was 35.5%. But it varies from 30.3% in the north to 40.3% in the south. As shown in Figure 2, the North East (26%) and the North West (29.7%) had the least emigration intention rates. The South East and the South West had the highest rate of intention to migrate (46.4% and 43.1%, respectively). Out of the respondents who indicated an intention to emigrate, more than half in both regions (53.2% in the north and 52.2% in the south) were making specific plans. More than one-third (36.7% in the north and 34.8% in the south) were yet to prepare but were planning to move in the next two years. At least one-tenth (10% in the north and 13% in the south) had made sufficient preparations, such as getting a visa.

Figure 2: Emigration intention by geo-political zones

Source: Afrobarometer Data, 2017.

We found differences in the preferred destination country between the two regions. Figure 3 shows that the most preferred destination country for northern respondents is Ghana (17.8%), a neighboring country, followed by Europe (17.3%), North America (17%), and the Middle East (9.4%). In all, 32.4% of northern respondents preferred migrating to another country within Africa. In contrast, the preferred destination places for southern respondents were North America (43.2%), Europe (23.9%), and Central and South America (6.3%). The Middle East was the least preferred destination place for southern respondents (1%), while Australia emerged as the least preferred destination country for northern respondents (5.3%).

Figure 3: Preferred destinations



Source: Afrobarometer Data, 2017.

Factors influencing emigration intention in Nigeria

Table 2 shows that respondents from the south had a higher likelihood of emigration intention than those from the north at both bivariate and multivariate levels (OR: 1.549; AOR: 1.613, $p < 0.001$). Age had a significant influence on emigration intention, and people aged 30 and above had lower odds of emigration intention than respondents younger than 30. In the multivariate model, however, people aged 45 and above did not differ significantly from those who were younger than 30. At both bivariate and multivariate levels, respondents who had secondary or tertiary education were significantly more likely to have an emigration intention than those without formal education. At the multivariate level, for example, those who had secondary education were 1.7 times more likely to have emigration intention than those with no formal education (reference category). The odds were 1.9 for those who had tertiary education ($p: 0.009$). At the bivariate level, Muslims were significantly less likely to intend to emigrate than Christians (OR: 0.686, $p < 0.001$), but the association was not significant at the multivariate level.

Table 2: Regression model showing the predictors of emigration intention in Nigeria

Predictors	Bivariate logistic regression					Multivariate model 1 Model X2 (p): 162.534 (<0.001); H & L Test (p): 7.270 (0.508); Nagelkerke R ² : 0.141				
	β	p	OR	95% C.I.for EXP(B)		β	p	AOR	95% C.I.for EXP(B)	
				Lower	Upper					Upper
Region										
South	.438	<0.001	1.549	1.259	1.906	.478	.002	1.613	1.188	2.189
Gender										
Female	-.011	.919	.989	.806	1.215	.068	.571	1.070	.846	1.354
Age										
30-44	-.450	<0.001	.638	.504	.806	-.362	.007	.696	.535	.906
45 and above	-.525	<0.001	.592	.441	.793	-.171	.322	.843	.601	1.182
Education										
Primary	.376	.089	1.457	.944	2.249	.340	.181	1.405	.854	2.312
Secondary	.747	<0.001	2.112	1.487	2.999	.522	.021	1.685	1.081	2.627
Tertiary	1.071	<0.001	2.919	2.024	4.209	.645	.009	1.905	1.174	3.093
Religion										
Islam	-.377	.001	.686	.554	.849	.228	.140	1.257	.928	1.702
Employment										
Employed	-.251	.017	.778	.633	.956	-.262	.030	.769	.607	.974
Level of corruption										
The same	.062	.694	1.064	.780	1.452	.167	.332	1.182	.843	1.659
Reduced	-.264	.021	.768	.614	.960	-.025	.859	.975	.742	1.283
Frequency of internet use										
Sometimes	.415	.002	1.515	1.171	1.959	.090	.563	1.094	.807	1.484
Every day	1.040	<0.001	2.829	2.198	3.641	.859	<0.001	2.361	1.695	3.288
Religious tolerance										
Neutral	-.276	.102	.759	.545	1.056	-.357	.089	.700	.463	1.057
Tolerant	-.475	.001	.622	.474	.816	-.725	<0.001	.484	.343	.683
Sexual orientation tolerance										
Neutral	.473	.039	1.605	1.024	2.517	.291	.263	1.338	.804	2.227
Tolerant	1.079	<0.001	2.940	1.675	5.161	1.004	.002	2.729	1.435	5.190
Tolerance of foreign nationals										
Neutral	-.030	.864	.970	.687	1.370	.071	.749	1.073	.696	1.654
Tolerant	.215	.163	1.240	.917	1.678	.425	.029	1.529	1.044	2.240
Political participation										
Constant	--	--	--	--	--	-1.556	<0.001	.211		

Reference category; Male; Less than 30 years; No education; Christianity; unemployed; increased; never; intolerant. β: Beta coefficient; p: p-value

Source: Created by authors

Respondents who were employed were significantly less likely to have emigration intention than those who were unemployed (AOR: 0.769; p: 0.030). At the bivariate level, perceived level of corruption was associated with emigration intention. Respondents who felt that corruption had reduced had lower likelihood of having emigration intention compared to those who thought that the level of corruption had increased (OR: 0.768; p: 0.021). But the association was not significant in the multivariate model. We found evidence that the frequent use of the internet had a significant influence on emigration intention at bivariate and multivariate levels. Model 1 shows that Nigerians who used the internet daily were 2.4 times more likely to have emigration intention compared to those who had no access to the internet. The three types of out-group tolerance were significant predictors of emigration intention but the directions of association differed. At the multivariate level, respondents who exhibited religious tolerance were less likely to have emigration intention compared to those who were intolerant (AOR: 0.484; p<0.001). But the reverse was the case for tolerance for homosexuals and tolerance for migrants. Respondents who expressed tolerance for homosexuals were 2.7 times more likely to have emigration intention than those who were intolerant (p: 0.002). Similarly, respondents who expressed tolerance for migrants were 1.5 times more likely to have emigration intention than those who were not tolerant. The model also shows that intention to migrate increased with political participation at both bivariate and multivariate levels.

Differences in the factors influencing migration intention

Table 2 shows that respondents from northern and southern Nigeria significantly differed in their emigration intention. We computed separate models for each region and present the results in Table 3.

Table 3: Logistic regression models showing regional differences in the predictors of emigration intention in Nigeria

Predictors	North (Multivariate Model 2)					South (Multivariate Model 3)				
	β	p	OR	95% C.I.for EXP(B)		β	p	OR	95% C.I.for EXP(B)	
				Lower	Upper				β	Upper
Gender						p				
Female	.289	.139	1.335	.911	1.956	AOR	.425	.881	.646	1.202
Age										
30-44	-.212	.301	.809	.541	1.209	-.445	.016	.641	.446	.921
45 and above	.017	.950	1.017	.602	1.719	-.342	.143	.710	.450	1.122
Education										
Primary	.582	.065	1.789	.964	3.319	-.707	.218	.493	.160	1.517
Secondary	.437	.127	1.548	.884	2.710	-.269	.611	.764	.270	2.159
Tertiary	.829	.010	2.292	1.224	4.291	-.286	.602	.752	.257	2.200
Religion										
Islam	.032	.884	1.032	.675	1.577	.441	.056	1.555	.989	2.444
Employment										
Employed	-.448	.018	.639	.441	.925	-.122	.453	.885	.643	1.218
Level of corruption										
The same	.308	.305	1.360	.756	2.449	.058	.790	1.060	.690	1.628
Reduced	-.056	.800	.946	.616	1.452	.036	.851	1.037	.712	1.509
Frequency of internet use										
Sometimes	.268	.296	1.308	.791	2.163	-.033	.869	.967	.650	1.439
Every day	.726	.008	2.066	1.204	3.545	.848	<0.001	2.334	1.509	3.610
Religious tolerance										
Neutral	-.159	.628	.853	.448	1.623	-.534	.063	.586	.334	1.029
Tolerant	-.669	.020	.512	.291	.902	-.789	.001	.454	.285	.724
Sexual orientation tolerance										
Neutral	.606	.134	1.833	.831	4.048	.067	.851	1.069	.533	2.143
Tolerant	1.958	<0.001	7.088	2.556	19.656	-.029	.955	.972	.361	2.616
Tolerance of foreign nationals										
Neutral	.028	.932	1.028	.543	1.948	-.002	.994	.998	.536	1.859
Tolerant	.633	.030	1.884	1.063	3.339	.150	.587	1.162	.677	1.993
Political participation										
Constant	-1.710	<0.001	.181			.114	.859	1.120		

Reference category; Male; Less than 30 years; No education; Christianity; unemployed; increased; never; intolerant. β : Beta coefficient; p: p-value

Source: Created by authors

Model X² (p) 89.611 (<0.001)

H & L Test (p) 14.211 (0.076)

Nagelkerke R²: 0.167

Model X² (p) 80.958 (<0.001)

H & L Test (p) 5.657 (0.686)

Nagelkerke R²: 0.133

We found that gender, which was significantly associated with emigration intention in model 1 (national model) is not a significant predictor at the regional levels. Age did not show any significant association with emigration intention in the north. But in the south, respondents aged 30–44 were less likely to have emigration intention compared to those who were younger than 30 (AOR: 0.641; p: 0.016).

We observed regional differences in the influence of education. In the south, education did not show any significant influence on emigration intention. However, in the north, respondents who had tertiary education were 2.3 times more likely to have emigration intention compared to those who had no formal education (p: 0.010). Religion was not a significant predictor of emigration intention at regional levels.

The perceived level of corruption did not show any significant association with emigration intention in the two regions. We found similarities in both regions regarding the influence of internet use – those who used the internet every day were more likely to have emigration intention than those who did not use the internet at all (North: AOR: 2.066; p: 0.008; South: 2.334; p<0.001). Religious tolerance was a significant predictor of emigration intention in both regions. The indication was that those who had religious tolerance were less likely to have emigration intention than those who were intolerant (North: AOR: 0.512; p: 0.020; South: AOR: 0.454; p: 0.001). However, differences were evident in the influence of tolerance of homosexual persons and foreign nationals, as seen in Table 3. In the north, respondents who tolerate homosexuals were 7.1 times more likely to have emigration intention than those who were intolerant (p<0.001), but the association was not significant in the south. Similarly, in the north, respondents who had tolerance for foreign nationals were 1.9 times more likely to have emigration intention than those who were intolerant (p: 0.17). But the association was not significant in the south. We found evidence that political participation was significantly associated with emigration intention in the south (AOR: 1.088, p<0.001), but not in the north. Table 4 below presents a summary of the results.

Table 4: Summary of results

S/N	Independent variables	Bivariate	Multivariate (Nigeria)	Multivariate (North)	Multivariate (South)
1	Region	✓	✓	-	-
2	Gender	X	X	X	X
3	Age	✓	✓	X	✓
4	Education	✓	✓	✓	X
5	Religion	✓	X	X	X
6	Employment	✓	✓	✓	X
7	Perceived level of corruption	✓	X	X	X
8	Frequency of internet use	✓	✓	✓	✓
9a	Religious tolerance	✓	✓	✓	✓
9b	Tolerance of homosexuals	✓	✓	✓	X
9c	Tolerance of migrants	X	✓	✓	X
10	Political participation	✓	✓	X	✓

✓ Significant predictor at 95%

X Not a significant predictor at 95%

DISCUSSION

This study investigated regional variations in emigration intention in Nigeria and associated factors. The study found that the rate of emigration intention is higher in the south than in the north. Specifically, South West and South East recorded the highest rates of emigration intention. Our results contradict the study of Yakubu et al. (2023), who report that health workers in the South East geopolitical zone have the lowest emigration intention.

There are plausible reasons why the south has higher emigration intention rates than the north. It should be noted that the explanations here are in the context of international migration, because people from the northern and the southern regions move within the country. One, it may be that, in totality, the north is more protective and preserving of its culture than the south. Hence, the idea of “japa” is taken more seriously in the south than in the north. Two, there is a possibility of perceived cultural differences. Northerners may perceive that some of their cultural practices (such as polygyny, adolescent marriage, etc.) may not be allowed in the West, and that may explain why they have lower emigration intention than those in the south. Perceived cultural differences and similarities may also explain why the majority (32.4%) of northern respondents preferred Ghana or elsewhere in Africa as destination countries, as there is the greater possibility of cultural similarity within Africa than outside the continent. Cultural dis(similarity) emerged as an important factor in migration decisions and patterns (Lanati and Venturini, 2021).

Three, many states in Nigeria rely on agriculture. However, the northern region (as shown in Figure 1) has a larger landmass to engage in agricultural activities than the southern region. Since land is immobile, northerners may prefer to stay back. Four, international migration requires education. In fact, education is the route through which many young Nigerians emigrate (Mbah, 2017). Since the

level of formal education is higher in the south than in the north, as seen in Table 1, it is reasonable to expect that the emigration rate will be higher in the former than in the latter.

Five, Reynolds (2002) established that the Igbo people of the South East have been migrating to the USA since the 1970s. They have formed associations such as the Organization for Ndi Igbo (ONI) that attract people to the USA from the Igbo regions in the south-eastern part of Nigeria. It is common to see Igbo people who have achieved success in the diaspora return to South East in Nigeria every December to celebrate Christmas in a plush manner. This practice may entice people at home to also want to emigrate. Furthermore, it may explain why the region has the highest emigration intention in the country. Van den Bersselaar (2005) observes that the Igbos, resting on the claims of the colonial masters, believe that migrating to the West will bring progress to their local community of origin. The author (2005: 3) notes that “successful migrants appropriated these claims as part of a strategy to achieve power, influence or at least recognition in the community of origin. By introducing what they perceived as progress and modernity, they intended to change the village materially.” The fact that the South West region has the second-highest emigration intention rate may be explained by the fact that education is prevalent in the region and tenacity to the local culture is not common. This is in line with the position of the cosmopolitan-success and conservative-failure hypothesis (CSCFH) (Kunnuji et al., 2017; Alabi et al., 2022) that people from conservative regions of the north may be more protective of traditional culture and may be less willing to explore foreign lands than those in the cosmopolitan south.

Our regression models found no significant influence of gender on emigration intention. This supports the finding of Adeniyi et al. (2022) and testifies to the fact that women are currently migrating as much as men. This study found that people younger than 30 have higher odds of emigration intention than those aged 30 and above. This is consistent with the earlier studies (Migali and Scipioni, 2019; Akinwumi et al., 2022; Onah et al., 2022; Yakubu et al., 2023) that report a negative relationship between age and emigration intention. This may be explained by the fact that younger people are usually considered more mobile and have a greater urge to explore than older people. Additionally, since they are more likely to be single than older people, there is the ease of intending emigration considering that they have no immediate dependants (such as wives and children) whom they have to consider in their plans.

The finding on the influence of education in the overall model and northern Nigeria is consistent with previous studies (Migali and Scipioni, 2019; Milasi, 2020; Gevrek et al., 2021). Higher emigration intention among the highly educated may be due to potential better job opportunities for them than those who are less educated. Another possible reason is the language barrier. English is the official language in Nigeria but not everyone can speak or write it fluently. Chances are that the highly educated will be equipped with these skills, thereby increasing their chances of

potential successful integration, more so than for the less educated. The language factor may explain why those who have tertiary education have the highest likelihood of emigration compared to those with no formal education, especially in the overall model and in the north. The finding that unemployed persons were more likely to intend emigrating is supported by Milasi's (2020) study. However, this should be treated with caution, as the association may not hold for the actual migration. Being employed is a stepping stone for many young Nigerians. Chances are that those who have had a few years of work experience may have more opportunities to emigrate than those who are unemployed.

The finding that those who use the internet are more likely to want to emigrate is supported by previous studies (Vilhelmson and Thulin, 2013; Dekker et al., 2016; Obi et al., 2020). Using the internet suggests that the users may be exposed to a foreign culture, networks of Nigerian immigrants abroad, and are more aware of better living opportunities overseas.

Surprisingly, in this study, religious tolerance is a significant predictor of emigration intention. In all our models, those who are religiously tolerant were less likely to have emigration intention than those who are intolerant. This appears counterintuitive as one will expect tolerant respondents to want to emigrate, more than the intolerant ones. Further studies are required in this regard. Perhaps, what could explain this surprising finding is that, although the intolerant group indicates emigration intention, more so than their tolerant counterparts, the majority of them prefer Ghana or another country in West Africa (27.2%) compared to 13.2% of tolerant groups. It shows that some religiously intolerant persons prefer another country within Africa where they can continue to practice their religion and interact more with in-group members.

In contrast to religious tolerance, respondents who tolerate homosexuality are more likely to have emigration intention than those who are intolerant in the overall model and in the north. The finding that the tolerant group expressed emigration intention, more so than the intolerant ones is understandable. In line with the similarity-attraction theory, it is expected that someone who tolerates homosexual persons will want to emigrate, especially to the West, where the laws of those countries accommodate homosexual persons.

This study found that political participation increases the likelihood of emigration intention in the overall model and in the south. The finding is consistent with the research conducted by Umpierrez de Reguero and Finn (2023). Common sense suggests that those who participate in politics would choose to remain in Nigeria, as opposed to those who do not participate in politics. What this indicates is that those who participate in politics are dissatisfied with the democratic process. Hence, they want to go elsewhere.

CONCLUSION

This study has contributed to the wave of recent studies exploring north-south differences from different perspectives in Nigeria (Alabi and Ramsden, 2022; Alabi et al., 2022; Adejoh et al., 2023; Alabi, 2023). The study has shown that indeed the northern and southern Nigerian regions may have some differences that are noteworthy to policymakers. The study has shown that southerners want to emigrate from the country more than northerners. In addition, the two regions have differences in their preferred migration destinations. The northerners seem to prefer intra-African migration and the Middle East, while the southerners prefer Europe and North America. It appears that potential migrants from the north favor destination countries that are culturally similar to their own. We believe that this may have implications for return migration intention, that is, whether or not Nigerian migrants abroad intend to return to their home country. This may be an interesting area of research for future studies.

A major lesson for future studies is the need to reconsider analyzing data on Nigeria as a single entity. Future studies should not assume that a certain predicting factor applies across regions. This study has shown that some predicting factors in one region may not be significant in another region. Hence, future studies may need to disaggregate their data into regions (as we have done in this study) or into six geopolitical zones for more in-depth analysis. In conclusion, this study has shown that the regular use of the internet increases the likelihood of having emigration intention across the two regions. Moreover, religious tolerance reduces the chances of emigration intention in the regions. Finally, the effects of other factors, such as age, education, political participation, and tolerance of homosexual persons and migrants are not the same in the northern and southern regions.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study has a few limitations. One, the north and the south are broad entities and comprise diverse and multi-ethnic groups. This study does not account for the variations among different groups within each region. Two, factors associated with emigration intention are endless and this study does not claim to have captured all of them. Emigration intention may not necessarily translate to actual migration, especially in developing countries like Nigeria where the currency has a low value against major foreign currencies. The increasing costs of flights and obtaining visas hamper potential migrants from translating their intention into reality. However, there is a higher tendency for someone who has emigration intention to eventually move, than one who never considered it, *ceteris paribus*.

REFERENCES

- Abuosi, A. A. and Abor, P. A. 2015. Migration intentions of nursing students in Ghana: Implications for human resource development in the health sector. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 16: 593–606.
- Adebayo, A., and Akinyemi, O. O. 2022. “What are you really doing in this country?”: Emigration intentions of Nigerian doctors and their policy implications for human resource for health management. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 23(3): 1377–1396.
- Adejoh, S. O., Alabi, T. A., and Ezechukwu, C. 2023. Regional variations in child and mother’s characteristics influencing the use of insecticide treated net in Nigeria. *Journal of Biosocial Science*, 55(2): 326–343. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021932022000050>.
- Adeniyi, M. A., Efuntoye, O., Popoola, G., Adebayo, O., Ekundayo, O., Ibiyo, M., Igbokwe, M. C., Ogunsuji, O., Fagbule, F., Egwu, O., Kanmodi, K., Omololu, A., Soneye, O. Y., Umar, W. F., Oduyemi, I., Egbuchulem, K. I., Amoo, A., Sokomba, A., Kpuduwei, S. P. K., and Olaopa, O. 2022. Profile and determinants of intention to migrate by early career doctors in Nigeria: A report from CHARTING study. *The International Journal of Health Planning and Management*, 37(3): 1512–1525. <https://doi.org/10.1002/hpm.3422>.
- Afrobarometer Data. 2017. Nigeria: Round 7. Available at: <http://www.afrobarometer.org>.
- Aina, D. 2023. Japa: More youths sell assets, seek fortunes abroad. *Punch Newspapers*. Available at: <https://punchng.com/japa-more-youths-sell-assets-seek-fortunes-abroad>.
- Akinwumi, A. F., Solomon, O. O., Ajayi, P. O., Ogunleye, T. S., Ilesanmi, O. A., and Ajayi, A. O. 2022. Prevalence and pattern of migration intention of doctors undergoing training programmes in public tertiary hospitals in Ekiti State, Nigeria. *Human Resources for Health*, 20(1): 76. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12960-022-00772-7>.
- Alabi, T. A. 2023. Explaining the experience of political violence in Nigeria. Working Paper No. 197. Available at: <https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/wp197-explaining-the-experience-of-political-violence-in-nigeria>.
- Alabi, T. A., and Ramsden, M. J. 2022. Regional variations in the acceptance and experience of intimate partner violence in Nigeria: Revisiting cosmopolitan-success and conservative-failure hypothesis. *Journal of Biosocial Science*, 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021932022000463>.
- Alabi, T. A., Atinge, S., Ejim, C., and Adejoh, S. O. 2022. Does where mothers live matter? Regional variations in factors influencing place of child delivery in Nigeria. *Journal of Biosocial Science*, 54(2): 163–183. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021932020000747>.

- Bernard, D. 2023. How “japa” became the Nigerian buzzword for emigration. OkayAfrica. Available at: <https://www.okayafrica.com/emigration-in-nigeria-japa/>.
- Burrone, S., D’Costa, B., and Holmqvist, G. 2018. Child-related concerns and migration decisions: Evidence from the Gallup World Poll. UNICEF. Available at: <https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/1014-child-related-concerns-and-migration-decisions-evidence-from-gallup-world-poll.html>.
- Chort, I. 2014. Mexican migrants to the US: What do unrealized migration intentions tell us about gender inequalities? *World Development*, 59: 535–552.
- Connor, P. 2012. International migration and religious selection. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 51(1): 184–194.
- Crawley, H., Garba, F., and Nyamnjoh, F. 2022. Migration and (in)equality in the Global South: Intersections, contestations and possibilities: Editorial Introduction. *Zanj: The Journal of Critical Global South Studies*, 5(1/2): 1–13.
- Crisan, E. L., Crisan-Mitra, C., and Dragos, C. 2019. The impact on migration intentions of perceived corruption at the organizational and country level in Romania. *Eastern European Economics*, 57(5): 430–455. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00128775.2018.1533410>.
- Dako-Gyeke, M. 2016. Exploring the migration intentions of Ghanaian youth: A qualitative study. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 17: 723–744.
- Dekker, R., Engbersen, G., and Faber, M. 2016. The use of online media in migration networks. *Population, Space and Place*, 22(6): 539–551.
- Diallo, M. A. 2022. Subjective poverty and migration intention abroad: The case of Senegal. *African Development Review*, 34(3): 410–424.
- Dibeh, G., Fakh, A., and Marrouch, W. 2018. Decision to emigrate amongst the youth in Lebanon. *International Migration*, 56(1): 5–22.
- Dim, E. E., and Asomah, J. Y. 2019. Socio-demographic predictors of political participation among women in Nigeria: Insights from Afrobarometer 2015 Data. *Journal of International Women’s Studies*, 20(2): 91–105.
- Frouws, B., and Brenner, Y. 2019. A persistent reality: The role of corruption in mixed migration. Mixed Migration Centre. Available at: <https://mixedmigration.org/articles/a-persistent-reality-the-role-of-corruption-in-mixed-migration/>.
- Gevrek, Z. E., Kunt, P., and Ursprung, H. W. 2021. Education, political discontent, and emigration intentions: Evidence from a natural experiment in Turkey. *Public Choice*, 186: 563–585.
- Harzig, C., and Hoerder, D. 2013. *What is migration history?* New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons.

- He, S. Y., Chen, X., Es, M., Guo, Y., Sun, K. K. and Lin, Z. 2016. Liveability and migration intention in Chinese resource-based economies: Findings from seven cities with potential for population shrinkage. *Cities*, 131: 103961.
- Hiskey, J., Montalvo, J. D. and Orcés, D. 2014. Democracy, governance, and emigration intentions in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 49: 89–111.
- Hoti, A. 2009. Determinants of emigration and its economic consequences: Evidence from Kosova. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 9(4): 435–458.
- Ikuteyijo, L. O. 2020. Irregular migration as survival strategy: Narratives from youth in urban Nigeria. In McLean, M. (ed.), *West African youth challenges and opportunity pathways*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 53–77.
- International Organization for Migration (IOM). 2022. Women and girls account for the majority of migrants in East and Horn of Africa: IOM Report. Available at: <https://www.iom.int/news/women-and-girls-account-majority-migrants-east-and-horn-africa-iom-report>.
- Isbell, T. A. 2022. Of all people, by all people, for all people? Perceptions of economic inequality and democracy in Africa. Doctoral Thesis, University of Cape Town. Available at: <https://open.uct.ac.za/handle/11427/36781>.
- Iwana, M. D. C., Hidayat, A. R. T., Dinanti, D., and Onitsuka, K. 2022. The effects of internet on rural-to-urban migrating intentions of young villagers: Evidence from rural Indonesia. *AGRARIS: Journal of Agribusiness and Rural Development Research*, 8(2): Article 2. <https://doi.org/10.18196/agraris.v8i2.14045>.
- Kenny, C., and O'Donnell, M. 2016. Why increasing female migration from gender-unequal countries is a win for everyone. Center for Global Development. Available at: <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/why-increasing-female-immigration-flows-gender-unequal-countries-could-have-significant>.
- Kunnuji, M. O. N., Robinson, R. S., Shawar, Y. R., and Shiffman, J. 2017. Variable implementation of sexuality education in three Nigerian states. *Studies in Family Planning*, 48(4): 359–376. <https://doi.org/10.1111/sifp.12043>.
- Lanati, M., and Venturini, A. 2021. Cultural change and the migration choice. *Review of World Economics*, 157(4): 799–852.
- Madowo, L., Feleke, B., and Okutoyi, F. 2023. Many talented young Nigerians are leaving. Halting the exodus will be a task for the next president. CNN. Available at: <https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/24/africa/nigeria-japa-exodus-trend-election-intl-cmd/index.html>.
- Mbah, M. 2017. Formal education as a facilitator of migration and integration: A case study of Nigerian university graduates. In Jöns, H., Meusburger, P., and Heffernan, N. (eds.), *Mobilities of Knowledge*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, pp. 247–268.

- Migali, S., and Scipioni, M. 2019. Who's about to leave? A global survey of aspirations and intentions to migrate. *International Migration*, 57(5): 181–200.
- Milasi, S. 2020. What drives youth's intention to migrate abroad? Evidence from International Survey Data. *IZA Journal of Development and Migration*, 11(1).
- Nwosu, I. A., Eteng, M. J., Ekpechu, J., Nnam, M. U., Ukah, J. A., Eyisi, E., and Orakwe, E. C. 2022. Poverty and youth migration out of Nigeria: Enthronement of modern slavery. *SAGE Open*, 12(1). <https://doi.org/10.1177/21582440221079818>.
- Obi, C., Bartolini, F., and D'Haese, M. 2020. Digitalization and migration: The role of social media and migrant networks in migration decisions. An exploratory study in Nigeria. *Digital Policy, Regulation and Governance*, 23(1): 5–20. <https://doi.org/10.1108/DPRG-08-2020-0101>.
- Oluwatumise, O., Anthonia Adenike, A., Omotayo Adewale, O., Hezekiah Olubusayo, F., Odunayo Paul, S., and Funmilade Loveth, A. 2020. Employee engagement strategies antecedents and migration intention of medical practitioners in Nigeria: A theoretical assessment. *Journal of African Research in Business and Technology*, 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.5171/2020.199942>.
- Onah, C. K., Azuogu, B. N., Ochie, C. N., Akpa, C. O., Okeke, K. C., Okpunwa, A. O., Bello, H. M., and Ugwu, G. O. 2022. Physician emigration from Nigeria and the associated factors: The implications to safeguarding the Nigeria health system. *Human Resources for Health*, 20(1): 1–15.
- Pew Research Center. 2012. Faith on the move: The religious affiliation of international migrants. Pew Research Center's Religion and Public Life Project. Available at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2012/03/08/religious-migration-muslim-migrants/>.
- Poprawe, M. 2015. On the relationship between corruption and migration: Empirical evidence from a gravity model of migration. *Public Choice*, 163(3–4): 337–354.
- Reynolds, R. R. 2002. An African brain drain: Igbo decisions to immigrate to the US. *Review of African Political Economy*, 29(92): 273–284.
- Röder, A., and Lubbers, M. 2016. After migration: Acculturation of attitudes towards homosexuality among Polish immigrants in Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK. *Ethnicities*, 16(2): 261–289. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796815616153>.
- Röder, A., and Spierings, N. 2022. What shapes attitudes toward homosexuality among European Muslims? The role of religiosity and destination hostility. *International Migration Review*, 56(2): 533–561. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01979183211041288>.
- Santric-Milicevic, M. M., Terzic-Supic, Z. J., Matejic, B. R., Vasic, V., and Ricketts III, T. C. 2014. First- and fifth-year medical students' intention for emigration and practice abroad: A case study of Serbia. *Health Policy*, 118(2): 173–183.

- Tjaden, J., Auer, D., and Laczko, F. 2019. Linking migration intentions with flows: Evidence and potential use. *International Migration*, 57(1): 36–57.
- Umpierrez de Reguero, S., and Finn, V. 2023. Migrants' intention to vote in two countries, one country, or neither. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 0(0): 1–24. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2023.2189727>.
- United Nations (UN). 2019. World Population Prospects 2019 Highlights. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. Available at: https://population.un.org/wpp/publications/files/wpp2019_highlights.pdf.
- Van den Bersselaar, D. 2005. Imagining home: Migration and the Igbo village in colonial Nigeria. *The Journal of African History*, 46(1): 51–73.
- Vilhelmson, B., and Thulin, E. 2013. Does the Internet encourage people to move? Investigating Swedish young adults' internal migration experiences and plans. *Geoforum*, 47, 209–216.
- Wanner, P. 2021. Can migrants' emigration intentions predict their actual behaviors? Evidence from a Swiss survey. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 22(3): 1151–1179. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-020-00798-7>.
- Yakubu, K., Shanthosh, J., Adebayo, K. O., Peiris, D., and Joshi, R. 2023. Scope of health worker migration governance and its impact on emigration intentions among skilled health workers in Nigeria. *PLOS Global Public Health*, 3(1): e0000717.