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Human Mobility in Africa

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RESPICE PROSPICE

AHMR Editorial Board

AHMR is an interdisciplinary peer-reviewed journal created to encourage and facilitate the study of all aspects of human mobility in Africa, including socio-economic, political, legal, developmental, educational and cultural aspects.

Through the publication of original research, policy discussions and evidence-based research papers, AHMR provides a comprehensive forum devoted exclusively to the analysis of current migration trends, migration patterns and some of the most important migration-related issues.

AHMR is jointly owned by the **Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa** (SIHMA) and the **University of the Western Cape** (UWC).

The Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (SIHMA) a member of the **Network of the Scalabrinian Centers for Migration Studies**, with institutions in New York, Paris, Rome, Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo and Manila.

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Contents

Editorial

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African Human Mobility Review (AHMR) is one of the few peer-reviewed scholarly journals in the field of migration in sub-Saharan Africa. The objective of AHMR is to publish up-to-date, high-quality and original research papers alongside relevant and insightful reviews. As such, the journal aspires to be vibrant, engaging and accessible, and at the same time integrative and challenging. At the moment, AHMR publishes three issues per year in April, August, and December. The journal also publishes occasional special issues. In the past few years, a number of articles were received by the editorial office, of which, after the critical peer review process, selected articles were published. Our online publication has increased accessibility of information for practitioners, researchers, students, academicians and policy makers.

AHMR, Vol. 6, No1, 2020, presents a diverse selection of stimulating articles from various scholars in the field. The first article looks at the interlinkages between migration and inequality in Africa through the review of contemporary studies in several parts of the continent. The second article analyzes policies and programs concerning African immigrants and refugees following the 2008 xenophobic crisis up to 2016. The third article reflects not only on the results of the study itself, but on the methodological process issues that can lay a foundation for a better understanding of how to study the intersections of migration and local governance. The fourth article examines how social media strengthen in-group solidarities with the attendant consequences of loss of lives, properties, and inter-state diplomatic relations in post-colonial Africa. The fifth article identifies the barriers to belonging for young migrants in South Africa. The last article analyzes how a migrant association facilitates being, belonging and integration of migrants in the host society.

This issue offers a shared vision and understanding of a major predicament of policies and programs in the African continent. In this regard, authors provide an increasingly critical and compelling evidence-based reflection on emerging trends and economic, social, political and cultural issues in Africa. This issue also provides valuable information to researchers, policy makers, practitioners and students, shedding light on the complexities of human mobility in Africa. It is a precious collection of insightful articles on various aspects and issues of human mobility, dynamics and perspectives in the African continent. The opinions expressed in this editorial report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of AHMR.

As always, we would like to thank the outgoing Board of Directors of AHMR, Dr Meselu Alamnie Mulugeta, (Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia), Dr Beneberu Assefa

Wondimagegnhu (Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia), and Dr Sharon Penderis (University of the Western Cape). Their guidance and support make our journal possible, and we are deeply indebted to them for the time and effort that they put into our journal. It is also with sincere pleasure that I welcome the New Board of Directors of AHMR, Prof Vivienne Lawack, Deputy Vice-Chancellor: Academic at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa, Prof Jonathan Crush, Balsillie School of International Affairs, Canada, Prof Wilson Majee, University of Missouri, USA, and Dr Eria Serwajja, Makerere University, Uganda.

In 2020, we are proud to be celebrating the 60th anniversary of the University of the Western Cape. For the past six decades, the University of the Western Cape opened up education for all. During this landmark anniversary, we are also celebrating the partnership and joint ownership of the African Human Mobility Review (AHMR) with the Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (SIHMA).

I believe that this issue provides invaluable information to researchers, practitioners and students. It also dishes up thoughtful ideas to policy makers to make well-informed decisions about migration policies, programs and projects, by presenting the best available evidence from research in Africa.

Scalabrini Network

SIHMA is part of the **Scalabrini International Migration Network** (SIMN), and joins an existing **Network of Scalabrini Study Centres** around the globe:

CSER (Centro Studi Emigrazione Roma), established in 1964 in Rome (Italy)
Journal: Studi Emigrazione
www.cser.it

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Journal: Migrations Société
www.ciemi.org

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Journal: International Migration Review (IMR)
and Journal on Migration and Human Security (JMHS)
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Interlinkages between Migration and Inequality in Africa: Review of Contemporary Studies

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In recent times, migration and inequality have become topical issues of global attention. In the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Goal 10 focuses on tackling inequality with indicator 10.7, which pertains to the facilitation of safe, orderly, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people. Few studies show that migration and inequality are interlinked; yet, others show that migration is an outcome of inequality. To the contrary, others argue that migration triggers inequality in the sending areas, due to increased flows of remittances sent by migrants to their areas of origin. The differential conclusions are attributed to varied methodological approaches used and the dimension of inequality investigated.

This paper seeks to contribute to this knowledge gap by highlighting the scholarly work on migration and inequality in Africa, challenges encountered, as well as presenting the key findings. The study comprised a desk review of published studies on migration and inequality in Africa.

The review found that most studies in Africa relied on census and survey data and mostly focused on the nexus between economic inequality and migration, thus ignoring other social inequalities. Few studies used population registers. None of the studies considered the drivers of internal and international migration and how these impact on inequality.

The study recommends an investigation of the nexus between non-income inequalities and migration as well as the unpacking of the contextual factors behind inequality and migration using both qualitative and quantitative approaches. Additionally, the study strongly encourages the use of specialist migration surveys to improve the body of knowledge on this subject.

Keywords: migration, inequality, migration survey, Kenya, Africa

INTRODUCTION

Migration and inequality are twin issues that have occupied global governance and humanitarian discourse in the recent years with the western countries focusing on the governance of migration, and large programs put in place to improve coordination and policy response (see for example the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development[1] (KNOMAD). The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) reflect the shifting global concerns on unsustainable development and rising inequality, with Goal 10 dealing with the reduction of inequality within and between countries. Tracking progress on SDG Goal 10 requires an assessment of the interface between migration and inequalities in the world.

Conceptually, there is no standard definition of inequality although different scholars agree that it has to do with differences in access to opportunities and outcomes in each population. McKay (2002:1) describes inequality as 'concerning variations in living standards across a whole population'. Inequality is a multidimensional concept but there is vast literature on economic inequality compared to any other dimensions of inequality. Economists define economic inequality as 'the fundamental disparity that permits one individual certain material choices, while denying another individual those very same choices' (Ray, 1998:170). Spatial inequality, defined as inequality in economic and social indicators of wellbeing across geographical units within a country, is also more common in the literature (Kanbur and Venables, 2005).

Globally, studies on migration and inequality rely on longitudinal data that compare prevailing circumstances before and after migration, looking critically at how household livelihood patterns change after migration. The studies vary methodologically, with some conceptualizing remittances as an exogenous source of income, and thus, measure how inequality in sending areas arises between households which have migrants and those that do not have migrants. Others simulate a counterfactual argument, where a society is compared with the contribution of income from remittances and compared with a different scenario where remittances do not exist. Fewer studies feature the effect of other dimensions of inequality on migration including spatial and horizontal inequalities.

Studies on the impact of migration on inequality have yielded stronger results from international migration than internal migration. Most of the global scholarly discourse feature the US-Mexico migration, China, and Global North to South pathways, but fewer studies have been done in Africa which boasts large intra-continental migratory flows. This paper reviews the existing literature of studies on the linkages between migration and inequality in Africa, interrogating the design, methodologies employed, as well as key findings on the linkages between migration and inequality in Africa.

The paper is organized as follows: The next two sections provide the rationale and methodology. Section 4 highlights the theoretical perspectives of migration and inequality. Section 5 features the sources of data and methodological issues in study-

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[1] See www.knomad.org

ing migration and inequality. Section 6 focuses on the empirical studies in Africa and their key findings on the relationship between migration and inequality. Section 7 provides a synthesis of the emerging issues from the earlier sections, while the last section provides conclusions and recommendations on studying migration and inequality in Africa.

RATIONALE

The choice of reviewing African-based studies separately from the Western and other regions is aimed at highlighting the uniqueness of the inequality structure, discourse, policy response and methodological issues that may face researchers based in Africa due to its geopolitical state. As the world moves towards monitoring trends on the SDG goals, there is a need to show evidence of the impact of migration on inequality in the Global South, using case studies from the continent to inform the policy discourse and programmatic interventions as necessary.

METHODOLOGY

The review uses secondary data sources based on published articles investigating migration and inequality in Africa. The review was not a systematic review but an online search for scholarly articles on migration and inequality in Africa. The methodology adopted included the use of the keywords, 'inequality', 'migration', and 'Africa' as well as the use of the phrase 'migration and inequality in Africa'. No time frames were indicated, to enable a higher number of articles to be traced.

Google Scholar was used as it is a freely accessible web search engine that indexes the full text or metadata of scholarly literature across an array of publishing formats and disciplines. The interface of Google makes it easier to do academic research than is possible through the standard Google interface. Once the articles were identified by Google Scholar, they were categorized by country and year of publication. All identified articles were considered in the review while those articles that did not consider migration and inequality were left out of the review.

Several limitations arise from using online searches including the fact that not all articles are published through such platforms, prompting some researchers to conclude that there is inequality of global academic knowledge production (Wight, 2008; Mouton, 2010; Collyer, 2018; Medie and Kang, 2018). Google Scholar uses automatic indexing systems resulting in the accidental indexing of non-scholarly sources. The search engine also limits each search to a maximum of 1,000 results, which are too voluminous to explore, and hence require additional effective ways of locating the relevant articles.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MIGRATION AND INEQUALITY NEXUS

Migration and inequality are both multidimensional concepts that have been studied over the years and theoretical formulations have been made to better understand

these phenomena. Migration is founded on various theoretical dispensations that describe the patterns, motivations, choices and outcomes of human mobility. Inequality on the other hand is a concept that has been associated with human welfare as economic development occurs, therefore focusing on how resources are shared and distributed within and between societies. Few studies have theorized the direct link between migration and inequality.

Demographic theories have an impact on the understanding of the migration and inequality nexus, and these include the seminal work by the American demographer, Frank Notestein who postulated the *Demographic Transition Theory* (Notestein, 1945). However, his work does not address outmigration in this formulation. The theory, based on data from the western world, describes the relationship between economic development and demographic changes, with a focus on the changing dynamics of mortality and fertility as society grows. A criticism of the theory is that it is based on experiences of the western world, which are different from those in developing countries, including Africa (Mabogunje, 1970). Additionally, it ignores the impact of migration transitions as societies develop over time. The theory does not facilitate the understanding of migration and inequality but provides a basis for understanding how population dynamics change over time. Zelinsky (1971) offers an alternative theory, the *Migration Transition Model* that links migration to Notestein's demographic transition theory. While still using data from western countries, Zelinsky shows that migration typologies depend on a country's stage of development, concluding that the more developed a country, the more complex the migration systems. Zelinsky has been criticized for ignoring the effects of spatio-temporal changes that occur in societies and which may impact migratory behavior, especially the improvements in transport and communications infrastructure (Skeldon, 1990; De Haas, 2007).

While the demographic transition theory does not help in explaining the migration and inequality nexus, the modified Zelinksy (1971) migration transition model is useful as it shows how complex migration typologies are formed as a society develops. The theory expounds on the migration hump showing high migration at the low levels of development, and after a critical threshold, migration begins to decline (Stark and Taylor, 1991; Faini and Venturini, 1993; Vogler and Rotte, 2000). The inverse relationship between migration and development has been observed in studies looking at migration and income inequality, noting that during the early stages of migration, inequality is low, but as migration rises, inequality also rises leading to a threshold where no further rise in inequality occurs with increased migration (Kuznets, 1955).

Several theories elaborate on the drivers of migration and mechanisms through which migration is sustained. Migrant selectivity is expounded on in the *Human Capital Theory* (Lee, 1966) which posits that international migration depends on the individual attributes of migrants including age, sex, educational level and skills, competencies, marital status, previous experience as well as risk-taking spirit. This theory

has been particularly useful in the migration and inequality nexus, as it shows the selectivity of migration; hence, the inequality of opportunities between nations leads to an increase in international migration. A similar observation is made in the *Push and Pull Model,* as articulated by Ravenstein (1885), that people move from their origin areas due to 'push factors' that drive them away and move to their destination areas due to 'pull factors' that attract them. Ultimately, the main flows are fueled by wage differentials between nations, which perpetuate migration.

The *Migration Systems Theory* pioneered by Mabogunje (1970) identifies a migration system as comprising of places linked by flows and counterflows of people, goods, and information, which increases the likelihood of migration between such systems. This theory is based on the observations of rural to urban migration in Africa and posits that the macro environment influences the individual migrants' decisions. Factors that influence migration decision-making, are the social welfare system including education and health, economic conditions including wages, prices, consumer preferences and degree of industrial development, as well as technological development including transport and communication networks. This theory argues that the transition of migrants from rural to urban subsystems results in a complete transformation of their social and other attributes. The theory recognizes the importance of a feedback mechanism between sending and receiving areas that promotes the continuous flow of people, goods and information between them.

The self-sustaining nature of migration is expounded by the *Cumulative Causation Theory* postulated by Myrdal (1957) and later modified by Massey (Massey, 1990; Massey et al, 1994; Massey and Zenteno, 1999), with the proponents arguing that migration motivations are different and each migration experience alters the social contexts in which each occurred.

The *Neoclassical Theory* of migration (Harris and Todaro, 1970) argues that migrants move from regions with low wages to those of higher wages by considering the cost-benefit of migrating. The theory argues that when wage differentials between regions in a country are reduced, then migration levels also reduce, thus migration is seen as an equalizing factor for rural-urban migration. Critics have pointed out that migration seems to continue even when there are no economic benefits or job opportunities available in the urban areas. Thus, they argue that it is not only economic considerations that make individuals move. The theory is useful in understanding the structural factors influencing migration, including spatial inequalities and wage inequalities.

The *Dual Market Economy Theory* (Piore, 1979), corroborates this view, adding that the capitalism of international migration maintained by two coexisting economic models, the capital-intensive primary sectors which offer well-paying jobs and high wages, and the labor-intensive sectors which have low wages and unskilled labor. Migrants therefore move to the regions with higher skills and higher wages, prompting the migration of educated and skilled members of the society compared to the immobility of their uneducated counterparts.

The *New Economics of Migration Theory* (Taylor, 1999) shifts the focus from individual migrant decisions to migrant households or families, where migration is seen as a household survival strategy. Migrants, both local and international, are seen to move based on the strategic decisions their households make when faced with economic shocks such as poor harvests, and harsh weather conditions. The theory helps in explaining the household decision-making mechanism, which results in either a positive or a negative impact of migration on inequality.

While these models argue that wage differentials between nations fuel migration, this view has been criticized as it ignores the counter flows between nations with shared history, who have a mutually dependent series of flows and counterflows, as expounded in the *World Systems Theory* (Fawcett and Arnold,1987). This theory conceptualizes the world as a capitalist system that perpetuates international migration, noting that colonialism shifted the global relations between the colonizers and the colonized countries, resulting in the continued flows of populations between the two regions owing to the differences in economic development between them. Capitalist firms from rich countries move to poorer peripheral countries in search of land, raw materials and markets for their products. Thus, proponents of this theory argue that migration systems are context specific and are linked by people who share historical, cultural, colonial and technological linkages. This perspective enriches the conceptualization of migration and inequality nexus, as it considers the role of macro factors, including the historical and sociocultural background of the migration system.

The review of the different theories shows that few of them distinctively look at migration and inequality, although they interrogate the possible consequences of migration and development. Most of the theories describe the development and mobility patterns of the western nations, but there is a need to have theories that are grounded in the social contexts and structural realities of different countries (Brown and Sanders, 1981). While the *World Systems Theory* expounds how colonial history influences inequalities between nations and perpetuates migration flows across the regions, the *Push and Pull Theory* and the *Human Capital Theory* elaborate on how the flows are sustained. The structured relations between origin and destination areas has also been well articulated in the works of Zelinsky (1971) and Skeldon (1990) who note the linkage between the demographic processes and the resultant typologies of migration. The theories under review only focus on international migration and not internal migration, although one could expect that they could also apply to the domestic migration contexts. Brown and Sanders (1981) criticize them as inadequate in explaining scenarios in developing countries, including the role of 'pull factors' including the importance of the informal sector to rural-urban migrants, the role of social networks in origin and destination areas, the impacts of circular and seasonal migration strategies as well as structural issues, including class and status of migrants.

The review of the literature shows that migration, unlike the other popula-

tion dynamics of fertility and mortality, is a system that affects and is affected by development (Skeldon, 1997; De Haas, 2010). Migration is an endogenous factor in development, or part of that change but the development impacts on migration are heterogeneous. De Haas (2007) reformulated the mobility transition in a more integrated format which can simply be referred to as *Migration Transition*. In this reformulation and underscoring the work of Skeldon (1997), it is impossible to envisage development without migration, as migration is part of development. Through this framework, De Haas (2007) provides three perspectives about the migration-development nexus. First, development is generally associated with higher overall levels of migration and mobility which arises because of increasing capabilities by loosening constraints on movement, increasing aspirations and increasing occupational specialization. Secondly, the relation between migration and broader development processes is fundamentally non-linear as development goes with the shifting patterns of the spatial opportunity differential. Thirdly, societies tend to go through a sequence of internal and international migration transitions.

De Haas (2010) reiterated that other factors, particularly those rooted in the political economy of countries, geographical location and historical contingencies explain why countries with roughly similar levels of development show divergent migration patterns. He summarizes the two emerging dilemmas about migration and inequality. On the one hand, migration is linked to increased inequality because migrants tend to come from better off households. On the other hand, as more migration occurs, the sending areas lose out on the human capital as development gains, leading to increased spatial inequalities between the sending and receiving areas. Empirical evidence has shown that migration does have positive effects on sending areas, and that it does not always lead to increased inequalities. Owing to the contradiction inherent in some of the findings, he proposes the need to conceptualize the role of structural factors including the political, institutional, economic, social and cultural contexts within which migration occurs, as well as the role of agency, the real capacity of humans to overcome constraints and potentially reshape structure (De Haas, 2010:241). Similar views have been articulated by other scholars such as Massey et al (1999) and Morawska (2007) who criticize theories that ignore human agency and how this interacts with state and other social structures to influence migration and inequality.

Inequalities both reflect and amplify a constrained opportunity structure (Melamed and Samman, 2013). Black et al (2006) argue that across different geographical, economic and social environments, the relationship between institutions of migration and inequality is governed by access – who gets to migrate where – and the different opportunities that different types of migration streams offer.

The complexity of the theorizing of migration has been captured in the works of De Haas (2014) where he notes that, 'there is no central body of conceptual frameworks or theories on migration that can guide and be informed by empirical work' (De Haas, 2014:6). He outlines some of the challenges faced in applying the theory

by the different 'modes of inquiry' adopted by scholars, such as focus on international versus internal migration as an example. The resultant complexity of migration confirms that the phenomenon 'has many parts in elaborate, multi-layered arrangements' (ibid).

In the next section, the paper reviews the findings on the established linkages between migration and inequality.

INTERLINKAGES OF MIGRATION AND INEQUALITY

Migration and inequality are interlinked through the development process, with studies showing that economic development results in unequal spatial development and therefore unequal wages and incomes between urban and rural areas, resulting in an inverse relationship between migration and development. With increased development, the rising incomes in the urban areas lead to urban-rural disparities in wages and result in the increase in migration between urban and rural areas. Simon Kuznets postulated this in his seminal paper on economic development and inequality, noting that during the early stages of economic development, inequality increases with rising incomes, but as the level of per capita income increases, inequality reduces, leading to an inverted U-shape relationship between income inequality and economic development (Kuznets, 1955). This assertion has been criticized for focusing on the developed countries rather than being aligned to the realities of the developing world.

An alternative mechanism is proposed by Lipton (1980), noting that inequalities within the origin area pushes out migration, hence individuals living in unequal settings tend to move out. As a result of the outmigration, remittances sent from migrants from rich households have a negative effect on the rural income distribution as it increases income inequality between migrant and non-migrant households. In the longer term, as migration increases between rural and urban areas, this leads to a neutralizing effect on intrahousehold inequality in sending areas. This perspective shows the linkage between inequalities in sending areas and the increased migration intensities, as migrants move to regions with better prospects.

The effects of migration on inequality can be direct or indirect. The direct effects of migration on inequality are associated with remittances sent to migrant households thereby changing their patterns of household expenditure and investments. The indirect effect is through the 'multiplier effects' of such investments and changes in the labor market in sending communities (Mendola, 2012). Barham and Boucher (1998) found that migration increases income inequality when comparing households with migrants to those without migrants, in their Nicaraguan study. Similar findings were observed in Pakistan (Oberai and Singh, 1980) and in Kenya (Knowles and Anker, 1981). Other studies did not find the same results when they decomposed incomes based on their sources. Those studies, conducted in Mexico, thus concluded that the effect of remittances on income inequality depends on the length of the migration history of the community, the ranking of the migrant house-

holds within the origin communities as well as the role that remittances play in comparison to other income sources for the receiving households (Stark et al, 1986).

While some studies focus on the mechanism through which migration effects inequality, scholars such as Stark and Taylor (1991) caution that the net effect of remittances on inequality depends on the relative deprivation of rural households before migration occurs. They conclude that societies with a longer migration history report a neutralizing effect on the income inequalities in the longer term. Ebeke and Le Goff (2011) add that the impact that migration is likely to have on inequality will depend on the cost of migration, level of development and human capital in origin communities. The effect of remittances has been found to spill over to the wider community (Massey et al, 1994). Communities also benefit from migrant networks which help to reduce the costs associated with migration, as they share information and resources that make migration less risky. They note that the effect of remittances on inequality is dependent on the position of the migrant household within the income distribution of the sending community.

The interlinkages of migration and inequality differ based on the type of migration, as differential effects have been found when comparing international and internal migration. Black et al (2006) conclude that although the migration-inequality relationship varies across space and time, there is a need to specify the type of migration and dimension of inequality as different types of migration may have different effects on different types of inequality.

Other linkages identified by scholars focus on the pessimistic or positivist views on the effects of migration on equality and vice versa. For the pessimists, migration results in increasing inequalities between regions reinforcing spatial and interpersonal disparities in development in low income sending communities, as seen in empirical studies in India (Zachariah et al, 2001); in Mexico (Binford, 2003; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2006); in Bangladesh (Rahman, 2000); and a comparative study of global data (Solimano, 2001). Additionally, there are scholars who believe that outmigration leads to the so-called 'brain drain' in rural areas, as the more educated members are more likely to migrate. A counter narrative argues that migration has the positive effect of reducing inequalities between regions, by leading to 'brain gain', as migrants acquire new skills which make them more competitive, and the remittances they send back are used to improve livelihoods.

Adams et al (2008) outline the two key methodological issues that arise when studying the impact of remittances on income inequality. The first approach considers remittances as an exogenous transfer from migrants, while the second approach considers remittances as an extra source of income that the migrant would earn if they had not moved out. Each of these cases requires a different determination. For the first case of remittances as exogenous income, the key task is to determine how such remittances affect the overall distribution of income in the origin area (Gustafsson and Makonnen, 1993). For the second case, the task will be to compute the changes in inequality in a counterfactual scenario where there is no migration and

no remittance and compare that with scenarios where there is migration and remittance with an input of the expected income that migrants would have earned if they had stayed at home (Adams and Page, 2005; Adams et al, 2008). Indeed, Barham and Boucher (1998) concur that these differential findings arise due to the empirical contexts of the study areas as well as methodological rigor, with studies that consider remittances as an exogenous transfer of income or as a substitute to home earnings getting conflicting findings on the inequality and migration nexus.

De Haas (2010:241) proposes the need to conceptualize the role of structural factors, including the political, institutional, economic, social and cultural contexts within which migration occurs, as well as the role of agency, the capacity of humans to overcome constraints and potentially reshape structure. Similar views have been articulated by other scholars such as Massey et al (1999) and Morawska (2007) who criticize theories that ignore human agency and how this interacts with state and other social structures to influence migration and inequality.

REVIEW OF STUDIES IN AFRICA

This section reviews the contemporary studies in Africa and highlights the conceptualization of the subject, data sources, and mechanisms through which migration and inequality are interrelated.

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF MIGRATION AND INEQUALITY IN AFRICA

The conceptualization of a migrant has differed in various studies conducted in Africa with those based on census data defining a migrant as a person who has changed the 'usual place of residence' at least once during the migration interval, which is one year before the census. For the normal census a migrant is considered a person who lived in the household for at least one year. In others, such as the World Bank African Migration project, a migrant is defined as a person who used to the live in a household in the country, for at least six months, to live abroad (international migrant) or in another village or urban area within the country (internal migrant). This definition of a migrant could influence the outcome of analysis, with those making moves within a shorter period likely to inflate the number of migrants.

While migration is easy to measure, inequality presents a different conceptual challenge. Inequality is defined as the difference in social status, wealth or opportunity between people or groups.[2] Distinction is often made between inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunity. Inequality of outcomes is concerned with differences in overall living economic conditions including income, wealth, education and nutrition. Inequality of opportunity is concerned with differential access to opportunities by people living in the same community, and therefore the circumstances surrounding their place of birth, their parental background, ethnicity and gender determine their access to opportunities, including where they go to school,

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[2] https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/inequality

what jobs they get and how economically successful they become. The studies reviewed have not delved into the interlinkages within and between group inequalities and migration, and this is an area for future exploration.

Globally, studies looking at migration and inequality have used the Gini coefficient generated from the Lorenz curve (Morgan, 1962). This requires the availability of consumption data from households which is not captured in the census questionnaires. Thus, most African countries have used the Small Area Estimation technique to generate values for subnational estimates (Ngugi, Kipruto and Samoei, 2013). An improvement in measuring inequality when income and expenditure data is unavailable in surveys or census was proposed by McKenzie (2005), where the relative measure of 'inequality in living standards' (I), is derived using asset indicators. The method has been used widely in studies of migration and inequality, including Latin American Migration Surveys3 where questions are asked about household assets.

McKay (2002) proposes that inequality studies should explore other dimensions apart form income, including the inequality of opportunities and outcomes, within-group and between-group inequalities such as considering households within communities, as well as exploring the temporal variations of inequality. Few studies have considered all these suggestions but there has been a greater focus on income inequality by economists in most studies including those in Africa, as will be outlined in the next section.

DATA SOURCES AND STUDY DESIGN IN AFRICA

Like most global studies, the scholarly work in Africa has relied on the three main data sources namely, censuses, surveys including specialist surveys, and ethnographic studies. While studies in the developed nations use population registers as a major source of data for migration studies, in Africa, due to poor civil registration systems, this is limited.

Survey data has been widely used to analyze the interlinkages between migration and inequality. The World Bank Living Standards Survey4 provides useful data on a wide range of issues including migration and migrant welfare. The surveys have been conducted in Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. A disadvantage of survey data is that it is not standardized and comparable as noted in a review of 70 household surveys conducted between 1990 and 2006 (Plaza et al, 2011). For example, the review found that migration modules are different and incomparable across many African countries, with most surveys collecting information on migration history of all household members above 15 years of age, while others collected information only from the head of the household.

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[3] This includes the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) and subsequent Latin American Migration Project (McKenzie, 2005:2).
[4] The Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) is a household survey program housed within the Survey Unit of the World Bank's Development Data Group that provides technical assistance to national statistical offices (NSOs) in the design and implementation of multi-topic household surveys.

Additionally, sections capturing migration data in these surveys are located differently, with some surveys putting this in a stand-alone, or incorporating it into the other modules (ibid).

Challenges identified in obtaining survey information include the difficulty in sampling of households. Researchers therefore rely on the use of national sampling frames to identify such households or the use of remittance transfer data from mobile phones (Bang et al, 2016). A critical look at the gender dynamics of studies based on sample surveys, shows that some studies featured only male migrants, especially those dealing with international migration. For example, in the study of migration and inequality in Egypt which sampled only male migrants, Adams (1989:47) notes that in rural Egypt, social tradition denied women in rural areas to work 'outside the home' by describing this as 'shameful'. There would thus have been fewer women in the study owing to such socio-cultural factors.

Census data has also been a source of data for research on migration and inequality. The census data captures two types of data, namely the migration event where information is collected about the migrants, capturing all the moves they make across time and space; and the migration transition where information is collected about who moved, when and where to – the kind of information collected in the national census. An obvious weakness of migration transition measure is that it fails to capture repeat moves, returns or even deaths during the interphase. Migration data captured in the census relates to the place of current residence, how long an individual has lived in such residence, any previous migration, place of birth and place of current remuneration, while reasons and motivations for migration are largely uncaptured. Migration history can be easily captured through a trend analysis of a series of census datasets (see Arouri and Nguyen, 2018) while inequality data can be derived from comparing household living conditions.

Increasingly popular are the specialist migration surveys that provide unique and rich data on the migration experience and migrant attributes which can be used to analyze migration trends, including effect of remittances on household economies (Stark and Lucas, 1988). In the early 90s, only Botswana and Burkina Faso had conducted such surveys, as observed by Oucho and Gould (1993). Presently, more countries in Africa have conducted specialist migration surveys, including Egypt which carried out the Egypt Household International Migration Survey (Egypt-HIMS) in 2013, that provides detailed information on why, when, where and how migration has occurred. The Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) also provides longitudinal data. The Remittances Surveys conducted by the World Bank also add to the pool of these resources, although they covered a few countries in Africa.

Comparatively, the use of specialist surveys has provided a wealth of knowledge about the US-Mexico border migration streams where data from the Mexico National Rural Household Survey (*Encuesta Nacional a Hogares Rurales de Mexico*, or ENHRUM) provides detailed data on assets, sociodemographic characteristics, production, income sources and migration from a nationally representative sample

of rural households. The other major source of data has been the Mexican Migration Project which employs ethnographic survey methodology to provide both qualitative and quantitative data; the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP) and later the Migrations between Africa and Europe (MAFE) project which collected data at individual, family and national level to provide longitudinal data for analysis. In Asia, China has institutionalized the use of household registration systems (*Hakou*) to capture and monitor migration.

The studies in Africa have progressively used data from specialist surveys to track the interlinkage between migration and inequality over time. While the surveys cannot be representative of the entire population, they complement the data on the drivers and impacts of migration. Use of population registers could provide updated data on migration and household characteristics.

MAJOR FINDINGS ON LINKAGES BETWEEN MIGRATION AND INEQUALITY IN STUDIES IN AFRICA

Migration and Income Inequality Linkages

The studies reviewed were largely testing the association between migration and income inequality, thus testing Lipton's hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship between the two phenomena. While some studies confirm that remittances lead to higher inequality in origin areas by increasing inequality between migrant and non-migrant households, others show that remittances reduce such inequality. In Kenya, Knowles and Anker (1981) found a weak effect when they studied the link between urban-rural remittances and income inequality, noting that remittances are highly related to the level of education and income, urban residence and migrant status as well as ownership of a house in the home areas and number of dependants living in a different residence from the migrant. Other studies confirm higher income inequality in rural migrant households than non-migrant households (Hoddinott, 1992, 1994; Oyvat and wa Githinji, 2017). Bang et al (2016) used data from the Kenya Migration Household Survey (2009)5 and found that existing differentials in propensity to migrate influence the distributional effects of remittances, thus while remittances increase household expenditure across all households in Kenya, they have a huger impact on poorer households.

Several other studies confirm that households receiving remittances from internal migrants have higher expenditure and improved social status, thus concluding that migration increases inequalities in sending areas. This has been confirmed in Nigeria (Chiwuzulum et al, 2010; Fonta et al, 2011); in Botswana (Lucas and Stark, 1985); in Somaliland (Lindley, 2007); in Egypt (Adams, 1989); and in Ghana (Quartey, 2006).

International remittances have higher impact on inequality than rural remit-

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[5] The dataset is publicly available for download at the World Bank's Microdata Library website at: http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/94.

tances as shown in findings from several countries. Wouterse (2010) found that, although remittances from within Africa reduced inequality for communities in Burkina Faso, intercontinental remittances increased inequality. In Nigeria, Olowa et al (2013) found that remittances, both domestic (within Nigeria) and foreign (other countries outside Nigeria and Africa), reduced poverty and inequality in rural households. In Egypt, McCormick and Wahba (2003) attribute rising rural-urban inequalities to returnee international migrants who are more likely to settle and invest in urban areas than rural areas of Egypt, while Arouri and Nguyen (2018) found that migrants in rural Egypt were more likely to move to areas of high-asset and high-income inequality. Comparatively, in Ghana, Adams et al (2008) confirmed that international remittances increased income inequalities more than domestic remittances, although rural households were more likely to access domestic remittances than international remittances.

In some cases, studies within one country yielded conflicting results on the interlinkage between migration and inequality. In Ethiopia, De Brauw et al (2013) measured the impact of migration on household welfare by comparing migrant and non-migrant households and the findings showed that consumption per capita increased for migrants, implying there was improved wellbeing, using data from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey,6 which was matched by a panel survey,7 tracking the employed migrants. Beyene (2014) used data from a 2004 survey8 and found no significant impact on inequality from remittances for Ethiopia when comparing actual and counterfactual scenarios with remittances. In contrast, Andersson (2014) found a considerable positive impact of remittances to rural household welfare when he considered the impact of remittances on household welfare in Ethiopia, using the data pertaining to household subjective economic wellbeing.

Elsewhere, Anyanwu (2011) assessed the impact of migrant remittances on income inequality in African countries using data for the period 1960-2006 and established that remittances had a significant positive impact on income inequality in African countries, although remittances to the North African regions fueled higher income inequality while the reverse was true for sub-Saharan Africa.

From these studies, the findings validated Lipton's hypothesis of an inverse relationship between migration and income inequality. Depending on the methodology used, some studies found a strong negative correlation between migration and income inequality while others found a weak relationship. This is similar to other global studies, such as in China (Ha et al, 2016); in Mexico, where migration remittances were found to increase inequalities, with migrants being better off than their non-migrant peers even within the same social class background (Stark et al, 1986;

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6 The ERHS is a unique, longitudinal household dataset collected by Addis Ababa University, the University of Oxford, and the International Food Policy Research Institute. It follows households from fifteen villages from 1994 to 2009. Three additional villages were added to the 2004 round (and were surveyed in 2005). The 2009 round then included all eighteen villages.

7 The focus of the migrant tracking study was to learn about migration and remittance behavior in Ethiopia.

8 Ethiopian Urban Socio-economic Survey (EUSS), collected by Addis Ababa University in collaboration with Gothenburg University.

Mines and Massey, 1985; Durand and Massey, 1992). In Egypt and Pakistan, remittances were found to affect the rural income distribution in poor villages (Adams 1989; Adams and Mahmood, 1992), with remittances benefitting mainly the migrant households.

Non-Income Inequalities and Migration Linkages

A few studies have reviewed the impact of spatial inequalities on migration and found that migration increased when spatial inequalities were high. In Egypt, Arouri and Nguyen (2018) found that migrants moved to regions with high income and asset inequality while McCormick and Wahba (2003) attributed rising rural-urban inequalities to returnee international migrants who were more likely to settle and invest in the urban areas than in the rural areas of Egypt. In Ogun State of Nigeria, a study found that the unequal distribution of higher educational facilities biased to urban areas resulted in increased migration between urban and rural Nigeria, leading to loss of human capital in rural regions Okhankhuele and Opafunso, 2013).

DISCUSSION

This paper presented a summary of key studies on migration and inequality in Africa, citing various empirical studies done in the region. The review shows that a higher number of studies considered the impact of income inequalities on migration compared to interlinkages between non-income inequalities and migration. The majority of the studies featured an econometric analysis of the effect of remittances on inequality, without illuminating the contextual factors behind the household welfare changes.

A limited number of studies used census data, as surveys were the more popular option. The limitation of census data, such as the unavailability of household welfare indicators to complement the migrant data collected in such censuses and surveys, results in the use of specialist surveys to fill the gap. This observation reinforces the notion that migration studies are not accompanied by data that induces perspectives of measuring inequality. The adoption of multiple data sources would therefore be highly recommended for such studies. Fewer studies looked at non-income inequalities and their interlinkages with migration.

Several studies have investigated the impact of remittances on inequalities using the World Bank sponsored Migration and Remittances Survey, although this survey did not cover many countries in Africa. This database, which is now outdated, needs to be expanded to include other countries, especially in northern and southern Africa. Local surveys such as the Ethiopian Urban Socio-economic Survey (EUSS) need to be scaled and replicated to improve the data sources on migration and inequality.

Most of the studies focused on understanding the impact of international remittances on inequalities in developing countries, but fewer considered internal mi-

gration and the effect of domestic remittances on inequality. The findings show that international migration has a positive effect on inequality compared to internal migration, attributing to the higher income received through international remittances compared to domestic remittances. However, domestic remittances have a higher impact on poorer households whose welfare changed due to remittances, according to most of the findings from the studies reviewed. What does not emerge from the studies conducted so far, is how the drivers of internal and international migration impact on inequality.

The major gap identified in most of the studies is the lack of examination of the role of human agency in understanding the effects of migration on inequality, a criticism offered by Massey et al (1999), Morawska (2007) and De Haas (2010). There is a need to expand the conceptualization of studies on migration and inequality to consider the impact of different migration patterns and their drivers. While Aiyar and Ebeke (2019) considered this for some developing countries, the focus was only on international migration and not internal migration.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Most studies relied on quantitative data sources from surveys. However, these are limited as they do not capture the qualitative aspects of migration. Although the Mexican studies used the ethnographic survey methodology in their migration surveys, they have limited coverage of countries in Africa. The use of specialist surveys in Africa to complement data on migration is a research necessity and more countries need to embrace it.

This literature review offers recommendations to address the shortcomings identified above. First, there is a need to update and increase the database of migration and remittances studies to incorporate more countries for comparative analysis, and to increase such analysis to non-income inequalities, including intergenerational, gender and spatial analysis. Further, there is a need to unpack the contextual factors behind inequality and migration by adopting qualitative techniques to understand how inequality affects those who migrate and those who do not migrate. The role of human agency should also be considered in future studies.

The policy implications of these findings include the need to improve the collection of longitudinal data on migration to inform the cross-sectional analysis of the impacts of migration. While the SDGs target the reduction of inequalities between and within countries, most of the African countries need to improve in their measurement and monitoring of internal and interregional migration, which are the most popular typologies in Africa. Additionally, there should be a deliberate effort to conduct specialist migration surveys periodically across most of the African countries to allow for comparative analysis.

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Turning a Blind Eye to African Refugees and Immigrants in a Tourist City: A Case-study of Blame-shifting in Cape Town

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What role do municipalities play in limiting xenophobia in all its forms and what should these bodies do in promoting the integration of African immigrants? This paper analyzes a case study of Cape Town's policies and programs concerning African immigrants and refugees following the 2008 xenophobic crisis, up to 2016. Municipalities as a separate sphere of the government have their own space to address socio-political problems and to shape local alliances and urban life. Despite being a tourist-led, gentrifying city which substantially draws on vulnerable African immigrant labor, Cape Town's leaders and businesses, however, have no explicit policies or programs to address xenophobia – a ticking time bomb; and they tend to shift the blame to other actors. City leaders and employers see African immigrants in an instrumental way (as mere labor; a financial burden and not as potential citizens). This paper focuses on local government's definition of the 'foreign immigrant problem' and its poor record of reducing the drivers of xenophobic conflicts in South African cities, recognizing that while cities are not the only players, they certainly are the closest to the problem. The paper concludes that the city needs a proactive, comprehensive approach, recognizing migrants and their organizations, especially foreign workers, legal immigrants and refugees, as key city builders, stakeholders and potential citizens in the city. The paper draws on interviews with city officials, migrants and asylum seekers in the City of Cape Town.

Keywords: Policy silences, Cape Town, leadership, local government, political inclusion, xenophobia

INTRODUCTION

According to Hogwood and Gunn (1985) policy should be analyzed for its covert aspects, its silences and non-decisions. As Hogwood and Gunn (1985) assert, policy is what governments do and do not do. The role of municipal street-level bureaucrats in bending policy to fit their prejudices and making policy as they implement it, is also crucial (Lipsky, 2010).

This paper argues that the problem in the City of Cape Town (CoCT) is three-fold: first, city leaders and key allies have no explicit policies or programs for assisting refugees and asylum seekers and foreign workers – a case of non-decisions and strategic silences. Secondly, they show little leadership around the needs and challenges of refugees and asylum seekers, shifting the blame to national and global actors. Their responses are essentially symbolic and they tend to shift the responsibility onto non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Thirdly, city leaders and powerful commercial interests in Cape Town, while blaming the national government for the presence of foreign Africans, see refugees and asylum seekers in an instrumental way (as a ready pool of acquiescent labor) and not as potential citizens.

The paper is divided into three sections. Section one focuses on the literature on xenophobia and the role of local government. The second section covers the CoCT context, local business practices, municipal policies (or the lack thereof) and how certain local officials (those interviewed) understand city policies. Section three considers the organizational responses of refugees and asylum seekers to threats and their interactions with the City; this section also discusses the role of non-governmental organizations. A total of 28 face-to-face interviews were conducted in 2015 and 2017, with City officials, NGOs, refugees and asylum seekers' associations, individual migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Researchers reviewed the City budget for spending related to refugees and asylum seekers, with a focus on four policy areas: Metro Policing, Cape Town's Social Development Strategy (CoCT, 2013), the Policy on Vulnerable Groups (Draft Policy, March 2013) and the Responsible Tourism Policy for the City of Cape Town (2009).

The research method is largely qualitative and interpretive. The paper does not compare Cape Town to Durban and Johannesburg where more explicit forms of xenophobia and harsher state action have been prevalent. A comparative study falls outside the scope of this paper. Importantly, this paper sees xenophobia as a multifaceted phenomenon that may surface in both episodic violence and covert, institutional ways. Institutional xenophobia (such as benign neglect) has been a marginal issue since much of the focus is on violence. Some argue that xenophobia has abated in some places because violence is less frequent.

IMMIGRANTS AND THE CITY CONTEXT

In South Africa, the intergovernmental system is meant to be cooperative and allocates functions so that the national sphere of the state provides foundational policies, while municipalities as a separate sphere of the government have their own space

to address socio-economic challenges and shape local alliances. City governments also have a responsibility to develop policies that promote integrated development, local economic development inclusive of non-racial societies, respect for diversity, and participatory local democracy (Palmary, 2002). Their roles as implementers and policymakers are frequently underestimated. Municipal governments are obliged to "take the lead in mitigating practices of exclusion and segregation that are so acutely felt in the places where people live" (Ray, 2003: 1) and develop local policies that reduce inequalities and integrate newcomers into vibrant workplaces and socio-political environments. They must also take the lead in mitigating spatial segregation, acutely felt in the South African cities (Pieterse, 2009). Social inclusion in cosmopolitan urban places will not simply happen with time or spontaneously through market forces.

Each city has its approach to these challenges. But most South African cities, in managing immigration, rely on the core national policies of public education, health care, public policing, the justice system and border control which are the immediate responsibility of national and provincial governments. Yet, "managing immigrants also depends on the quality of the countless interactions that occur between individuals, social groups, and institutions that exist in a city at the level of local workplaces, cultural and religious activity and residential areas" (Ray, 2003). Xenophobia is not only violently expressed but also operates through institutional practices that exclude and discriminate against foreign Africans within the Department of Home Affairs, the police, hospitals, and schools, based on their appearance, documents, or language.

South Africa has long been a country of immigration – from European colonial settlers to an exploitative migrant labor complex where Southern African workers served mining capital. But immigration has changed dramatically since 1994 when the apartheid system ended and South African cities became desirable for refugees and economic immigrants. According to Crush and Chikanda (2015), SA ranks 36th in the world for the size of its refugee population, and although South Africa receives many asylum seekers, it grants refugee status to very few. Nonetheless, by 2019 the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2019) estimated that South Africa had the largest number of immigrants in Africa (around 4 million). A refugee, as defined by the Refugees Act 130 of 1998, is a person to whom the South African state has granted asylum. Acceptance rates are less than half of the global average. Most immigrants remain 'undocumented migrants, whose labor can be hyper-exploited.

Based on the 2011 census, more than 550,000 new immigrants moved to South Africa between 2001 and 2011 (an average of 55 000 per annum). That is an undercount but is nonetheless a substantial influx for a country of South Africa's size. In 2016 the Western Cape received 296 000 internal migrants from other provinces and 106 000 international migrants (RSA, 2019: 15-16). Recent immigrants, including white immigrants (who make up 17% of the total), are five times more likely to have post-matric qualifications and generally enjoy employment rates of 78%, which is

substantially higher compared to South Africans at 58%   (GroundUp, 2017).

In the post-1994 era, a growing number of African refugees and economic migrants (Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, Malawians, Somalis, Nigerians, and Congolese) have found work in diverse fields and have settled in major cities including black townships. In 2005, international migrants comprised only 2.8% of South Africa's population, but by 2019, this figure had climbed to 7.2% (IOM, 2019). In South Africa, about 20% (or 300 000) of the 1,5 million domestic workers are reported to be foreign migrants while migrants make up 4% of the general labor force (Africa Check, 2015). Migrants are 3.5% more likely than South Africans to be involved in sales and services and almost 5% more likely to be involved in crafts and related trades. Only 14.68% of international migrants are unemployed compared to 32% of South African national migrants (Africa Check, 2015). This is very unusual since, in most other countries, international migrants tend to have higher unemployment rates than locals (Africa Check, 2015).

Gauteng leads the national statistics in reported incidents of xenophobic violence since 1994, followed by the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal (Mlilo and Misago, 2019). Over "200 Somali nationals were murdered in South Africa, most in the Western Cape, between 2000-2004 and media reports show that migrants have been targeted by youths in Cape Town areas such as Philippi, Khayelitsha, Dunoon, Gugulethu, Nyanga and Masiphumelele townships for years" (Jara and Perbedy, 2010: 25). A two-week countrywide spree of violence in May 2008 left 62 people dead and 150 000 immigrants homeless.

> During the course of the violence, an estimated 20 000–30 000 were displaced in Cape Town and it is thought that as many as 30 000 may have left the city. It is not possible to provide exact figures as people not only fled to community halls, mosques and churches before being moved to camps but also sought refuge with family and friends in safer areas (Jara and Perbedy, 2010: 26).

During November 2009, 3 000 Zimbabwean seasonal farmworkers in De Doorns, outside Cape Town were forced to flee after xenophobic violence. Violent attacks by some South Africans, problems experienced obtaining official documents, workplace exploitation and everyday discrimination have become major issues for foreign workers and refugees but scholars remain deeply divided about defining and explaining xenophobia (Uwimpuhwe and Ruiters, 2018).

LITERATURE REVIEW: XENOPHOBIA AND THE CITY CONTEXT

There are diverging definitions of xenophobia in the scholarly literature. Far-right populists in Europe have exploited "fear about existential and ontological threats to spur the exclusion of unwanted 'others', such as Muslims, Roma, and refugees" (Kinnvall, 2017: 1). Recent scholarship on this phenomenon has focused exclusively on collective violent acts, and inflammatory statements of national and local city leaders (Crush and Tawodzera, 2014; Misago et al, 2015). Citizens in South Africa regularly draw on xenophobic state discourses and negative statements by politicians about

immigrants (Landau, 2006). Others hold that populist politicians have no incentive to protect foreigners since they are not eligible to vote (Mngqibisa and Netshikulwe, cited in Daily Maverick, 2018) and hence it is easy to scapegoat them. Moreover, Misago et al (2015: 24) argue that:

> National government and relevant local authorities have thus far either tended to categorise violence against foreign nationals and other forms of xenophobic behaviour as part of 'normal' crime with no need for additional targeted interventions.

However, the general social explanations argue that xenophobia reflects the realities of deepening inequality, rising unemployment and frustrations of the poor in South Africa often leave out the issue of how general discontent is mobilised and channelled into collective xenophobic acts (Misago 2019) and how the silences of the local state are complicit in such processes (Maharaj, 2009).

Academic research on the discriminatory practices and the complicit role of local businesses that eagerly employ vulnerable foreign Africans (a kind of labor preference or xenophilia) and how the local state influences or overlooks these unfair labor practices, is uncommon. South Africans' xenophobic fears about jobs being taken by foreigners are also seen by some as unfounded (Crush and Chikanda, 2015; Misago et al, 2015).

An exception is Maharaj (2009), who examines the challenges of international migrants in the eThekwini (Durban) municipality. He argues that:

> The local authority has yet to engage constructively in addressing the problems of migrants and refugees, and the policy response has ranged from one of benign neglect to active hostility. Almost all the major policy documents of the eThekwini local authority make no reference to migrants (Maharaj, 2009).

Anti-immigrant violence by groups is a collective act, and one of the key explanations focuses on how this violence is organized and resourced, and the opportunities for such violence to happen (McAdam, 1986). Some analysts focus on only specific local factors and the organized nature of violence:

> A strong explanation must account for the appearance of violence in some areas while others with similar socio-economic conditions remained calm…. Violence occurs in specific areas … where local government is weak or considered illegitimate (Misago et al, 2015: 24).

Yet, in Cape Town local government is considered both legitimate and strong and not complicit with perpetrators of violence. The benign neglect of townships by strong municipalities and by the wealthy cannot be underestimated. This paper argues that the focus should be on local governance, which is much broader than local government as the former is usually an alliance of fractions of powerful networked interests that govern a city (Harvey, 1989; Miraftab, 2007). Such alliances include wealthy ratepayers (who use the services of mainly foreign workers), the local business chamber, donors to political parties, city improvement districts, big property, tourism interests, etc.).

CAPE TOWN: ECONOMY, LABOR AND POLITICS

Cape Town is a popular global tourist destination. It has some of the most expensive real estate and private schools in the country; it also has some of the highest concentrations of multi-millionaires (mainly white). In 2016 Cape Town had a retail, catering and accommodation and financial services economy with 78% of jobs in the tertiary sector (City of Cape Town, 2018). During 2011, the area received 1.4 million foreign visitors (City of Cape Town, 2013b: 31).

It is no exaggeration to suggest that the success of the city and the profitability of tourism is built on the labor of its poor citizens and especially its recent foreign African immigrants. Moreover, Mathers and Landau (2007) suggest that South African tourism depends on the willingness of African migrants to risk crossing the border, often with artefacts to sell and invest in the South African craft markets. According to Mathers and Landau (2007: 530), "one only has to stroll the markets that tourist buses frequent to note that the vast majority of artefacts on sale are made and sold by Africans from anywhere but South Africa". They assert that certain sectors of South African tourism is dependent on the endeavors and labor of migrants.

When Cape Town was run by the African National Congress (ANC) in the mid-1990s the mayor, Nomaindia Mfeketo worked with a power block of the city managers, politicians, rich property owners and bankers, who mobilized to 'save' Cape Town from "going the way of Johannesburg" and "descending into a morass of crime and grime", social decay and capital flight (Cape Town Partnership, 2009). They initiated and designed the Central City Improvement District (CCID) in 2000, a private-public partnership to provide "safety and cleanliness" and make Cape Town "a pleasant urban environment" to live and work in.

Governed by the Democratic Alliance (DA) since 2006, Cape Town has fashioned itself as a successful, non-racial, inclusive, well-governed city that seemingly works for social inclusion (McDonald, 2008). Under the DA the City of Cape Town (CoCT) has eight separate metro police units including an 'anti-land invasion unit' aimed at curbing informal settlements and an 'anti-vagrant unit'. The increasing repressive local state apparatuses, in policing everyday life, are not unusual in tourist-based world cities (Lemanski, 2006; Miraftab, 2007, McDonald, 2008). Binns and Nel (2002: 240) point out that "waterfront developments and convention centres … in Cape Town and Durban have attracted strong criticism … they do not adequately involve community members, few benefits devolve to them, and the developments are undertaken without adequate concern being given to affected communities".

There is another interesting twist in the Cape Town government's rhetoric about immigrants since black South Africans have previously been labelled as immigrants by DA leaders. In 2012, Helen Zille, the then Premier invoked the term 'refugee' to refer to black African South Africans. The context is that the Western Cape has the lowest black African population of all nine provinces at 32% and the Eastern Cape, South Africa's most underdeveloped province, has the highest black population

at 86% (RSA, 2011). She suggested that the Western Cape (and Cape Town) was in danger, given the Eastern Cape African 'influx' taking resources and jobs that belong to the Western Cape. The narrative of fear appeals to the idea that Cape Townians (the majority 'coloured' and minority white groups) are being 'swamped' by 'refugees' from the Eastern Cape (who are also seen as predominantly ANC supporters). This 'Western Cape first' and Eastern Cape 'invasion' narrative has underpinned the DA's electoral success among 'coloureds' and whites.

AFRICAN FOREIGN MIGRANTS PREFERRED AS WORKERS

Cape Town with its burgeoning tourist economy has attracted tens of thousands of refugees and asylum seekers, who have settled close to economic/work opportunities (in the informal shack settlements in areas such as Hout Bay, Dunoon, Masiphumelele). They also choose to settle in areas where they can set up 'spaza' shops (for example, in Khayelitsha where Somalis predominate) or they find casual jobs around Cape Town. Foreign migrants entering Cape Town appear to have become an ever more visible, vulnerable and influential sub-population in both black townships and central business areas (Hill and Bekker, 2014: 675).

Cape Town's refugees and asylum seekers are mostly young people (in their 20s and early 30s) who have migrated mostly without their families. They often accept lower wages, work longer hours and tend to be exploited and are averse to joining trade unions (Taal, 2012; Dodson, 2018).

Moreover, migrants have changed labor markets: employers often prefer vulnerable foreign labor and "this vulnerability makes immigrants popular with management as they are cheaper and easier to control" (Taal, 2012: 21). As a manager at a top restaurant in Cape Town, where the majority of staff are foreigners, claimed, "foreign waiters, especially from Zimbabwe, are usually better spoken and offer phenomenal service to customers" (cited in Dirk, 2015). Another Canal Walk restaurant manager revealed that "the high work ethic of foreign employees was the reason they were more readily hired" (cited in Dirk, 2015). It was suggested that "South African employees are not "up to scratch for these jobs" (cited in Dirk, 2015). For instance, a Cape Town Fish Market and restaurant at the Waterfront employed 16 waiters, but only four were South African. Another manager at a major restaurant had 12 waiters but only one was from South Africa. He noted: "They (Zimbabweans) have the kind of personalities where they are able to keep our patrons happy and entertained" (cited in Dirk, 2015). A manager in Camps Bay claimed when it comes to hiring staff, it has more to do with the best candidate than whether the applicant is foreign or local. Five of the restaurant's seven waiters are from Zimbabwe (cited in Dirk, 2015). There is thus a cocktail of racial, ethnic, national identity stereotypes at play in the split labor market.

The Cape Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCCI) noted:
It was important to understand that the people fleeing their own countries were among the best qualified and most enterprising workers. They were strongly

motivated and they competed fiercely for jobs and trade. In many cases, this competition was unwelcome and created some local resentment (CCCI, 2015). According to Taal (2012: 21) "Foreign workers are encouraged by management to see South African workers as lazy". These sentiments might reflect a new split labor market formation, the preference among employers for foreign workers, and also unresolved residual hostilities between black and white South Africans. One interviewee highlighted that:

> South Africans take advantage of the fact that foreigners are desperate and will work for lower wages. And in many cases, when the residence permit is about to expire, the bosses refuse to pay foreign nationals (Respondent D).

It is evident that this increasing role in visible services means that the footprint of foreign workers is considerable. However, this has produced significant resentment among black local workers and the unemployed towards both employers and foreign national employees.

DEFINING THE 'PROBLEM': OFFICIAL SILENCES

What are the official approaches to and definitions of the 'problem'? The City over time has had contradictory definitions and messages. In 2003 when the ANC governed the province there were an estimated 20 000 to 30 000 refugees and asylum seekers in the City. A high level 2001 City Report noted that, "The 'problem' aspect of foreign migrants is overstated and that in many ways the presence of these migrants contributes positively to the economic and cultural development of the region" (CoCT, 2003: 13). But at this time, local government officials interviewed by Palmary (2002: 6) also felt that provision of services for refugees should be the responsibility of the Department of Home Affairs at the national level. A front-line CoCT official cited in Palmary's study argued:

> There is no land for these immigrants … They occupy city-owned land illegally. So we take action against them. We're trying to get central government to take full responsibility for this. Because the city does not have the resources or the manpower to deal with this. Tonight I've got to go again, go deal with the immigrants.

In 2005, at a World Refugee Day event, ANC mayor, Nomaindia Mfeketo put a positive spin on immigrants saying, "We are committed to developing a sustainable partnership. Through our social development directorate, we are assisting Tutumike with completing an audit of skills of refugees in Cape Town. We have been amazed at the results so far: 23 medical doctors, 6 engineers, 20 lawyers and 5 teachers. And this is only the beginning" (UNHCR News, 2005).

In 2006, the DA won the municipal elections. A series of violent xenophobic outbreaks in 2008 in Gauteng spread, about a week later reaching Cape Town. In May 2008, Somalis and Zimbabweans were attacked by mobs and their shops were vandalized and looted. In response to the humanitarian needs of people who left their homes and needed shelter and other basic items, the City prepared six safety camps

at former 'coloured' beach camping sites and the Youngsfield Military Base (City of Cape Town, 2008).

The DA decisively swung the definition of the issue towards blaming the national and international factors and showing how local city resources were being wasted on poor refugees from dysfunctional countries. These messages can be seen in the Mayor of Cape Town, Helen Zille's media responses to the 2008 wave of xenophobic violence, as captured by Mnguni (2010). Zille essentially labelled the problem as an "international" one, thereby shifting the focus away from the city to global factors. "They just haven't applied themselves to how they deal with it," Zille remarked of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Counting the financial costs to the city of having poor foreign blacks in the city, she argued that, "the UNHCR had an international mandate and budget to deal with problems". She asserted that:

> This is an international problem. Why are people forced to be refugees in the first place? R170m had been taken away from other service delivery projects to deal with the xenophobic violence of 2008 (Mnguni, 2010).

Cape Town mayoral committee member for Safety and Security, Councillor J.P. Smith similarly remarked: "Attacking other people incurs costs and the city paid R147 million to house, feed and protect dispossessed people in 2008. We had to use rates money to cover those costs" (Defence Web, 2010). Zille and Smith were appealing to their ratepaying voters when they referred to the waste of money and they implied that foreign refugees are an unfunded mandate.

The Cape Chamber of Commerce and Industry similarly held that:

> We should be asking why people are fleeing from African countries and what can be done about it. I'm afraid we are all dealing with the fall-out from poor governance, corruption and the actions of war lords…Xenophobia is a much bigger problem than we realize. We must get the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations involved (CCCI, 2015).

Another cluster of official negative messages linked immigrants to crime and unrest. In interviews with J.P. Smith refugees and foreign nationals were also mentioned alongside 'street people' and crime (Smith 2019).

On the other hand, there is some evidence of local ward community development workers (CDWs) aligned to the ANC and the development forum playing a constructive role in calling township meetings between locals and refugees and asylum seekers and building solidarity during the 2008 crisis in Imizamo Yethu (IY) in Hout Bay. According to Pillay (2015):

> Our team finds out that IY has a vibrant community life, and that its development forum (CDF) is very active. A range of political organizations operate here, and there are two very active community development workers (CDWs), who also happen to be officials of the ruling party. We find out very quickly that the CDWs are angry – not at foreign nationals, but because two years of community work to build relations between the locals and foreign nationals

is being undone by a very vocal and insistent group of residents in Hout Bay. The CDWs are angry because the white residents of Hout Bay, on hearing the stories about attacks on foreign nationals, are putting increasing pressure on the police to escort foreigners from the area. They are angry that white residents are arriving at IY and removing the foreign nationals in their employ themselves; and they are angry that all of this is done without consultation, particularly because after the foreign nationals leave the area, the looting of their shops, homes and businesses begins. Now, this is but one recurring story and I think it is instructive.

In Dunoon, for example, these meetings were called by councillors without official assistance from the City (Samodien, 2013).

VULNERABLE GROUPS

The CoCT decided to exclude refugees and asylum seekers from its final Social Development Strategy based on a belief that the problem is not a priority. In an early draft policy of the CoCT, the City identified five priorities. As depicted in the table below, immigrants were initially considered in goal 4.3 related to enhancing community participation and involvement.

Figure 1: Extract from the draft Social Development Strategy Policy

Goal 4: Enhancing community participation and involvement			
Strategies		**Actions**	
S.4.1	Strengthening of NGO sector & empowerment of community leaders	A4.1.1	Complement the capacity of NGO's dealing with refugee community
		A4.1.2	Capacity building for community leaders to deal effectively with issues pertaining to sustainable relationships between foreign nationals and host communities

S.4.2	Compliance engagement & enforcement	A4.2.1	Facilitate the establishment of area based Business Forums, facilitate development and implementation of guidelines to regulate informal business
		A4.2.2	Regulate and monitoring selling of houses to foreign nationals to start small businesses
S.4.3	Entrepreneurial Development and Mentoring	A4.3.1	Empower both foreign and nationals and locals with entrepreneurial skills and mentoring services
S.4.4	Cultural and Sport Activities	A4.4.1	Implement cultural and sport activities to integrate foreign nationals and locals
S.4.5	Poverty Mitigation	A4.5.1	Involve foreign nationals in poverty reduction programs and social security networks
		A4.5.2	Ensure that in all programmes implemented/sponsored by government, foreign nationals are involved

Source: The City of Cape Town, 2012.

Even though the draft policy was not explicit on how foreign nationals were going to be integrated into the city's development strategy, it indicated that some in the city leadership at least thought about foreign nationals and had an agenda. However, in the final version published in 2013, this aspect of 'goal 4' was entirely removed.

The 2013 Policy on Vulnerable Groups (PVG) defines certain categories of people as vulnerable in the CoCT (CoCT, 2013c). This policy (see definition on page 7 and throughout the document) completely excludes refugees and African immigrants. Undocumented female migrants and even unaccompanied children who are asylum seekers or refugees are not considered as part of vulnerable children (Mundell and Carone, 2016).

RESPONSIBLE TOURISM

The CoCT's Responsible Tourism Policy (2009: 3) defines responsible tourism as an activity "that creates better places for people to live in, and better places to visit". The Responsible Tourism Policy, however, has a blind spot regarding the reality of mi-

grants in the CoCT. Where it talks about non-South African migrants (CoCT, 2009: 25), it merely calls for encouraging business relationships between foreign, local and emerging entrepreneurs. The policy also identifies local crafts as a priority. It says:

> Give customers the opportunity to purchase locally produced crafts and curios, set targets to increase the proportion of sales of goods sourced within 20 km of the enterprise. Assist local craft workers to develop new products to meet market demand (CoCT, 2009: 26).

However, it is self-evident that most of the crafts sold in craft markets are from north of the Limpopo. Rogerson (2018: 157) found that:

> In Cape Town, despite a pro-development rhetoric in the inner city, there is evidence of a subtle but systematic exclusion of street traders, including of migrant entrepreneurs. Little evidence exists of a coherent analysis by city policymakers to understand and foreground the contributions made by migrant entrepreneurs for the urban economy.

IGNORANCE AMONG CITY OFFICIALS, LOW PRIORITY OF REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS, LACK OF VISION AND TOKEN PROJECTS

To probe how the City sees foreign Africans, this study included interviews of mid-level officials in Trading Licensing services. At this level, the responses revealed that City officials (much like Cape Town's DA mayors) were not clear about what was meant by terms such as 'asylum seeker' or 'refugee'. Informants employed by the City indicated that they were not aware of any policies about foreign nationals.

By and large, local government officials view migrants' access to services such as housing as the responsibility of the National Department of Housing. Local government respondents often failed to understand who refugees are and what rights they have (see Palmary, 2002).

According to a respondent:

> As far as the city is concerned, we're not making any provisions for them [migrants] at this present moment. I think they're doing it for themselves…We are not really involved, as the Department of Housing… (Interview, Department of Housing, Cape Town).

The term 'xenophobia' is mentioned only once in the Disaster Management Policy. And here it is listed with social unrest. Moreover, the city has no language support services or learning centres to assist migrants.

Rather than formulating a solid policy, the CoCT initiated a token project such as hosting a forum for community dialogue about xenophobia, in honor of Mandela Day in 2011. This single event sought "to increase awareness about issues affecting foreign nationals and to encourage a spirit of unity and peaceful relations between South Africans and African foreign nationals" (CoCT, 2011).

In the 2014/15 events budget, zero funding was assigned to the World Refugee Day budget line item whereas the World Triathlon Series received R2,1 million (CoCT, 2015). In early 2015, then mayor of Cape Town, Patricia de Lille stridently

condemned the new surge in nationwide xenophobic violence. In a public statement, she proclaimed that, "We cannot let this be done, in the name of our country, South Africa" (CoCT, 2015). In 2015 de Lille donated R21 000 – a tokenistic amount – to a non-governmental organization (NGO) assisting the children of refugees and asylum seekers. In 2015 she also minimized the issue, proclaiming that Cape Town has a small minority of xenophobic people. Yet, she reported:

> We have daily meetings with the South African Police Service and Metro Police to report on any potential threats of xenophobic attacks. Our early warning system is therefore in place. Members of the public are also urged to report any suspicion of impending attacks in their communities (CoCT, 2015).

A City-NGO agreement for a small sponsorship of R75 000 for World Refugee Day (2017) provides an indication of the low status of refugees on the City's agenda and budget in 2017 (CoCT, 2017). In summary, the City of Cape Town has distinctly sidestepped its role and responsibility to provide a solid lead to minimize the xenophobia tragedy. Refugees and foreign migrants enjoy very low priority in the CoCT budget.

NGO'S VIEWS

In contrast to the lack of knowledge about refugees and asylum seekers among CoCT officials, four NGO workers interviewed for this study were able to distinguish between the different status categories among refugees and asylum seekers. In the NGOs responses, one participant stated that:

> Yes, there are administrative categories in terms of documentation. The asylum seeker is the person who has made an application for asylum. This is a recognized refugee whose asylum application was granted. Then there is a migrant who is a holder of a passport and visa that corresponds with the purpose for their visit to SA (e.g. work, study). An undocumented migrant is someone who has no documents whatsoever to legalize their stay in SA. Then there are citizens and permanent residents. A visa is thus pertinent to a temporary resident and 'permanent resident' is another category (Respondent C).

An NGO worker (Respondent C) also indicated that "Refugees and asylum seekers have the same rights as South African citizens, except that they do not have the right to vote or form a political party". NGOs assisting refugees, asylum seekers and migrants raised some interesting points. Two of the four NGO respondents referred to the need to address institutional xenophobia routinely found in government departments as well as inflammatory political rhetoric. Respondent C stated that "There's a great need for training and creating awareness".

All four NGO respondents felt that foreign nationals do not receive enough support from local government and stated that there are no special or additional services to assist foreign nationals, even in light of the 2008 xenophobic attacks. They indicated that they were not aware of any policy changes that had been beneficial to foreigners but they identified new ones that are not beneficial, such as the City's amended trading by-law. PASSOP, an NGO which has especially fought the criminal-

izing of the informal sector, has suggested that the government should focus on real crime as opposed to enforcing "outlandish by-laws":

> The renewed harassment of informal traders by the police and city officials results in a breakdown of trust and makes informal traders especially vulnerable to criminal elements who extort 'taxes' and victimize them without them being able to rely on the police for protection due to the police being seen as being a part of an oppressive system (PASSOP, 2013).

Another respondent stated that:

> I also think that they want to first save South Africans before foreigners. It's not supposed to be like that, you are supposed to treat everyone fairly. The City also discriminates against those who do not have documents and offers no assistance to rectify this. They also often think that you have received your documents illegally, especially the metro police (Respondent D).

REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS AS TRADERS AND ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS

The black foreign traders interviewed (Malawian, Somalian, Cameroonian, and Zimbabwean nationalities) were asked what they thought the CoCT Municipality could do to prevent xenophobia. Four of the five said that the city should improve security and protection services on the streets, especially the security of foreigners. One respondent indicated that:

> The metro police, they will come here and I will show them even who stole from my stall but they will do nothing. But if you fight with the people then they blame you (Respondent J).

In 2015, refugee traders in Cape Town paid R879 per month to the City for renting a site, and R1950 for an annual permit – three times more than in Limpopo (Crush and Tawodzera, 2017: 5). Despite this, three respondents indicated that they had experienced hostility from Metro Police. A respondent operating in Wynberg indicated that "They must stop taking our stuff. When we do something wrong, they take our stuff and we must pay to get it back" (Respondent G).

> Asked whether they felt that special allowances should be made for the employment of foreign nationals in South Africa, all five agreed. One female respondent stated that, "There should be a law in place that allows foreigners easier access to jobs. When South Africans come to my home country they get jobs, they are not left without jobs and we should be treated the same in their country" (Respondent I).

Another respondent indicated that:

> We don't get the jobs that we are qualified for in South Africa. South Africa does not see that we are teachers in our countries. Instead, we must come here and look for other jobs that pay a little money (Respondent K).

Cape Town has dozens of migrant organizations representing the interests of refugee and asylum seekers, as well as several NGOs that support refugees and asylum seekers by providing different services. There are also intimate relationships between

South African blacks and foreign Africans, for example through marriage (Sichone, 2008; Owen, 2015; Uwimpuhwe and Ruiters, 2018; ISD, 2018).

Each migrant organization has independent initiatives to assist its members but the local state has not effectively engaged with these organizations or assisted the refugees and asylum seekers. If, as Portes (1995) suggests, migration is rarely a single individual effort, then migrant organizations and networks need to be central to efforts to find solutions. For example, Somalis in townships initiated a 'self-protection program' and street committees. Moreover:

> We encourage them also to be part of the local community where they are ... Furthermore, we are creating street committees that will be composed of both Somalis and South Africans in order to encourage locals to protect Somalis (A.R. Sheikh, February 2016).

Language barriers were identified as being a problem for immigrants. Health services also provide an example of language and cultural discrimination. The Albayaan Islamic Council Trust (AICT) leader asserts that Somali women are facing a big problem at clinics, as some women are being sterilized without their consent:

> When our women go to maternity clinics they are abused and given family planning without their consent. Some of them find out that they can't have kids anymore while they didn't know when they had been sterilized. I think it is because many of them don't know English and are forced to sign what they don't understand (A. Rachid, October 2015).

The AICT is involved in integrating Somalis into the South African citizenry. This is done through skills transfer initiatives in which they teach South Africans how to run a small business. This organization also identifies people in the local communities who need help:

> Firstly, as refugees we are helping South Africans by employing them in our businesses, teaching them how to start a business. We also help other immigrants, for instance last year we gave donations to Burundians in townships. We also do cleaning of this Bellville CBD; last year we did it twice and we are planning to do it again this year. We have a good relationship with the Darul Islam Foundation Trust, Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) and the African Muslims Agency (A. Rachid, 2015).

Immigrant organizations are involved in promoting social cohesion through civic education and cultural events. For example, the South African Somali Association organizes different educational programs for both Somalis and South Africans of different cultural backgrounds and promotes social cohesion between immigrants and citizens (A Khalif, leader of the Somali Association of South Africa (SASA).

The Amis BK (Friends of Bukavu) brings together both South Africans and African immigrants through cultural events:

> In 2011 and 2012 we had a volunteering project in Langa Township to teach South African students in public schools Maths and Physics, which is part of the integration. We wanted to show citizens that it is not true what people are

saying that migrants came to take their jobs and their women (A. Namufakage, Amis BK, February 2016).

The level of self-defence, organization and networking among migrants and external refugees and with NGOs has increased since the mid-2000s (Uwimpuhwe and Ruiters, 2018). Migrant organizations play a major role in social cohesion, albeit with very little active local government support.

CONCLUSION

While recognizing that city authorities are not the only players, they are certainly the closest to the problem. This study analyzed the CoCT's policies vis-a-vis foreign African migrants, revealing that despite their growing numbers and significant contribution to the growth of the city, refugees and African immigrants remain at the margins of policies and the local government's programs. The study found that there is a blame game between the local government and the central government about who is responsible for poor immigrants and the xenophobic conflict. This paper identified local government's shifting definition of the 'foreign immigrant problem' and its poor record of resourcing and encouraging the integration of African migrants. The City of Cape Town has also underplayed the extent and scope of the xenophobia problem and the related labor market issues. It has missed opportunities to devise a more visionary, comprehensive approach to ensuring citizenship for all who labor and live in Cape Town. Refugees and foreign migrants are not taken into consideration in the formulation of the CoCT's budget.

The study found that NGOs and refugee and asylum seeker organizations have much to bring to the table to alleviate problems and realize the vision of Cape Town as an African cosmopolitan city. As argued in an earlier paper, "given the dominant 'methodological individualism' and gaps in recent migration scholarship in South Africa, a fresh theoretical perspective and knowledge about organized refugee and asylum seeker formations, the activities and services they offer, their geographical reach and location, who they assist and what sorts of resources they can mobilize" is needed (Uwimpuhwe and Ruiters, 2018: 1122).

It is, therefore, crucial to increase the political will and capacity of local authorities, to ensure an inclusive response to the needs of migrants. A comprehensive response needs to take seriously the claims that working-class South Africans feel threatened by competition in the labor market and that employers are taking advantage of the new labor pool of insecure foreign African migrants. The CoCT should consider including migrants and representative migrant organizations in ongoing policy dialogues and its planning for housing and other programs. It should create spaces for positive encounters between various groups in public spaces, encourage inclusive public art, food festivals, exert social and other kinds of pressure through campaigns for decent work for all to ensure that employers do not exploit foreign workers who underpin the tourist economy and enforce equal treatment, apply equal standards and uphold regulations for all. It should provide training and awareness-

raising for local government officials and councillors on refugee and migrant rights. It should develop programs to educate businesses and landlords about refugees and asylum seekers and monitor those businesses and landlords who take illegal advantage of vulnerable migrants.

By valuing and recognizing migrants, especially legal immigrants and refugees, as key city builders and stakeholders in the CoCT, the exploitation of the insecurity of migrants could be minimized. Migrant exclusion not only leaves large sections of the population without the services they need but in the long run, they too become less productive. The City of Cape Town could nurture a Pan-African partnership with transnational players and be more tolerant of the presence of the poor in the city. Finally, local governments should have policies and funded programs built on co-creation and cooperation with both migrant and local civic and cultural organizations.

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List of Named Interviewees

Abdul Rachid, leader of the Albayan Islamic Council Trust (AICT), interviewed in Bellville, October 2015.

Abdi-Rashid Shiekh, leader of the Somalis Community Board South Africa (SCB-SA), interviewed in Bellville, February 2016.

Abdul Khalif, leader of the Somali Association of South Africa (SASA), interviewed in Bellville, February 2016.

Amani Namufakage, chairperson of the Amis BK, interviewed at Observatory, February 2016.

Anonymous Interviews

Interviewee (pseudonym)	Area of Expertise	Place Interviewed	Date Interviewed
CoCT Business Areas Management			
Mr A	CoCT Business Areas Management	Cape Town CBD	30 July 2015
Mrs T	CoCT Business Areas Management	Cape Town CBD	30 July 2015
CoCT NGOs working with refugees			
Ms C	NGO (1)	Cape Town CBD	7 July 2015
Mrs D	NGO (1)	Cape Town CBD	12 August 2015
Mrs F	NGO (2)	Cape Town CBD	12 August 2015
Mrs Q	NGO (2)	Cape Town CBD	20 August 2015
Informal Traders in the CoCT Municipality			
Mr G	Malawian trader	Wynberg	18 August 2015
Mr H	Somalian trader	Wynberg	18 August 2015
Ms I	Cameroonian trader	Cape Town CBD	26 August 2015
Mr J	Somali trader	Cape Town CBD	27 August 2015
Ms K	Zimbabwean trader	Cape Town CBD	27 August 2015
Mr G	Malawian trader	Wynberg	31 August 2015
Mr H	Somali trader	Wynberg	31 August 2015
Ms I	Cameroonian trader	Cape Town CBD	25 August 2015

Intersection of Migration and Local Governance: Lessons on Methods and Research Design

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A recent study interrogating the ways in which municipal authorities in South Africa are governing their mobile communities demonstrated that there is potential for both conceptual innovation and methodological rigor when integrating the cross-cutting systems of migration and local governance. However, this integration also posed a number of challenges that were apparent both during the data collection phase, as well as when the diagnostic tool was designed. The process of implementing this research raised methodological and conceptual questions about how these two areas of work intersect. This paper aims to reflect not on the results of the study itself, but on the methodological process issues that can lay a foundation for a better understanding of how to study the intersection of two interdisciplinary fields. This research took place in five South African municipalities in Limpopo, Gauteng, and Mpumalanga, selected because they reflect a broad spectrum of migration dynamics and demographic patterns. An institutional ethnography approach was drawn on, which included mixed methods fieldwork with document review, key stakeholder interviews, focus groups, and community mapping took place in all five municipalities, taking an inductive approach to developing a diagnostic tool, which was applied retrospectively based on the data gathered. This paper found that resolving a number of divergent conceptual issues is important to effectively interpret results around the intersection of the cross-cutting fields of governance and migration. This methodological reflection is important on its own, but it will also help ensure that future initiatives around strengthening local governance, or making systems more responsive to the needs of migrants, are on solid conceptual, methodological, and practical ground.

Keywords: migration, governance, research methods, urbanization

INTRODUCTION

The governance of municipalities and migration are both critical forces in reconfiguring processes of democracy and development both globally, and in South Africa. Megacities have long been recognized as spaces of global innovation, economic growth and creativity, but this lens has rarely been extended to South Africa's secondary cities. While these are the metropoles that are statistically receiving the highest percentage of migrants, they remain on the periphery of scholarship and policy-making (Mberu et al., 2017). They have a high degree of autonomy in development planning, but the competencies required to plan proactively towards the demographic changes posed by migration vary significantly.

This research found that the ability of local governments to respond effectively to a mobile population varied considerably on the basis of a wide range of factors. It also emerged from the research process that preconceptions held by both municipal officials and migrants about the nature of the community, the service delivery needs of migrants, and the processes of municipal planning have meant that municipalities are missing an opportunity for more effective and efficient service delivery, and migrants are unable to access the participatory channels that do exist. This paper does not primarily engage with the content of the findings of the study, which have been published elsewhere (Blaser and Landau, 2014). While these results are important for municipal planning and local government capacity building, the focus of this paper is on the conceptual and methodological lessons that were learned through the process of implementing the research. Studying the local governance of mobility, two cross-cutting topics that are hotly contested, requires methodological tools that allow the researcher to take respondents beyond their instrumental understanding of either topic.

Through a focus on the research process, this paper provides lessons for a wide range of stakeholders, academics, and practitioners who are working with cross-cutting governance or migration initiatives. This paper highlights key lessons for how both areas of focus are conceptualized and translated into research methods and tools. Illustrating how research methods hinge on these intersecting topics, is an important way of understanding how local government can be more responsive to migration dynamics in the future.

CONTEXT OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND MIGRATION

Local governance, and particularly municipal level governance play a central role in discussions on migration, and the management of mobile populations (Ahouga, 2018). The United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have a strong focus on localization, looking at global issues through a lens of local management structures. Goal 11 focuses explicitly on sustainable cities, and urban planners and municipal managers are now engaging with a range of global processes that are actively seeking to understand what role local governance, and the governance of

cities in particular, play in key global issues such as inequality and climate change (Kanuri et al., 2016; Communitas Coalition, 2016).

This interest in local governance is juxtaposed with a similarly strong interest in migration. Migration has often been part of a wider debate on development and identity, but a rise of populism globally is reigniting debates about the definition, identity and rights of migrants (Okyerefo and Setrana, 2018). Inspired in part by Brexit, the process of defining nation states and the populations they govern is part of a global conversation contemplating how these different definitional approaches connect to public sector bureaucracies, and what it means for migrants (Somerville, 2016). Furthermore, spatial mobility in Africa has long been defined by poorly defined borders between international and internal migration, due to colonial national boundaries that cut across shared culture and language (Adepoju, 2006). These two cross-cutting trends are the localization of analyses of global governance, and the importance of migration in understanding how places develop spatial definitions and cohesive communities.

In spite of the simultaneous importance of both areas of study, there is no consensus around how to understand local government's responsiveness to migration, let alone what good practice could look like in this regard (Zapata-Barrero et al., 2017). This research therefore required the development of a tool and method that could bring people together around common core concepts, and specify an approach that would allow the research team to understand how these concepts were operationalized by respondents, and analyze trends and areas of divergence. Through this experience, a range of important lessons were learned, and this paper aims to distill a few of the most salient points that have emerged from this process. In doing so, this paper first explains the design of a diagnostic tool designed to categorize municipal responses to mobility, and considers the practical, conceptual, and contextual challenges of applying this tool across several different municipalities. It concludes with lessons for scholars who are studying the intersection of cross-cutting fields.

Among the many scholars of governance in South Africa, Greffrath and van der Waldt (2016) posit that, "transformation of the local sphere of government has probably been the largest undertaking within the entire governance adjustment process since democratization in 1994". However, tremendous work remains for municipalities to be functional, let alone developmental entities. In the 2015-2016 financial year, only 49 out of 263 municipalities received a clean audit, and none of them were from Limpopo, where much of this fieldwork was conducted (AGSA, 2016). A wide range of capacity development initiatives are targeting municipalities in the hope of improving local service delivery, with an increasing focus on intervention by national and provincial structures (Reddy, 2014; Greffrath and van der Waldt, 2016). However, without a widely held consensus of what the composite components of planning capacity are, efforts are likely to remain incomplete.

DEVELOPMENT OF A MIGRATION RESPONSIVE DIAGNOSTIC TOOL

It was evident from the outset that building a diagnostic tool that would reflect the migration responsiveness of local government would be an important step in providing participants from different perspectives with a common reference point on a complex topic. However, it was also clear that the tool had to be informed by an iterative process of data collection, and could not be developed without first understanding the conceptual boundaries of the respondents. It has already been acknowledged that the way dimensions of local governance are conceptualized is a driving force in management research (Roiseland, 2011). A collaboration between the Migrating Out of Poverty Programme (MOOP), the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) at the University of Witwatersrand, and the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) made it possible to spearhead iterative fieldwork to better understand the ways in which local government in South Africa is responding to migration in five South African municipalities. Municipalities first self-selected into the project, based on their identification of a need to build capacity in their response to mobility, and among the municipalities volunteering to participate, a selection of secondary cities was chosen. Secondary cities were targeted because they experience the highest rates of migration and are relatively under-studied (Awumbila, 2017). Selection was based on identifying the widest range of demographic and migration dynamics from the municipalities available, to allow for lessons that could be relevant across various contexts. This research was part of a longer-term, phased research project which aims to better understand how migration is reshaping communities, and what potential it holds for poverty reduction.

The overall methodological design of the research was based on principles of institutional ethnography. Fieldwork for this research was conducted in iterative steps guided by an inductive approach, with two visits to each site. Due to data privacy concerns, the specific municipalities involved cannot be named. The duration of the first visit was a week, and included a community mapping exercise, as well as interviews to get a sense of both the migration and governance dynamics within the community (Gioia et al., 2013). The second visit took place over a month and included key stakeholder interviews and focus groups. The tool emerged from these key stakeholder interviews rather than informing them. It was based on a conceptual framework of ecological systems developed by Bronfenbrenner (1979) and previously used by the author in a gender diagnostic study (Jansen van Rensburg and Blaser Mapitsa, 2017). This model includes the macro levels of social cohesion and participation, meso levels of accountability and participation, and micro levels of data collection and budgeting. This approach was adopted keeping in mind a systems approach to governance, which acknowledges the administrative and social dynamics therein.

While the diagnostic tool is deliberately reductionist to allow for comparability across a range of contexts, it did not replace a more exploratory, inductive approach, which was a hallmark of the research project. Without bringing together

both approaches, such detailed substantive and methodological reflections would not have been possible. The research team tried to balance issues of comparability across different administrative and institutional contexts, and held that a framework which simplified these issues was helpful provided that it was not at the exclusion of more exploratory work. However, the structured tool still created difficulty in reaching consensus among the various stakeholders around the scope of measurement, particularly with regards to which components of governance would be captured.

Scope of the Tool

Six dimensions emerged, which covered the widest span of key competencies municipalities needed to demonstrate in order to be responsive to mobility. The dimensions included: budgeting, data collection and use, participation, accountability, perceptions, and social cohesion. A deliberate decision was made to include a full spectrum of competencies, ranging from technical, to strategic. Moreover, the purpose of the tool was to be broadly indicative, so while each step of the five-point scale was generally defined (Blaser and Landau, 2014), a decision was made not to be prescriptive in the scoring process, because the value of the tool was to identify relative strengths and gaps.

Several criteria were identified within each dimension, to interrogate the degree to which mobility was found in the various dimensions. The criteria began with a score of 0, as entirely absent or even problematic to responding to mobility. The scale increased to a score of five, which was a robust and proactive response to a mobile population and the needs of migrant communities. The measurements were a deliberately imprecise process, with the numerical values being broadly indicative. That was to allow for a schematic comparison across contexts from which rich qualitative data had been gathered, rather than applying a specific quantitative scale.

Applying the Migration Responsive Diagnostic Tool

Once the tool was fully developed, it was applied retrospectively to the municipalities of Bushbuckridge, Lephalale, and Hammanskraal on the basis of data which had already been collected, and from which the diagnostic tool emerged. Sources of information for the assessment included Integrated Development Plans (IDPs), a review of documents from the municipalities, key stakeholder interviews and focus groups, and participant observation notes from a range of municipal public participation initiatives. Departments responsible for local economic development, planning, and service provision were explicitly targeted for interviews as well as observation, in addition to civil society organizations, and community-based organizations serving migrants within the community.

Data was collected through an iterative process described above. Once fieldwork was complete, data was analyzed, and the tool was developed on the basis of points of convergence and divergence across the municipalities studied. The tool was

then applied retrospectively on the basis of available data. The results were then discussed with the municipalities in a verification workshop. Had time and resources allowed, having an additional step of fieldwork to apply the tool collaboratively with stakeholders may have both resulted in less schematic findings and more refined criteria, but also strengthened buy-in and ownership. However, applying the tool retrospectively was a useful way of triangulating the consistency of data gathered across municipalities, and confirming areas of consistency and divergence in the findings.

Conceptual Challenges in a Comparative Case Study Approach

In developing the migrant responsive diagnostic tool, a key concern was to have some level of comparability across each municipality, and to the extent possible, to maintain comparability across different dimensions of the diagnostic. A first phase of research conducted at ACMS carried out detailed case studies within several municipalities, but the focus in this later stage was to target the potential for capacity building initiatives, and as such, while contextualizing the data was important, being able to compare and generalize was a central aim (Vearey et al., 2014).

Each municipality demonstrated key differences. Some will be discussed later in the paper, while others are illustrated in detail in publications addressing the content of thematic findings of the research (Blaser and Landau, 2014). These differences ranged from contextual differences around the dynamics of mobility within the municipality, to institutional differences in the structures of governance and political incentives. Sometimes, these institutional differences presented a challenge in defining concepts around both migration, and governance (Zapata-Barrero et al., 2017). Consistently applying these concepts in different institutional concepts was a constant struggle for the research team. This was made even more challenging due to the fact that a range of responsibilities were required to respond effectively to mobility, including planning, data management, etc. Each municipality defined and delegated these responsibilities differently across different offices, with some functions located strongly in departments of economic development, while others were performed by service delivery departments. Finally, others conducted these functions through institutional partnerships with other bodies (Vearey et al., 2014). Since no municipality had specific, defined outcomes around migration, understanding what these different capacities looked like, and where they were located within the municipal administration was a crucial part of the diagnostic study.

Furthermore, each municipality had varied migration dynamics, which interfaced with mechanisms of governance in different ways. In some communities, migrant workers remitted a significant portion of the economy, and represented a powerful political force. In other municipalities, international migrants were closely aligned to the ruling political party, and were again a powerful political force. In yet other municipalities, the ruling party was actively involved in perpetuating xenophobic violence to build its electoral support (Blaser Mapitsa, 2018). These differences in context between the various municipalities had a tremendous influence on the way

the diagnostic tool was applied, and the way the results were interpreted. Due to this, it is particularly important to have stronger tools, applied more broadly, for understanding municipal institutions and their role in responding to a mobile population.

Reflecting on the methodology of developing and applying the diagnostic tool from a comparative perspective is important because the results of the diagnostic tool will only translate into learning if the context from the municipalities is reflected. Further studies about municipal planning capacity can only be appropriately contextualized if the methodological approach, as well as the study's results, have sufficient reflection and interrogation.

OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

While this paper primarily deals with the study's conceptual framework and research methods, rather than its explicit findings, a summary of the key results helps to contextualize this methodological discussion. The most central finding of the study is that both migrants and local government officials are co-creating the community through a dynamic process of governance and contestation around how communities are defined and served.

Municipal policy is developed in a way that largely ignores both the specific service delivery requirements of migrants, but also that does not take into account the ways through which migration is shaping the community (Blaser and Landau, 2014). With the introduction of the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act (SPLUMA), which gives municipalities widespread powers linked to land use, strengthening municipal capacity to spatialize planning processes is becoming increasingly vital. There are other key powers in the municipal domain that are critical for migrant well-being, such as the management of nodes of transport, and shaping social cohesion, where municipal authorities play a central role in shaping migrant experiences in South Africa.

This paper synthesizes the results of a research project that entailed fieldwork in five South African municipalities in 2013-2014, exploring how secondary cities in the region are responding to mobile populations. What emerged were three themes, that, when seen in aggregate, point to a need for a conceptual shift to be shared by migrants and local government officials if mobility is to achieve its potential of enabling development. The first is that migration is seen overwhelmingly as a problem, by both municipal authorities, and sometimes even by migrants themselves. While there are some nuances within this, most local authorities within municipalities are certainly not embracing migration as an opportunity. Blaser and Landau (2014) previously explored the various capacities required for local government officials to respond effectively to mobility at a municipal level. However, none of these dimensions will work effectively if municipal officials are not, first and foremost, willing to view the opportunities migration presents.

The second theme that emerged as particularly important for the way municipal responses to mobility should be designed, is that state practice is experienced

locally. While both municipal authorities and migrants have a discourse that speaks to a belief in a rationalized bureaucracy that is uniform at least at a national level, in fact, the evaluation of governance and people's experiences of management happen on a very localized scale, and this needs to be understood in planning. While scholarship on local governance in Africa acknowledges that the state has varied manifestations at a local level (Fukuyama, 2017; Börzel and Risse, 2016), it is critical to explore this in more granularity for issues which are often not considered a local competency.

Finally, migrants are currently seen as being in limbo, in a bureaucratic, social, and political 'no man's land' in terms of state governance. Claimed by neither their communities of origin nor their hosts, there is no clarity of mandate in terms of either what is needed to govern migrant communities, nor where that competency and responsibility should reside. The result is an oscillation between a policy vacuum, and a cacophony. As one scholar summarizes, "where policy instruments have, explicitly or implicitly, addressed issues of migration, there have been contradictory and confusing messages" (Atkinson and Marais, 2006). The confluence of these three things means that both the migrant experience is made far more difficult, but also that municipal authorities are missing a tremendous opportunity for more efficient service delivery and accelerated economic development.

METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTION

This paper considers reflections that came from all researchers who were part of the project, as well as the data gathered in the findings. It specifically assesses three different aspects of the research process. The first area is of practical considerations, such as differences in language and migrant status of the research team, preparation of the research project, and the data collection itself. The second section reflects on the conceptual challenges in applying the tool, and the institutional differences in the municipalities. The third and main area of reflection looks at the intersection of and fragmentation between governance and migration. It is through this third area that it becomes apparent how both fields need to be reconceptualized to better articulate areas of intersection. It also points to areas where capacity building may gain traction at the municipal level.

Practical Challenges in Transecting Two Interdisciplinary Areas

Working multi-locally was a time- and resource-intensive process. Even with significant time allocated to the fieldwork process, multiple trips needed to be taken to each site, for an iterative approach to data collection. With a small team of researchers all at the behest of municipal officials' schedules, a significant travel budget and generous time were both requirements to ensure coherence in data collection approaches. Additionally, since the research began as inductive, as the diagnostic tool was forming, the research team needed to be in constant communication about the findings emerging from each site, and developed a tightly coordinated approach to

data collection. That was particularly important with the most critical stakeholders, with whom the interview instruments were open-ended, to allow for maximum benefit from an inductive approach. However, it also meant that results were reliant on skilled interviewers who were in close communication with each other, to build the data collection in a common direction across sites.

One decision was taken to aggregate the technical capacities of the municipality across all departments and entities. In fact, there was significant variation across different departments and entities, around everything from accountability and participation, to data collection and use. That was true in some places due to individual competency, but also in other places due to the location of a function within the municipal administration. While the diagnostic tool could be adapted to be applied to a smaller unit of analysis, keeping it at the municipal level was an important decision in order to maintain the possibility for researchers to compare across municipal contexts. Departmental levels were too varied and localized for the purposes of the research.

Additionally, defining both the concepts of migration and governance in a way that resonated across all the municipalities was difficult. While there were administrative definitions in place, these were not always accurate reflections of the way the concepts were practiced. Furthermore, the same terminology, both around migration and around governance, was often used to represent very different concepts. For example, governance in some places looked at the exercise of the audit function, while in other places it referred to ethnolinguistic dimensions of the ruling political party. It emerged through the course of fieldwork that there was a very evident practical challenge linked to existing stereotypes of migration. While international migrants were particularly targeted with xenophobic beliefs, the negative sentiments were not restricted to migrants who had to cross international borders. Negative associations with migrants and migration are reasonably well documented in the literature on migration and governance (Vertovec, 2015). However, governance is also subject to a range of stereotypes, particularly at a local government level, where municipal capacity and political violence dramatically impact individual attitudes and perceptions (Benit-Gbaffou, 2014).

Conceptual Difficulties Applying the Tool

An immediate struggle in developing the tool and applying it effectively is because migration was often a politically charged topic at the municipal level, prompting officials to respond in a certain way. However, these influences were not the same across municipal contexts. As a result, it was difficult to know that respondents were engaging with the concept of migration in the same way. For example, in some places 'migration' immediately triggered discussions of foreign-born spaza shop-owners. In other places, 'migration' spoke nearly exclusively to migrant mineworkers. Both migrant communities existed in all these municipalities, but due to the local social and political dynamics, one particular migrant community was a reference point, and

certainly informed the approach of municipal officials to the research.

Related to this problem was the challenge that many municipal officials had not thought in great detail about the various ways in which migrants shape communities, and as a result, questions that were articulated around migration specifically, either led to officials saying that migration is a national competency and does not have anything to do with their work, or spoke only to issues of service delivery towards international migrants, which was of interest, but a very limited component of the research. While this did come out in the pilot phase and was mitigated by the introduction of a range of questions related to planning and demographic change and less explicitly about migration, it remained a key conceptual issue as the research unfolded.

It is evident that due to a lack of consensus about the importance and competencies to respond to a mobile population, different municipalities located these functions in different places (Parnell et al., 2002; Harrison and Todes, 2015). While exploring these functions in more detail may have been interesting, pragmatically, it meant that entry points into municipalities varied, and that understanding how these functions were expressed was inconsistent and often difficult. It also made it more complex to go through a process of obtaining buy-in and support for the research process, as it was not immediately evident who the most important stakeholders were. The fact that this hurdle was encountered in every single municipality, demonstrates that there is a definite lack of consensus around how municipalities should best respond to migration.

Contextualizing and Comparing Results

The previous sections have already agreed that analyzing the results of the diagnostic study required returning to a large amount of inductive data on how municipalities understand migration, and how communities understand governance, to look for points of intersection and divergence. A diagnostic tool then summarized the most salient features, to allow for comparability across a range of municipal contexts. This is important to allow each municipality to plan for coordinated capacity development responses.

A further challenge to comparing municipal responses to mobility across different municipalities is that it is difficult to contextualize each site's demographic variations, as well as the political dynamics these imply for migration. Both are socially and historically embedded, constantly changing, and require a high level of contextual knowledge about each community. In future studies, methods around these intersections might introduce respondent coding to address some of these contextual variations, but it was not possible to introduce such approaches for this particular study.

Finally, the research encountered a simple shortage of contextual information in all the municipalities that would have made it easier to draw stronger comparisons. As discussed earlier, the municipalities were specifically chosen due to their

relative exclusion from migration-related research. While this is a strength in terms of the study's contribution to literature in the field, it is a weakness from the perspective of contextualization and comparability. Understanding the richness of the social dynamics in each municipality was part of the strength of the research, but for purposes of future research, a more nuanced comparative analysis would be possible if these contextual diversities had a stronger basis in research.

INTERSECTING MIGRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE

Mainstreaming migration across local governance in South Africa faces a wide range of challenges. Both include divergent technical and political concepts that different stakeholders understand and practice in different ways. The mandates and practice within local government for responding to mobility are complex and at times, unclear. While both fields have been widely recognized as priorities, given the economic development trajectory and the SDGs, activities are unlikely to increase as long as there are not commonly held definitions, or widespread capacity.

Without consensus on core conceptual tenets of migration and local governance, it was a difficult task to pull together a diagnostic tool that will gauge their intersection, particularly one that could then be compared across a range of municipal contexts. However, that was precisely why the research team found the development of the diagnostic tool so valuable. This iterative process of sharpening the scope and focus of the tool helped uncover the core competencies that municipalities need to respond effectively to migration, and to see how these looked across different municipal contexts. The research process was an important part of defining the problem, which may be a theme in better understanding how cross-cutting fields intersect.

One important aspect that emerged, is that a wide range of roles and responsibilities are involved in making municipalities more responsive to migration. However, for this to happen effectively, it is important to separate out each role and mandate within each administrative body, and strengthen cross functional coordination. This has not traditionally been a strength of local government (Rogerson, 2014), and points to an area that may require capacity building if a mobility citizenry is to be responded to effectively.

Finally, complexities in this research, and the development of the diagnostic tool, highlighted that each municipal context had a distinct political, social, and administrative structure. It is within each of these contexts that migration and local governance processes of planning and participation are contested, conceptualized, and operationalized. This points to considerable variations in how migrations are conceptualized and received by municipal institutions. For example, in some communities, international migrants shared a common linguistic heritage to the community, and were considered more 'local' to the municipal authorities than migrants from other provinces of South Africa. While the diagnostic tool development was one step towards teasing out some of the points of contestation, and making these divergent views more explicit, more work is still needed to translate this into a process

of building capacity and encouraging consensus.

LESSONS LEARNED IN INTEGRATING CROSS-CUTTING TOPICS

Over all, this study highlighted several lessons for integrating mobility and local governance, both of which are cross-cutting fields with multiple points of intersection. Any effort at understanding municipal capacity, or planning capacity development interventions, will only be successful with an in-depth engagement of the intersection between local governance and mobility, to ensure that planning processes effectively accommodate demographic change. There are clearly multiple factors ranging from technical skills around data and use, to the structure and implementation of participation practices, and more contextual components of social inclusion. Municipal officials would benefit from clear guidelines around how they can better respond to migration in the community, and these materials would be best developed with engagement from a wide range of stakeholders, using the diagnostic tool as a basis for discussion and consensus building. It is important that the capacity to respond to a migrant populace does not lie with specific individuals responsible for service delivery or participation processes, but that the complexity is owned across the municipality, and that a range of functions can be drawn on to ensure responsive planning and implementation. Sometimes, a resistance to engaging with migrants or issues of migration can be a helpful starting point for understanding how best to transform municipal practice.

Finally, it was evident that a municipality's capacity to respond to migration was interwoven with its capacity to engage with a large range of other issues, from planning to service delivery. As such, this diagnostic tool should not stand in isolation of other tools to gauge and support municipal effectiveness, ranging from the Local Government Management Improvement Mechanism (LGMIM) to audit functions (Reddy, 2014; Sanderson, 2001). However, using the lens of a cross-cutting issue, migration in this case (though other population indicators like gender, could provide a different and equally interesting analysis), can occasionally uncover intersectional linkages that other approaches to understanding capacity might miss. In this case, what came out most clearly were the interlinkages between technical and institutional capacities within the municipality, as well as the way in which political authority within municipalities is historically and socially embedded. While this is not a surprise to those working on issues of local governance, capacity development approaches may not always integrate this reality.

CONCLUSION

The results of a preliminary application of the diagnostic tool in three municipalities, Lephalale, Bushbuckridge, and Hammanskraal, offer a significant opportunity to identify strengths and gaps in municipal capacity to manage a mobile community. Technical challenges were identified, such as data availability and management, as

well as the existence of forums for coordination and mechanisms for participation. There are also political and social factors which range from the ownership of spaza shops to historical economic ties across migrant communities. Despite the unique localized landscape of mobility and governance, there are many common threads in municipal response capacity.

Municipalities and migrants are both engaged in a dynamic process of creating a common community. However, expectations and perceptions held by both migrants and municipal officials are limiting robust participation and effective service delivery. One step towards overcoming this will be developing a shared understanding of what municipal responses to mobility could look like. Given the level of autonomy municipal authorities have in South Africa, empowering municipal officials to translate the lofty goals held nationally in the Constitution and the National Development Plan (NDP) requires equipping officials with appropriate tools to understand migration-responsive budgeting, participation mechanisms, and accountability. An important foundational step to facilitate this is to build recognition for the fact that municipal policy-making has an impact on migrants. There is a widespread perception that migrants can only be governed by national government, and this ignores the realities that governance is experienced locally, and local policies and practices are crucial frontline links between migrants and governance.

One of the results of implementing the study is that it revealed the extent to which definitions and concepts linked to migration and local governance are divergent, and dependent on the specificities of the municipality and its unique social and political dynamics. This was unexpected; it made a strong case for the importance of the diagnostic tool, given the difficulties of comparing the empirical data across different contexts. At the same time, it generated additional results. The diagnostic tool helped identify and draw attention to areas of contestation that otherwise may have been overlooked. If these discussions are continued and deepened, there is a possibility to build consensus among stakeholders who have an important role to play in municipal responsiveness to a mobile population. Additionally, such results will help all levels of government better understand the current capacity and landscape to identify the most relevant capacity development interventions. Given that municipalities having such autonomy in the way migrants are received, starting to define migrant responsive local governance is critical for meeting SDG targets around inclusive cities.

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Social Media and Xenophobic Solidarity in Post-colonial Africa

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In recent times, there is a resurgence of aggressive consciousness by citizens of most African countries, firmly fashioned and sustained through social media. Social media in this way effectively play roles of mobilizing and (re)constructing national identities and solidarities in ways that citizens regularly enter into violent confrontations with foreign nationals, often stereotyped as threats to the prosperity of citizens. In some African countries, executive orders have been given by heads of government that saw the vicious expulsion of millions of foreign nationals. With the advent of distance-and-time-shrinking information and communication technologies, social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and WhatsApp are relied upon in rousing support for national interests and in-group solidarity. Through a systematic review of national immigration policies and content analysis of Facebook newsfeeds in selected countries of East/Central, West and Southern Africa (Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Somalia, Ghana, Uganda, and South Africa), this paper examines how social media strengthen in-group solidarities with the attendant consequences of loss of lives, properties, and inter-state diplomatic relations in post-colonial Africa. The paper concludes that while encouraging freedom of expression within the continent, social media also bolster freedom to hate as both citizens and foreign nationals become more distrustful of one another, thereby exacerbating competition, rivalry and xenophobia. As citizens exercise their right to voice their opinions, they also actively dehumanize foreign nationals. The paper recommends that kin and friendship networks should become the sphere within which interventions for anti-xenophobia campaigns occur in post-colonial Africa, as these hold the social capital to bridge the divide between citizens and foreign nationals in attempts to achieve peaceful co-existence.

Keywords: Social cohesion, xenophobia, social capital, coloniality, social media, nationalism

INTRODUCTION

This paper examines how social media leverage on the social structures of post-independence Africa to fuel nationalistic sentiments in ways that unremittingly affect visions of Pan-Africanism and the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In recent times, social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, BlackBerry Messenger, YouTube and WhatsApp, have become powerful platforms to broadcast messages, photos and video clips to a global audience (Gillespie, 2010). Aker and Mbiti (2010) and the African Union (AU, 2015) argue that both nationals and foreign nationals of African countries engage with social media to disseminate misleading narratives that generate negative perceptions of themselves. Landau (2010) show that this is generating an aggressive and restless consciousness among nationals and foreign nationals, frequently leading to conflict and confrontation – including the use of violence against themselves – as foreign nationals are often seen as threats to the prosperity of nationals.

In Nigeria for instance, during the President Shehu Shagari administration in 1983, an executive order was given for undocumented foreign nationals and those with improper documents to leave the country within two weeks (17 to 31 January 1983). Almost all of those foreign nationals were West Africans, of whom over a million were Ghanaians, and the remaining one million were a mix of other West African countries (Aremu and Ajayi, 2014). During that period, foreign nationals had been attracted to Nigeria because of the oil boom of the 1970s, when the Nigerian economy thrived (Eker, 1981). However, in 1983 when the 'Ghana must go' revolution began, the Nigerian economy had become weak and was fast falling apart (Umaru and Zubairu, 2012). About two decades earlier, in 1969, the Ghanaian Government had banished Nigerians and other immigrants in an expulsion order, commonly known as the 'Alien's Compliance Order' (Aremu and Ajayi, 2014:176). This order saw the expulsion of a large number of African migrants from Ghana. The order required all foreign nationals in Ghana to be in possession of a residence permit within two weeks. It earned Ghana the displeasure of most West African governments, especially Nigeria, Togo, Benin, Niger, Mali, Ivory Coast, and Burkina Faso whose nationals were affected (Aremu and Ajayi, 2014). In the same fashion, in 1981 President Mobutu of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (which he had renamed Zaire in 1971) repealed his 1971 presidential decree granting citizenship to Rwandan and Burundian immigrants in reaction to national resentment against foreign nationals. Likewise, immigrants from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) were brutally expelled and chased away by the Angolan state agencies in 2008 (Betts, 2010). Kersting (2009) documents the September 1977 decision of the DRC government to deport about 6,000 West Africans, whose shops and businesses were confiscated and distributed to Congolese. These West Africans were described by Congolese as *ndingari,* which refers to a "tick sucking blood from a cow to which it is attached" (Kersting, 2009:14). The West Africans were also stereotyped as being corrupt, liars, violent, criminal and unclean (Kersting, 2009). In a similar vein, the

DRC government in a 2005 national legislation completely barred foreign nationals from owning small transport businesses, side walk stalls, and bakeries. These are all disquieting accounts of how Africans have been dehumanizing each other. In recent times, mostly public individuals and institutions in Africa tend to take advantage of social media to continue the dehumanization of fellow Africans by spreading and promoting ideologies that find scapegoats in foreign nationals, who are often blamed for underdevelopment and poor social services, thereby winning and retaining the trust of nationals for non-performance (Landau, 2010).

Adopting the social capital theory, this paper discusses the origin of xenophobia and xenophobic violence in post-colonial Africa, which is traced to the strong bonding in-group social capital or social ties among nationals of African countries. This strong-bonding social capital among nationals results in weak ties with foreign nationals who are often considered as 'out-group' members. The paper engages Pierre Bourdieu's (2011) social capital theory to explain the role of kin and friendship networks in maintaining strong bonding in-group social capital among nationals and foreign nationals. In explaining social capital, Kelly and Lusis (2006) support Bourdieu (2011), arguing that although social capital may be typically acquired through immersion in kin networks, to them, state interventions for peaceful co-existence between nationals and foreign nationals do not often take into consideration the pivotal role of kin and friendship networks. They argue that immigrants or foreign nationals who maintain strong ties exclusively with their kin men and women or people with whom they share the same nationality, may be socially and economically disadvantaged, as these strong ties may prevent them from accessing material, informational, instrumental and emotional support from wider networks. Putnam (2007:143) also reaffirms the relationship between bonding and bridging social capital by illustrating how people who have many friends with whom they share the same kinship or ethnicity, also tend not to have many friends who do not share the same kinship or ethnicity.

In explaining why some foreign nationals and nationals remain strongly bonded to their kin or nationalistic ties, Bourdieu (2008) provides a useful analysis. Rather than taking networks for granted, Bourdieu argues that networking requires effort and the investment of time and resources. Thus, depending on the available time and resources, people have different opportunities to access and participate in networks. He identifies three forms of capital that individuals may possess: economic, cultural and social. Economic capital refers to material assets and income, while cultural capital refers to the symbolic assets that a person possesses, such as language and behavior – this can also be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications. Social capital refers to the size and type of social networks a person can access and draw upon (Bourdieu, 2008). In this era of digital technologies where social media reign, the ability of both nationals and foreign nationals to mobilize social capital and successfully engage in bridging with kin and friendship networks outside their nationality is mostly dependent on the cultural capital (which include language, social

media skills and educational qualifications) at their disposal. Morris (2003) argues that in post-colonial Africa, this ability is further conditioned by wider social processes such as national immigration policies.

The new pan-Africanist initiative envisions a united, integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena (AU, 2015:11). By this aspiration, it therefore means that the global economic order with its new information and communication technologies as well as its new digital technologies greatly offer opportunities for the integration of the African continent in terms of ease of the mobility of labor and capital (Kersting, 2009). To the contrary, opportunities of digital technologies have rather triggered transnational migration on an unprecedented scale within the continent and have also reinvigorated national identities and local cultures where there is a fort of nationalism that strives for in-group solidarity and out-group hostility (Guarnizo and Smith, 2017). This form of nationalism declares national boundaries sacrosanct, with the suppression of ethnic and cultural diversity (Kersting, 2009). According to Kersting (2009), citizens under this form of nationalism are made to incontestably accept the concept of state in ways that they develop a feeling of national solidarity and identity based on an imagined shared history and a common destiny. In this way, national symbols such as anthems, holidays, currency, passports, postage stamps, flags and football or 'rugby' teams are depended upon to foster nationalism. Nationalism here only represents a doctrine in which the citizens' culture, history, institutions, and religion are distinct and the aspiration for self-rule and politics is to preserve and protect their distinctiveness (Kersting, 2009:8). In this way, nationalism is ethnocentric (Mamdani, 2005; Ihonvbere, 1994; Yeros, 2016). In ethnocentric nationalism, the inclusion of foreign nationals into the destination society is based on criteria such as language, religion, or a myth of shared kinship (Kersting, 2009:8). In the context of post-colonial Africa, the new social media serve as important tools that nationals rely on to remind themselves daily of their place in the world of nations (Guarnizo and Smith, 2017). Claude Ake (1996) calls nationalism in Africa 'internal xenophobia'. To Ake, the first wave of nationalism during colonial Africa mobilized nationalistic solidarity against colonial powers, while post-colonial nationalism in the continent mobilizes solidarity among nationals against denizens (non-citizens) (Kersting, 2009:8). In this nationalism, citizenship is key, it gives right to access social services, employment, land, and identity. Hence, foreign nationals or 'strangers' are violently excluded even when they have been long-term denizens of a given country. They are excluded because they are not "sons of the soil" (Kersting, 2009:11). In this way, migration is not recognized as a veritable cause that has the ability to contribute to inclusive growth and development at destination countries (De Haas, 2010). Instead, I argue in this paper that the accordances and offerings of social media have made it easier for xenophobia and xenophobic violence to be transmitted in post-colonial Africa. Misago (2016:446) has noted conceptual and empirical distinctions between 'xenophobia' and 'xenophobic violence'. In his definitions, Misago (2016:446) refers

to 'xenophobia' as negative attitudes towards the 'other'; while 'xenophobic violence' is a manifestation of xenophobia towards the 'other'. According to Misago (2016:447), the methodologies and interventions required to tackle xenophobia (attitudes) are different from those required for tackling xenophobic violence (behavior).

In an attempt to understand how social media maintain social bonds among nationals and foreign nationals in manners that exacerbate xenophobia and xenophobic violence in post-colonial Africa, this paper systematically reviews national immigration policies and Facebook newsfeeds in selected countries of East/Central, West and Southern Africa. These include Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, the DRC, Nigeria, Somalia, Ghana, Uganda, and South Africa. The paper consists of three sections. The first section provides a global overview of migration as a defining feature of the 21st century. This section stresses that people will continue to cross borders in search of a decent life. It also provides the origins of the term 'xenophobia', which emerged from the Greek words *xenos* meaning a 'stranger' or a 'foreigner' and *phobo* meaning 'phobia', referring to an irrational fear of persons or groups regarded as 'outsiders' (Kang'ethe and Duma, 2013:157). Discussions in this section coalesce to advocate that foreign nationals need to be entitled to the same universal human rights and fundamental freedoms which must be respected, protected and fulfilled at all times. The second section of the paper explains the methodological approach and underscores the emancipatory and oppressive power of social media, highlighting how social media influence xenophobia and xenophobic violence in Africa.

The paper concludes that as nationals feel stronger bonds to seek national development, there is a correlate heightening of opposing relations and interests against foreign nationals in the form of violent actions, including xenophobia. This frustrates efforts for an integrated African continent, politically united, based on ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance. The paper therefore recommends that kin and friendship networks – which broadly include extended family, biological relationships, genealogy, marriage, and other self-ascribed associations, beyond the nuclear family – have a critical role to play in catalyzing action and facilitating anti-xenophobic interventions in post-colonial Africa. Digital technologies, which include social media platforms, can serve to encourage pro-social behaviors that build bridging rather than only bonding social capital among nationals and foreign nationals of African countries.

HUMAN MOBILITY, XENOPHOBIA AND STATE CAPABILITY IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA

A key defining feature of the 21st century is believed to be human mobility characterized by the trends of fragility and mobility (Betts, 2015). In this era, people will continue to move and cross national borders in search of a decent life (Betts, 2015). With advances of globalization, opportunities to move have increased (Castles et al., 2013; Czaika and De Haas, 2014). Regrettably, most nation-states, especially within the African continent, are fragile with weak governance structures and capability that

complicate their ability and willingness to ensure the protection of the most funda-
mental human rights of citizens and immigrants. Pointedly, the 2018 Fragile States
Index for instance, placed both countries that are poor (such as Zimbabwe, Mali,
Congo, DRC), and rich countries (such as the United Kingdom, United States and
Qatar) towards the top of its list as the most-worsened countries (Messner, 2018:1).
This clearly demonstrates that the world has fewer answers to challenges of fragility
and mobility.

 Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2017) and Hanna (2017) argue that the world
is witnessing the greatest human mobility throughout all human history as tens of
millions of people are daily forced to cross national borders. According to Betts
(2015), there were 70 million international migrants worldwide in 1970. However,
this number has risen to over 200 million international migrants across the world
in 2018 (Mella, 2018). According to the World Migration Report 2020, "current es-
timates are that there are 272 million international migrants globally (or 3.5% of the
world's population)" (IOM, 2020). Even though most nation-states are pursuing the
politically expedient fiction that they can unilaterally assert sovereign control over
immigration, the reality shows that control over immigration is becoming a more
complex matter in the 21st century (Mella, 2018). A common position has emerged
that affirms the global migration crisis, even though there are debates whether it is ei-
ther a 'migrant' or a 'refugee' crisis (Geddes and Scholten, 2016:85). Specifically, most
human migratory movements have been from refugee-producing countries (Czaika
and De Haas, 2014; Reuveny, 2007). Feller (2005), Koser (2010), Zetter (2007) and
Morris (2003) differentiate between migrants and refugees. They are in consonance
with Anderson and Blinder (2011:2), who assert that migrants are persons who make
a conscious choice to leave their country to seek a better life elsewhere. On their
part, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' (IFRC)
policy on migration describe migrants as people who leave or flee their places of ha-
bitual residence to go to a new place across international borders or within their own
state, to seek better or safer prospects (Moretti and Bonzon, 2017:165). Moretti and
Bonzon (2017) argue that before migrants decide to leave their home country, they
usually seek information about their destination country, study the language and ex-
plore employment opportunities. This means that they have the time and privilege to
plan their travel, take their belongings, and to say 'goodbye' to the important people
in their lives (Betts, 2015). They are also free to return home at any time if things
do not work out as they had hoped, or if they get homesick or if they wish to visit
family members and friends left behind (Betts, 2015). On the other hand, refugees
are forced to leave their home country because they are at risk, or because they ex-
perience persecution (Moretti and Bonzon, 2017:165). This therefore means that the
basic concern for refugees is the protection of their human rights and safety. Regret-
tably, Betts (2015) argues that a significant proportion of foreign nationals across the
world today fall into the category of survival migrants whose governments cannot
support or provide some kind of remedy or reliefs to people affected by environmen-

tal change, food insecurity, and generalized violence.

On his part, Ragaven (2008) reveals that cultural, genocidal and hegemonic racism and ethnicity remain primary social evils of our times globally. Accordingly, these de-socialize and pathologize whole generations of foreign nationals, depriving them of fundamental human rights and fabricating them as 'outcasts' in countries of destination. This has resulted in the fragmentation of populations, thereby indelibly etching identities and solidarities that accentuate 'otherness' (Christou and Spyrou, 2012), with new forms of xenophobia, racial and ethnic segregation, prejudice and rationalities becoming the norm globally (Mendelberg, 2017). Xenophobia is used here in a more general sense to describe hostilities based on prejudice and stereotypes toward foreign nationals (Harris, 2002; Neocosmos, 2010). This therefore means that xenophobia constitutes stereotypical thinking or prejudiced attitudes toward groups and members of groups that can be distinguished on national or ethnic terms (Crush and Ramachandran, 2010). The term 'xenophobia', as indicated earlier in this paper, is believed to have originated from the Greek word *xenos* which refers to a 'stranger' or a 'foreigner' and the Greek word *phobo* which means 'phobia' – an irrational fear of persons or groups that are regarded as 'outsiders' (Kang'ethe and Duma, 2013:157).

All through history, there are accounts of xenophobia occurring across different nations and peoples, as exemplified in the Jewish holocaust that culminated in hate and an explosion of unimaginable brutality leading to the mass, industrialized murder of nearly six million Jews, not killed in battle or war, but put to death in factories built expressly for murder (Major, 1996). In Europe, a study of social attitudes by Harvard University established strong racial bias in several Eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria, Slovakia, as well as Malta, Italy, and Portugal (Greenwald and Pettigrew, 2014; Kinge, 2016). In the United States of America (USA), xenophobia has manifested in the form of anti-Hispanic hate crimes (Stacey et al., 2011). A 2016 survey from 'The Environics Institute', which was a follow-up to a study conducted ten years earlier, identified discriminating attitudes in the United States (Kinge, 2016). In Myanmar (former Burma), an estimated 400,000 Rohingya Muslim refugees, out of a total of about one million living in Myanmar, escaped a surge of xenophobic violence in Myanmar's Rakhine State in 2017, into neighboring Bangladesh, after at least 6,700 Rohingya were killed by the Myanmar army (Persio, 2017). According to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC, 2020), the Rohingya "risked everything to escape by sea or on foot, a military offensive which the United Nations later described as a 'textbook example of ethnic cleansing'… (T)he massive numbers of refugees who fled to Bangladesh in 2017 joined hundreds of thousands of Rohingya who had fled Myanmar in previous years." According to Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2019), "more than 730,000 Rohingya have fled to neighboring Bangladesh since the military campaign of ethnic cleansing began in August 2017."

In Africa, Nigeria and Ghana have had records of hatred for foreign nationals ending up with xenophobia (Campbell, 2003). For example, there have been xeno-

phobic reactions of leading politicians and intellectuals in Ethiopia and Eritrea towards each other and the contradictory tendency towards forced 'unification' have made a clear understanding of each other's claims and identities difficult (Smidt, 2012:116). In the beginning of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war in 1998, tens of thousands of Eritreans and persons of Eritrean origin were expelled from Ethiopia within a few weeks. That was followed in 1999-2000 by the expulsions of Ethiopians from Eritrea (Smidt, 2012). Since then, both in Ethiopia and Eritrea, national discourses strongly claim that "the other" belonged to a "different race" (Smidt, 2012:116).

South Africa has been experiencing xenophobia and xenophobic violence both during apartheid and after apartheid (Giliomee, 2003). Giliomee (2003) states that during apartheid in South Africa, hostility between the British and the Boers exacerbated during the Second Boer War, which led to a rebellion by poor Afrikaners who looted British-owned shops. During this period, South Africa passed several laws that ostracized foreign nationals, for example, the Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913 was intended to exclude 'undesirables', a term that referred to foreign nationals (Giliomee, 2003). This effectively halted the immigration of other foreign nationals to South Africa. The Township Franchise Ordinance of 1924 deprived foreign nationals of certain municipal privileges (Giliomee, 2003). In 1994 and 1995, there were several demands by armed youths demanding that the police repatriate foreign nationals back to their home countries. Homes of most foreign nationals were destroyed in Johannesburg (Giliomee, 2003). From 2008 to 2019, recurring spates of xenophobic violence took place in South Africa, where tens of thousands of foreign nationals were displaced, and properties, businesses and homes were looted (Misago, 2019; Kinge, 2016). In their definition of xenophobia, Delanty and O'Mahony (2002) depict this phenomenon as a pathological condition that arises when the self is unable to cope with 'otherness' and is destructive of both self and others. In South Africa, the term *makwerekwere* is widely used to refer to foreign nationals (Kinge, 2016:14). Interpretively, the term refers to "a people who speak strange languages coming from economically devastated countries in search of greener pastures" (Kinge, 2016:14).

Kersting (2009) argues that, across the African continent, xenophobia and xenophobic violence have become a common feature in post-colonial Africa, manifesting in different forms, ranging from everyday street-level abuse to discrimination and harassment by government officials, the police, and private organizations. Nnoli (1998) concurs, positing that in post-colonial Africa, it is no longer a question of excluding 'out-group' members from jobs and the enjoyment of various social services or repressing them, but the trend has become about ruthlessly and inhumanely eliminating them in violent actions including xenophobia and genocide. Illuminating examples of xenophobic sentiments in post-colonial Africa abound in the histories of Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Djibouti, and South Africa (Kersting, 2009).

In his seminal work, Horowitz (2001) analyzes forms of xenophobia and he adduces four reasons for xenophobia and xenophobic violence in human society.

He identifies the first form of xenophobia as 'ethnic' or 'national' antagonism. This form involves conditions where there are outbursts against out-groups who differ in language, religion, or a myth of shared kinship. The second form of xenophobia occurs in cultures that have a 'reasonable' justification for violence, such as cultures that emphasize absolute obedience to religious texts with the aim of eliminating outsiders' influences from every part of their culture. The third form of xenophobia has to do with retaliating with violence when confronted with a xenophobic event. The last form of xenophobia relates to the form that prevails in societies where there is little or no punishment for perpetrators of xenophobia.

Mark et al. (2014) note that with the increase of strong nationalism in post-colonial Africa, citizens of most African countries are becoming strong supporters of affective and normative systems that are nationalistic in nature. The implication of this is that national identities and local cultures are reinvigorated, thereby consolidating strong nationalism and in-group solidarity at the expense of out-group hostility (Kersting, 2009). These dispositions are heightened at unprecedented scales especially with the advent of new information and communication technologies (Bennett, 2012).

Gijsberts and Hagendoorn (2017) show that foreign nationals in most African countries are confronted on a daily basis, with barriers that prevent them from fully participating in the political, economic, and social life of host countries. These barriers rob them of dignity, security and the opportunity to lead a better life. Other studies from the World Bank (2010) and Nurse (2018) illustrate that the exclusion of foreign nationals or minority groups from the political, economic and social life of a country, has damaging consequences for human capital development. This is because the majority of foreign nationals have been recognized as possessing the capacity of promoting inclusive growth and achieving the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in both country of origin and country of destination (Nurse, 2018). Hence, the acknowledged developmental potential of foreign nationals, as captured in four goals and five targets of the SDGs, which established the prominence of labor mobility and remittances as development triggers, especially in developing countries (Clemens and McKenzie, 2018). With the call, as provided in the Global Compact on Migration (GCM), to create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries, social inclusion of foreign nationals is undoubtedly vital in achieving the World Bank Group's twin goals of ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity (GCM, 2018:3). The advocacy here is that foreign nationals need to be accorded the same universal human rights and fundamental freedoms which must be respected, protected and fulfilled at all times. The social inclusion of foreign nationals in this context implies the process of improving their ability, opportunity and dignity to take part in the political, economic and social life of their host country (Ratha, 2016). Consequently, social media have both the potential and responsibility to contribute towards continental and international efforts at unlocking the potential of foreign nationals in enriching the social, economic and

political life of both origin and destination countries.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

The research strategy wherein data for this paper emerged involves a close textual analysis of reviewed national immigration policies and Facebook newsfeeds in East/Central, West and Southern Africa. The following top African countries of origin of migrants in South Africa were purposively selected: Zimbabwe (Southern Africa), Ethiopia (East/Central Africa), the DRC (East/Central Africa), Nigeria (West Africa), Somalia (East/Central Africa), Ghana (West Africa), and Uganda (East/Central Africa). The systematic review of national immigration policies and Facebook newsfeeds was complemented with direct observation of nationals of Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, the DRC, Nigeria, Somalia, Ghana, Uganda, and South Africa, living, working and doing business in the City of Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa. Throughout the period of the systematic review and observation from July 2018 to December 2019, the researcher lived in Sunnyside, a part of the City of Tshwane, where a significant number of the identified foreign nationals live, work and do business (Segatti et al., 2012). Events and behaviors relating to how social media reinvigorate national identities and local cultures among these foreign nationals were observed. Systematic observations were directed at membership and attendance of churches and mosques, business partnerships and patronages, and sport groupings among foreign nationals.

The data analysis took an inductive approach. This approach allows for the descriptive and detailed analysis of collections of stories, which enables the researcher to constitute a logical account based on a comparison of different accounts (Ritchie et al., 2003). This recognizes inter-relationships between the interpreter and the interpretation. Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee of the College of Human Sciences, University of South Africa.

SOCIAL MEDIA AS CURATOR OF XENOPHOBIA AND XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA

In its wider use, the term 'social media' connotes a generic term that refers to all forms of electronic communication and networking sites that allow users to follow and share content such as texts, pictures, videos and ideas within an online community (Zeitzoff 2017:1970). In broad terms, social media have made it easy to maintain connections with close friends, relatives, as well as acquaintances, which also allow for new connections with other people (Harari, 2018). In this way social media have demonstrated the ability to blur audience boundaries, where audiences are collapsed into one general space (Sanchez Abril et al., 2012). This is because social media offer public and private communication features in the form of tagging, liking or commenting and passive communication which involves the silent consumption of what is on the newsfeed (Utz and Muscanell, 2015).

Gerbaudo (2018) has highlighted how social media are taking away the mo-

nopoly of traditional media sites and outlets that have been controlling information dissemination in human society. Sunstein (2018) describes this take-over as the 'Facebook' or 'Twitter' revolution. According to him, this revolution has given enormous emancipatory powers to social media users in diverse ways. In many parts of the world, including post-colonial Africa, social media have been relied upon to organize collective action against oppressive regimes. For example, social media played a critical role in both the 'Arab Spring' uprisings across the Arab world from late 2010 until 2011, and in the 9-month protests in Sudan that eventually led to the ousting of President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019. McCombs (2018) and Valenzuela (2013) argue that the power of social media is in its ability to mobilize and get ordinary people on the streets to use its platforms as both content producers and content receivers to shape public opinion. In this way, social media allow ordinary people to be active in sharing instant information in news that go viral in a matter of seconds (Lievrouw, 2009). On the contrary, Lievrouw (2009) argues that as a result of instant sharing of sensitive information in seconds, African societies are becoming desensitized to violence, murder and death to a point where these do not affect citizens any longer, as images of gruesome deaths and torture of humans are circulated on social media with no trace of respect for the dead. With its far-reaching capacity, social media reaches out to a wide range of people, including the most isolated people, thereby posing both a threat and an opportunity for African societies (Van Dijck, 2013). Digital transformation therefore has brought about a social condition whereby about half of the world's population get their news from social media (Allen, 2018:193).

With the increasing penetration of news through social media in Ethiopia and Eritrea, nationalist discourses are continuously framed in manners that the existence of 'otherness' is no longer acknowledged. Most of the news that exacerbated tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea in recent times was obtained from digital or social media (Gagliardone and Stremlau, 2011). This provoked xenophobia and xenophobic violence, especially among younger Ethiopians who continue to use social media to uphold Pan-Ethiopianism, by claiming that Eritrea belongs to Ethiopia and to express xenophobic rejections of Eritrea as a nation-state. Ethiopian nationalism in this way regards Eritrea as an eternal trouble-maker (Smidt, 2012). Even though the development and use of social media in Ethiopia is similar to the path taken by other authoritarian regimes, there are, however, unique characteristics of social media in Ethiopia (Gagliardone and Stremlau, 2011). The Ethiopian government has a strong monopoly over social media platforms, in spite of pressure from the international community to liberalize the market. A high-ranking Ethiopian technocrat confirmed that the monopoly of telecommunications and social media is crucial to the government. This is because social media have the capacity to penetrate every aspect of "our lives that we have to make sure that it is the state that is in charge of using and implementing them. Hence, state-ordered internet shutdowns are on the verge of becoming the 'new normal' in Ethiopia" (Statement by an Official of the 'Internet Society', 18 June 2019). In Ethiopia social media is synonymous with Facebook, which

accounts for about 84% of social media users (Pettersson and Solomon, 2019). Other social media players are Google's YouTube, Facebook-owned Instagram and WhatsApp, and messaging service Telegram. In a 2019 report by Fojo Media Institute, social media in Ethiopia is described as a dark horse that not only mobilizes people but is also a means of spreading rumors, hate speech and disinformation (Pettersson and Solomon, 2019:3). In Somalia, statistics of social media users as at January 2020 from Globalstats (2020) show the Facebook dominance at about 63.23%, followed by YouTube (15.56%), Twitter (10.48%), Pinterest (3.5%), and Vkontakte (0.14%).

In South Africa, a study by the 'Citizen Research Centre' analyzed public social media posts (comments and blog posts) across Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, Instagram, forums, and chat rooms. In their report, social media contents represent the truest expression of the people's views on xenophobia and xenophobic violence in South Africa (Khoza, 2017). The report reveals that between 2011 and 2015, Twitter posts that demanded that 'all foreigners' must leave South Africa, amounted to about 5.7 billion feeds (Khoza, 2017:1). The report also affirms that on average, there are about 760 posts per day in social media calling for all foreign nationals to leave South Africa (Khoza, 2017). The report notes that social media played critical roles in two incidents involving xenophobic violence in South Africa in April 2015 and in February 2017. In the April 2015 xenophobic violence incident, the Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelithini was reported to have commented on social media that "all foreigners should leave the country" (Khoza, 2017:1). These comments were believed to have sparked the violence directed at foreign nationals in KwaZulu-Natal which rapidly spread to other parts of the country. During the periods of xenophobic violence in South Africa, daily social media conversations around the subject of 'xenophobia' rose from 760 posts per day to 5,670 posts per day (Khoza, 2017). Misago et al. (2015) observe that even local business associations such as the Greater Gauteng Business Forum (GGBF) and the South African Blacks Association (SABA) depended on social media to mobilize their members against foreign business owners in South Africa.

XENOPHOBIA AS 'POLITICS' BY OTHER MEANS: SOCIAL MEDIA AND SAFE-ORDERLY MIGRATION

Within continental and international frameworks, migration has been recognized as a source of prosperity, innovation and sustainable development (GCM, 2018:2). Migration therefore affects countries, communities, families, and migrants in very unpredictable ways. Hence, in order to effectively appropriate the development-dividend of migration, it is crucial that social media be engaged in ways that unite people and communities to make migration work for all, rather than divide and impoverish them. The potential of social media as the fastest channel of disseminating information means that social media can be engaged in ways that ensure that current and potential migrants are fully informed about their rights, obligations and options for safe, orderly and regular migration and are also informed of the risks of irregular

migration (GCM, 2018).

Although different explanations have been given to account for xenophobia and xenophobic violence in post-colonial Africa, Misago et al. (2015) point out that most of these explanations are not based on empirical evidence. Instead, they are merely based on normative assumptions, political rationales and ideological stances (Misago et al., 2015:24). These explanations only trace xenophobia and xenophobic violence in Africa to factors like poverty, unemployment, rising costs of living, poor service delivery, and poor border control (Misago et al., 2015). These explanations name 'nationality' as the sole reason for xenophobia and xenophobic violence in Africa without credence to other structural variables (Misago et al., 2015).

Misago (2016) argues that while structural factors such as history and national immigration policies are important factors in explaining xenophobia and xenophobic violence in post-colonial Africa, these factors are not given serious attention in xenophobia discourses. Hence, there is a need to explain why there is pronounced xenophobia and xenophobic violence in post-colonial Africa especially as most countries in Latin America with similar socio-economic conditions have remained calm with peaceful co-existence between citizens and foreign nationals. Misago et al. (2015) argue that a critical assessment of the nature and character of xenophobia and xenophobic violence in post-colonial Africa shows that specific groups of foreign nationals are usually targeted during acts involving xenophobic violence and that these incidents occur at certain times and at certain locations. With these peculiarities, it is convenient to posit that there is a political dimension to xenophobia and xenophobic violence in post-colonial Africa. According to Misago et al., (2015), acts of xenophobia and xenophobic violence against foreign nationals in post-colonial Africa are in most cases organized and led by local groups and individuals who are attempting to get and solidify their power bases for political and economic purposes. To these local groups and individuals, xenophobia is just 'politics by other means' (Misago, 2016). In this sense, acts of xenophobia and xenophobic violence are products of coloniality rather than products of differences in national origins or cultural heritage. This is when post-colonial African politicians take advantage of social media to reinforce strong nationalistic bonds and solidarities to justify their non-performance by scapegoating foreign nationals as presenting threats to national prosperity and development.

In defining xenophobia, an analysis of the hashtag '#xenophobia' shows that 17,000 tweets were issued with this hashtag between 30 January 2017 and 26 February 2017. Of all the ten top hashtags involved in the conversation, only one was aimed at an individual; the rest were targeted at groups. For instance, the South African Minister of Home Affairs tweeted a denial of the existence of xenophobia, stating that:

It is merely crime, drugs and prostitution that South Africans are fixating on. In a tweet, '@johny_theblessd' said:

To me #xenophobia is: selling counterfeit goods, human trafficking of SA

women, selling drugs, kidnapping and prostituting young SA girls by Nigerians, not paying your taxes, overcrowding SA schools and hospitals, smuggling of cigarettes by Zim and 4x4 highjacks by Moz and Zim.

However, along with related hashtags, there are words that are often used in conjunction with '#xenophobia' – 7.7% of tweets with this hashtag included the word 'fellow', indicating that nationals acknowledge that foreign nationals ordinarily were supposed to be 'fellow' Africans.

REVIEW OF AFRICAN POST-COLONIAL MIGRATION POLICIES

Building on the global interest in migration development, international immigration policies are recognizing key policy issues, debates, and consequences of international migration. A close analysis of Africa's post-colonial international migration policies identifies at least three areas where migration is influencing development in post-colonial Africa. First, by offering options to Africans affected by conflicts and crises, especially in countries with limited formal disaster management and social protection systems. Second, by mitigating shortcomings and distortions in national and regional labor markets. Third, by providing support to struggling rural economies and ever-expanding urban areas in the continent in terms of livelihoods and social capital transfers.

In analyzing changes in contemporary official attitudes toward migration in South Africa, Segatti (2011) observes that despite changes in the economy and the adoption of constitutionally sound legislation, regulations governing low-skilled labor remain largely unchanged, and the mobility of skilled professionals has not been addressed. Rather, policy developments in South Africa reflect increasing engagement with research and advocacy groups on issues such as human rights, but these groups' appeals have remained largely unheeded in terms of substantial changes in the management and implementation practice of international migration. Three continuing challenges befall international policy in South Africa. First, the fundamental disagreements between government, business, and unions on access to the South African labor market and the role of the state and the market in the control and management of international migration. Second, the leadership deficiencies of the Department of Home Affairs; and third, the absence of a functional platform of engagement between stakeholders, including migrants' organizations, rights advocacy groups, research, business, unions, and different government departments (Segatti 2011:31).

Within the Southern African region, Tevera and Zinyama (2002) note that Zimbabwe's migration history is unusual. They argue that Zimbabwe has always been in the unusual position of being both a recipient and sending country for international migrants. Over the years, many Zimbabweans migrate primarily to South Africa to work. For example, almost a quarter of adult Zimbabweans have parents and grandparents who have worked in South Africa at some point in their lives (Tevera and Zinyama, 2002). On the other hand, Zimbabwe was a recipient of international

labor migrants from countries such as Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique (Tevera and Zinyama, 2002:2). During the 1951 census, there were about 246,000 foreign Africans in Zimbabwe (40% of them from Mozambique) (Tevera and Zinyama, 2002:2). Zimbabwe has been a source, destination and a corridor country for international migrants. Benyera (2018) identifies the preconditions that brought about xenophobia and xenophobic violence in Zimbabwe: the construction and reinforcement of certain identities, contestation over land and land ownership and by extension, exclusion from land ownership, and human movement within states' borders.

In the past three decades, Nigeria has witnessed a "reverse migration transition, transforming itself from a net immigration country to a net emigration country" (De Haas 2008:162). Within the African continent, Nigerians increasingly emigrate to countries such as South Africa, Ghana, Gabon, Cameroon and Botswana (Adepoju, 2000). Nonetheless, Nigeria remains a migration destination for international migrants. Despite the country's economic decline since 1980, substantial communities of West African migrants remain in Nigeria, especially Togolese, Nigeriens, Beninoise and Cameroonians. Nigeria has largely pursued laissez faire international policies. In early February 2020, the Federal Government of Nigeria announced the introduction of the issuance of a visa at the point of entry into Nigeria to all persons holding passports of African countries. This is intended to encourage the free circulation and mobility of Africans within the continent, especially as the African Union (AU) launched its operational phase of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in July 2019 (WEF, 2019). In contrast to this aspiration of a free flow of trade with other Africans, in late August 2019 and "until further notice" (President Muhammadu Buhari statement on 2 December 2019 when he received a delegation of Katsina State Elders Forum in his country home in Daura, Katsina State). Nigeria closed its international land borders with neighboring African countries that highly depend on the Nigerian market. This could be interpreted as being driven by xenophobic sentiments, as the main explanation for closing the border, as given by the Controller-General of the Nigerian Customs Service:

> …is to ensure that we have total control over what comes in… (T)his time Nigeria must survive first before we begin to ask for our rights (Interview with the Nigerian Customs Service Boss during his appearance before the National Assembly Joint Committee on Finance on 2 October 2019).

This no less reinforces national solidarity and xenophobia against nationals of neighboring African countries who are blamed for colluding with Nigerians to bring into Nigeria about:

> …95 per cent of arms and ammunition inflow to Boko Haram, kidnappers, killer herdsmen and bandits… (Statement made by Nigerian Minister of Information and Culture on 26 November 2019).

On 19 January 2020 'TallJohn@JohnFanimokun' posted a tweet that said:

> President @MBuhari has again said that the Nigeria's border will remain closed. Only a fraudulent soul will be displeased with what the president said.

There were 300 retweets and 685 likes of the tweet. All the retweets coalesce to represent these xenophobic sentiments. For example, '@OduObodumu' replied to '@JohnFanimokun':

> Borders should be SEALED. All noise about some West African countries doing better have gone. All depend on illegal businesses in Nigeria. We can see that we have capacity to do many things on our own, that is how to grow an economy of about 200m persons.

Also, '@zheun85' replied to '@OduObodumu' and '@JohnFanimokun':

> Throw the key into the Lagos Lagoon. Who will believe that we can grow our own rice to this level? We only need a serious leader, Walahi this country will be great.

A further response – '@sethmola' replying to '@zheun85' and '@OduObodumu':

> So many idiots and bots still so seriously believed that Nigerian Rice production is a fallacy still? Meanwhile the facts are all there now, we are the best Rice producer in whole of Africa, from a position of best importer of same Foreign Rice. Asides other Nigeria farm produces.

CONCLUSION

In post-colonial Africa, foreign nationals are looked upon as competitors with nationals (citizens) for markets and social services. Hence, kin or ethnic solidarity is vigorously pursued and mobilized through affordances and offerings of social media to reinforce in-group loyalty (solidarity) and out-group hostility against foreigners, particularly foreign nationals of other African countries. Also, nationalist immigration policies in post-colonial Africa strengthen and pressurize national governments to maintain structural injustices that encourage citizens to resort to xenophobia and xenophobic violence with little or no punishment. So far, the perception of foreign nationals by citizens of most African countries is intensely incongruent with the vision of Pan-Africanism as promoted by Agenda 2063 that has a vision of perceiving Africans as comrades who need to be supported by one another to achieve the vision of African renaissance and development. Hence, there is a need to reinvigorate and strengthen kin and friendship networks within Africa's rural and urban spaces, as these networks have shown resilience to persist in terms of continued interaction among kinfolk of different generations, in spite of the impacts of globalization. Kin and friendship networks are intensely characterized by strong affective ties among members that perform various services for one another. Hence, kin and friendship networks should become the sphere wherein interventions and campaigns against xenophobia and xenophobic violence occur in post-colonial Africa. This is because these social networks hold the social capital and cohesion to bring together citizens and foreign nationals in peaceful co-existence. With advances of digital technologies, social media hold the potential to play the role of 'lynchpins' (Ryan et al., 2008) through which newsfeeds, gossip and information are shared among nationals and foreign nationals in ways that place the responsibility for social cohesion on society

as a whole, rather than on individuals.

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Building Belonging through Art with Young Migrants Living in Care in South Africa

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As young people with migration experiences build their lives in new contexts, their connectedness to who they are, to other people, to place and to culture underpin whether and how a sense of belonging is built in their lives. Belonging as a concept matters in young lives as it is underpinned by feelings of acceptance, inclusion and self-determination. The realization of belonging can have important implications for young people's wellbeing and development. This paper shares the barriers to belonging for young migrants in South Africa, and how the pain of past experiences, and the exclusions they are navigating in the present constrain their sense of agency, impacting self-worth and relationship formation. We share how a child and youth care center in Cape Town specializing in supporting young migrants and young people with experiences of trauma, innovated with a group of young women through participatory arts-based methods towards building belonging. We found that layering multiple arts methods can support young people to connect to their cultural roots and personal relationships, re-build trust, reimagine their identities as part of a collective and challenge power relations around gender, nationality and generation. We found that building belonging should be seen as a continuous learning process, that builds young people's reflective capacities to understand self and others and to make sense of the interaction between past, present and future. In turn, belonging provides an important conceptual tool for youth-led, context-specific approaches to working with young migrants, including on youth transitions.

Keywords: belonging, identities, youth, migration, participation, arts methods, care

INTRODUCTION

Belonging, understood as our connection to people, culture, place and subjective sense of home, and mediated by a politics of inclusion and exclusion, (Antonsich 2010) has particular relevance to young people with migration experiences (De-Graeve and Bex 2017; Harris 2016; Magqibelo et al. 2016). Young people that migrate are navigating changes in relationships, as well as in social, political and economic contexts. As young people work to build their lives in new contexts, the relationship between their past and the present can come into tension (Kistner 2015; Kohli 2011). Young migrants are working to make sense of the changing dynamics of their attachments and identities, and at the same time processing past pains including those related to loss and violence (Denov and Shevell 2019; Clacherty 2015). These experiences and emotions are being negotiated alongside new and changing desires and aspirations including for their families, communities and within society (Kohli 2011; Opfermann 2019). Young migrants are longing to belong, and at the same time trying to make sense of what they long for (Probyn 1996). How belonging is determined for young people with migration experiences is also deeply interwoven in the politics of who is seen as welcome within society (Antonsich 2010; Yuval-Davis 2006). Many young migrants face a reality of unbelonging as socially produced lines of difference, of exclusion, are drawn in their lives within their new contexts (Christensen 2009).

The influence these dynamics have on young people's ongoing identity formation and sense of having 'a place in the world' (Arendt 1971: 296), can have significant implications for their wellbeing and the foundations from which they are building their futures (Correa-Velez et al. 2010; Gonzales et al. 2013). In South Africa, young migrants' resilience is tested on a daily basis through their navigation of everyday and institutional xenophobia, alongside racialized inequalities established through apartheid and colonialism. Global research has shown that where a sense of isolation, loss or being an outsider is dominant in young migrants' lives, their identities and belonging can be destabilized (Huot et al. 2014; Kaukko and Wernesjö 2017). For young people with migration experiences living in residential care, relationships can involve a new sense of instability, which can perpetuate loneliness and feelings of being an outsider (Ní Raghallaigh and Sirriyeh 2015). Feelings of being out of place can be further amplified at the age of 18 when young people transition into legal adulthood and out of the care of the state (Bengtsson and Mølholt 2018).

Research and practice that work with young migrants to understand their lived experiences of belonging provide an opportunity to comprehend the interplay of personal, emotional factors and sociocultural and political dynamics as they build their lives in new contexts. This knowledge can help build insight into how young people make sense of their past and present life experiences, build meaningful connections and attachments, and develop a sense of possibility for the future (Bradbury and Clark 2012). This knowledge has the potential to foster young people's capacities to forge identities and belonging, and to navigate the barriers to belonging. These capacities can also provide an important foundation for the social and institutional

transitions young migrants will navigate at the age of 18. There is limited knowledge however, globally and in the South African context, on how to foster an everyday sense of belonging with young migrants, including those living in residential care (Kaukko and Wernesjö 2017; Valentine et al. 2009).

This paper discusses the development of a participatory arts project that aimed to creatively engage young people with migration experiences in building belonging. The commitment to participation emphasizes the importance of understanding young people's perspectives on belonging and the need to respond to their understanding and aspirations for how it can be nurtured in their lives. Participatory arts approaches create space for young people to grow confidence in self-expression, to build relationships and to share experiences with other youth, artists and practitioners (Nunn 2018; Marnell and Hoosain Khan 2015). The creative focus builds on the empowering qualities of arts-based methods, recognizing that words do not always support people with migration experiences to connect to and communicate complex experiences in a culturally and emotionally appropriate way (Kohli 2005; Lenette 2019). Taking a strength-based approach within creative methods also emphasizes the remembering of past abilities, to build strength of self and hope for the future (Norton and Sliep 2018). Building on the therapeutic and restorative possibilities of arts approaches (Koch and Weidinger-von der Recke 2009; Leavy 2018; Reavey 2011), the work presented here connects to calls within social work practice to better understand the role of art in supporting people with migration experiences (Denov and Shevell 2019).

This paper argues that participatory arts approaches can provide an important space for young people's safe and supported exploration of their identities and can nurture their capacities for building a sense of belonging. Through long-term engagement, these methods can support young people to reconnect to their sense of self, to have control of the narratives of their identities and to have the tools to build their relationships with community and society. To establish this argument, the paper first sheds light on the realities of migrant young people who are living in residential care in Cape Town, South Africa, and the barriers that undermine their sense of belonging. Secondly, it introduces the specific case of Lawrence House, a child and youth care center, that has evolved a youth-centered praxis focused on supporting young migrants to strengthen their sense of self, relationships and resilience. Thirdly, the paper shares the specific development of a layered, participatory arts-based approach within Lawrence House that aims to contribute to building a sense of belonging with these young migrants. We discuss how the approach engages young people in self-understanding, building trusting relationships, and mobilizing collective power in order to support their navigation of society. Throughout this paper we share our reflections on this work and conclude with implications for continuing practice. We do this from the perspectives of being in a leadership role at Lawrence House (Treves), and a collaborating researcher-practitioner (Shahrokh) who worked together, with artists, child and youth care workers and young people to develop the

participatory arts initiative. This paper contributes to knowledge on child and youth care practice with young migrants, and provides insights for researchers committed to social justice and transformation in research.

BARRIERS TO BELONGING FOR YOUNG MIGRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

In the context of South Africa, children and young people have moved to the country both independently, and as a part of family networks, for multiple reasons including, amongst others, extreme poverty and unemployment, violence and persecution including based on religion, ethnicity, and politics, in their countries of origin (Fritsch et al. 2010; Mahati and Palmary 2018; Magqibelo et al. 2016; Palmary 2009). Young people have often navigated extreme adversity journeying to South Africa (Hillier 2007), and trauma related to reasons for leaving their countries of origin is a pervasive reality for many (Clacherty 2015). Painful memories related to war, conflict, abandonment and abuse including sexual violence and exploitation, disrupt young people's lives, undermine trust and fracture meaningful relationships (Borg 2018). Where loss occurs, whether familial, cultural, societal or political, there is a loss of identity, and being able to see a "place in the world" (Arendt 1971: 296). These fractures can become embedded in young people's life narratives and this can create multiple and compounding barriers to belonging (Alayarian 2007).

Migrant young people in South Africa face complex challenges in building their lives. They often live insecurely with inadequate housing or shelter, face language barriers, and struggle to access education and health services (Magqibelo et al. 2016; Willie and Mfubu 2016). They are also confronted with new norms, roles and expectations around race, gender and power in South African society (Kihato 2007; Walker et al. 2017). They can be met by exclusionary social structures as the country bears the scars of apartheid's racialized systems of oppression. As Swartz et al. (2012: 36) suggest, young people "experience belonging to South African society...through their exclusion from it". This racialized exclusion manifests, socially, economically and politically for young South Africans as well. For young migrants from other African countries this exclusionary context mobilizes the politics of belonging in their lives in the form of everyday xenophobic violence (Landau 2012; Misago 2015) and bullying (Hlatshwayo and Vally 2014), which is fuelled by a sense of xenophobic sentiment within the state (Crush and Tawodzera 2014; Opfermann 2019). This impacts young people's ability to feel safe, stable and accepted in the context they are building their lives in. Kistner (2007) refers to migrants in South Africa as living in landscapes of past and present trauma, a conceptualization which corresponds with what Benjamin and Crawford-Browne (2010) refer to as the continuous trauma of young people living with pervasive violence in South Africa.

Through migration, many children and young people are unaccompanied or become separated from their families. South Africa's Children's Act (RSA 2005) commits to the care and protection of all children (a person under the age of 18) regardless of nationality. Young migrants in some circumstances find their way into

the child protection system. Research found that four per cent of young people in Cape Town's child and youth care centers are defined as non-citizens (Sloth-Nielsen and Ackermann 2015; RSA 2016). Not all children and young people are able to access the full resources of the child protection system as government service providers are not always aware of migrant children's right to equal protection (Willie and Mfubu 2016). Research by Magqibelo et al. (2016) found that context-specific care was not being prioritized for migrant children under the protection of the South African government, in particular with regard to their trauma and loss, alongside issues around legal documentation. This is in spite of the Department for Social Development (DSD) having guidelines for social workers on assisting unaccompanied children (DSD 2009).

Large numbers of unaccompanied children and young people struggle to be documented. There is a shortcoming in the South African Children's Act (RSA 2005) whose concept of care and protection does not entail the provision of legal status as a form of protection, or as a need necessary to ensure children's wellbeing (Ackermann 2018). The realization of one's legal rights, including the right to an identity, not only enables access to legal services and rights claims, but also can confirm a sense of having a valued and recognized identity. The mental health implications of being young and undocumented have been explored globally (Ellis et al. 2011), with research by Gonzales et al. (2013) in North America finding that young people's wellbeing and identity formation were constrained by their construction as 'illegal'. The missing of significant social milestones and constricted trajectories, alongside a sense of contracting social networks, created isolation and hopelessness. Living without documentation creates an incredible amount of uncertainty on young people's futures, in particular around the age of 18 where they are no longer protected as children by human rights law. Turning 18 can also be a significant rupture for young people living in state care, who must at the same time prepare for their transition to adulthood. Young migrants living in care often face a double burden when they transition into adulthood at 18 years as they are called upon to deal with how this experience relates to the immigration system, and the social care system. They may be transitioning out of care without legal documentation, or with a temporary status, and at the same leaving school and starting to live independently in a setting where they feel they are not accepted. Despite structural constraints, Gonzales et al. (2013) found that undocumented young people maintained hope in the face of hopelessness. This sense of hope was made possible in particular where young people had secure relationships and could build trust.

BUILDING BELONGING INTO CHILD AND YOUTH CARE PRACTICE WITH YOUNG MIGRANTS

Within the broader setting outlined above, the complex dynamics of young migrants' belonging in Cape Town provides the context for this work. The Lawrence House child and youth care center opened its doors in the city in 2005 to offer a residential

setting for unaccompanied migrant children and young people. This decision was taken, as there seemed no alternative solution to the situation of a group of over 20 young migrants stranded at the Ark shelter in Mfuleni township, outside Cape Town. Most of them had no appointed caregiver, were not accessing formal schooling and were undocumented. The then Child Care Act of 1983 was not giving clear instruction on the rights of non-nationals and their access to social services; hence social workers on the ground were unsure about their mandate concerning these children. With time, Lawrence House established itself within the residential care sector and the promulgation of the Children's Act 38 of 2005 (RSA 2005), alongside consistent advocacy and lobbying work, solidified the general understanding that all children, irrespective of their nationality or legal status were entitled to the same protection and care.

Through ongoing reflective practice between child and youth care workers, social workers and the center manager, Lawrence House generated knowledge on the shared difficulties faced by this group of young people, in particular regarding their emotional wellbeing and social interaction. Of particular significance in unpacking these patterns was the persistent fracturing and fragmentation of young people's sense of belonging. The analysis was initially grounded in Lawrence House's use of the developmental assessment framework, the Circle of Courage. The Circle of Courage is a resilience-focused approach to working with young people, which is premised on the understanding that emotional health is connected to young people having a sense of belonging, mastery, independence and generosity (NACCW 2014). Lawrence House staff found that young people tended to displace attachment to staff and the network of the care center, and that a sense of belonging in relation to their past, to kinship networks, culture, and their relation to their countries of origin was fractured. Dominant feelings that young people held, included a sense of loss, isolation, detachment, emotional numbness and challenges in sustaining relationships.

It was visible that the pains these young people had experienced, had moved with them across time and space, and were affecting their capacity to build belonging in their present and future lives (Alayarian 2007). The impact of this fractured sense of self and belonging, was exacerbated by anxiety and frustration linked to feelings of not having control over their lives (Ward 2011). This appeared to be amplified by being in an institutional care setting where young people often felt powerless over the decisions that affected their lives. Future transitional moments also came with fear of the unknown. The intersecting nature of past pains, present exclusions, and anxieties about the future were interacting with a decline in agency, mental wellbeing, and retreat from self-development, including less independence, scarce generosity and a continuous withdrawal into oneself.

This deeper understanding of the complex realities that young migrants faced, shaped Lawrence House's strength-based youth practice approach, which was linked to the need to counter the impact of trauma within migratory experiences. In doing so, Lawrence House emphasized a contextualized and grounded approach to youth

development and started to challenge practice that imposed linear, or external definitions of successful life transitions for young people (Everatt 2015). This was an integral part of recognizing young migrants' resilience, capabilities and agency in driving their development trajectories. Practice evolved to focus on creating journeys of self-discovery and self-reflection and to create opportunities to build knowledge and understanding through relational learning processes. The aim was to build empowered transitions where young people can replenish and move forward with choices, albeit not always with all solutions. Within this broader approach, and in a collaboration between the young people living in Lawrence House, the organization's programming staff and Thea Shahrokh as a researcher-practitioner, there was a sense that belonging as a process of personal and collective change, with implications for young people's present and future wellbeing, needed to be specifically engaged. The rest of the paper shares the emergence of a youth-centered, developmental, participatory and arts-based praxis within this setting and discusses its contribution to building belonging with young migrants.

NYUMBA YANGU (MY HOME): A PARTICIPATORY ARTS PROJECT CONNECTING SELF AND SOCIETY

Nyumba Yangu, a participatory arts project developed with young people living at Lawrence House focused on how young migrants locate themselves in the here and now, form emotional connections, relationships and a sense of place (Antonsich 2010). *Nyumba yangu*, meaning 'my home' in Swahili, evolved with a focus on connecting young people to finding their own sense of home in South Africa. The approach aimed to create space and time for young migrants to explore their identities and belonging through a reflexive, relational, and strength-based learning process that surfaced agentic acts. Lawrence House aimed to support young people to practice agency, grow resilience and build relational and political forms of belonging, in turn collapsing the difference felt between self and society. Drawing on critical childhood studies, for example the work of James and Prout (1990), it was evident that children and young people were established as social actors that produce meaning in their own right, and can direct their own journeys, including within new contexts (Goodman 2004; Denov and Bryan 2012). This project aimed to contribute to the refinement of young person-centered, participatory, and creative methodologies for working with young migrants to build their belonging (Green and Denov 2019; Kohli 2005; Korjonen-Kuusipuro and Kuusisto 2019; Nunn 2018).

A participatory approach places young people at the center, and shifts power relations towards young people driving the process (Torre and Fine 2006). It means working with youth to move "beyond silence into a quest to proclaim the world" (Freire 1982: 30). Creative and artistic expression can enable a freedom of expression that is not constrained by language, or expectations (Kohli 2005). Young people often feel defined by past traumas and experience a fragmented sense of self. Creative expression can support new ways of seeing and understanding both the self and so-

ciety, which can be a catalyst for countering narratives of being an outsider, and feelings of rejection (Heidenreich-Seleme and O'Toole 2012; Pink 2004; Harper 2002). Participatory, arts-based methods take multiple forms and can support visualization and self-representation from corporal expression such as dance and dramatization, to drawing and image creation methods such as body mapping, collages, and photography. The approach developed here focused on group-building and nurturing relationships through creative connection (Korjonen-Kuusipuro and Kuusisto 2019). This emphasis also builds on youth development approaches, including the role of sport, that emphasize the power of positive social interactions and self-efficacy in building belonging (Burrmann et al. 2017).

Drawing on lessons from art therapy, the approach was grounded in the premise that artistic and performative expression can remediate feelings of helplessness or powerlessness (Clacherty 2006; Kalmanowitz and Lloyd 2005), and support the identification of ways of healing, and defining self, through emotional expression (Österlind 2008). Connecting this art-making as an agentic practice to the development of positive interactions and relationships in the environments young migrants were building their lives in, shifted the focus of resilience in youth development work away from the individual, towards the social context within which resilience is interwoven and shaped (Kohli 2011). The use of creative and visual methods builds on a growing body of culturally sensitive, decolonizing, participatory work in South Africa that takes an adaptive and responsive approach to supporting the visibility of the voices of marginalized young people (Blackbeard and Lindegger 2015; Luttrell et al. 2012; Mitchell and De-Lange 2011; Mitchell et al. 2016) and young migrants (Clacherty 2016; Norton and Sliep 2018; Opfermann 2015, 2019).

The project was initiated with 10 young women between the ages of 14 and 19 living in Lawrence House. These young women had diverse experiences of migration and dislocation, including experiences of complex trauma as a result of abandonment, loss, trafficking and violence. The young women's countries of origins included Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Tanzania, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Somalia and South Africa. For a number of the young women it was difficult to identify a 'home' country, having spent many years moving between countries and with dual heritage parents, or having never lived in their ancestral lands. The project started with a young women's group, aiming to sustain previous group-building work at Lawrence House that had supported the beginnings of a collective identity between these young women. It also aimed at recognizing gendered experiences of violence and insecurity and creating a single gender space that would offer a sense of safety for the young women. For migrant young people, safety is an important marker of belonging (Kohli 2011).

This work took a layered, and emergent methodological approach (Wheeler et al. 2018) that built towards different kinds of change at personal and collective levels. Its aim was to generate more equitable and just experiences and transformed lived realities towards belonging for the young people involved (Cahill 2007). An

initial dialogue process with the young women on how and why a participatory arts project on belonging would be relevant to their lives, led to the process starting at the personal level, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: A layered and emergent participatory arts-based approach aimed at building belonging

Starting with a focus on 'self-understanding', each new layer emerged, revealing the aspirations for knowledge and change, as expressed by the young women. This responsive approach was important for ensuring young people's experiences with and reactions to the arts methods that drove the process. The project took place over a period of 12 months. Each methodological layer differed in its duration, depending on the aim of the process and the arts method. Ultimately, the first and the last layers ran over a longer-term – over four months each – with layers two and three running consecutively for six weeks at a time.

NYUMBA YANGU PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES

The methodological approach within the *Nyumba Yangu* project aimed to support the young women to move through cycles of sharing, listening and reflecting on their lived experiences as expressed through different artistic mediums. In doing so, the project envisaged to support the young people to see self, other and society differently as they learnt from their own and others' experiences in new ways, and with a sense of safety in self-expression. This would also create mindfulness of the power relations and differential experiences of social marginalization between the young women in the group. These participants were supported within the project to engage in the way that they negotiated power amongst themselves and with others in their lives, to recognize that such power relations affected not only their everyday lives but also the participatory arts process. The following sections elaborate on the implementation of the *Nyumba Yangu* project, highlighting what was learnt about the process of building belonging with young migrants in care.

Self-understanding

The process was initiated with a set of artistic workshops facilitated by Shahrokh, that supported young people to explore, through the mediums of drama and visual arts, what belonging, or home, meant in their present lives, and the extent to which it mattered to them. As an external facilitator, Shahrokh focused on evolving a process that was driven by the young women and their aspirations. The facilitator also connected her own experience of living with Iranian-Scottish dual heritage and holding a migrant background in the United Kingdom and South Africa into the process, which supported conversations about complex and changing identities as they relate to context. Initially the discussions centered around the idea of unbelonging, as this was the dominant connection the young women felt to the concept. As shown in Figure 2 below, there was a sense of detachment between this young woman's close personal relationships. The young woman who created this image explained that her relationships were separated not only by geographical, but by emotional distance.

As the young women shifted towards discussing their aspirations for belonging, their definitions centered on the relationality of belonging. The definitions included: something between people; when you are able to be yourself and have self-worth; when you have a place where you feel safe and long to be; when you have control over your decisions; and when you are supportive and kind to others. From this shared starting point, the workshop focus shifted to self-understanding, because the young women felt that their identities were in tension between their self-definition and who they felt others wanted them to be. Self-reflection and awareness became important as a first step to opening other wider possibilities of change.

Figure 2: Relationships of belonging

Artwork by young woman aged 17

Resonating with Kistner's (2015) analysis of migrants in South Africa being situated in landscapes of trauma, for many young women in the group, past pains were a barrier to engaging with a wider sense of home, and making positive cultural, relational and place-based connections that could become a part of their present lives. As one young woman explained: "I need help in learning to express my feelings and to be able to speak about my life". Another young woman explained that, "I don't want my face to change, from happiness to sadness by looking back at the past". Visual and creative storytelling methods supported young people to regain a sense of control and to 'safely', and ethically connect with both past and present, and with each other. The facilitators developed a method that supported layers of private and public expression so that the young women could engage in uncensored preparatory work before choosing what they wanted to make public about their experiences. The young women created private 'My Belonging' books that provided space for freedom of self-expression, processing of difficult past experiences, and aspirations for what they wanted to know more about in their lives. The creation of an artefact (the book) aimed to bring a sense of ownership and continuity to the process, something that can feel disrupted in the lives of young migrants and young people in care (Ward 2011). The young women then engaged in group reflections and sharing circles where they chose what to share about the work that they had been doing, and had conversations about related social and political issues.

By starting to engage the self, young women were taking ownership of their identities, which was a response to their sense of fragmentation from their cultures and histories. In resonance with Probyn's idea of 'be-longing', being desires that come with the longing for something other than what you have (Probyn 1996: 5), the young women were supported to speak about what they "wanted to know more about" to build their sense of self and belonging, and why that was important to them. An example of this reflective work is shown in Figure 3.

This young woman's aspirations were connected to her desire to make sense of multiple life-worlds. She wanted to speak her own language, as well as Afrikaans, the language spoken by her South African peers at school, and by a number of the child and youth care workers; it is also the language which she was studying. She wanted to know more about her "family root(s)" and her "family history", and build a connection to that part of herself. She also expressed her desire to find confidence and courage. When this was discussed, she explained that this was in relation to being able to take the linguistic and cultural aspirations in the list forward.

Through the artwork, the young women were recalling parts of their identities and depicting the times when they were loved as a child, sister, grand-child, friend – these were identities that they felt they had lost as a result of their experiences. They were shifting their sense of self to becoming a young person who could build personal strength and positive relationships. An example of this is a 16-year-old young woman who used oil pastels to create an image of the bedroom she used to share

with her mother. She was on her own in South Africa as her mother had returned to her country of origin. She explained that, "this picture is about me and my mother and the bond that a daughter has (with her mother)". This experience echoes another young woman's reflection that through this process, "we have moved from what was lost, to feeling found". Another young woman explained that, "I gained as a skill, learning to express myself in a positive way. I've learnt to speak and write about my feelings and I've learnt to accept life as it is and being positive". This work was catalytic, a beginning rather than an end, and a contribution towards being able to bring positive connections with the past into the present (Bradbury and Clark 2012; Kistner 2015; Kohli 2011).

Figure 3: What I want to know more about

Artwork created by young woman aged 18

Building Relationships and Trust

For young people with backgrounds of migration a sense of safety within relationships has often been broken. This happens through diverse and complex experiences but has lasting effects on young people's abilities to feel safe, stable and to trust (Korjonen-Kuusipuro et al. 2018). Issues and questions around trust, in particular around fear of judgment from others, existed within the group. To complement the above visual expressive modes, the idea of integrating a dance component into the program emerged. The young women responded positively to this artistic form of expression within a regular "girls' group" that they participated in. The dance group was facilitated by a South African woman, a native of Cape Town, who had also

lived and worked abroad in the performance arts. The facilitator's understanding of the complex cultural and relational dynamics within this group of young women, informed by her own lived experience as a woman in South Africa, coupled with her experience as a dance facilitator, contributed to the creation of a sense of safety and trust in this process.

This set of relationships, experience and contextualized knowledge was brought into a partnership with evidence from the field of dance and movement therapy (Pierce 2014) including with refugees (Koch and Weidinger-von der Recke 2009; Verreault 2017). This research suggests that a movement-based process could strengthen a sense of safety and trust within the young women's relationships with themselves and in their relationships with each other. The method using art to give expression to feelings, was also particularly important given the emphasis on bodies, race and skin color within the xenophobic narratives of exclusion in South Africa. The facilitated workshops aimed to counter these narratives through building embodied connections to self and others. To support openness in self-expression, the program of dance and movement work was facilitated using the 5Rhythms approach (Roth 1997). This is a therapeutic practice structured through improvizational movement where participants explore the rhythms of flowing, chaos, staccato, lyrical and stillness, using their bodies. Within this structure, creative expression took place, particularly in relation to self-discovery and in working towards unity (Payne 2006).

Within this process, grounding exercises were used to encourage the young women to find healing in being connected to their bodies. Finding their own ways of expressing their bodies through movement helped address harmful communication strategies, where anger or aggression could dominate, and strengthened a sense of agency (Koch et al. 2012). Movement, connected to the different rhythms helped to bring about images and metaphors of symbolic expression around different emotions. Body-to-body relation through mirroring promoted the feeling of being validated by others, built empathy and countered assumptions that the young women had about the way that others in the group would treat them. Group-based movement created relational exchange between the young women and supported nonverbal dialogue that helped build trust. In response, one of the young women explained that, "I didn't have trust and it is hard to do the moves; trying to let go was hard. Trying to trust when you are unsure, is difficult. But, in the trust circle, they didn't let me fall". This validation within the group supported young women to reflect that they could be accepted when expressing themselves in their own ways, to build a positive relationship with their own bodies, and to have a sense of control in their lives (Bengtsson and Mølholt 2018; Kohli 2011). The artistic process included an activity where the young women collectively worked on a body map, shown in Figure 4. This exercise created a space for reflection and articulation of a shared sense of identity within the group.

Figure 4: Body map image of connections made through movement

Artwork created by the group of young women

As the artwork shows, this space gave the young women a platform from which to recognize and value their uniqueness as their beauty, to articulate the power that they have to fight for what they believe in, and to establish that others do not have the power to change who they are. This transition from personal expression in the visual storybook work, to nonverbal dialogue through movement, to a collective articulation of self and identity was a powerful way of building trust in others, to understand the connections between bodies, lived experiences and aspirations for change. The body map presents evidence concrete example of this important transition.

Creating Collective Power

The progression from personal to collective reflection illustrated the connection between a sense of self, and a sense of belonging in relation to others. Learning from the lived experiences of others, as a part of a collective can enable engagement with broader power relations that surround young people's lives, as well as understanding the lived reality of others. As the young people moved through the process, they articulated a desire to shift from reflecting inwardly, to narrating their identities outwardly, and shaping their place in the world (Arendt 1971). As a result, the next phase of the process built on the performance art of spoken word poetry. This layer of the project invited young people to engage as active witnesses to each other's expe-

riences and their quests for recognition, healing and autonomy (Prendergast 2015).

The spoken word process was facilitated by a Cape Town-born poet, raised on the Cape flats, an area of the city to which people of color were forcibly relocated under apartheid, and to which a strong history of activism is attached. With a background as a performance artist and cultural activist, her work as a youth facilitator connects the power of poetry to social transformation and integration. The process started with the young women writing "I" poems, which located themselves as the main actor, and agent of change within their poetry. Through sharing and reflection, the young women then worked in pairs, then small groups to start a process of reimagining shared identities and narratives in their lives, through the medium of poetry. In doing so the young women were encouraged to make personal connections to cultural references, symbols and icons, and their own lived experiences, to enable them to build new narratives about their lives (Antonsich 2010).

The process connected to the political ideology of spoken word poetry, which is a form of collective resistance for marginalized people – a refusal to accept stereotypes or imposed identities, rather, presenting a call for social justice (Stovall 2006). The work that the young people were engaged in, brought them together with others to find a way of speaking to the world, engaging with the politics of belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006). Importantly, this exercise was not about creating a simplistic narrative of who these young women are, but rather giving space to both their individual and collective identities. The poem shared here is the final version of the collective poem that all the young women in the group constructed together:

We are the start of a line that never ends
by Lawrence House young women's group

I am flowing on the dark side of the moon
I am the smell of blood that shed many tears
I am the womb of a barren woman
I am the refugee that crawled through the dust of a thousand borders
I am the pencil that draws this story
The thief that stole the heart of the unknown

We are the start of a line that never ends
Generations wrought of earth's womb
Diamonds risen from the bowels of an African tomb

I am the daughter of an African woman
The beat of my heart is the first drum
I am strong, I am feeling, I am love
I am fire
The light that brings everything to life

> We are the start of a line that never ends
> Generations wrought of earth's womb
> Diamonds risen from the bowels of an African tomb
> And so now in life's highs and lows my heart stays steady
> In the spirit root of this family tree
> Africa lives proud in me.

In writing this poem these young women were still grappling with what it means to belong, but rather than it being something out of reach, it was something, that together they started to articulate and to claim. They claimed it in re-writing themselves; they are strong, they are love, they are fire. At the same time, they retain the complexity, the confusion and the dark and light of their lived experiences. They recognize their strength and their agency in writing their own story and they recognize that they have the power to take hold of their belonging together, as African women.

Navigating Society

Drawing on critical and participatory pedagogy, the facilitators and Lawrence House staff were committed to the young people's engagement with the wider social realities and power relations that impact on their lives. Throughout the process it was evident that young migrants in care often felt that they were powerless to change what they know about who they are and their life stories. Furthermore, there was a strong sense of others having control over their lives. Up until this point the group space had been for young women only. Within the visual, movement-based and spoken word layers of the process the young people had started to explore the gendered power relations that shape belonging. Responding to this, the young women chose for the final layer of the process to be opened up to all young people at Lawrence House. Methodologically this also recognized the relational nature of gender, and the importance of seeing the interaction of norms around gender roles and responsibilities, and power in young people's lives (Gouws 2017). This also increased the number of young South Africans within the process, which also shifted the dynamics of learning towards understanding shared realities across perceived lines of difference. The young people's commitment to work together aimed at building respect for, and understanding the perspectives and ideas of others, countering experiences of unbelonging (Christensen 2009).

Throughout the process it became clear was evident that young people found value in self-expression through drama and performance. Dramatic expression appeared to be deeply enabling in terms of critical dialogue and reflective learning with others, as well as in 'rehearsing' change in their lives. Participatory theatre became the focus for engaging the young people in understanding the role of societal narratives in oppression and the reconstruction of self and agency. Given the emphasis on self-making and building collective community in this program, a strong col-

laboration was forged with a female European facilitator who lived in South Africa for an extended period, and whose doctoral work engaged critically with the construction of gendered identities in young South Africans' lives. Her methodology was informed by the principles of Paulo Freire's conscientization and Augusto Boal's 'Theatre of the Oppressed' that emphasized the use of physical and verbal expression in making visible social issues, deconstructing them and practicing transformation through performances. In response to the changing gendered make-up of the group, a local male co-facilitator with a background in youth work, was also invited to support the process.

The participatory theatre methodology constituted fictionalized stories based on young people's lived experiences which were able to support a sense of distance between emotionally and politically sensitive issues. The theatre work gave young people space to make visible silenced issues, and to engage with the sensitivity of the issue of belonging as it relates to norms and expectations around what belonging is, and for who (Yuval-Davis 2007). Young people were able to articulate the way violence, abuse and bullying impacted their capacity to belong. Additionally, that assumptions of the family being a safe and supportive place of belonging need to be challenged. Instead, new forms of relationships and sense of family need to be imagined. As Clark (2009) articulates, this created space for young people with migration backgrounds to speak out about who they are, who they can be, and in turn move towards the belonging they long for (Probyn 1996).

IMPLICATIONS FOR BUILDING BELONGING WITH YOUNG MIGRANTS IN CARE

The young people involved in this process have, through the embodied practice of making art, generated an understanding of belonging that is both relational and in process. Building belonging is therefore not about working towards a fixed outcome or identifiable end goal; it is a continuous process that is deeply interconnected with the changing dynamics of young people's lives. Young people are looking to build self-worth, feelings of safety, decision-making power and supportive relationships, in order to support their capacities to navigate these dynamics. This project's findings indicate that participatory arts methods can create a space for understanding and realizing belonging in young people's immediate lives, and contribute to the development of capacities for building belonging as young people construct their future, independent lives.

To nurture the relational dynamic of belonging, the process needed to engage with the role of trust in relationships and in building connections to others. Nonverbal expression in the form of movement and dance was a powerful way of young people finding new ways to trust and to share experiences as equals. Trust between the adult facilitators was supported by the commitment to the time and space needed for this process to grow in response to the unfolding aspirations of the young people involved. The creation of a safe space, was supported by long-term relationships be-

tween young people, and with facilitators, which help to (re)build trust that had been fractured through complex life experiences. The emphasis on trust draws visibility to the interaction with past experiences, of loss, violence and abandonment (Kistner 2015), and building present and future relationships that can establish connections to people and places (Antonsich 2010; Arendt 1971). Nurturing this trust, and trusting relationships with peers and adults in turn can contribute to the capacities of young people to build trust beyond the life-space of the participatory arts group.

Work on belonging is not easy; it is not a neutral issue for young people and involves emotional labor that needs to be continuously held and nurtured by the care network around the young person. Significantly, this project was supported by an organizational culture of young people's participation in their own development. Child and youth care workers and social workers were engaged from the outset and feedback loops were embedded so that young people were able to articulate the changes they were going through to their peers and care workers. Within this process, child and youth care workers indicated that an important lesson for their practice was that while legal documentation is critical for young migrants, it is not all that is needed for belonging. Social workers should continue to ensure documentation is realized, and at the same time, young people want to know more about their families, their communities, their language and their cultures. This research has shown that participatory arts processes can support young migrants to engage with these questions and work towards possibilities of realizing change.

The knowledge generated through this process provides rich and in-depth understanding of belonging in young migrants' lives, which has implications for the young people themselves, as well as for the practitioners and researchers engaged in their care. Reflective arts methods supported young people's self-understanding, enabling them to make sense of fractured pasts, in relation to how they were directing their lives in the present. Using a creative approach supported young people in recognizing the multiple forms of knowledge and identities that exist within them, and to reclaim this new knowledge. Visual storytelling created the space for narrative construction that recalled past strengths, including those pertaining to people, cultures and places, and to connect this to self-identification and determination within their futures (Bradbury and Clark 2012).

The transitioning from the personal to the collective level was also important for building understanding of self and other, and for developing new ways of seeing connections and relationships. This layered learning was supported by the emergence of a deep form of empathic listening that enabled an understanding of complexity and power-relations within the different young people's stories and experiences. This complexity helped build the potential for transformation as it created room for young people to construct new identities and belongings that embraced fluidity, multiplicity and change. This embracing of multiplicity has the potential to support them to make sense of their whole selves, without fear, shame or rejection of what had come before. It also supported their connection to each other, and fa-

cilitated the finding of linked social issues that led to their connection to a shared struggle, overcoming the isolation that can manifest through the politics of belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006). An important change seen in young people was reflected in the development of "non-oppressive identities" (Swartz and Soudien 2015: 35), made up of tolerance, acceptance and a rejection of discrimination.

The further development of this work with young migrants, together with young people marginalized within the care system more broadly, may create opportunities for young people to come together and learn across perceived lines of difference, building towards more inclusive societies. Additionally, by developing this work with other young people within the communities where these young people currently live, and will be transitioning into, it may become possible for young people to translate their knowledge into concrete action, and make meaningful connections with their future selves, and future lives (Korjonen-Kuusipuro et al. 2018).

CONCLUSION

This paper shared the reflections and insights of young migrants living in care in South Africa, on their search for belonging. The project grew from the perspectives of young migrants, and provides insight into methods using different art forms, that can contribute to their unique conceptualizations of belonging. The participatory approach supported the building of meaningful connections to self and others, which have the power to facilitate feelings of belonging across young people's past, present and future lives. The building of belonging for these young people speaks to the unique realities of their past pains, and present insecurity in South Africa. The contextualized knowledge generated through an emergent, participatory arts process can help improve child and youth care practice by enhancing sensitivity and responsiveness to young people's realities. This project has shown that efforts towards building belonging need to be continuous, they have to move through cycles of connecting young people to self, to others, and to society. Belonging is a process. Within a context of youth transitions, participatory arts can support young people to drive this process, and through this, they could reconceptualize and realize their sense of self, and sense of belonging, in the present, and importantly, in their futures.

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NOTE

The young people in this study have been anonymized throughout to protect their identities.

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In Pursuit of Being and Belonging: Migrant Associations and the Integration of Nigerian Migrant Entrepreneurs in Harare

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The main thrust of this article is to analyze how a migrant association, particularly the Nigerian Community in Zimbabwe (NCZ), facilitates being, belonging and integration of migrants in the host society. Grounded on ethnography as a method of inquiry and transactional theory as an analytical framework, the article attempts to answer two questions: i) how does the association help to bond and enrich the lives of migrants; and ii) how does the association facilitate the bridging of social connections with the 'other' with the ultimate goal of burying differences, which in essence helps them to continue staying and accumulating in the diaspora. The article illustrates how the association facilitates newcomers' integration, through a range of activities, purportedly, to enrich the lives of migrants in 'strange' downtown environs. As increased contact with the indigenes ensues, the article also shows that the association shifts focus and starts to lessen the social differences between 'us' and 'them' through various activities. The article concludes that migrant associations act as a buffer for migrants as well as a bridging mediator vis-à-vis the host society. With these observations, the article recommends that there is a need for nation-states to leverage on migrant associations for effective migration management as their roles need to be incorporated into migration policies. Additionally, establishing a line of communication with migrant associations is vital. Migrant associations and the nation-state need to find more spaces of communication and interaction to bridge the divide that separates 'us' and 'them'.

Keywords: Ethnography, identity, integration, migrants, migration, transactionalism

INTRODUCTION

Migrations, with all incidental collision, conflicts and fusions of peoples and culture which they occasion, have been documented among the decisive forces in human history (Park 1928). In recent years, one consequence of increased mobility which is evidential in mobility discourse is migrants' disposition to form migrant associations in host nations. However, despite the overwhelming evidence on intra-African mobility, research has mainly focused on the Global North (Layton-Henry 1990; Putnam 1993; Owusu 2000; Moya 2005; Sardinha 2009). African migrants in other African countries have rarely been the subject of serious study, and hence very little is known about migrant associations in African settings.

The overbearing angle of this article is to look closely at the roles attributed to migrant associations when it comes to migrants' being, belonging, and integration in host societies amidst ethno-cultural and social differences. In practice, Nigerian migrant entrepreneurs have organized themselves internally often belonging to an association – the Nigerian Community in Zimbabwe (NCZ). The article also shows that beyond the entrepreneurship, the association also helps them to forge relationships with the 'other', namely the local community to which they are strangers and must fit in. In addition, the article shows how they use this association to win favours among the authorities and the local people who constitute their neighbours. Accompanying ethnographically-based observations, this article sets itself within the theoretical outlook that being, belonging and integration are not only socially constructed but mutually constructed by migrants and the host society they are settling in. Within this context, the article supports the assertion that being, belonging and integration are migrants' objectives to be achieved within multicultural/intercultural environs.

LITERATURE REVIEW – CONTEXTUALIZATION

The current era is one in which varied forms of human mobility, across cities, nations and geopolitical frontiers are redefining the meaning of 'home', 'community' and 'belonging' (Landau and Bakewell 2018). Migration is not a new phenomenon in the history of Africa. According to migration scholars, migration had its own functions for different groups and societies, which included the pursuit of sheer survival, search for better opportunities and improved conditions, and of course, the consolidation of advantages and benefits (Adepoju 1995; Baker and Aina 1995).

Some observers have amply described Africa as a 'continent perpetually on the move' (Flahaux and De Haas 2016). In Africa, the dominant theme has been movement to the Global North (Adepoju 2005; Obi 2010). However, there is evidence which points to internal mobility within the continent even if this is intended to prepare for final migration to the Global North (Whitehouse 2012; Antwi-Bosiakoh 2009).

Despite the apparently distinct phases of African history (the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras), migration assumes a considerable measure of both

diversity and continuity in its causes, magnitude and effects on African cities and economies (Mbembe and Nuttall 2004). As the African City increasingly becomes metropolitan (Mbembe and Nuttall 2008; Simone 2001), new scents are smelt, new tastes savoured, new sounds heard and above all, new faces seen (Simone 2004). The city is reproducing the uneasy convergence of seemingly different needs and practices among migrants as new arrivals are moving in, seeking profit, passage and protection (Landau and Bakewell 2018). Through migrants' mobility into, within and out of cities, urban spaces which had tenuous connections between subjects for many years, have now become nodes in diasporic networks of social and economic exchange (Mbembe and Nuttall 2004; Landau 2014).

Migrants not only leave their homelands and find ways into new spaces, rather they reshape themselves along with relations, values and institutions in the host country (Landau and Freemantle 2016). They create and recreate relations with their compatriots who moved with them or before (Schrover and Vermeulen 2005). In the host country they are subject to different laws and regulations; they take on new customs; they have different neighbours and they learn new skills and reshape their own history (Owusu 2000; Whitehouse 2012). These novel and peculiar laws and regulations, as alluded by Landau and Bakewell (2018), create possibilities of migrants organizing themselves and creating symbiotically organized associations in order to navigate the strangeness and quandaries that characterize the new urban milieu (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). These associations are formed to create solidarities in the host countries to protect mutual interests and mobilize support on issues of concern (Layton-Henry 1990).

Casual observers and scholars alike have called attention to migrants' disposition to form associations or communities abroad (Moya 2005; Vertovec 2004). De Haas (2006) defines a migrant association as a voluntary grouping of migrants based on reciprocity, solidarity and collectivism, which wields resources and power to forge collective benefits. Bell (1975) defines a migrant association as an effective tie with a common interest formed to preserve the identity and culture of migrants as well as playing a role in the settlement processes through to pathways of integration. These associations provide migrants with social capital, either bonding or bridging (Putnam 2000). Bonding capital connects migrants internally to sustain in-group reciprocity. Thus, integration is maintained through interdependence, exchange and reciprocity (Sardinha 2009). On the other hand, bridging capital connects migrants and the hosts and helps to bring consensus between 'us' and 'them' (Putnam 1993) and integration is achieved through forging of relationships with the hosts, which can lead to cooperation, transactions, and exchange of resources (Cheater 1989).

The review above is suggestive that migrants often develop social and close relations with each other. This might involve subjugating themselves to a membership or voluntary association. Whatever the case, migrants are able to adapt to the new environment using these institutions. But there is another set of literature which suggests that migrants also forge relationships with outsiders using these associa-

tions (Sardinha 2009; Cheater 1989). They may provide gifts, information or provide social responsibility. The range of what they do is unlimited. These sets of relationships, it would appear, are capable of making the new migrants better understand, and more importantly exploit the resources at destination.

This article deals with this matter, using the case of Nigerian migrant entrepreneurs who have migrated to Harare since the 1990s. Mangezvo (2018) observed that Nigerian migrants represent the largest proportion of foreign entrepreneurs operating informal businesses in Harare. Data provided by the Nigerian Community in Zimbabwe (NCZ) shows that there are between 1500–2000 Nigerian entrepreneurs, broken down to fluid ethnic groups which include Yoruba, Edo, Igbo, Hausa and Ogoni. These ethnic identities are de-emphasized, and the common identity as 'Nigerian' is the one that is preferred. These migrants chiefly come for business opportunities which they say are endless in Zimbabwe. Even those who view Zimbabwe as a transit point to other destinations end up attracted by these opportunities. In Harare, Nigerians have taken over the downtown area, putting up shops retailing goods and services ranging from motor spares, electricals, cell phones, clothing, cosmetics and internet cafes. However, in this same locale, migrants are often regarded as 'aliens and unwanted intruders' who have come to grab opportunities from the autochthons, and this further compounds their precarity. Thus, to navigate this seemingly chaotic and rough terrain imbued in their everyday struggles over 'politics of space' (Certoma et al.2002), they enact being and belonging through forming associations.

This article employs a transactional lens to show how migrant associations facilitate migrants' integration into the host society. Barth (1963, 1966, and 1969) and Bailey (1970) propose the importance of association in enhancing group solidarity. Additionally, these scholars also observe that reciprocity and exchange between diverse actors is the basis for bridging social relations. In recent years, a new concept of conviviality has emerged (Nyamnjoh 2017; Overing and Passes 2000; Gilroy 2004), emphasizing how migrants create associations to enrich themselves or to use these associations to create convivial relations with the 'other' thereby forging belonging in particular contested spaces. This article argues that this is still the essence of transactionalism, which both Frederick Bailey and Fredrik Barth – two leading transactionalists – saw as being at the centre of all societies, including urban cities.

METHODOLOGY

Data for this article was generated from ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Harare's popular downtown boulevards, located in the fringes of the city centre. This is a locale where migrants, Nigerians included, have arrived in various migratory rhythms seeking opportunities in the thriving informal sector. In line with Ferguson's assertion that, "ethnography is like fishing; all you need is a net to swing; and you will be sure of catching something" (1999:17), ethnography allowed for the acute exploration of the associational lives and experiences of participants.

Since there was no existing sampling frame and participants exemplified a

hard-to-reach population (Atkinson and Flint 2001), snowball sampling was the main vehicle through which participants were selected. As suggested by Akanle (2013), this method consists of identifying and contacting participants recommended by others. For example, the researcher identified the association's president and one local entrepreneur operating in downtown Harare, who then referred the researcher to other participants. This technique was useful because many potential participants were sceptical of the researcher's intentions. Thus, initial participants and contacts were relied upon to recommend other participants.

In keeping with Denscombe (2010), the aim of this study was to emphasize the depth and detail of everyday associational lives and experiences rather than the breadth of associational lives and experiences of migrants. The number of participants was thus limited to 45. By its nature, ethnography may not yield depth if not narrowed to a few cases. Geertz rightly points out that "small facts speak to large issues" (1973:23). Participant observations and in-depth interviews were the primary avenues of approach to gather the required data from a broad swathe of participants, who included: 20 Nigerian entrepreneurs, 8 association leaders, 3 commuters, 10 local traders, 2 immigration officials and 2 Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) officials. In other instances, the researcher made use of informal discussions, some spontaneous and some orchestrated to capture the lived realities of Nigerian migrant entrepreneurs. Secondary sources, particularly the local newspapers and the associations' Facebook pages were also used to triangulate data obtained from in-depth interviews and participant observations.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Motives for Formation of the Nigerian Community in Zimbabwe (NCZ)

According to its president, Mr Obodo, the Nigerian Community in Zimbabwe (NCZ) was formed in 1994 to cater for the welfare of Nigerians in the country. The association has a clear organizational structure which consists of the president, vice-president, secretary, vice-secretary, treasurer, welfare officer, assistant welfare officer, spokesperson and the provost/coordinator. These leaders 'give face' to the association and work as active members, defining rules and modes of action, emitting their opinions and exercizing their influence on the association's members. This resonates well with the observations of Cheater (1989) and Albuquerque et al. (2000) that social relations and agreed rules govern migrant associations.

Additionally, the NCZ leaders have been in Zimbabwe for a period of 15–20 years, and have extensive knowledge about the host country. This coincides with the popular belief that migrant associations are governed 'from above' by migrants who have been in the host country for considerable periods of time (Antwi-Bosiakoh 2010; Obeng 2010). NCZ leaders are chosen on a rotational basis, after every two years. Mr Osuofa, vice-president of the NCZ and household electricals shop owner, succinctly captured the various prerequisites for eligibility to serve on the leadership

structure:

> NCZ is the powerhouse welfare organization of Nigerians in the country and leaders are chosen on a rotational basis. Each of the leaders has his or her own roles and responsibilities. We vote for each leader based on merit. We check whether the individual is brave enough and with 'big heart' because no one is paid and it is time consuming. We try to involve every tribe in these leadership positions based on ethnicity, although in Zimbabwe there are more Igbos than any other tribe (18 December 2018, Harare Street).

Thus, based on the above narrative, being a leader of the association is contingent upon the personal qualities and abilities required to qualify for various leadership positions. These can be academic qualifications, knowledge of the host country, and credibility they may possess in the eyes of Nigerian migrants. As argued by Labelle et al. (1994), as association leaders, these individuals are vital in carrying out the responsibilities of group representation, partly because of their positioning and visibility as intermediaries.

The association's members meet once every two months to discuss planned activities. At these meetings new migrants are introduced to the association and members also vote for their respective leaders. Non-members may also attend the meetings but they do not have the right to vote. Moreover, all association members are obliged to pay a monthly subscription fee of $5 (USD) and those who default are relieved of their privileges as active members of the association.

Adaptive and Integrative Functions of the Nigerian Community in Zimbabwe (NCZ)

One thing that is clear about migrants is that they find their initial phases of settling bewildering because they lack the requisite information about the host nation. The NCZ plays a pivotal role in providing information about the host nation to migrants. It functions as an intermediary in offering first-hand experience of the host country to the prospective migrants. This came out clearly from the association's spokesperson, who runs a business specializing in motor spares. He said:

> You can't migrate without prior information of where you are going. You have to join the association together with people you know and as Nigerians, we help each other with information about the host nation, we are brothers and we love each other (23 December 2018, Kaguvi Street).

Similarly, the NCZ Coordinator claimed:

> We inform Nigerians who would want to migrate what is required in Zimbabwe before they come here. This involves information about visas, permits, either spousal permit or investors' permit. We also tell those who want to travel that if they are not married, they should marry here in the country and get a spousal permit (5 January 2019, Bank Street).

Additionally, the association informs members about investment opportunities in the country as some migrants end up running illicit businesses that tarnish the image of all Nigerians in the country. This was expressed clearly by the welfare officer

of the association who poignantly expressed the following:

> I came here in 2005 and I found out that there was NCZ in the country. NCZ was formed to bring all Nigerians in Zimbabwe together. In NCZ we ask a lot of questions: what are your reasons for coming here? What are you doing? Some of our fellow brothers bring a bad name which the host country doesn't like. If you want to specialize in minerals, we warn members to never go near the mineral sector as it is highly political (8 January 2019, Kaguvi Street).

Likewise, Obi, a 40-year-old from Enugu State is exemplary to the sentiments made by the NCZ welfare officer. Obi came to Zimbabwe in 2006, a period when diamonds were discovered in the eastern parts of the country. Obi had a goal to 'flourish in exile' as he wanted to trade in these precious gems. That was possible for him because the diamond fields were characterized by impunity and lawlessness, an indication of the desperation and chaos that pervaded the country at that time (Katsaura 2010). Upon arrival in the country, he registered with the association and was warned not to do that business as it was going to tarnish the image of Nigerians in the country. To avoid swimming in troubled waters, Obi then invested in the motor spares business and today he is a proud owner of two motor spares businesses, one in Harare and another one in Lagos. The laconic narratives above clearly show the importance of the NCZ in conveying pertinent information to migrants. These results concur with scholars. For instance, Crisp (2000) states that migrant associations provide invaluable information to prospective and new migrants. According to Caglar (2006), migrants are often secluded in host communities and migrant associations help migrants by providing critical information for their survival in host communities.

Advocacy Roles

Generally, when migrants move to new territories they are regarded as aliens; and they become scapegoats when nation-states confront economic, political and social problems. They become targets of hostility from the autochthons and blamed for all the social, economic and political problems in the host nation. Zimbabwean bureaucrats suspect migrants of being drug dealers, thieves, fraudsters, and con artists (Mangezvo 2018). This means that Nigerian migrants have to devise new strategies of surviving such a toxic environment. Nigerian migrant entrepreneurs have learnt that the only resolution to disputes with their hosts is through forming an association, which plays a critical judicial function in advocating for their rights. Despite the documents they have to legitimize their stay, they remain subject to multiple forms of exactions from various rent-seeking individuals, maltreatment and unlawful arrests. Rather that exercizing the 'politics of invisibility', which characterizes most migrants in a foreign land (Whitehouse 2012), they have opted for the 'politics of recognition' (Taylor 1994; Englund and Nyamnjoh 2004) through the association, to defend their interests en masse – by collectively refusing to put up with abuse, being cheated and paying bribes.

To illustrate its advocacy roles, the association's president reiterated that there

was a time when Nigerian entrepreneurs were continually maltreated by the Zimbabwean authorities. They were unlawfully arrested and detained and pressured to pay huge sums for legal representation or bribes. However, the association helped by representing them in the courts of justice. Ozeze, a 33-year-old specializing in cosmetics was once arrested. He expressed the following:

> I was once arrested and unlawfully detained by the Immigration, Compliance Department. Our NCZ lawyers represented me in the courts and I was later released (15 January 2019, Gulf Complex).

However, taking such a grand stand of 'politics of recognition' does not go down well with some Zimbabweans, who think that this is a breach of their tacit agreement not to 'rock the boat' in the host country. This was evident from Kenny, the compliance officer at the Immigration Department who was reported by the NCZ to the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) for soliciting bribes from some Nigerian traders. He frantically noted:

> It's a very difficult position for foreigners to advocate for their rights in this country. They should not do what they want and they should know they have limits. Last time I was called by the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) to respond to allegations of soliciting bribes from foreigners including Nigerians. This led to my immediate suspension but I was later reassigned. It didn't go well with me and my superiors (5 January 2019, Department of Immigration).

This narrative concurs with Whitehouse's (2012) observations that strangers in a foreign land should have a stranger's code that obliges them to desist from any activity that might disturb the tenuous relationships between them and the hosts. This includes desisting from drawing unwanted scrutiny to the locals in exchange for permission for 'belonging' in the host country. By this, Whitehouse (2012) argues that strangers should remain quiet and keep their heads down, as exile knows no dignity. Moreover, at an individual level, the association has also performed the judicial function of solving disputes among Nigerians, that would otherwise end up as police or court cases. Such disputes are normally arbitrated by the leaders of the association who use appropriate Nigerian social practices as the basis for settling the disputes.

Death and Bereavement

Generally, people of African descent desire to be buried in their native lands. The NCZ also ensures that its members are buried in their native land. In the event of the death of a member, their kin or relatives in the host country, the association offers a monetary contribution to the grieving family and assists in repatriating the body back home. This was stated clearly by both the association's treasurer and the spokesperson, respectively:

> NCZ helps members during good times and bad moments. For example, if death befalls our members, we contribute towards repatriation and burial (3 March 2019, Harare Street).

> Sometimes the NCZ helps in times of need. For example, when my wife died, the association took over the whole repatriation process to Imo state for her burial (3 March 2019, Kaguvi Street).

However, it appears that those Nigerians who are not part of the association do not get any help from the association when misfortune befalls them. This was expressed by the association's spokesperson:

> We love each other as Nigerians, but there are those who go astray and NCZ punishes them. NCZ helps to repatriate the dead back to Nigeria unless you don't associate with us. Someone died 2 years ago who wasn't registered with us and he was buried here (7 May 2019, Robert Mugabe Street).

These narratives reflect that in the event of the death of a member, the association helps financially to repatriate the body back home. Moreover, in the case of migrants whose family members in Nigeria pass away, the association also contributes financially to assist them. These contributions attest not only to the social and economic importance of migrant associations, but also to the cultural importance attached to death in their homeland (Owusu 2000). According to Nwala (1985), the Nigerian customary belief in an eternal existence in the assumed next life, often leads to burial rites that embrace a variety of functions and rituals, mediated by kinsmen, sons and secret societies, to mention but a few. Where burials are well-planned, they comprise of many rituals, separating the dead from the living, as well as re-arranging spiritual communion and relationships with the ancestors (Nwala 1985). From this discussion of the roles of the association, it is clear that these activities help to bond, enrich and facilitate the adaptation of Nigerian migrants in the host nation.

The next section discusses how Nigerian migrant entrepreneurs, through the NCZ, mount activities and forge relations with the locals, thus facilitating their continued living and accumulation in the host community.

Recognition of Incompleteness leads to Conviviality with the 'Other'

When a migrant community encounters adaptation and integration challenges, the activities of a migrant association take a new direction. This section discusses the efforts of the migrant community at cementing relationships between 'us' and 'them' with the ultimate goal of bridging social connections and burying differences (Albuquerque et al. 2000). This bridging of social connections, where Nigerian traders come closer to the indigenes in various contact zones, allows for the forging of conviviality, where differences between outsiders and insiders recede and become somewhat inconspicuous (Overing and Passes 2000).

Nyamnjoh (2017) asserts that conviviality is the recognition of being incomplete, as humans, on the part of both migrants and indigenes. It is this incompleteness that allows migrants to be open minded in their claims and articulations of identities, belonging and being. "Conviviality encourages (both 'insiders' and 'outsiders') to reach out, encounter and explore ways of enhancing or complementing themselves with the added possibilities of potency brought their way by the incompleteness of

others, never as a ploy to becoming complete, but to make them more efficacious in their relationships and sociality" (Nyamnjoh 2017: 1).

One of the activities where this much-needed conviviality is experienced in abundance, is end-of-year parties, where all Nigerians gather to celebrate their achievements of the year. Two of the participants expressed the following:

> This is the time that we gather as NCZ and our families. We invite Zimbabweans happening to be our in-laws as well as other well-wishers to celebrate ourselves after a hectic year. This is just a way of cementing our relations (3 January 2019, Kaguvi Street).

Every year we hold end-of-year parties for our families, where we also involve locals. Sometimes we even invite the local ministers. We are all Africans and it's a moment for togetherness with Zimbabweans as one people. In Africa there are no borders, like in Europe (8 January 2019, Copa Cabana).

It is also at these end-of-year parties that relations with the officialdom are also consolidated, as a few officials, especially from the Department of Immigration, the City Council and Zimbabwe Republic Police are tactically invited. By forming alliances with these high-ranking officials, they are fashioning a new form of 'tactical cosmopolitanism' (Landau and Freemantle 2010) to navigate real or imaginary intricacies characterizing the host community. One might say that they are playing by the rules, which although largely unspoken and unwritten, are known by the actors. This concurs with Milandou (1997) who argues that laws and regulations are only for the anonymous; everything is a matter of relationships. Thus, conviviality can be explored as a process of interaction embedded in social practice, sometimes free from tensions and racism (Wessendorf 2014; Wise and Velayutham 2014; Gilroy 2004). As Putnam (2000) argues, networks forged in these contact zones, like the end-of-year parties, facilitate the integration of newcomers into the host nation, and they also potentially open up more social and economic opportunities.

For locals, this is also an opportunity to know and integrate with the 'aliens' better and also to pursue their own interests. This was expressed by a Zimbabwean entrepreneur who operates a clothing shop in downtown Harare:

> Nigerians have their own association here in Zimbabwe called NCZ. This association serves a lot of purposes for them. Every year they hold end-of-year parties where we are also invited. I have been invited to their parties several times where we celebrated together and I befriended most Nigerians who later helped me (27 March 2019, Gulf Complex).

However, it is not only migrants who invite the locals to their celebrations. Locals also extend the 'olive branch' and invite migrants as a symbol of oneness. This was well captured by Kedha, a local entrepreneur who shares a cosmetic shop with Ozeze, a Nigerian entrepreneur:

> I have managed to invite a couple of NCZ members to our celebrations like weddings, parties and other cultural ceremonies and rites in my rural area. This is just to show that we are one and to cement our relations even more (16

January 2019, Gulf Complex).

Moreover, besides the ordinary Zimbabweans inviting Nigerian migrants to their celebrations, the officialdom is not left out. This was expressed by a senior Immigration Officer who articulated the following:

> Every year we send formal invitations to all foreigners in the country, including the Nigerians to attend our Independence celebrations, Heroes Day Celebrations as well as the Annual Harare Carnival, to come and showcase their cultural talents. This is a gesture to show our cordial relations with Nigeria from time immemorial (3 July 2019, Department of Immigration).

From the narrative above, it is clear that the NCZ is fashioning new forms of belonging where convivial relations are continually created and recreated. It is at these parties, celebrations and gatherings where accommodation of differences between 'them' and 'us' and where reciprocity and exchange have become the norm (Hinchliffe and Whatmore 2006).

The demonstration of conviviality above bears testimony to the ways in which migrants employ celebrations and rituals to win the support of a potentially hostile community, narrowing the gap between 'us' and 'them'.

Financial Assistance

Sometimes migrants get start-up capital to start their businesses from the association because they do not have, as a result of their unresolved citizenship status, the requisite documentation to access funding from formal institutions like banks and credit institutions. The association offers direct financial assistance to its members in the form of soft loans, with low interest rates and flexible repayment terms. One of the respondents, Ngozie, who owns two cosmetic shops at the popular Gulf Complex, delightedly expressed the following:

> When I came to Zimbabwe, I didn't have enough capital. NCZ helped me with start-up capital amounting to $3000 USD which I repaid after a year (3 June 2019, Kaguvi Street).

Besides financial assistance, the association also assists newcomers to stock their new businesses, if they do not have enough. This was the case of Victor, who was given motor spares to stock his shop and he said:

> At first when I came here it wasn't easy because I didn't have enough capital for a business. One of my brothers, who is also one of the members of the association, advised me to join the association which then helped me with the motor spares stock (26 June 2019, Harare Street).

These results confirm Putnam's (2000) observations that migrant associations foster social ties, which facilitate entrepreneurship among migrants. Norris (1975) also pointed out that migrant associations provide newcomers with a basis of familiar and viable interactions and relationships on which they start to build their new lives 'elsewhere'. However, besides borrowing from the association, some have also borrowed from their Zimbabwean counterparts. For instance, Stany borrowed about US$ 5000

from his Zimbabwean business partner to expand his business. At the same time, one Zimbabwean automotive entrepreneur based in Norton, about 40km North West of Harare who has close ties with the association members noted that, in order for him to start his motor spares business, he borrowed from association members. This two-way reciprocity qualifies migrant associations as 'communities of itinerancy' in which debts, gifts and finances are exchanged whilst fostering a sense of collective consciousness among migrants and indigenes who did not know each other previously (Alioua 2011).

Social Responsibility

The Nigerian community in Zimbabwe seldom limits its integrative activities to one specific activity. Rather, it has a range of activities to facilitate integration of Nigerian entrepreneurs into the socio-economic environs of the host country, as the scope of its activities involve, most often, forging relationships with the indigenes. Of late, the association has donated to the less privileged, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, the Harare City Council and the victims of Cyclone Idai that ravaged parts of Eastern Zimbabwe. The following narratives by Nigerians support this assertion:

> We have donated towards Cyclone Idai victims. We do it with our hearts. Sometime in 2015, we bought bicycles for the Zimbabwe Republic Police and sometime, we bought refuse bins for the Harare City Council. This country is also our country, so we need the Zimbabweans to welcome us as fellow Africans (30 April 2019, Bank Street).

Typically, Nigerians are the most travelled people in Africa, but when we travel, we take with us beliefs that, whatever place we live in is our second home and problems faced in that country we also regard them as our problems. We are committed to serving this country with all our hearts (8 May 2019, Robert Mugabe Street).

The expression, 'this country is also our country, so we need Zimbabweans to welcome us as fellow Africans' can be conceived as a narrative to claim space and belonging, where new-comers try to portray an image that there is no difference between 'us' and 'them' (Landau and Freemantle 2010). Moreover, the Nigerian Foreign Minister, Mr Onyeama, was invited by the association to Zimbabwe in the aftermath of Cyclone Idai in 2018. He was accompanied by the NCZ president to the State House to meet the Zimbabwean President. As cited by the local newspaper, the Herald, the Foreign Minister candidly expressed the following in light of the special visit:

> It is a manifestation of the fraternity and solidarity between our people and our two countries (Interview with Foreign Minister Onyeama at State House).

More so, the Zimbabwean President was overwhelmed by Nigeria's gesture, reiterating that it was demonstrative of the cordial relations between the two countries which date back to the liberation struggle (Munyoro 2019). The President expressed the following:

> The people of Nigeria and its leadership have realized that our brothers and sisters here were visited by Cyclone Idai and in their compassion have sent us a

plane-load of aid to give to people in that area, who have suffered a devastating event (Interview with Zimbabwe's President at State House).

By virtue of these activities and initiatives, the association can be conceived as allowing newcomers to be 'at home away from home'. The association contributes to 'home-making abroad' (Antwi-Bosiakoh 2009), as it is strategically encouraging its members to be responsible citizens at points of destination. Members are encouraged to exhibit a high level of civic spirit to facilitate cohesion and integration. As suggested By Landau and Duponchel (2011), this could offer newcomers protection from exploitation, as these activities and initiatives seem to grease the corridors of bureaucracy. As one Nigerian internet café owner clarified:

> At first, the police and the immigration officials were so suspicious about us, so they couldn't take our matters seriously, but now when we can't solve our matters on our own, we now engage the police and immigration officials as we now have a cordial relationship, particularly because of what they have seen us doing in the country.

Enhancing Networks through Cultural Exchanges

In reaction to the swelling 'politics of non-belonging' on the continent, African scholars have stood up to challenge the rhetoric of nativism and autochthony (Whitehouse 2012). Achille Mbembe has been at the forefront of this crusade, as well as Ghanaian Philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah. Appiah (2006) argues that cultural purity is an oxymoron. Endeavours to fix human identity in space and place, he argues, rests on a fundamental error: cultural hybridization and migration are not exceptions but are indeed its very essence. It is possible, thus, to imagine a future in which openness to outside influence is celebrated as a virtue. Appiah (1997) argues that the cultural differences that we bring to the table, make it rewarding to interact after all.

Owusu (2000) argues that one element that defines the identity of migrants is the ability to exercize their sense of belonging through symbolic and material practices. As argued by Giberovitch (1994), migrant associations help to fulfil the cultural needs of their members for the perpetuation of their particular language, tradition or culture. This is done through cultural expression, preservation, exchange and promotion. Chineze and Ajoki expressed the following, respectively:

> As an association we also observe our cultural holidays, for example the New Yam Festival, which is for Igbos. We invite even our Zimbabwean friends to celebrate our culture together. This is just to facilitate oneness, just like Shonas and Ndebeles here in Zimbabwe (3 August 2019, Chinhoyi Street).
> Every year we celebrate New Yam Festival and it's a time for all Igbos in the host country to come together wearing our attire to thank the gods for the harvest and protection (3 August 2019, Cameroon Street).

The New Yam Festival also offers an opportunity for cultural mixing between the Igbos and other Nigerian tribes. As noted by the association's president, who is himself an Igbo, the New Yam Festival is the most glamorous and most important festival of

the Igboland in the Southeast of Nigeria. It is celebrated between August and October each year to thank the gods for a bumper harvest. It also heralds the time of harvest as well as providing an opportunity for social integration of the various tribes in Nigeria or in the diaspora. The festival creates a sense of oneness and solidarity between migrants and helps to forge belonging in host communities. It is also at these festivals where Nigerians invite the local people for cultural exchanges. This was expressed by Mama Amaka, a local woman married to a Nigerian Igbo King:

> We celebrate New Yam Festival each year where we also invite Zimbabweans for cultural exchange. Zimbabwean music is played and we dance to it and Nigerian music is played and the local people also dance to it. Different Nigerian and local cuisine is also served at the festival (8 September 2019, Mbuya Nehanda Street).

A local Zimbabwean friend of a Nigerian who was invited for the 2018 New Yam Festival expressed the following:

> I used to think that Nigerian food is unpalatable. However, thanks to my friend who invited me to their festival, I really enjoyed their food as they do too, our own food here. We look forward for more of these festivals as they help us to meet and exchange our cultures with our Nigerian brothers. I have also invited a couple of Nigerians to our rural home for various celebrations and they really enjoyed it. They now feel home away from home with the reception we give them here in Zimbabwe (8 September 2019, Kaguvi Street).

Although a cultural exchange denotes bridging of social capital, it is not integration itself (Landau and Duponchel 2011). What emerges from these cultural exchange arenas is what Bhabha (1994) refers to as a 'third space' of belonging, a space that fuses multiple identities and practices. This is where resources, rights and belongings are constantly negotiated, with the result that migrant associations become multi-ethnic and multinational (Sardinha 2009; Marquez 2001).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The main thrust of this article was to analyze how a migrant association, particularly the Nigerian Community in Zimbabwe (NCZ), facilitates being, belonging and integration of migrants in the host society. The article attempted to answer two questions: i) how does the association help to bond and enrich the lives of migrants; and ii) how does the association facilitate the bridging of social connections with the 'other' with the ultimate goal of burying differences, which in essence helps them to continue staying and accumulating in the diaspora? As revealed in this study, migrant associations function to minimize the challenges of initial settlement caused by mobility, becoming spaces of solidarity and reciprocity (Putnam 1993; Alioua 2011). At the initial stage of migration, the association facilitates the adaptation among migrants. Additionally, the association functions to preserve the migrant community's values and heritage. It is these shared values and heritage, together with the cultural identity shared by migrants, which become fundamental for a positive association

(Nwala 1985; Owusu 2000). However, migrants' associative actions are reliant upon the host society's attitudes towards the migrant community, and this is vital for their integration. As increased contact with the indigenes ensues, the association shifts attention and starts to mount activities to bridge social relations, thereby lessening the social differences between 'us' and 'them' (Nyamnjoh 2017; Overing and Passes 2000; Gilroy 2004).

What conclusions can be drawn from this case study? Contrary to the prevailing idea that African mobility and cities are characterized as chaotic and competitive, it turns out that these places are centres of conviviality and encounters between migrants and hosts. Diverse cities are thus transformed into places and spaces of interrelationships, interconnections, collaboration, interdependence, compassion and coproduction where migrants and hosts are converging and producing new forms of values, practices and beliefs in potentially hostile and toxic environments. This seems to be a more useful way of theorizing about urban cities, than the dominant perspective which describes them as chaotic and doomed. The authors perceive being, belonging and integration as mutable processes, ever-changing in space and time. These processes are not conclusive, but rather it is the making of headway and progression towards achieving the acceptance of difference within diverse spaces that makes migrant associations momentous. Migrant associations advocate the right to negotiate difference and identity, in turn allowing migrants to actively belong and participate under the flagship of plurality.

Within this context, the authors recommend that in calling for attention to place migrant associations in migration policy-making discourse, there remains an urgent need for nation-states to leverage on migrant associations for effective migration management in Zimbabwe and beyond. The roles that migrant associations play should be incorporated into migration policies such that migration associations should be viewed positively, and if possible encouraged by nation-states. Finally, establishing a line of communication with migrant associations is critically important. Migrant associations and the nation-state need to find more spaces of communication and interaction to bridge the divide that separates 'us' and 'them'.

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