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Through the publication of original research, policy discussions and evidence-based research papers, AHMR provides a comprehensive forum devoted exclusively to the analysis of current migration trends, migration patterns and some of the most important migration-related issues.

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Editorial

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This issue consists of five articles. The first article by Mulatu Zerihun, entitled "Remittances and Economic Growth: Evidence from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda", analyzes the possible effect of international remittances on the economic growth in three selected countries within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The result demonstrates that remittances in the countries included in this study serve as a 'big-push' towards economic development and have an impact on growth. The findings also suggest the development of close cooperation with host countries to leverage mutual benefit, as well as the establishment of successful collaboration with migrants and diasporas. Finally, the research proposes future studies on the impact of remittances on economic growth.

The second article by Adebayo Makanju and Hafiz Khan is entitled "Determinants of Healthy Aging in Internally Displaced Communities in Nigeria". Different statistical techniques were used in the analysis, including cross-tabulation and binary logistic regression. The findings of the research indicate a high mean prevalence of old-age disability within the study area, irrespective of migration status in North-eastern Nigeria. The research also establishes robust predictors of later-life health outcomes as socio-economic and environmental determinants. Regression analysis has also shown that a variety of factors have a negative influence on the well-being of older adults. Based on the findings of the research, the authors recommend that the proposed Sahelian 'Green Belt' afforestation project of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) targeting, in particular areas around the Chad basin, be fully implemented. The authors also emphasize the urgent need to formulate a systematic and evidence-driven integration between migration and geriatrics.

The third article by Edmond Akwasi Agyeman is entitled "Between the Imagined and the Reality: Threat of African Invasion and Spain's Migration Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa". The study examines Spain's migration policy aimed at controlling Sub-Saharan African immigration. A review of policy papers, migration statistics and secondary literature was used methodologically in the research. The study indicates that current migration trends and statistics do not support the perception that Spain is being invaded by Sub-Saharan African migrants. The study also shows that the restrictive policies of Spain neglect the long-standing interdependent trade and other economic networks existing between Spain, North Africa and West Africa prior to the European colonization of Africa.

The fourth article presented by Hemish Govera and Amiena Bayat is entitled

"Differences in Mental Health among Migrants and Non-migrants in South Africa: Evidence from the National Income Dynamics Study". The goal of this research was to determine whether the prevalence of depressive symptoms is higher in South Africa among migrants than among non-migrants. The study also investigates the association of migration status with a wide set of sociodemographic variables in the same context. The study applied descriptive analysis and logistic modelling to the South African National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) panel datasets. The study found a significant association between low sociodemographic status and the risk of poor mental health. The report concludes that compared to the Western Cape, residing in the rest of the South African provinces was associated with a lower risk of poor mental health after controlling for migration status.

The final article, presented by Victor Mlambo, is entitled "Externalization and Securitization as Policy Responses to African Migration to the European Union". The study explores the externalization and securitization of African migration to the European Union (EU) and the consequences this has for migration governance and management for both the EU and Africa. Methodologically, a qualitative research approach was applied. The study concludes that EU-Africa migration management needs to be focused on policies that address the main 'push' factors driving irregular migration from Africa.

I believe these articles offer invaluable insights to scholars, practitioners and students with the skills necessary to provide solutions to many of the major migration challenges faced by society. They also provide informative advice for policy-makers to think critically about migration policies, programs and projects by presenting the continent with reliable empirical research evidence.

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Remittances and Economic Growth: Evidence from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda

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The purpose of this study is to analyze the possible effect of international remittances on the economic growth in three selected economies of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member countries, namely, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. Remittance inflows have emerged as a key link between human mobility and development. However, empirical findings on the nexus between remittances and economic growth are either conflicting or at most mixed. This paper explores the effects of remittances from international migration inflows on the economic growth of three IGAD member countries. The study uses quantitative analysis that encompasses the above-mentioned countries using the World Bank's annual data from 1990 to 2017. The novelty of this study is that it uses different approaches to solicit the short-run and the long-run nexus between economic growth and remittance flow. The pooled estimation result from fully modified least squares (FMOLS) shows that the logarithm of remittances impacts the dependent variable, economic growth, positively but not statistically significant. The Kao panel residual cointegration test shows that the null hypothesis is not sufficiently supported by the data. There is a statistically significant long-run relationship between the variables in the series. This implies that international remittances have a long-run impact on the economic growth of the countries considered in this study. In addition, remittances Granger cause economic growth, significantly at a five percent level of significance in the long run. To verify the results from dynamic panel regression, fixed-effects and random-effects estimation are used as a robustness check. Both fixed-effects and random-effects estimation results confirm the same findings as in the panel regression results. The findings from this paper will present important policy inputs for policymakers on how remittances impact the economic growth of the countries included in this study.

Keywords: Economic growth, remittances, migration, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda

INTRODUCTION

Migration has been an integral part of human dynamics since the very existence of humans (Faist, 2016). However, in recent years, more than any time in human history, migration has become one of the topical issues under discussion among policymakers, politicians, the media, and citizens of both developed and developing nations. When supported by appropriate policies, migration can contribute to inclusive and sustainable development in both origin and destination countries, while also benefiting migrants and their families. International migration is in large part related to the broader global economic, social, political and technological transformations that are affecting a wide range of high-priority policy issues (Kotze and Hill, 1997; Koser, 2016; Triandafyllidou, 2018).

Remittance inflows have emerged as a key link between human mobility and development. There are also diverse theories that have emerged to explain the impact of remittances on economic growth (development) of the countries of origin of migrants. Among these are the developmental (neo-classical), the structuralist (dependency), the pluralist, and the 'big push' theory.[1] The big push theory states that a 'big push' or comprehensive investment package could jumpstart economic development in the developing countries (Pragyandeepa, 2016). According to this theory, if remittances are managed properly and if smooth inflow is facilitated, remittances can play a 'big push' role for many African countries. These four theories are considered reliable guides to ascertain how remittances impact economic growth in this study's three IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development)[2] member countries.

Remittances are classified as current private transfers from migrant workers resident in the host country for more than a year, irrespective of their immigration status, to recipients in their country of origin (World Bank, 2019). Many recent empirical studies suggest that remittances may have the potential to positively affect a country's economic growth and the development of financial systems in developing or emerging countries (Yaseen, 2012; Ratha, 2013; Fromentin, 2018; Adeoye et al., 2020; Azizi, 2020; Donou-Adonsou et al., 2020). Furthermore, remittances from international migrants have proven to be a more sustainable source of foreign currency for developing countries than other capital inflows, such as foreign direct investment, public debt or official development assistance. However, the nexus between remittances and development remains complex, especially with regards to the movement of people, which contributes to the spread of global interdependence in social, economic and political spheres. Workers' remittances and compensation of employees comprise current transfers by migrant workers and wages and salaries earned by non-resident workers.

[1] For a detailed discussion of the first three theories, see De Haas (2007) and for details on the 'Big Push' theory, see Rosenstein-Rodan (1957).

[2] The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in the Horn of Africa, comprises member countries like, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda. IGAD is also an AU-recognized Regional Economic Community (REC) and building-block of the African Economic Community (AEC) under the AEC Treaty, implying a commitment to establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA) and regional infrastructure, including transport development.

Remittances inflow is one of the major sources of capital flows in the world. Although developing countries, and especially sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), do not have a bigger share of this capital flow, remittances are recognized as being very useful in promoting household welfare and health in developing countries. Tah (2019) found that remittances have a significantly positive impact on financial access in sub-Saharan Africa. The objective of this study is to analyze and understand the possible effect of international remittances on the economic growth in the three selected economies, namely, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. These countries were chosen because they are among the top recipients of remittance inflows in East Africa. Furthermore, the study tests the causal relationship between international remittances and economic growth in these countries, in relation to potential policy lessons. This study analyzes the economic dynamism between international remittance flows and economic growth among the three major economies in the East African region. There are studies that assess the importance of remittance inflows in Africa as a continent, while there are also specific country-level studies (Tah, 2019).

The motivation for this study is to research other sub-regions within SSA in relation to their status as dominant migration destinations. Sub-regional analysis facilitates better corridor-specific policy interventions towards the realization of policy goals and objectives relating to remittance inflows (Eyden et al., 2011). Given the significant increase in migration and remittance flows to the continent, the literature on international migration and development in sub-Saharan Africa has also increased. However, the results from many studies are inconclusive or at best, they are mixed. Therefore, there is still room for further investigation of the topic under discussion. The next section provides a context on immigration in the three selected countries. Section three presents the literature review; section four discusses data and methodology. Section five presents the result of the data analysis. The last two sections present the overall discussion of the findings and conclusion, and policy implications, respectively.

CONTEXT

Geographically sub-Saharan Africa is the region of the African continent that falls south of the Sahara Desert. It is composed of all African countries and regions, situated completely, or partially, south of the Sahara. This study comprises a purposefully selected group of three IGAD countries in SSA. This section highlights the context of migration and remittance flows in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia is among the largest remittance receiving countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Ratha and Mohapatra, 2011). The history of immigration in Ethiopia began with revolution and an unstable political environment during the 1970s. Most of the people who migrated at that time formed part of a well-educated urban section of

the population, who migrated to western countries in order to seek political asylum (Geda and Irving, 2011). Political migration was followed by more economically oriented migration, initially driven by the aspirations of the urban population. Currently, as the Middle East has become an important destination region for Ethiopian migrants, the migrants are increasingly from rural areas, migrating to find better (employment) opportunities abroad (Geda and Irving, 2011).

Remittances are an extremely important source of foreign exchange for Ethiopia, perhaps larger than the export earning of the country in its foreign exchange generation capacity. However, the remittance industry in Ethiopia is besieged by several problems (Reinert, 2007). The size and scale of remittances also create the possibility for harnessing these flows for productive investment, thus contributing to the long-term development of Ethiopia. According to studies by Isaacs (2017) and Adugna (2019), the volume of remittances in Ethiopia could be between US$ 2 to 4 billion per year (an average of about US$ 3 billion). This is about the size of Ethiopia's total export and development aid combined. However, a non-conducive policy environment, as well as the lack of the deepening of liberalization of the financial sector, remain key challenges in the sector. However, there are disparities between the report released by the National Bank of Ethiopia and the World Bank reports on the amount of remittance flows to the country (NBE, 2017; World Bank, 2018a)

Remittances play a large role in financial household dynamics in Ethiopia, notably as risk-reducing instruments and as insurance against external shocks (Aredo, 2005). The diaspora has had an influential voice in Ethiopian politics and development over the past decades. The role of the diaspora in the current socio-economic transformation[3] led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is significant. A few years before the transformation in the country, the Ethiopian diasporas, especially those living and working in the United States of America, declined the volume of remittances and avoided the formal channels of sending remittances home as a way of bringing about change. The Ethiopian government increasingly recognizes the importance of remittances from its migrants, for the development of the country and has taken several initiatives to optimize the effects of these financial flows. One of their goals was to stimulate its diaspora members to send money through the official channels. However, most financial transfers are still made through informal channels (ICMPD, 2008). This situation is directly related to the immigration status of the diasporas in host countries. Most Ethiopian diasporas in Europe and North America have legal documented immigration status that allows them to send remittances through official channels. However, those in countries in the Middle East and the rest of Africa, especially those in South Africa, are in a dire situation because of their unfavorable immigration status in those countries.

[3] Since taking over as head of the Ethiopian government in April 2018, Abiy Ahmed has increased his openness, by lifting the state of emergency, releasing political prisoners, announcing economic openness, and privatizing national enterprises. Regarding foreign policy, Abiy Ahmed surprisingly initiated an historic rapprochement with Eritrea. Abiy Ahmed is applying his manifest skills to the vital purpose of transforming Ethiopia into a prosperous society (Collier, 2019; Financial Times, 2020).

All Ethiopian migrants in South Africa, with exception of few professionals, are unable to send money through formal channels and remit informally, as they do not have the required official identification and thus lack access to formal financial services. Complicated formal banking procedures and their cumbersome requirements make the lives of Ethiopian migrants in South Africa very difficult (Dinbabo, 2020). To ease the flow of remittances, countries like Mexico issue official identification to their nationals living abroad, irrespective of their migratory status in the destination country. The Ethiopian government may need to explore such options as well. Likewise, the European Investment Bank and Mediterranean developing countries have signed an agreement to allow migrants in European Union (EU) countries access to simplified banking facilities upon presentation of consular registration cards (UNCTAD, 2013). The South African government should also consider the introduction of simplified banking facilities, in order to facilitate remittance outflows through formal channels and make the process much easier and less costly, for the benefit of both the host nation and the African diaspora.

Another discouraging factor with respect to remittance flows to Ethiopia for the last two-and-a-half decades, was that the former government of Ethiopia had introduced indirect (implicit and hidden) remittances tax, requiring recipients to convert remittances to the local currency at uncompetitive officially-fixed exchange rates (Adugna, 2019). In addition, the former Ethiopian government adopted a more opportunistic approach, damaging the trust of migrants and diasporas, by issuing diaspora bonds, which were embezzled by government officials due to poor governance, lack of economic and political stability, and unfavorable investment regulation. However, in recent years, the current Ethiopian government has put in place several positive measures to improve the operations and flow of formal remittances, as well as to reduce the costs of transfers and to increase access to international remittance services (Isaacs, 2017). However, the Ethiopian government should make continued efforts in ensuring that the Ethiopian diaspora community is recognized by host nations, through its diplomatic channels.

Kenya

After Kenya gained its independence from Britain in 1963, the inflow of remittances to Kenya from the diaspora grew substantially and ranks among the top-four leading sources of Kenya's foreign exchange (Makori et al., 2015). This has been attributed to the surge in the numbers of Kenyans living in the diaspora (Ngugi, 2015). From the mid-1980s when Kenya began to experience an economic downturn and political instability, a significant number of Kenyans left the country to join the diaspora (Makori et al., 2015). They moved to countries where political and economic climates were favorable and promising and became the initial remitters of funds to Kenya from their destination countries. In fact, as far back as the post-independence period, Kenya started experiencing a gradual increase in remittances (Ngugi, 2015).

Kenya has experienced a steady growth in the annual volume of diaspora re-

mittances recorded over the post-independence period. Remittances have become a major source of foreign exchange and a key driver of economic growth, as underscored in the "Kenya Vision 2030", Kenya's national development policy blueprint (Aboulezz, 2015). Ratha et al. (2011) found that remittances received in Kenya from within Africa were used primarily for the construction of houses, while inflows from outside Africa were devoted to long-term investments. The volume of emigrants from Kenya and the volume of remittances have been increasing over time. The Kenyan government has been very keen to encourage the diaspora to participate in national development (World Bank, 2012). The importance of the diaspora has also been recognized in the "Kenya Vision 2030". Although remittances have the potential to contribute to national development, there has been a lack of administrative structures and mechanisms to enable the government to tap directly into these foreign inflows from the diaspora as an asset for investment and national development (Government of Kenya, 2011).

Studies comparing poverty levels between Kenyan households that have no remittances and those that receive remittances have recorded higher poverty levels in the former than in the latter (Makori et al., 2015; Ocharo, 2015). It is well understood that remittances do facilitate household incomes and are efficient anti-poverty forces in poor or developing countries such as Kenya (Kamuleta, 2014; Nyamwange and Paterson, 2015). Indeed, recipients of remittances are able to identify and utilize the remittances to meet their most pressing poverty needs. Studies conducted around Kenya on the well-being of households receiving remittances and those that do not receive remittances reveal that the households that receive the remittances are better off financially than those that do not receive the funds (Kamuleta, 2014; Nyamwange and Paterson, 2015). The reason for this is that the recipient households can invest the remittances in income-generating activities, which result in the reduction of their poverty standing and improvement of their living standards while the non-remittance receiving households have no funds to invest. Furthermore, studies carried out across Kenya indicate that remittance-receiving households experience higher income levels and have a higher purchasing power than the non-remittance-receiving households (Ngugi, 2015).

Uganda

Remittance inflows in Uganda have been increasing steadily while outflows have remained relatively stable. Mobile money is increasingly successful in Uganda and has driven a lot of the growth in remittance volume and value. The regulatory requirements for cross-border remittances are relatively clearly outlined, compared to many other SSA markets (Macmillan et al., 2016). There are no caps on outward remittances and no foreign exchange controls exist. According to interviewees, the regulator comes across as mostly open-minded and eager to advance the sector. However, regulation around mobile money is unclear and lags the rapid technological advances in the market, preventing inclusive development (Macmillan et al., 2016).

Uganda's remittance market is thriving, yet costs are high (World Bank, 2018b). Informal inflows and the costs of sending remittances are high, despite the significant developments in the market structure, regulation and access which have taken place in recent decades.

Remittances to Uganda have surpassed traditional foreign currency earners with positive impacts on the economy. The positive role played by remittances include that the aggregate flows into the economy have a direct effect on the national reserves, foreign exchanges and GDP of the economy as well as improvement on savings and credit ratios as a result of improved investment. Ugandan migrants are sending remittances to improve conditions in their households and communities. There is evidence that remittances in Uganda have the potential to significantly contribute to development compared to the official aid (Bank of Uganda, 2016). In Uganda, remittances tend to be more stable than other sources of foreign exchange, and they are often countercyclical, helping sustain consumption and investment during downturns and performing the role of a shock absorber (Ratha et al., 2011; UNHCR and UNCDF, 2018).

Remittances play a key role for Ugandans and refugees alike, providing vital funds from friends and families abroad. Uganda is a net recipient of remittances, given the large flows that the Ugandan diaspora remits home as well as the inflows that are supporting the enormous refugee population. Uganda's open border policy towards refugees from crisis-ridden neighboring countries is particularly commendable, given the current global rise in anti-immigration sentiments and policies. The remittance sector in the country is further advanced than in most countries in Africa, yet challenges remain. While formal remittance flows into Uganda are the sixth highest in Africa, it is estimated that both domestically and regionally a large proportion of personal transfers are still made informally (Cooper et al., 2018).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Migrants remit money home from host countries for two main reasons, namely altruism and self-interest motives. Altruism refers to the migrant's assistance to the family back home to meet basic family needs, while self-interest motives refer to returns seeking purposes for remitting back home (Docquier and Rapoport, 2006). Remittance inflows sometimes involve a complex arrangement that incorporate features of both self-interest and altruism, such as risk diversification, consumption smoothing and intergenerational financing of investments (Docquier and Rapoport, 2006). Migrants also remit home, aimed at maintaining good family ties to improve their standing for inheritance purposes or to ensure that their assets back home are properly taken care of. This is referred to as "enlightened self-interest"(Lucas and Stark, 1985: 906).

This section presents empirical studies that have analyzed the relation between remittances and economic growth. There are positive and negative externalities associated with international migration. One of the positive outcomes of migration is

remittance inflows, which have emerged as a key link between human mobility and development. A great deal of literature is available on remittances both in developed and developing countries. These include research in the area of development economics (Corden and Neary, 1982; Barajas et al., 2011; Koyame-Marsh, 2012; Siddique et al., 2012; Ahmed, 2013; Alvarez-Tinajero, 2013; Marwan et al., 2013; Richard and Alfredo,2013; Kemegue et al., 2014; World Bank, 2014; Adarkwa, 2015; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016; Hien et al., 2019; Tchamyou, 2020).

The empirical studies show that remittances can stimulate economic activity and motivate entrepreneurial communities (Ahmed, 2013; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016; Tchamyou, 2020). Remittances help households move out of poverty and increase educational and housing spending. Siddique et al. (2012) investigated the relationship between remittances and economic growth in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka and found that there is no causal relationship between economic growth and remittances in India, that there was a two-way relationship between remittances and economic growth in Sri Lanka, and that remittances did not lead to economic growth in Bangladesh.

Studies from sub-Saharan African countries show mixed results. For example, a study undertaken by Koyame-Marsh (2012) found that remittances do not lead to economic growth in all ten ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) countries studied. Marwan et al.'s (2013) study on Sudan found a long-run positive relationship between growth, export and remittance. Richard and Alfredo (2013) also found evidence of the strong role of remittances in promoting social welfare in Ghana. Adarkwa (2015) examined the impact of remittances on economic growth in four selected West African countries and found mixed results.

From another angle, Barajas et al. (2011) show that the growing consumption of recipients may increase the local market price and appreciate the exchange rate. As a result, the macroeconomic mechanism known as 'Dutch Disease'[4] may yield the failing of the tradable sector of the domestic economy, the rising of the current account deficit, and inflation with weaker monetary control (Hien et al., 2019). Meanwhile, the growing pressure on wages may lead to job losses in the tradable sector, while the sudden rise of prices would increase the labor costs in the non-tradable sector, thus leading to the loss of national competitiveness. In addition, the assessment of the impact of remittances on national growth suggests a wide range of multifaceted causal links and presents both positive and negative aspects, which may vary depending on the socioeconomic factors pertaining to each country at national and local levels (Yaseen, 2012). Table 1 presents a summary of positive and negative effects of remittances.

In general, sub-Saharan Africa lags woefully behind other regions in efforts at effectively harnessing the benefits of remittance inflows while minimizing negative externalities associated therewith. This has been attributed to several factors, such as

[4] An economic model developed by Corden and Neary (1983), when a country experiences a resource boom due to a tradable resource discovery and/or to an increase in a resource price.

inadequate awareness of the drivers and constraints to these inflows through formal channels, overregulation, underdeveloped financial systems and markets, lack of the requisite structures and enabling environment (Kemegue et al., 2014). In 2013, inflows of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa increased by 3.5% (World Bank, 2014). However, the increase was not distributed evenly across the continent. East African countries experienced significant gains in remittance inflows while those in the West African sub-region experienced only a marginal increase (World Bank, 2014).

Table 1: Summary of positive and negative effects of remittances

	Positive effects	**Negative effects**
National level	• Increase national income if remittances are transferred through formal channels. • Recipient countries gain creditworthiness in international credit markets. • Recipient countries may stabilize national balance of payments accounts.	• Large remittance flows could lead to currency appreciation, with negative consequences on exports.
Local/household/ individual level	• Boost local economies by stimulating consumption, demand for local goods or services, fostering job creation. • Potentially increase local capital to be reinvested in businesses. • Afford basic needs (food, healthcare, education, housing). • Face risks (unemployment, disability, accidents, illness). • Afford social/family events (town festivities, weddings, funerals); strengthen social networks; gain prestige, power and resources (social or material advantages); Redress relative deprivation (access to what others in the immediate environment have). • Partly redress social (class, gender) disadvantages.	• Generate a demand for imported (rather than locally produced) goods. • Increase the price of land, property, construction materials. • Exacerbate structural inequalities between recipients and non-recipients. • Foster dependency links between senders and recipients. • Put pressure on senders, leading to the deterioration of their living conditions.

Source: Adapted from Alvarez-Tinajero (2013).

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Data

This study uses data from the World Bank for the period from 1995 to 2017 to evaluate the nexus between inflow remittance and economic growth among three IGAD member countries, namely, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. The descriptive statistics for the data used in this study are presented in Table 2. The variable name GR stands for the real GDP growth rate. Most studies use GDP as a proxy variable for economic growth. However, using GDP growth rate better mimics the growth trend in respective countries. $GR_{i,t-1}$ is the lag of the logarithm of GDP growth rate, INF is inflation, measured as the annual percentage change in the consumption price index, INV is investment, lnGEXP is the logarithm of government expenditure, lnPOP is the logarithm of population size as a measure of human capital, lnREM is the logarithm of remittances over time, and OPN is openness to international trade, defined as the ratio of the sum of exports plus imports of goods to total output. In the analysis, many variables in this study are transformed to logarithm (log) forms. In time series analysis, logarithmic transformation is often considered to stabilize the variance of a series and mimics normal distribution (Luetkepohl and Xu, 2009).

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables

	G	INF	INV	lnGEXP	lnPOP	lnREM	OPN
Mean	6.339514	8.245000	22.86067	19.88665	17.52654	19.55574	17.22065
Median	6.081430	7.114000	21.47600	19.80179	17.41449	19.86758	14.15700
Maximum	13.57260	39.24500	39.41700	23.61567	18.34440	21.40123	125.9680
Minimum	-3.458139	-8.999000	12.35200	15.94040	16.73840	16.03824	-22.65600
Std. Dev.	3.585341	7.624076	6.616714	2.154349	0.476774	1.307967	22.08911
Skewness	-0.213900	1.538381	0.760696	-0.141375	0.299412	-0.837405	1.794977
Kurtosis	2.883122	7.925549	3.055465	2.052124	1.839402	2.799826	9.949993
Jarque-Bera	0.565438	96.96656	6.663418	2.812946	4.903541	8.179549	175.9217
Probability	0.753732	0.000000	0.035732	0.245006	0.086141	0.016743	0.000000
Sum	437.4264	568.9050	1577.386	1372.179	1209.331	1349.346	1188.225
Sum Sq. Dev.	874.1174	3952.604	2977.101	315.6030	15.45734	116.3329	33179.17
Observations	69	69	69	69	69	69	69

Source: Author's estimation from World Bank. 2017. Migration and Remittances Data, Annual Remittances Data (updated as of Dec. 2018).

The larger values of skewness and kurtosis show asymmetric distribution around the mean. This fact is also evidenced in the Jarque-Bera test that rejected the null hypothesis of normality at 1 percent level of significance for most of the variables.

Methodology

Since the main objective of the study is to analyze the impact of international

remittances on economic growth in the three east African countries, the effect of international remittances on economic growth can be modelled as follows:

Methodology on panel unit root tests

As a common accord in the literature, panel unit root tests are superior to time series unit root tests. Therefore, this paper uses panel unit root tests, as outlined in Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) (2003) and Levin Lin and Chu (LLC) (2002). Following IPS (2003) and LLC (2002) we have the following panel unit root regression:

$$\Delta y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i y_{i,t-1} + \sum_{j=1}^{\text{wij}} \delta_{i,j} \Delta x_{i,t-j} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \text{ , i = 1, …, N, and t = 1} \quad (1)$$

where:

Using equation (1), LLC (2002) test and IPS (2003) test are carried out, respectively. The LLC test examines:

H_0: $\beta_1=\beta_2=...=\beta_N=0$ (no cointegration) against

H_1: $\beta i<0$, for some i (there is cointegration)

H_0 and H_1 are the null and the alternative hypotheses respectively, where the appropriate lag order w_{ij} from equation (1) must be determined. The conventional t-statistics for testing $\beta_i=0$ is:

$$t_{\beta i} = \frac{\hat{\rho}}{\hat{\delta}(\hat{\rho})} \quad (2)$$

The IPS adjusted t-statistics is expressed as:

$$t_{\beta i} = \frac{t_{\beta i} - NTS\hat{N}\sigma\varepsilon^{-2}STD\left(\hat{\hat{\sigma}}\right)\mu^* M\hat{\hat{T}}}{\hat{\delta}(\hat{\rho})M\hat{T}} \quad (3)$$

Note that the IPS test also examines similar null and alternative hypotheses as specified in the LLC test.

Dynamic Panel Model Specification

Following from Giuliano and Arranz (2009) and Barguellil et al. (2013), the dynamic panel model used in this study is specified as follows:

$$GR_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 GR_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 Inf_{i,t} + \beta_3 lnInv_{i,t} + \beta_4 lnGEXP_{i,t} + \beta_5 lnPOP_{i,t} + \beta_6 lnREM_{i,t} + \beta_7 OPN_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (4)$$

where:

GR - is the real GDP growth rate

$GR_{i,t-1}$ - is the lag of GDP growth rate

INF - is inflation, measured as the annual percentage change in the consumption price index

INV - is investment

lnGEXP - is the logarithm of government expenditure

lnPOP - is the logarithm of population size as a measure of human capital

lnREM - is the logarithm of remittances over time

OPN - is openness to international trade, defined as the ratio of the sum of exports plus imports of goods to total output

ε - is the error term

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Panel Co-integration Test

Given the nature of the data used in this study, the unbalanced panel data analysis is employed. For the analysis of the long-run relationship among variables in this study, an array of panel cointegration tests are employed to ensure the veracity of the findings. Table 3 presents a summary of the panel unit root test.

Table 3: Panel Unit Root Test: Summary

Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)			**Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)**	
Variable	**Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC)**		**Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) W-stat**	
	Level	First difference	Level	First difference
G	-3.6445***		-2.71078***	
INF	-3.1507***		-2.84007	
lnREM	-1.68116**		-0.31627	
INV	0.04313	-2.04313**	0.32596	
lnGEXP	2.43817	-1.80750**	4.48814	-2.28552***
OPN	-4.4806***		-5.18781***	
lnGDPP		-2.96322***		
D(lnPOP,2)	-6.31624***		-6.05418***	

Source: Author's estimation from World Bank. 2017. Migration and Remittances Data, Annual Remittances Data (updated as of Dec. 2018). Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Most of the variables are stationary at level, since the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected. That makes our estimation reliable. Table 4 presents a summary of the pooled estimation result from the panel fully modified least squares.

Table 4: Pooled Estimation Result from Panel Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS)

Dependent Variable: G (Growth rate)				
Sample (adjusted): 1996- 2016				
Periods included: 21 Cross-sections included: 3				
Total panel (balanced) observations: 63 Cointegrating equation deterministic: C				
Coefficient covariance computed using default method				
Long-run covariance estimates (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth)				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Probability
GT_1	0.198874	0.097510	2.039522	0.0464**
INF	0.138120	0.039452	3.500981	0.0009 ***
INV	0.031040	0.082528	0.376110	0.7083
lnGEXP	0.060569	1.354254	0.044725	0.9645
lnPOP	-2.554559	5.488141	-0.465469	0.6435
lnREM	0.635389	0.540616	1.175305	0.2451
OPN	0.064385	0.014339	4.490131	0.0000***
R-squared	0.419647	Mean dependent var		6.269976
Adjusted R-squared	0.321097	S.D. dependent var		3.672979
S.E. of regression	3.026373	Sum squared residual		485.4234
Long-run variance	3.462648			

Source: Author's estimation from World Bank. 2017. Migration and Remittances Data, Annual Remittances Data (updated as of Dec. 2018).

The logarithm of remittances impacts the dependent variable, economic growth, positively but is not statistically significant. However, the first lag of economic growth, inflation, and openness has affected economic growth during the study period positively and significantly at five percent and one percent levels of significance respectively. Table 5 presents the results from the Kao panel residual cointegration.

Table 5: Kao Panel Residual Cointegration Test for long-run relation between remittance and economic growth

Series: G, GT_1, INF, INV, LNGEXP, LNPOP, LNREM, OPN				
Sample: 1995 2017				
Included observations: 69				
Null Hypothesis: **No cointegration**				
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend				
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with a max lag of 5				
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel				
			t-Statistic	**Prob.**
ADF			-3.447484	0.0003***
Residual variance			11.10221	
HAC variance			1.559893	

Source: Author's estimation from World Bank. 2017. Migration and Remittances Data, Annual Remittances Data (updated as of Dec. 2018).

The Kao panel residual cointegration shows that the null hypothesis is not sufficiently supported by the data. There is a statistically significant long-run relationship between the variables in the series. This implies that international remittance, our variable interest, has long-run impact on the economic growth in the countries considered in this study. Table 6 presents a summary of the Granger causality test.

Table 6: Granger Causality Test

Pairwise Granger Causality Tests			
Sample: 1995 2017 Lags: 2			
Null Hypothesis:	Obs	F-Statistic	Prob.
lnREM does not Granger Cause G	63	4.29316	0.0182**
G does not Granger Cause LNREM	0.24848	0.7808	

Source: Author's estimation from World Bank. 2017. Migration and Remittances Data, Annual Remittances Data (updated as of Dec. 2018).

There is not enough evidence to accept the null hypothesis. Therefore, remittances Granger causes economic growth – significantly at 5 percent level of significance in the long run.

Robustness Check

To verify the above dynamic panel regression result, fixed-effects and random-effects estimation are used as a robustness check. As shown in Tables 7 and 8, both fixed-effects and random-effects estimation results confirm the same findings, as shown in other panel regression results. That is, the logarithm of remittances impacts

economic growth in the panel of countries included in this study positively, affects economic growth, but is not statistically significant. However, in the random-effects analysis, the estimation result is negative but not statistically significant. The other variables like inflation and openness have affected economic growth during the study period positive and statistically significant in both models (see Tables 7 and 8). These findings are in line with economic theories on growth.

Table 7: Fixed-effects Estimation Results

Fixed-effects(within)regression				**Number of obs. = 66**	
Group variable: i				**Number of groups = 3**	
R-sq:				**Obs. per group:**	
Within = 0.3450				**min = 22**	
Between = 0.2236				**avg. = 22.0**	
overall = 0.0011				**max = 22**	
				F (7,56)	**= 4.21**
corr(u_i,χb) = -0.9435				**Prob> F**	**= 0.0009**
G	**Coef.**	**Std.Err.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**[95% Conf. Interval]**
Gt_1	0.13875	0.1273	1.09	0.280	-0.1161 0.3937
lnREM	0.7595	0.7387	1.03	0.308	-0.7204 2.2394
INV	-0.0132	-0.1086	-0.12	0.904	-0.2307 0.2043
lnGEXP	1.5202	1.6533	0.92	0.362	-1.7917 4.8322
OPN	0.0633	0.0184	3.44	0.001***	0.0264 0.1001
INF	0.1108	0.0529	2.09	0.041**	0.0048 0.2168
lnPOP	-8.9945	6.5789	-1.37	0.177	-22.1737 4.1846
_cons	116.3416	89.7058	1.30	1.30	-63.3503 296.0334
Sigma_u	9.0418				
Sigma_e	2.9079				
rho	0.9063				
F_test that u_i=0: F(2,56) = 2.47				Prob> F= 0.0942	

Source: Author's estimation from World Bank. 2017. Migration and Remittances Data, Annual Remittances Data (updated as of Dec. 2018).

Table 8: Random-effects Estimation Results

Fixed-effects(within)regression				**Number of obs. = 66**	
Group variable: i				**Number of groups = 3**	
R-sq:				**Obs. per group:**	
Within =0.3033				**min = 22**	
Between =0.9807				**avg. = 22.0**	
overall = 0.4073				**max = 22**	
				Wald chi2(7)	**= 39.85**
corr(u_i,χ) = 0 (assume)				**Prob> chi2**	**= 0.0009**
G	**Coef.**	**Std.Err.**	**t**	**P>|t|**	**[95% Conf. Interval]**
Gt_1	0.2144	0.1192	1.80	0.072	-0.0192 0.4481
lnREM	0.0291	0.0571	0.06	0.955	-0.0419 1.0426
INV	0.1320	0.0887	1.49	0.137	-0.9376 0.3059
lnGEXP	-0.0268	0.4648	-0.06	0.954	-1.7917 0.8839
OPN	0.0564	0.0185	3.04	0.002***	0.0200 0.0927
INF	0.1198	0.0527	2.27	0.021**	0.0165 0.2230
lnPOP	-0.0225	1.6846	-0.01	0.989	-3.3243 3.2793
_cons	0.3749	31.7787	0.01	10.991	-61.9103 62.6602
Sigma_u	0				
Sigma_e	2.9079				
rho	0 (fraction of variance due to u_i)				

Source: Author's estimation from World Bank. 2017. Migration and Remittances Data, Annual Remittances Data (updated as of Dec. 2018). Note: ** and *** indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

CONCLUSION

Human migration is one of the topical issues under discussion among policy-makers, politicians, the media, and individual citizens of both developed and developing nations. When supported by appropriate policies, migration can contribute to inclusive and sustainable development in both origin and destination countries, while also benefiting migrants and their families. However, sub-Saharan Africa lags woefully behind other regions in efforts at effectively harnessing the benefits of remittance inflows while minimizing negative externalities associated therewith. This study investigated the effect of remittances on economic growth in three IGAD member countries, namely, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, for the period ranging from 1995 to 2017. The pooled estimation result from panel fully modified least squares (FMOLS) shows that the logarithm of remittances impacts the dependent variable, economic growth, positively but not statistically significant. The Kao panel residual cointegration test shows that the null hypothesis is not sufficiently supported by the data. There is a statistically significant long-run relationship between the variables

in the series. This implies that international remittances, our variable interest, has a long-run impact on the economic growth in the countries considered in this study. In addition, remittances Granger cause economic growth – significantly at 5 percent level of significance in the long run. In this study, the impact of human capital is captured using the population size of the respective countries. However, the result comes with a negative effect. Such result is not surprising, given that the countries included in this study have relatively higher population growth rates that may hamper capital formation because of high levels of consumption. Education and training could better capture the effect of human capital on economic growth.

The countries included in this study are known for poor governance, lack of economic and political stability, and unfavorable investment regulation that deters the inflow of remittances. The trust deficit between the diaspora and governments should also be addressed to promote diaspora investment appetite in local financial instruments, like bonds and other financial assets. Policymakers in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda should formulate policies that can stimulate additional remittances from their diaspora. Governments, institutions, and civil society are interested in mobilizing remittances, as illustrated by the growth initiatives targeting the financial and human capital of migrants and diasporas. Remittances can serve as a 'big-push' towards economic growth in the countries included in this study; countries need to design appropriate policies suitable for money transfer. In addition, there should be strong collaboration with host countries to harness mutual benefit in both ends. The migrant-sending countries should also create a strong collaboration with migrants and diasporas, with respect to their rights, and improve their quality of life in host countries. Future studies in this area may focus on the channels through which remittances impact economic growth.

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Determinants of Healthy Aging in Internally Displaced Communities in Nigeria

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The main objective of this research article, is to assess the effect of socio-economic and environmental determinants on the healthy aging status amongst internally displaced migrants and non-migrants nestled within the environmentally stressed regions of Northeastern Nigeria. Methodologically the study utilized secondary data from the Nigerian IDP Survey 2018 (Location-Northeastern States; n-1293 adults aged ≥50; male n-63.1%, female n-36.9%) using a multi-stage stratified random sample. Varied statistical techniques such as cross-tabulation and binary logistic regression were used to analyze the dataset. The study results show a high mean prevalence of old-age disability within the study area, irrespective of migration status in Northeastern Nigeria. Secondly, socio-economic and environmental determinants were robust predictors of later-life health outcomes. In addition, the regression revealed that concomitant factors such as age, gender and sanitation have a negative effect on older adult wellness and well-being. Meanwhile, the migration status of internally displaced persons (IDPs), although in most cases forced, significantly improves the odds of aging healthily. Conclusively, the quality of life of the older adults, irrespective of migration status, is poorly impacted by diminishing familial supports, social exclusion, non-existent social security program and non-existence of healthcare infrastructure. Based on the study results, we recommend that the proposed Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Sahelian "Green belt" afforestation project targeted, especially to areas around the Chad basin be fully implemented, as this project will help mediate the perennial conflicts between the herdsmen and farming communities. Furthermore, there is an urgent need to formulate an integration between migration and geriatrics which would be comprehensive, and evidence-driven. Study recommend that budgetary allocation for health should have a flooring capped at 20% of the national budget..

Keywords: environmental stress, forced migration, population aging, Nigeria, Sullivan method

INTRODUCTION

The combined impacts of conflicts, environmental and climatic changes on socio-economic development as witnessed in the 21st century are complex (IOM, 2018; IDMC, 2019a; IDMC-GRID, 2020). This trident portends short- and long-term challenges to policy audiences and nations worldwide, in most cases precariously altering the demographic structures while also hindering the sustainable development drive of most countries. Increasingly more regions around the globe are experiencing unprecedented levels of habitat loss due to factors such as climate change, change in land use/land cover, desertification, and water pollution. This has devastating effects on the most vulnerable communities, particularly in least developed countries (LDCs), landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS) (Hartter et al., 2015; IPCC, 2018; Strandberg and Kjellström, 2019).

In order to better comprehend the scale of this phenomenon, according to the IDMC-GRID (2020), 33.4 million people were recently internally displaced, making 2019 the year with the highest annual increase since 2012. A staggering 8.5 million of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) were driven by conflict and violence, while 24.9 million IDPs were triggered by around 1,900 recorded disaster events across 145 countries and territories. The status of 23.9 million of these IDPs was directly attributable to weather-related disasters (See in Figure 1). During 2019, a total of 75.5% of IDPs, which accounted for an estimated 34.5 million IDPs, were resident in just 10 countries. Of these IDPs, 18.3 million are children under the age of 15 years, while 3.7 million are persons aged 60 years and above (IOM, 2018; IDMC-GRID, 2020).

Climate-induced displacement is fluid and widespread, constantly reshaping migration patterns across different regions and most especially in the LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS nations. According to the UNHCR (2018) an estimated 79.5 million people are currently displaced worldwide, which constitutes about 1% of the human population derived from 28 million new humanitarian crises across 148 countries and territories. It is evident that the humanitarian crises abound and persist unabated (IDMC-GRID, 2020). The global migration picture must, therefore, be seen as a sum of many parts and it is important to put recent developments in specific regions into global and historical contexts.

Figure 1: Annual distribution of internal displacement by causation (2008-2019)



Source: Authors' compilation (2020)

Sub-Saharan Africa

In Africa, inter-tribal conflicts are the leading source of internal displacement[1] alongside the effects of environmental change. The continent at present houses over one-third of the global internally displaced population. This is in spite of the unanimous adoption by the different African states of the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons plan in 2012 (AU, 2012). The sub-Saharan region which comprises 47 nations is still home to an estimated 16.8 million IDPs. Conflicts and violence within the sub-region contributed 4,590,000 new IDPs and 3,448,000 IDPs were displaced as a result of environmental stress. This is evidenced in the temporal escalation of violence and an overall deterioration of security, mostly within the Sahelian sub-regions, that are still ongoing in nations like Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (World Bank, 2017a).

Causes of internal displacement in Nigeria (stylized fact)

The problem of forced migration and internal displacement in Nigeria persisted post-independence, and this has often been triggered by ethno-religious communal

[1] In this study the terms internal displacement and forced migration are used interchangeably.

disputes, electoral violence, a civil war in 1967 and natural disasters such as flooding and desertification. Nigeria is currently ranked as one of the highest IDP-dense countries with one of the highest numbers of conflict-induced IDPs (IOM, 2018; GTI, 2019). Since 2013, the country has experienced an unprecedented spike in internal displacement due to the insurgency in the northern part of the country caused by Boko-Haram[2] (north-east) and Fulani herdsmen[3] (north-west). Together, they account for 78% of terror-related incidents and 86% of deaths from terrorism (Mohammed, 2017; GTI, 2019). The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Round 13 Report estimated 1,770, 444 IDPs in the northeastern parts alone. Displacement in this area is principally caused by conflict (1,770,444) attributed to the Boko-Haram Islamist group, coupled with the intensification of the conflict between pastoralists and the nomadic Fulani terrorist-facilitated further displacements leading to a total of 2,706,152 IDPs across 13 states in Nigeria (IOM, 2018).

Environment-induced migration is occurring at an increasing rate in Northern Nigeria, considering that 613,000 persons were recently displaced as a direct impact of environmental stressors (IDMC, 2019b). Studies have shown that the Sudano-Sahelian Ecological Zone (SSEZ) suffered from seasonal and inter-annual climatic variability as measured in most parts of the country (See in Figure 2). This led to increased droughts and the inevitable onset of the desertification processes, particularly since the 1960s decrease in rainfall in the range of about 3-4% per decade since the beginning of the 19th century (FRN, 2003; Abaje et al., 2011). The Sahelian droughts of the 1970s and the 1980s ravaged this zone and left farmers impoverished (Ati et al., 2007). This zone falls within the "Arc of Tension", a region burdened by successive disasters in the form of flash flooding, coupled with the slow onset of extreme drought and desertification (Abaje et al., 2011; Abaje et al., 2012).

2 Boko-Haram is known as the Islamic State in West Africa, and was formerly known as Jama'at Ahl as-Sunnah Lid-Da'wahwa'l-Jihad (Founded in 2002).

3 Fulani extremists are from the Fulani tribe in Northern Nigeria and from other neighboring countries in the Sahel, a tribe known for cattle herding.

Figure 2: Climatic Transition in Nigeria (1901-2016)



Source: Authors' compilation (2020)

Northeastern Nigeria is being structurally transformed and overburdened by forced migration, triggered by conflicts and disasters resulting in clashes between host communities and the displaced population over scarce socio-economic resources. This humanitarian situation in the Northeast is deteriorating, with almost 8 million people heavily dependent on humanitarian aid. An estimated 823,000 people are out of the reach of aid organizations, and little is known about their health needs. According to the UN, 5.4 million people are in dire need of healthcare (UN OCHA, 2018).

There is a growing need to view the resultant problems associated with migration and non-migration within this region through new lenses, as they are far too complex to be characterized in just a binary perspective. In compositional terms, most people and households that face climate risks do not migrate, particularly in LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS. On the other hand, forced migration is increasingly recognized as a leading source of global health crises. Evidence shows that conflict-driven displacement has profound impacts on both the physical and mental health of those displaced persons, among which consist of older adults (Burns et al., 2018).

Older adults, irrespective of legal status, are more susceptible to social and healthcare exclusion, especially with the decline of the traditional familial support system. Despite their increased health risks, a large number of older persons within

this conflict-stricken region lack access to adequate levels and quality of health care. Older adults within host communities have to compete with older IDPs for the limited healthcare services and aid provided by often over-stretched local governments. This "double stress" puts additional strain on the scarce resources, further reducing their coping ability and weakening their resilience (Le Van et al., 2018; UNHCR, 2018; UN OCHA, 2018).

Figure 3: Conceptualizing the research problem



Source: Authors' construct (2020)

The adverse impacts of conflict-driven displacement on health outcomes are well-documented (see for example, Julca and Paddison, 2010; Heudtlass et al., 2016). This paper argues that inasmuch as some people migrate willingly and voluntarily, there are other forms of migration that occur under forced or coerced conditions as far as Nigeria is concerned. Some scholars refer to the voluntary–forced migration nexus as continuum (Oucho, 2009; Koppenberg, 2012). This work does not delve into the voluntary and involuntary migration nexus; rather, it focuses on internal displacement as a form of forced migration (Mooney, 2005; Terminski, 2013). In addition, less is known about the nexus between migration status and determinants of healthy aging in Nigeria. The main objective of this article is to assess the effect of socio-economic

and environmental determinants on healthy aging status among displaced migrants and non-migrants nested within the environmentally stressed region of Northeastern Nigeria. The study also seeks to contribute to the emerging body of literature on global population aging studies as impacted by migration, while also contributing to the discussion on the dynamics of internal displacement in Nigeria.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In the past few decades, the literature on migration has paid less attention to the subject of forced migration, although this sub-field in migration has its roots in the early writings of contemporary migration studies. Ernst Georg Ravenstein (1834–1913) propounded in the Laws of Migration that "bad or oppressive laws, heavy taxation and unattractive climate, uncongenial social surroundings, and even compulsion (slave trade, transportation) produce flows of migrants, but none of these flows can be compared in volume with that which arises from the desire inherent in the most men to 'better' themselves in material aspects" (Ravenstein, 1885:167-227; 1889:224-310.).

The voluntary form of migration enthused by economic causes propagated by Ravenstein has dominated and influenced major migration theories (see: mobility transition by Zelinsky, 1971; dual economy model, 1950/1960) throughout the twentieth century up to the present. The reduction of human mobility due to economic pull factors alone overlooks certain important immeasurable social factors in contemporary times such as environmental and climatic stressors (Terminski, 2013).

Healthy aging

Currently, more than 11.6% of global populations are persons aged 60+ years (about 901 million persons) and this number is projected to rise to about 1.4 billion people by 2050 (UN, 2015). Similarly, the eastern and south-eastern Asian sub-regions are anticipated to experience the largest demographic transition (312 million people), while sub-Saharan Africa is projected to experience the largest increase in life expectancy gain (11.4 years), rising from 49.1 years (1990-1995) to 60.5 years (2015-2020), and a further gain of 7.6 years is anticipated between 2015-2050 (UNDP, 2018; UN-DESA, 2020).

The global advancement in healthcare and living standard has translated into prolonging life expectancy of people worldwide. Thus, a person who turns 60 years old could expect to live an additional 17 years in 2015-2020, and this number could rise to 19 years in 2045-2050. Those living in sub-Saharan Africa are projected to live only an additional 14.2 years in 2045-2050 (Higo and Khan, 2014; UN DESA, 2020). However, more emphasis should be placed on the quality of life, rather than longevity alone, optimizing opportunities for health, participation and security in order to enhance the quality of life of older adults in society. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines healthy aging as, "the process of developing and maintaining the

functional ability that enables well-being in older age" (WHO, 2015).

The Nigerian government confronts a major problem, optimizing health opportunities, social inclusion and security for older adult IDPs in order to promote healthy aging. Elder et al. (1994) showed the adverse effects of conflicts and war on the physical health of persons older than 30 years. In addition, Kuh et al. (2002), Shaw and Krause (2002), Krause et al. (2004) all revealed that early-life events are adversely related to health outcomes in middle- and older age. The WHO (2015b) report, points out that healthy aging status is significantly influenced by social determinants of health, for instance persons classified as socio-economically disadvantaged, such as in the case of most IDPs, who experience markedly poorer health in older age.

Furthermore, the review of some studies revealed problems of inequality in health status and well-being among older people, highlighting different factors, such as socio-economic status (Lindström et al., 2017), age (Aboderin, 2010; 2011), nationality (Axén and Lindström, 2002), educational status (Ibáñez and Moya, 2006), marital status and economic status (Kirchhoff and Ibáñez, 2002), emotional support (Ahs et al., 2006), the transformation of familial support (Higo and Khan, 2014; Khan et al., 2017; Khan, 2019), and not having a partner present. These factors are associated with poorer health and well-being, and in general lower quality of life (Gómez-Olivé et al., 2010; Phaswana-Mafuya et al., 2013).

METHODS AND DATA

The study utilized the Nigerian IDP Survey (FRN, 2018), a household survey with a multi-stage stratified random sample. Six Northeastern states were surveyed namely: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe (See in Figure 4). This region is characterized by harsh climatic conditions, poor infrastructure, poor service delivery and frequent epidemic outbreaks. The sampling frame consisted of a list of wards with IDP household counts in the six states, provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) of 2017. The survey is representative for IDPs and host communities, defining host communities as the non-displaced population living in the Enumeration Areas (EAs) with displaced populations. All the households in the selected EAs were first listed and 12 IDP households and 12 (or multiples of it) host community households were randomly selected and surveyed per EA, to reach the designated sample size.

Figure 4: Nigeria showing its Northeastern geo-political zones



Source: Authors' compilation (2020)

Variable measurement

The WHO (2015b) notes that healthy aging is significantly influenced by the social determinants of health. This implies that people from socio-economically disadvantaged groups experience markedly poorer health in older age and have a shorter life expectancy. Social determinants of health (SDOH) encompass the social, economic and environmental factors that can affect an individual's health and quality of life. For older adults in particular, SDOH-related factors can have significant implications for their ability to live independently in advanced age.

We selected physical disability (B_3_3_disal_3) as a proxy of healthy aging status for the outcome. The study justification for this decision of selecting sensory impairment as a health status metric is based on the fact that it is a prevalent cause of unhealthy aging in low- and lower-middle-income countries like Nigeria. Environmental factors include the household's type of toilet (C_1_21_toilet), source of household drinking water (C_1_11_water_home), and type of waste disposal (C_2_21_waste_disposal). Economic factors consist of consumption quintile (Quintile_tc), labor participation status (Status), and household density (HH_sleep). Social factors include age (Age_cat_g), migration status (Migr_idp), educational status (edu_level_g_c), and household dependency status (Depend_share).

For the purpose of this study, we selected persons aged 50 and above, rather

than the generally utilized age of 65 years, for two reasons. Firstly, the life expectancy age of the average Nigerian is marginally greater than 50 years (Ex=54.49year; Male=53.79/Female=55.62). Secondly, the Northeastern region is considered the poorest in Nigeria, with socio-economically disadvantaged groups experiencing markedly poorer health in older age and shorter life expectancy.

In Nigeria ethnicity and religious identities are often intertwined, forming part of a complex pattern of social exclusion. Religious minorities experience social, political and economic exclusion, as a result of these differences (UNECA, 1991; World Bank, 2017b; Idris, 2018; Le Van et al., 2018). Interestingly, the majority of IDPs in Northeastern Nigeria relocate to places where they connect with host communities with shared ethnicity and religious beliefs.

Data analysis

We utilized descriptive statistics, alongside the disability-free life expectancy (DFLE) calculation, a health concept centered on the health expectancies proposed by Sullivan (1971). The Sullivan health expectancy reflects the current health of a real population adjusted for mortality levels and independent of age structure (Bone et al.,1995). The Sullivan health expectancy provides a means of comparing the health states of an entire population at two time-points or of two different populations at the same time-point. This stated merit helps advance scholarship in migrant studies, as in the case of this study, because it affords us the opportunity to determine health disparities between persons in internally displaced communities and persons in their host communities.

The binary logistic regression technique was also utilized in order to actualize the aim of the study. This technique is one of the often-used machine-learning algorithms for binary classification that utilizes a performance baseline (Hosmer et al., 2013). This technique was used to determine the binary healthy aging outcome between the host and migrant communities, predicted by an assemblage of varied factors. Furthermore, this technique has significant importance in the measuring of migrant's health outcomes. The binary logistic regression model is given below,

$$Y=\beta_0+\beta_1 X_1+\beta_2 X_2 + \beta qXq \quad (1)$$

$$Logit\ (\pi) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 +\beta_2 X_2 + ... + \beta pXp \quad (2)$$

$$Logit(p(\pi))=log\left(\frac{p(x)}{1-p(x)}\right)=\alpha+\beta_x \quad (3)$$

(Then for $x=0$ (Healthy aging), $x=1$(Unhealthy aging))

Where; $\beta_1 \rightarrow \beta_q$=coefficient for q

$\beta_1 \rightarrow \beta_q$ are regression parameters; X_1, X_2…. Xq are explanatory variables, and π is the probability of success. β = Regression coefficient; α = Constant.

$$\ln\left[\frac{p}{1-p}\right]= \beta_0+\beta_1 X_1+\beta_2 X_2 \ +\beta_q X_q \quad (4)$$

Since the study was assessed at an individual level, the probability of an individual

aging in a healthy manner is needed, the binary logistic regression:

$$P= \frac{exp(\beta_0+\beta_1X_1+...\beta_qX_q)}{1+exp(\beta_0+\beta_1X_1+\beta_2X_2+...\beta qXq)} \quad (5)$$

Overview characteristics of the sample and to identify factors associated with healthy aging status p. The binary logistic regression analysis can be used to determine the relationship between a binary response and continuous or categorical explanatory variables (Vittinghoff et al., 2011; Long and Freese, 2014). In addition, logistic regression gives a discrete outcome, unlike other analytical techniques such as linear regression, that gives a continuous outcome.

$Y_i=$ 0 = Do not have Sensory Impairment; 1 = Have Sensory Impairment

Outcome Variable (Healthy Aging Status)

Logit (Health Status) = β_0 + Social factor + Economic factors + Environmental factors+ X_n (6)

Predictor variables utilized: X_1-Age, X_2-migration status (non-migrants =1, migrants =2), X_3-educational status, X_4-gender (male=1, female=2), X_5-labor market participation, X_6-household dependency status, X_7-consumption quintile, X_8=communal participation, X_9- type of waste disposal, X_{10}-type of toilet, X_{11}-source of drinking water and X_{12}-household density.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Table 1: Basic demographic background of the aging

Variable	Host(N=692)	IDP(N=601)	Combined(N=1293)
Age			
50-54years	242(18.7%)	214(16.6%)	456(35.3%)
55-59years	120(9.3%)	112(8.7%)	232(17.9%)
60-64years	171(13.2%)	145(11.2%)	316(24.4%)
65-69years	15(1.2%)	20(1.5%)	35(2.7%)
70-74years	72(5.6%)	51(3.9%)	123(9.5%)
75-79years	33(2.6%)	29(2.2%)	62(4.8%)
>80years	39(2.6%)	30(2.3%)	69(5.3%)
Gender			
Male	420(32.5%)	396(30.6%)	816(63.1%)
Female	272(21.0%)	205(15.9%)	477(36.9%)
Gender of household head			
Men	449(34.7%)	384(29.7%)	833(64.4%)
Women	243(18.8%)	217(16.8%)	460(35.6%)
Religious Affiliations			
Christianity	58(6.4%)	23(2.5%)	81(8.9%)
Islam	414(45.5%)	413(45.4%)	827(91.0%)
Traditional	1(0.1%)	0(0%)	1(0.1%)
Literacy			
Yes	358(27.8%)	262(20.3%)	620(48.1%)
No	331(25.7%)	337(26.2%)	668(51.9%)
Highest Educational Attainment			
No education	299(23.3%)	306(23.9%)	605(47.2%)
Primary andIntermediate	36(2.8%)	30(2.3%)	66(5.1%)
Secondary	90(7.0%	47(3.7%)	137(10.7%)
University	33(2.6%)	12(0.9%)	45(3.5%)
Technical and Vocational	7(0.5%)	6(0.5%)	13(1.0%)
Religious	174(13.6%)	170(13.3%)	344(26.8%)
Others	47(3.7%)	25(2.0%)	72(5.6%)

Note: Mean age= 56±9, Standard deviation= 1.737

Source: Authors' computation (2020)

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the socio-economic status of the respondents. Based on the study age distribution, the majority of the respondents were aged 50-59 (53.2%), followed those aged 60-69 (27.1%), those aged 70-79 (14.3%) and persons aged 80 and above (5.3%) had the lowest representation. The

adult mortality rate is 3.18 deaths per 1,000 of the populations among women and 3.25 deaths per 1,000 of the populations among men (NDHS, 2019).

Delineation by gender revealed that the population of male (63.1%) respondents was nearly double that of their female (36.9%) counterparts. This gender disparity could be a direct effect of cultural and religious norms, particularly where women are barred by their husbands/guidance to attend to male visitors. Similarly, 63.1% of households were headed by men, compared to 36.9% of households headed by women. Observers of the Islamic faith constituted 91.0% of the respondents, followed by Christians (8.9%) and African traditionalists (0.1%). Furthermore, based on the ability to read in any language, 48.1% of the respondents were literate compared to 51.9% who were non-literate. Additionally, 47.2% of respondents had no form of formal education, 26.8% had Islamic education (known as Karatu Islamiyah) and 26% had some form of western education (see Table 2).

Table 2: Disability-free life expectancy (DFLE) using an abridged life table

	Host N=(692)			**IDP N=(601)**			**North-West (Combined) N=(1293)**			
Age (*x-x+n*)	Life expectancy (e_x)	Deaths (D_x)	Survival (l_x)	Life expectancy (e_x)	Deaths (D_x)	Survival (l_x)	Life expectancy (e_x)	Deaths (D_x)	Survival (l_x)	Proportion disability (N_x)
50-54	19.8	242	0.6503	18.1	214	0.6042	20.5	456	0.6473	46.4%
55-59	16.1	120	0.4769	14.6	112	0.4576	17	232	0.4679	56.5%
60-64	12.7	171	0.2298	11.3	145	0.2163	13.7	316	0.2235	69.9%
65-69	9.7	15	0.2081	8.6	20	0.1830	10.7	35	0.1964	80.0%
70-74	7.1	72	0.1040	5.9	51	0.0982	8	123	0.1013	73.7%
75-79	4.9	33	0.0564	3.7	29	0.0499	5.8	62	0.0534	85.3%
>80	2.9	39	0.0000	2.0	30	0.0000	4.1	69	0.0000	89.9%

Source: Authors' computation (2020)

Life expectancy at a specific age is the number of additional years that a person of that age can expect to live, if current mortality levels observed for higher ages continue for the rest of that person's life. Thus, based on the result of the study's abridged life table (Sullivan method), aged persons in the host communities are expected to live 4±9 years more than IDPs. Along cohort delineation, a host person aged 50-59 has a mean life expectancy of 17±9 years compared to IDPs (mean 16.4± years; a host person aged 60-69 (mean 11±2 years) > IDPs (mean 10 years); a host person aged 70-79 (mean 6 years)>IDPs (mean 4±8 years); and host persons aged 80 and above (mean 2±9 years) > IDPs (mean 2 years) respectively (see Table 2). Longer lives are an incredibly valuable resource, both for individuals and for society more

broadly. Older people participate in, and contribute to society in varied ways. This social engagement may in turn reinforce the health and well-being of older people themselves.

Figure 5: Nigeria's LIfe expectancy (ex) Transition (1960-2019)



Source: Adapted from World Bank (2020)

The results show that Nigeria has experienced a progressive trend, growing at an average annual life expectancy growth rate of 0.60%. Interestingly, during the onset of the economic recession in the early 1980s, the country experienced a decline (1980(45.3)-1990(45.9)-1998(45.9)) in its life expectancy status, and this remained so until the re-adoption of democratic governance in 1999 (46.1-2010(50.9)-2019(54.5)). Coincidentally, the 21st century has also ushered in an increase in global life expectancy due to concomitant factors (see Figure 5).

Figure 6: Disability-free life expectancy (DFLEx) of the study area



Source: Computed by authors from NGA-IDP data (2018)

The Sullivan health expectancy was utilized to determine the current health status of persons aged 50 years and above, adjusted for mortality levels and independent of age structure. The study calculated the number of remaining years, at a particular age, that an individual can expect to live in a healthy state, void of sensory disabilities (see Figure 6), considering that almost one-third (32.8%) of people aged 60 or older in Nigeria are reported to have at least one form of disability (NDHS, 2019). The study's results showed healthy aging disparities, considering that IDPs were more susceptible to sensory disabilities. This means that this cohort was projected to have a far less disability-free life compared to their peers in the host communities across the entire age cohort (aged 50-80 and above).

Table 3: Result of the Binary Logistic Regression Model (IDP and host population)

VARIABLES	Model 1 IDP population				Model 2 Host population			
	β	**Wald**	**Sig.**	**Exp(β)**	**β**	**Wald**	**Sig.**	**Exp(β)**
Age								
50-59	-.604	43.691	<.002	.547	-.792	5.296	<.001	.453
60-69	-.545	43.334	<.010	.661	.439	5.122	<.001	.527
70-79	-.451	41.223	.052	1.232	-671	4.992	<.002	.531
>80	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
Educational Status								
No Education	.017	.122	.001	1.017	-.168	.738	<.002	.845
Pry Education	-0.29	.164	<.002	1.040	-.271	2.124	<.001	.743
Sec education	.071	2.177	<.001	.575	-.283	1.341	<.001	.447
vocation								
University	.098	.434	.510	.767	-.099	1.291	<.006	.751
Religious	.373	2.115	.075	.918	-.282	3.418	<.001	.847
Others	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
Gender								
Male	-.404	3.177	.<.001	.668	-.980	.784	<.001	.375
Female	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
Labour Force Participation								
Active	.488	10.879	.001	1.629	1.055	2.988	<.001	2.871
Non-active	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
Household Dependency Status					.			
High	.832	1.139	<.001	.856	.226	.362	<.004	1.253
Low	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
Household Consumption Quintile								
Poorest Q1	.668	2.566	<.001	1.950	-.655	.192	<.001	.520
SecondQ2	.831	3.288	.003	2.296	-.301	.039	<.002	.740
Middle Q3	.631	1.654	<.001	1.880	-2.936	2.889	<.004	.053
FourthQ4	.383	.648	<.001	1.467	-1.741	1.321	<.001	.009
Highest Q5	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
Level of Communal Engagement								
High	.241	3.651	0.56	1.272	.019	.003	<.003	1.019
Low	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
Type of Waste Disposal								
Discrete	-0.13	.438	.508	.987	.217	4.81	<.000	1.242
Indiscrete	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
Type of household Toilet								
Unimproved	.081	.100	<.001	.922	-.905	1.303	<.002	.404
Improved	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref

VARIABLES	Model 1 IDP population				Model 2 Host population			
	β	Wald	Sig.	Exp(β)	β	Wald	Sig.	Exp(β)
Household Density High Low	-.154 Ref	1.085 Ref	.005 Ref	.857 Ref	.760 Ref	2.114 Ref	<.001 Ref	2.138 Ref
Constant	8.602	48.133	.000	5439.928	10.243	4.258	.000	28073.768
Model Summary	-2 Log likelihood 554.219a Cox and Snell R^2 .116 Nagelkerke R^2 .368 Hosmer and Lemeshow Test .802				2 Log likelihood 68.196a Cox and Snell R^2 .237 Nagelkerke R^2 .368 Hosmer and Lemeshow Test .815			

Source: Computed by authors from NGA-IDP data (2018)

In Model 1, all the explanatory data was found to be statistical predictors of the healthy aging status among older IDPs. Based on demographic predictors, age was negatively correlated to the healthy aging status of IDPs (p-value.000<0.05). There is a 0.55 odds of unhealthy aging with advanced age; more educated persons were 1.017 times more age-healthy in comparison with their less-educated peers. Males were .668 times more likely to age healthily, compared to females with 1.497 greater odds of aging healthily (see Table 3). Economic variables were all statistically significant and made unique contributions to the prediction of the healthy aging status in the full model. People actively involved in the labor force were 0.614 times more likely to experience unhealthy aging while those outside the labor force were 1.629 times more likely to experience less wellness as they age. Consumption patterns appear to be quite skewed among the IDP population – persons grouped in the lowest consumption were 1.950 times more likely to experience prolonged health complications, as they age. In addition, environmental predictors were all statistically significant. Older adults who were more socially engaged, were 0.78 times less likely to age in poor health, compared to the less-engaged ones who had a 1.272 higher likelihood of aging in poor health. Improved waste disposal: host persons were .987 times more likely to experience healthy aging, compared to those residing in households with unimproved waste disposal methods, with 1.085 greater odds to age poorly. Unimproved toilets: elderly IDPs were .922 times more likely to experience unhealthy aging, compared to persons resident in households with improved toilets, who were also 1.085 times more likely to age in good health. Likewise, older persons in households with an unimproved source of drinking water, were .857 times more likely to age in poor health (see Table 3).

In model 2, the p-value for each regression effect is smaller than .05; thus, all the predictors in the model were statistically relevant. The results show that there is a .453 times increase in the odds of aging in poor health among persons in the host community. Males were .375 times more likely to age in poor health compared to females (2.667 better odds of healthy aging); older persons in the labor force were

2.871 times more likely to age in poor health compared to their peers who are still active (0.348 better odds of healthy aging). Older adults resident in households with the lowest consumption profile, were expected to age in poorer health, by .520 times. The environmental factors were also found to be unique predictors of healthy aging status. The findings in Table 3 show that persons residing within households with unimproved waste disposal methods (odd ratio=1.242), using unimproved toilet types (odd ratio=.404), drinking water from non-sanitary sources (odd ratio=2.072), and sleeping in densely populated housing (odd ratio=2.138), are highly likely to experience unhealthy aging (see Table 3).

Figure 7: Logistic regression graph showing propensity to healthy aging



NB: X_1-age, X_2-education, X_3-gender, X_4-labor participation, X_5-dependency ratio, X_6-consumption quintile, X_7=communal participation, X_8- waste disposal, X_9-toilet type, X_{10}-drinking water source, X_{12}-household density.

Source: Computed by authors from NGA-IDP data (2018)

Figure 7 presents the projected odds ratio of older adults aging in an unhealthy way, in both the host and IDP households, by determinants. The demographic determinants appear to be uni-directional across both groups, which might be a result of the normalized distribution of respondents by age. Unlike the demographic factors, the effects of the economic factors exhibit more variance. Out-of-labor older adults in the host communities, be it due to retirement or unemployment, were projected to be less active while aging, accompanied with predicted higher morbidity in later life. IDPs without employment or any work would also experience the same fate, but with much lower odds. In terms of consumption rate, more IDPs were projected to

experience more health crises in later life in comparison to their host community peers.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Nigeria has benefited immeasurably from the socio-economic and technological evolution of the 20th century, resulting in improved standard of living and life expectancy. This success can be attributed to migratory processes, be it human resource migration, technological transfer and data/information transfer. Interestingly, older adults, often referred to as the "invisible population", have also been development actors. However, recent estimates indicate that the aging population in Nigeria now constitutes more than 10% of its national population, with a doubling time of a few decades. Interestingly, the failure to ensure that extra years of life gained are enjoyed in the best possible health, is avoidable. However, this mega-demographic change has become a macro-level concern, mainly due to the accompanying economic and social costs, culminating in the absence of a geriatric healthcare policy to cater for the healthy aging needs.

Contemporary Nigeria is being battered by phenomena such as environmental stressors – such as floods and drought – and widespread conflict, notably in its most disadvantaged region, the Northeastern part of the country. Therefore, households' decisions on whether to migrate or not, now has later life health implications on the older adult cohort within this region. Our study makes a valuable contribution to the literature on population aging in Nigeria. In particular, the goal of this study is to better understand the impact of socio-economic and environmental determinants on the healthy aging status among later-life migrants and non-migrants within both IDp and host communities in Northern Nigeria. The study's findings revealed a much higher prevalence of sensory impairment among IDPs than for residents in the host communities. In general, the mean prevalence was significantly higher in the Northeastern region. Secondly, the socio-economic and environmental determinants were significantly associated with the healthy aging status outcomes in Northeastern Nigeria. In addition, combinations of this factor, or the lack of it, were also associated with healthy aging. Inclusion of the decisions on the part of the IDPs to migrate to neighboring towns and cities in Northeastern Nigeria, has significantly improved their odds of aging in an active and healthy manner. This is probably due to competing with residents in these communities for limited resources and services, such as healthcare, employment and farming space. Alternatively, these residents had slightly greater odds of aging healthily. However, factors such as the increased inflow of more migrants, increased desertification, poor governance, the trade-off for non-migration, may impact on their healthy aging trajectory in the long run, which may fall lower than that of the IDPs.

Based on our findings, we conclude that the older people's lives are characterized by growing inadequacies in customary family supports, social exclusion and non-existent social security programs targeted at them, thus rendering them vulnerable to

poverty and diseases. We recommend that the proposed ECOWAS Sahelian "Green belt" afforestation project, especially areas around the Chad basin, be expedited, as this project will help reduce perennial conflicts between herdsmen and farmers. In addition, the government needs to improve security by defeating Boko-Haram and other Islamist militias. Furthermore, there is an urgent need to formulate an integrated migration–adult health policy or plan that is both comprehensive and evidence-driven. Finally, the budgetary allocation for health should have a flooring capped at 20% of the national budget.

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Between the Imagined and the Reality: Threat of African Invasion and Spain's Migration Policy in sub-Saharan Africa

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The paper examines Spain's migration policy aimed at controlling sub-Saharan African immigration. It is based on analysis of policy documents, migration statistics and secondary literature. The paper shows that current migratory trends and statistics do not support the perception that sub-Saharan African migrants are invading Spain. The paper shows that Spain's policy of walling itself off the African continent is borne out of an imaginary threat and Spain's role as a gatekeeper for Western Europe's southern borders. It further argues that Spain's restrictive policies ignore the long-standing interdependent trade and other economic networks that exist between Spain, North Africa and West Africa, which predate the European colonization of Africa.

Keywords: sub-Saharan migration, Spain, immigration control, policy

INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I trace the strategies adopted by the Spanish government since the 1990s to control 'unwanted' migration from sub-Saharan Africa. I show that, these policies are based on a false premise that African migrants are invading Spain and, by extension, Europe. In 2019, the government of Spain launched its third Plan África, a strategic document for the governance of Spanish relations in sub-Saharan Africa. As is the case with the previous Plans, immigration from sub-Saharan Africa proved to be a crucial concern for the Spanish government. The first Plan África which was launched in 2006 had specified that Spain's geographical proximity to the African continent and the use of some African nations as transit points for drug trafficking or for the establishment of terrorist networks and refuge points in the continent coupled with the issue of immigration constituted a reality that preoccupied public opinion in Spain. For that matter, the document spelled out the strategies to intensify Spain's border control mechanisms and to plant and extend Spanish influence in Africa through aid, trade and cooperation. The ultimate goal of the first Plan África and subsequent ones was to keep Africans at home and focused pre-eminently on building fortress Spain by barricading borders used by sub-Saharan African youth to enter Spain 'illegally' through diplomacy and border controls.

I argue that the volume of African migration to Spain in the last thirty years represents an insignificant fraction of the total immigrant population in Spain and that the policies themselves have rather led to creating unwanted migrants out of the African migrant population in Spain. I indicate that Spain's policy of walling itself off the African continent is borne out of an imaginary threat and Spain's role as a gatekeeper for Western Europe's southern borders. I further argue that there is a long-standing interdependent trade and other economic networks that exist between Spain, North Africa and West Africa predating the European colonization of Africa, which have also contributed to shaping the migration trends.

LITERATURE AND METHODS

Spain's southern border control strategies have received a lot of scholarly attention in the past three decades. Broadly, these studies can be grouped into two: (i) those that focus on border control methods and strategies, including border externalization and excessive pressure on Morocco and Senegal to crack down on sub-Saharan migration and the human rights implication of these policies; and (ii) those that focus on Spain's foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa.

Studies that focus on border control mechanisms by Spanish authorities against sub-Saharan African migration have sustained that the surveillance methods used at Spain's southern sea borders breach international human rights treaties, because by intercepting immigrants at sea before they reach Spanish waters, they prevent potential asylum seekers from receiving protection (Ceriani et al., 2009; Williams, 2018). Some other researches, however, try to examine the effectiveness of the

control methods used at the Spanish southern borders. They include the works of Alscher (2005) Carling (2007) and Carrera (2007) which analyze the impact of the Integrated System of Exterior Surveillance (Sistema Integral de Vigilancia Exterior–SIVE) and the activities of Frontex, the European border and coast guard agency. In a recent work, Williams (2018: 157) argues that this approach "was not effective at stopping current or future migration".

The literature that examines Spain's foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa focuses on the legal, political and economic implications of relying on economic aid and diplomacy as means of controlling unwanted migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Spain. They generally fall into two categories: those that have economic, sociological, political and moral character, and those that have legal character. The first group includes the work of Eduardo Romero, which questions the moral base of Spain's migration policies in sub-Saharan Africa (Romero, 2006); and the study by Arango and Martin (2005), which has both economic and political character, and focuses on the migration control methods and bilateral agreements reached between Spain and Morocco. Pérez Graciela (2008) examines the possible conflict of interest between migration control and Spain's development aid programs in sub-Saharan Africa. Wolff and Schout's (2013) work focuses on the identity of Frontex, the legitimacy of its operations and their implications for interstate relations and human rights. The other group of works that are more juridical in nature include the publications by Asunción Asín Cabrera (2008) and Del Castillo Fajardo (2006) that analyze the bilateral agreements signed between Spain and the sub-Saharan African countries and their implication for cooperation. Much of this literature is very critical of the approach adopted and some of them have questioned their implication in regards to race relations, human rights, state autonomy of African countries and the need to respect the interest of African states and migrants (Casas et al., 2011; Jones, 2017; Adam et al., 2020).

The approach of this paper is analytical, focusing on Spain's policy documents and secondary literature relating to sub-Saharan African migration control. I also draw on official statistical data sources of Spain—Instituto Nacional de Estadística data bank—to obtain figures of sub-Saharan African migrant stock in Spain, World Bank data on migrants' remittance flows, as well as the 2020 official report by the Frontex agency and other official sources on migration flows and interception data. Based on this information, I develop tables and figures to enable me to do a comparative analysis of actual migrant flows and stocks, and Spain's migration control policies. The goal is to tease out how the principle of fear of invasion based on the imagined rather than the actual migrant stock and flows, has influenced Spain's migration policy in sub-Saharan Africa.

THEORY AND CONCEPTS

The concept of imagined threat of invasion as used in this paper draws on sociological theories of inter-group relations by Blumer (1958), Blalock (1956, 1957) and Quil-

lian (1995). I also draw on the invasion anxiety concept advanced by Burke (2008) to explain the feeling of imminent threat of invasion on the part of states and state actors, which informs their attitudes, actions and policies towards certain migrant groups. I also rely on more recent works by Herda (2010, 2013, 2018) and Semyonov et al. (2008) to show how in many instances this feeling of threat is borne out of the imagined rather than the actual threat by the migrant population.

Blumer was one of the key proponents of the Chicago sociological school. In his seminal 1958 paper entitled "Race prejudice as a sense of group position", he argues that during inter-group or race relations, each group develops a position relative to the other in hierarchical terms that influences power relations between them. He indicates that group prejudice develops when the dominant group feels that its position is threatened by a subordinate group. Blumer (1958: 588) identifies four types of feelings that he believed could lead to this situation: "(1) a feeling of superiority, (2) a feeling that the subordinate race is intrinsically different and alien, (3) a feeling of proprietary claim to certain areas of privilege and advantage, and (4) a fear and suspicion that the subordinate race harbors designs on the prerogatives of the dominant race". For Blumer, group prejudice is a function of perceived rather than actual threat. Arguing along the same line, Blalock (1956; 1957) shows that perceptions of threat by the dominant group towards the subordinate group are influenced by demographic and economic factors. Blalock posits that the size of the subordinate group relative to that of the dominant group as well as precarious economic conditions constitute major sources of threat perceptions by the majority group towards the subordinate group. More recent studies have further showed that the feeling of perceived threat by majority groups with respect to minority groups worsens when the former have to protect their economic interest (Quillian,1995) or where there are economic and cultural threats at stake (Fietkau and Hansen, 2018).

In some instances, however, the perceived threat posed by migrant groups hinges on national identity issues. This is the position taken by Burke (2008) to explain Australian authorities' attitudes towards migrants and national migration policies. He argues that the idea of white racial supremacy and the fear of a non-white invasion have had great impact on Australian migration policy and attitudes toward other Asian immigrants over a long period.

In several studies based on national surveys, Herda (2010; 2013, 2018) and Semyonov et al. (2008) have also argued that misconceptions and ignorance about the actual threat posed by immigrants inform a great deal of host nations' policies and attitudes towards certain migrant groups. They show that migrant exclusion is associated with these misconceptions. In particular, Herda (2013, 2018) found that citizens' misconception about migrants' legal status (i.e. conceiving migrants to be undocumented or illegal settlers) or having an inflated perception of their actual population size, is associated with citizens' tendencies and desires to exclude migrants, halt immigration, restrict migrants' rights, or support anti-im migrant policies. Hsia (2007) observes that the imagined threat may be the result of media construction and fram-

ing, which in many instances could be far from reality. Other studies have shown that immigrant threat feelings among host populations are sometimes the result of political framing by radical right-wing political parties to improve their popular appeal and electoral fortunes (Doerschler and Jackson, 2018). In the case of Spain, Toasije (2009) maintains that African migration is manipulated by the Spanish political elite as a strategy to please European Union law makers and to Europeanize Spain with the ulterior agenda of weaning the country from its African and complex multi-ethnic identity. In this paper therefore, I examine how the perceived or imagined rather than the actual threat of invasion is manipulated and used by Spain's political actors to manage the socio-political challenges posed by African migration to Spain.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN MIGRATION TO SPAIN

Spain, unlike France, United Kingdom or Portugal, had minimal colonial ties with Africa. Equatorial Guinea, which passed into the hands of Spain in 1827 after seventeen years of British administration, is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa that has a direct colonial link with Spain. Resultantly, migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Spain started relatively late and has remained on a very low key.

The early group of sub-Saharan labor migrants in Spain originated from Cape Verde. In 1975 a group of Cape Verdean men from Lisbon settled in the mining towns of Bembire in the area of El Bierzo and Villablino in the Laciana valley in León after their failed trip to the Netherlands (Moldes and Gonzàlez, 2008). Between 1977 and 1978 another community of Cape Verdeans settled in Galizia to work on the construction of the Alúmína-Alumíno metallurgical plant. After the construction of the plant some of the migrant workers were integrated into the local fishing industry while the rest dispersed in the area to find jobs. The men were later joined by Cape Verdean women from Lisbon and the rate of family reunification increased from the second half of the 1980s. In the early 1980s migrants from Gambia, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal settled in the Catalonia region following the restriction imposed by France after the 1973 oil crisis (Sow, 2006). The first group of Senegalese migrants, consisting mainly of people from Pulaar and Soninké ethnic groups, settled in Maresme in Barcelona and from there they moved on to Zaragoza and Valencia. They are currently dispersed all over the country due to their itinerant commercial activity.

By the end of 1992 there were only 12,776 sub-Saharan immigrants in Spain out of which four communities represented three-quarters of the total population. The Senegalese (3,190) represented the largest group at the time and they were uniformly distributed across the country. They were followed by the Gambians (2,952) concentrated in the Catalonian provinces of Barcelona and Gerona where they were largely employed in the agricultural sector. Cape Verdean citizens made up the third largest group (1,939). They lived between León and Madrid. Migrants from Equatorial Guinea (1,569), found mainly in Madrid, were the fourth largest group (Pumares, 1997).

From the late 1990s, the sub-Saharan African population in Spain began to experience a sharp increase. However, despite negative media reportage and criminalization of these movements the rate of growth remained very slow and was much contained over the years. Sub-Saharan Africans in Spain originate principally from West Africa and account for close to 80% of the total sub-Saharan migrants.

STEMMING AFRICAN MIGRATION TO SPAIN

In the past two decades, Spain and the European Union have spent millions of euros to prevent Africans and other nationals entering their territory. Williams (2018) shows that between 2006 and 2015, close to €127 million was budgeted for joint migrant interdiction operations in the central Mediterranean Sea. These operations include: Nautilus, Hermes, Aenas and Triton. Spain's immigration control policy in relation to sub-Saharan immigration is influenced strongly by domestic politics (negative public opinion, interest group politics and political party politics) and is strictly linked to national security matters and foreign aid (Pinyol-Jiménez, 2008; 2012). For that matter, the main political strategy that Spain has adopted to control migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa could be synthesized into two strategies. The first strategy consists of a set of policy measures directed towards intensive border control. These measures are designed and coordinated principally by the Spanish Interior Ministry in collaboration with the EU and the affected African countries. Their main objective is to obstruct and dissuade illegal entry or illegal stay of sub-Saharan immigrants in Spanish territory. The second set of policy measures focuses on development aid, trade and investment to reduce migration pressure in the migrant sending and transit countries. This policy measure is preventative and it is driven mainly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. Its objective is to mitigate the root causes of emigration. The roadmap for this approach is contemplated in the Plan Africa (Romero, 2006; Casas et al., 2011).

Even though the two strategies are different, their ultimate goals, however, are to reduce the propensity to migrate from sub-Saharan Africa to Spain and to the European Union, ensure that unwanted African migrants do not arrive in their territory, remove those who enter or stay in Spanish territory without authorization, and encourage voluntary return of those who have legally settled in Spain (Agyeman, 2011; Agyeman and Fernandez Garcia, 2016).

MARITIME BORDER CONTROL SYSTEMS

Alscher (2005) observed that during the period between 2000 and 2004 when Spain's conservative Popular Party (PP) won an absolute majority in parliament, the fight against illegal migration became the central issue of immigration policy. However, it was the socialist government, led by Felipe González and the Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) that introduced visa requirements for Moroccan immigrants and began the early construction of a border fence around the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla

(Alscher, 2005). The accession of Spain to the Schengen Treaty required that Spain controlled its southern border, which until the late 1990s was considered the transit route for African migrants heading towards various European destinations.

The first set of measures that Spain adopted to control migration pressure from sub-Saharan Africa included intensifying its maritime border control system through dissuasion, obstruction, apprehension and repatriation of migrants found entering Spain illegally through its southern borders (Carling, 2007). Dissuasion and obstruction are strategies involving putting pressure on Spain's immediate southern neighbors, particularly, Moroccan, Senegalese and Mauritanian authorities to introduce stricter border control and visa regulation in order to crack down on illegal smuggling of Moroccans and sub-Saharans into Spain (González-Enríquez et al., 2018). Other efforts to dissuade 'unwanted immigration' included information campaigns and joint police patrols in Morocco and sub-Saharan countries, particularly Senegal and Mauritania to dissuade prospective immigrants from departing. These efforts are facilitated by opening Migration Information Centres (MICs) in sending countries. For example, as part of the EU-funded Ghana Integrated Migration Management Approach (GIMMA) program, Spain funded the establishment of MICs in Tamale and Sunyani, considered transit and origin zones of Ghanaian youth destined to Spain across the Sahara.

Border surveillance is perhaps the area where Spain has devoted greater resources to the effort to fight 'unwanted' immigration from sub-Saharan Africa. The first step to a stricter border control started in the early 1990s with the construction of an 8.4km fence around Ceuta in 1993 and another around Melilla in 1996. These fences were later fortified and equipped with video and infrared cameras, control towers and motion detectors (Alscher, 2005). In January 1998, the PP government introduced the Plan Sur (Alscher, 2005) to strengthen the border control system. The project introduced more intensive surveillance systems in Spain's air and sea ports, it tightened the deportation procedures and strengthened cooperation with Moroccan and Algerian authorities. Additionally, a special unit of motorized police force was created to search for undocumented immigrants along Spain's coastal cities. Half a year later, the Civil Guard (Guardia Civil), introduced another project named Frontera Sur (southern border/frontier) equipped with new vehicles and helicopters from the Spanish Army (Alscher, 2005). In May 1999, the PP government introduced a more intensive border control system labelled Integrated System of Exterior Surveillance (Sistema Integral de Vigilancia Exterior–SIVE). Initial work on the project was financed at a cost of €150 million. It was operated by the Civil Guard (Guardia Civil) and its objectives were to detect and intercept small vessels and pateras (boats) and cayucos (kayaks/canoes) arriving at Spain's southern sea border. The system was equipped with fixed and mobile detection devices including radars, infrared and video cameras that are able to detect a small vessel 10km away and estimate the number of people in the vessel when it is 5km away. When a vessel is detected, information about its course and position is transmitted to a central command, from where in-

terception units including boats, helicopters and cars are dispatched (Carling, 2007). The SIVE was first developed on the coast of Gibraltar and in 2002, was extended to the Canary Islands in the towns of Fuerteventura, Gran Canaria and Lanzarote. It was also extended to cover the entire coast of the Cádiz province in 2004 and the entire coast of the province of Andalucía in 2005. It is noteworthy that the PSOE government continued to develop the SIVE project after it won the 2004 election, although it initially opposed the project when it was in opposition.

In addition to SIVE, in 2005 Spain impressed upon the EU, the need for a European border and coast guard agency, hence the creation of Frontex. This agency was created in 2006 with a Spanish official, Gil Arias, appointed its Executive Director (González-Enríquez et al., 2018). In addition, the General Directorate of International Relations and Alien Affairs and its two sub-directorates were also created in 2006 to enable Spanish authorities to reach agreements for institutional cooperation with officials in the migrant origin or transit countries. This enabled Spanish police officials to collaborate with officials of the Frontex agency and officials of origin or transit countries to organize joint border operations. The European Union's sponsored projects undertaken by Frontex at the Spanish coasts include, Agios (joint operation to identify forged documents in Spain's Mediterranean ports); Hera I (identification and return of unauthorized immigrants); Hera II (patrol of Spanish seas near Senegal and Mauritania) (Commission of the European Community, 2006); and Hera III (surveillance mission by Frontex deployed on the territorial waters of Mauritania and Senegal) (Ceriani et al., 2009).

Greater effort has also been made to improve information exchange between Spain and the African countries. The Spanish police have provided technical and material support and exchanged information with the police and immigration officials in the transit and origin countries to strengthen their internal patrol system (Ministerio de Interior, 2007). Examples include the Seahorse and the Atlantis projects funded by the European Union which formed a network of information exchange among the border police between Spain, Portugal, Mauritania, Senegal, Cape Verde and three other countries which were incorporated in 2009 which also include Morocco, Gambia and Guinea Bissau (González-Enríquez et al., 2018). The joint border surveillance operations have three objectives: to dissuade the immigrants in the origin or transit country before they set out to reach Spanish borders; to intercept and return the immigrants who succeed to depart before they reach Spanish coasts; and, to ensure that those who reach Spanish borders are repatriated within the terms established by law (Ministerio de Interior, 2007). While Spanish officials and some scholars tout this initiative as contributing to stemming unwanted immigration to Spain, Williams (2018) argues that the operations of Frontex are nothing more than search and rescue.

IMMIGRATION CONTROL THROUGH 'MIGRATORY DIPLOMACY'

Since 2000, Spain's development aid to sub-Saharan countries has become a tool to control immigration from these countries to Spain. Their declared goal is to fight poverty and promote economic development and democracy in Africa – factors believed to be the main cause of migration. The main architecture of Spain's foreign diplomacy to control migration pressure from sub-Saharan Africa is the master plan called Plan of Action for sub-Saharan Africa (El Plan de Acción para África Subsahariana) or Plan África in short. The first plan was developed in 2006 to cover the period between 2006 and 2008. Since then, two other master plans have followed: the 2009-2012 plan and the more recent 2019-2024 plan.

Plan África I set in motion what Pinyol- Jiménez (2008: 61) described as Spain's "migratory diplomacy". The document laid greater emphasis on migration management, commercial links and development cooperation (Casas et al. 2011). The document placed the sub-Saharan countries into three main geographical divisions based on the type of actions that the Spanish government intended to perform in the regions. The first group consists of countries that are considered to respond to the majority of the objectives set out by the plan. The second division is made up of countries considered as strategic for the fight against illegal immigration or for Spain's economic and cultural activities in Africa. The last group consists of countries considered as strategic in the medium term—due to their political situation of being unstable and in conflict-prone areas. However, a critical look at this geographical division shows that two main principles guided the choice of countries, namely, economic interest and the fight against immigration. The document exposed a clear distinction between African countries that are senders, potential senders or transit points of migrants destined to Spain and countries that are strategic for Spanish trade relations with Africa because they host large quantities of raw materials and natural resources essential for Spain's economy.

In anticipation of the master plan, Spain's Foreign Minister visited Ghana, Angola, Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger and Mali in 2005 (Moratinos, 2005). After Plan África I was launched, it paved the way for the signing of bilateral and readmission agreements between Spain and sub-Saharan African countries including Gambia (2006), Guinea (2006), Cape Verde (2007), Mali (2008) and Niger (2008) (Cabrera, 2008). Spain's objective for these agreements was to enable it to establish and expand its institutional base and influence in sub-Saharan Africa through the establishment of diplomatic missions, new embassies and consulates, offices for economic cooperation and trade as well as offices for the technical operations of the Spanish Interior and Defense Ministries' missions in sub-Saharan Africa so that its fight against unwanted migration from sub-Saharan Africa could be effective. To this end, Spain established a permanent diplomatic mission in Cape Verde in 2006 and an office for the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation in 2007; in 2006 Spain created a permanent diplomatic mission in Mali; in 2007 Spain created a general consular office in Dakar, Senegal; and in the same year it established offices for the Span-

ish Agency for International Cooperation in both Senegal and Mauritania (Cabrera, 2008: 86).

All the bilateral agreements that were signed, with the partial exception of the one signed with Mali, have almost identical structure and content (Cabrera, 2008). They all have eighteen articles expressed in eight chapters. They begin with an identical preamble and end with an annexure indicating the procedures and guarantees for readmission of persons. Six lines of action are also delineated in the agreements, which include: admission of workers; voluntary return; integration of immigrants; migration and development; cooperation in the fight against illegal immigration and trafficking of persons; and readmission of persons. However, the most controversial aspect of the agreement lay in sections dealing with the readmission of persons, or obliging African nations to prevent the emigration of their own nationals. Contracting African countries were obliged to readmit their citizens apprehended or found living illegally in Spain. This section took inspiration from Article 13 of the Cotonou Accord of 2000, rectified by Spain in 2003 in which the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and EU countries committed themselves to accept their nationals deported from another country party to the contract.

Another issue which the Spanish government pursued was to seek the cooperation of the contracting African countries to fight what Spain termed as the illegal migration or trafficking of African nationals to Spain. Chapter six of the agreement obliged the contracting parties to cooperate in the following areas: (i) exchange of information between the competent authorities on human trafficking; (ii) provision of technical assistance to the sub-Saharan African countries affected in the fight against illegal migration to Spain; (iii) organization of formation courses for consular and immigration personnel; (iv) cooperation for border control enforcement; (v) mutual support to guarantee the security of national identity cards; (vi) strengthened capacities of the fight against illegal migration and human trafficking; (vii) running of campaign programs on the dangers of illegal migration and human trafficking (Cabrera, 2008). In return, Spain promised to open a window for the legal recruitment of African migrant workers and put measures in place to promote temporal migration through the admission of seasonal workers and through the quota system as well as facilitating the travel of highly qualified professionals such as professors, scientists, researchers, managers, as well as artists, sportsmen and women (Cabrera, 2008). However, a more recent study has revealed that these kinds of schemes have not yielded positive results. For example, González-Enríquez et al. (2018), note that a recruitment scheme meant to enable Senegalese women to work in the strawberry sector in the Province of Huelva in Andalusia was not successful and had to be discontinued. This was because there were deficiencies in the selection process and many recruits ended up becoming illegal immigrants in Spain. In spite of the limited legal channels, remittances from sub-Saharan African migrants in Spain far outpace Spain's official development aid to these countries and thus contribute immensely to the wellbeing of families left at home, as shown in the Table 1.

Table 1: Remittance Flow from Spain to Sub-Saharan African Countries per $ million

Country/Year	2015	2016	2017
Nigeria	690	706	771
Senegal	211	272	302
Mali	40	64	71
Gambia	50	58	60
Ghana	48	51	53
Cape Verde	5	6	6

Source: Author's elaboration from World Bank data

Cassarino (2007) observes that the reciprocity of obligations expressed in the agreements does not mean that both parties benefit equally due to the "significant level of development asymmetry" between the contracting parties and that,

> while the interest of the destination country sounds obvious ("unwanted migrants have to be effectively removed"), the interest of the origin country may be less evident, above all when considering that its economy remains dependent on the revenues of its (legal and illegal) expatriates living abroad, or when migration continues to be viewed as a safety valve to relieve pressure on domestic unemployment (Cassarino, 2007: 182).

Therefore, Spain's migration policy, while seeking partnership of African countries to execute, regrettably, focuses on the likely benefits which will accrue to Spain, and not that of the sub-Saharan migrants involved or their nations which Spain has made its (control) partners.

THE IMAGINED THREAT OF AFRICAN INVASION VS REALITY: REVISITING THE STATISTICS

As asserted earlier, Semyonov et al. (2008) comment that the inflated perception of the size of the immigrant population in a country is one of the main causes of anti-immigrant feeling, discrimination and support for exclusionary policies towards migrant groups. We have also discussed studies by Herda (2013, 2018), who observes that misconceptions about the actual population size and the legal status of migrants are more likely to generate exclusionary sentiments towards immigrants. He notes that in most European countries, citizens perceive immigrant numbers to be more than twice the actual size of the immigrant population in their country. He describes this as immigrant population innumeracy (Herda, 2013). The imagined rather than an actual threat of sub-Saharan African migrants invading Spain is the main motivation behind Spain's anti-African immigration policy.

At the end of 2019, there were 235,951 sub-Saharan African immigrants from over forty countries, resident in Spain. This was fewer than the British immigrants in Spain and a little above the Italian nationals resident in Spain. Sub-Saharan African migrants represent 4.75% of the total immigrant population in Spain and only 21% of Africans, as shown in Table 2

Table 2: Sub-Saharan Africa Immigrants in Spain

Region/Year	1999	%	2004	%	2009	%	2014	%	2019	%
Sub-Saharan Africa	32,302	4.31	115,999	5.14	230,044	4.07	231,373	4.6	235,951	4.68
Africa	174,402	23.28	579,372	19.09	1,009,169	17.86	1,076,164	21.42	1,122,409	22.28
Spain	748,954	100	3,034,326	100	5,648,671	100	5,023,487	100	5,036,878	100

Source: Author's elaboration from INE data (www.ine.es)

Senegal has the largest sub-Saharan community in Spain (71,020), followed by Nigeria (39,306), Mali (25,011), Gambia (20,387), Ghana (17,669), Equatorial Guinea (13,221), Guinea (10,811), and Mauritania (8,184). It is significant to know that the population of Nigerian immigrants in Spain has seen a substantial decrease consistently since 2012. Several other countries, including Spain's former colony, Equatorial Guinea, have also seen a marginal decrease in their population. In fact, since the economic crisis and particularly from 2013, the entry of African migrants in Spain has seen a substantial decrease, with the exception of 2017, when the number of irregular entries went up sharply (Consejo Económico Y Social España, 2019).

Figure 1: Growth Rate of Foreign Population in Spain by Continent



Source: Author's elaboration from INE (www.ine.es)

Over the past twenty years, the sub-Saharan Africans have recorded the slowest growth rate in Spain compared to Europeans, South Americans and Asians, as shown in Figure 1. This supports the argument that there is no threat of invasion, as portrayed by Spain's right-wing political parties and the media (Toasije, 2009). This supports Hsia's (2007) findings that the threat of invasion is sometimes the product of media construction and political manipulation.

Moreover, public opinion toward sub-Saharan African migrants in Spain is increasingly positive compared to that of other immigrant groups. In a recent survey, only 2% of Spanish claimed they felt uncomfortable working with a black person, compared to 3% for Asians and Jews and 7% for Roma and Muslims (González-Enríquez, 2017). In the same study, González-Enríquez (2017: 20) notes that, "there is also a significant increase in responses expressing closeness, especially noticeable towards US citizens and sub-Saharan Africans". About 25% of the Spanish who participated in the survey said they felt "quite or very close" towards sub-Saharan Africans whereas only 18% and 15% said they felt the same toward Moroccan and Chinese migrants respectively. This form of public opinion does not support Spain's aggressive control of sub-Saharan immigration.

GENERATING ILLEGALITY THROUGH RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION POLICY

From the time Spain became an immigration country, its coastal cities became regular scenes of sub-Saharan, North African and Asian boat-people entering Europe without going through the strict immigration regulations, by using small wooden boats known in Spain as pateras. These scenes raised media interest and almost every week there was news of new entrances and reports of deaths on the boats. The excessive media attention and coverage of African migrants entering the European southern border by boat, dominated policy discourse on illegal migration and increasingly conveyed the image that massive numbers of desperate Africans are fleeing poverty and war and are attempting to enter Europe irregularly. This raised fears of possible invasion and security threats (De Haas, 2007). Since then, a great deal of literature has fueled the perception that economic and demographic pressure persisting in Africa today is driving Africans to invade Europe and the rest of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries in the same way as the European states migrated to America in the half-century before World War I. This perception has strongly influenced public opinion on immigration matters and electoral politics in Spain (Hatton and Williamson, 2003). For example, in July 2018, the leader of Spain's Popular Party claimed that there were over fifty million prospective African migrants ready to invade Spanish territory, a claim which was discredited by Spain's popular newspaper, El Pais (2018). Even though such claims lack an empirical base, these forms of perceptions have greatly influenced Spain's relations with its black African neighbors at their southern borders and have

informed the increasing apprehension, detention and repatriation of sub-Saharan migrants who are legally or illegally resident in Spain. As Burke (2008) observes, the emphasis on security threats posed by immigrants, although based on false pretense, gives legitimacy to restrictive immigration control measures by state authorities.

However, empirical data does not support the media hype of sub-Saharan African invasion of Spain through illegal migration. Since 2000, the annual number of migrants who arrive in Spain or Italy by sea, represents a small fraction of the total number of migrants who enter Spain illegally. Data from the Frontex agency shows that out of 141,846 persons intercepted at border crossing points (BCPs) attempting to enter Europe illegally in 2018, those who originated from the West African route were a meagre 2,718 persons, representing 1.9% of the total. Of these, Moroccan nationals constituted one-third. In 2017, for example, only 25,251 individuals out of 532,482 immigrants who entered Spain that year without following the regular immigration procedures, were Africans (El Pais, 2018). This reduction in numbers is, however, attributed to the aggressive control measures that have been put in place by Spain with European Union backing to stem immigration from sub-Saharan Africa (González-Enríquez et al., 2018).

The asymmetry between the actual figures of sub-Saharan migration flows to Spain and the restrictive state control policies can be properly understood within the sphere of race relations where the perceptions of threat rather than the actual threat, govern policy decisions, attitudes and actions. Following from studies by Blumer (1958), Blalock (1956; 1957), Quillian (1995) and Burke (2008), one can argue that the perceptions of threat to Spain's racial identity and economic position rather than the actual migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa to Spain, have greatly informed Spain's migration control policies in Africa.

LONG-STANDING RELATIONS VS SPAIN'S ROLE AS EUROPEAN UNION'S SOUTHERN BORDER GATEKEEPER

Touching on issues pertaining to identity and economic relations, this paper argues that Spain, by its actions of excessive migration control of sub-Saharan African migration, is ignoring the long-standing relations that have existed between Spain, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, which span across several centuries (Toasije, 2009). These relations have generated several forms of interdependence within the spheres of economics, politics, culture, family ties and social relations, spanning several centuries. Toasije (2009: 343) notes that "until the defeat of Grenada in 1492, the western end of the European subcontinent had been the core of European and African struggles, and this has created an ethnically-mixed population" in Spain. Moreover, there is also a long history of migration and trade relations between Spain and the rest of the Mediterranean and sub-Saharan countries. During his visit to Timbuktu in 1352, Ibn Battuta reported that, "In this town is the grave of the illustrious poet Abu Ishaq al-Sahill of Granada, known in his own country as al-Tuwaijin ('the little cooking pan'), and also of Siraj al-Din b. al-Kuwaik, one

of the great merchants among the people of Alexandria" (Gibb and Beckingham, 1994: 969). These interconnections were the subject of the 2019 special edition of the Journal of North African Studies, which depicts not only a history of conflict between Spain and Morocco but also a construction of economic, social and cultural relations and interdependence through "ideas, people, texts, and material goods that have circulated across the sea and continue to do so until today" (Stenner, 2019: 8). In his introduction, Stenner (2019: 8), notes that this "focus on connections between Europe and Africa indirectly challenged the notion of the Mediterranean as a frontier separating two worlds, and instead highlighted its role as a shared cultural space".

González-Enríquez (2017) asserts that the right-wing anti-immigration politics which has a lot of force elsewhere in Europe, has struggled to gain influence in Spain to push the anti-black immigration agenda. This may be due largely to the long-standing relations that Spain has had with Africa over the centuries. However, Spain bears the brunt of anti-black African sentiments held elsewhere in Europe. Spain is therefore forced to implement policies which in many situations are not in its interest and to a large extent run counter to the long-standing relations that it has with the African continent. Toasije (2009) considers this as part of efforts to Europeanize Spain and to deny it of its African and complex multi-ethnic identity. Many European governments assume that uncontrolled sub-Saharan immigration can generate social alarm among the citizenry, challenge the sovereignty of the state and jeopardize the welfare system and the idea of ethnic homogeneity underlying the formation of European states (Toasije, 2009; Ambrosini, 2013). Consequently, there is a subtle criminalization of African migration through the complicity of the European Union, Spain's political elite and the media (Toasije, 2009).

Politics, more than actual migration trends, is the main factor underlying the illegalization and aggressive combatting of sub-Saharan African migration to Spain. This is because, given the trends of African migration to Spain over the past three decades, it is very difficult to imagine that African migrants would flock to Spain and stay there permanently if the borders were open. In fact, open borders would have generated fluidity of human movements across the borders, as it existed before. This is because, for centuries, movements across the Mediterranean Sea has been bidirectional, and as Therrien (2019) observes, there is a growing trend of Spanish migrants moving in the opposite direction to Morocco, to settle there. The sendentation of African migrants in Spain and elsewhere in Europe is borne largely out of restrictive immigration policies and border controls against African migrants (Agyeman, 2011). According to Cachón (2002), immigrants from southern European nations who migrated to northern Europe for reconstruction during the post-World War II period, sought permanent settlement and family reunification when restrictions were imposed after the oil crisis in the 1970s. The increasing proportion of 'illegal' or 'unwanted' African migration to Spain is borne out of the policies being implemented by the Spanish government.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have shown that Spain's migration policy in sub-Saharan Africa involving intensive border policing, and strategies to dissuade African migrants from entering Spain, is borne out of an imaginary threat of possible African invasion of the Spanish peninsula and Europe. The paper argues that statistics showing the migration trends from sub-Saharan African to Spain, both through legal and illegal means over the last three decades, does not support this perception of invasion. Compared with migration movements originating from other parts of Europe, South America and Asia to Spain, sub-Saharan migration trends are the slowest. However, the African migration figures, although low, are magnified and manipulated to give legitimacy to restrictive control policies.

Based on the above observations, the paper argues that Spain's control of sub-Saharan African migration is an over-reaction and ignores all forms of historical, economic and social relations that exist between Spain and sub-Saharan Africa. It further maintains that there are long-standing cultural, economic and social relations between the two regions that have generated aspects of interdependence which predate European colonization of Africa. However, Spain's role as the European Union's gatekeeper at its southern borders appears to be the main motivation behind Spain's aggressive border control mechanisms.

This paper concludes that Spain, in pursuing its migration policies aimed at restricting African immigration, focuses mainly on its own interests or those of the European Union, and does not factor into the equation the interests of the migrants or the African states that are supposed to be Spain's partners or accomplices in combating African migration. This is because, remittances that families and African states receive from migrants in Spain, whether legal or illegal residents, have a very positive impact on African economies and far outpace Spain's development aid to these countries.

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Differences in Mental Health among Migrants and Non-migrants in South Africa: Evidence from the National Income Dynamics Study

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The literature associates migration with poor mental health outcomes. Despite extensive empirical research in other countries, there is a paucity of research examining the mental health consequences of migration in South Africa, and the factors that compound the relationship between the two variables. The study objective was to evaluate the differences in the mental health status of internal migrants and that of non-migrants in South Africa with a special focus on depressive symptoms. The study considered the influence of various vulnerability and sociodemographic factors such as gender, age, educational attainment, race, income group, marital status and province of residence. Mental health disorders are already considered the largest contributor to the global disease burden. Hence, understanding the nature of the relationship between migration and mental health is critical for public health prevention efforts. To make the determination, the study applied descriptive analysis and logistic modelling based on the South African National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) panel datasets of 2008, 2010, 2014/15 and 2017. Descriptive statistics were employed to derive the frequency distribution of sociodemographic characteristics and migration factors. Logistic regression analysis was used to assess the associations between depression, migration and sociodemographic factors.

Keywords: Migration, acculturation, gender, depression, sociodemographic factors

INTRODUCTION

The process of migration is complex and stress-inducing, regardless of whether migration is internal or international (Bhugra, 2004; Carroll et al., 2020). This is due to the association of migration with stressful experiences of change, inadequacy, perceptions of discrimination and social marginalization (Bhugra, 2004; Gkiouleka et al., 2018; Bauer et al., 2020). The migration process entails social change of cultural settings for the migrants and this change has implications for mental health (Ajaero et al., 2017). Therefore, migration has the potential to negatively influence mental health and has been identified as one of the social determinants of negative mental health outcomes (Satcher, 2000). The association between mental health issues and migration bears a considerable influence on health disparities (Ai et al., 2015). Empirical evidence has established sociodemographic inequalities in migrants' health (Giannoni et al., 2016). As such, migration and health inequalities continue to be a key concern of public and policy debates (Bircan et al., 2020).

The concept of migration is not new in South Africa. The country is one of the main destinations of immigration in Africa (Fauvelle-Aymar, 2014). Within the country, the Western Cape and Gauteng account for most of the inter-provincial migration (Kleinhans and Yu, 2020). Evidence suggests that the population of internal migrants has increased in the post-apartheid era (Ajaero et al., 2017). A significant proportion of internal migration within the country is intra-district and economically motivated (Rogan et al., 2009). Despite extensive empirical research in other countries, there is a paucity of research examining the mental health consequences of internal migration in South Africa. In this context, it therefore becomes pertinent to examine if migrants actually have better mental health than non-migrants in South Africa. Understanding the nature of the relationship between migration and mental health is critical for public health prevention efforts.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXTUALIZATION

In South Africa, internal migration is historically associated with the social engineering and enforced fragmentation of families that took place under apartheid (Hall, 2016). This was part of the apartheid strategy to entrench minority rule through spatial arrangements that strategically divided families and split generations and separated breadwinners from dependants (Hall, 2016). Such social conditions have been conceptualized as a challenge to the emotional resilience of individuals who may experience psychological distress, personal crisis and could precipitate poor mental health (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006). In this context, it becomes relevant to examine if internal migrants have worse mental health than non-migrants in South Africa.

LITERATURE REVIEW/THEORETICAL/CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

There are various theoretical frameworks in the literature that provide concepts that may be useful in analyzing the association between migration and mental health

outcomes. Theories of acculturative stress posit that tensions due to living in a foreign culture contribute to mental disorders (Gutierrez-Vazquez et al., 2018). Bhugra (2004) developed a contingency model which hypothesizes vulnerability (risk factors) or resiliency (protective factors) for psychological disorders based on the person's situation and migration stage.

In physical health literature, the selection hypothesis predicts that more prepared and healthier individuals are more likely to migrate compared to their counterparts in worse conditions (Akresh and Frank, 2008). Migrant selectivity could be evident in both observable and unobservable characteristics such as preparedness to migrate. As a result, migrants could be positively selected on the sociodemographic characteristics that are protective against poor mental health outcomes such as gender and family background. This implies that migrants could be better positioned to handle uncertainty and stress compared to those who select not to migrate. However, given the high prevalence of poor mental health among migrants, it could be that selection can negatively impact on mental health. According to Gutierrez-Vazquez et al. (2018), if migrants are negatively selected with respect to sociodemographic background, or have underlying traits that make them more prone to dissatisfaction, then selection could be an important contributor to adverse mental health outcomes.

The literature provides evidence of the significant prevalence of depressive symptoms within migrant population groups compared to non-migrants. Mulcahy and Kollamparambil (2016) investigated the impact of rural-urban migration on subjective well-being in South Africa between 2008 and 2012. The study adopted the use of instrumental variables to control for endogeneity caused by shock-induced self-selection, and propensity score matching to control for migration self-selection bias. The results indicated that rural-urban migration leads to decreased subjective well-being which could be due to unrealized expectations and changing reference groups used to peg aspirations, as well as the emotional cost of being away from family and a home environment.

Gkiouleka et al. (2018) researched the prevalence of depressive symptoms among migrant and non-migrant communities in 21 European countries. The research looked into the impact of gender, childhood experiences, sociodemographic factors and social support on depressive symptoms using data from the seventh round of the European Social Survey and the Greek Migheal survey. The study found that migrants reported significantly higher levels of depressive symptoms in seven of the examined countries, while in Greece and in the UK, they reported significantly lower levels compared with non-immigrant populations. The findings suggest that the impact of migration status on depressive symptoms is subject to additional determinants of mental health as well as on contextual factors.

Gutierrez-Vazquez et al. (2018) sought to explore the link between migration and depressive symptoms among Mexicans residing in the United States of America (USA) and those residing in the sending communities in Mexico. The study reviewed the standard explanations for the links between migration and depression, such as ac-

culturative stress, lack of social support, and powerlessness and isolation. The study also tested the migration selection hypothesis using propensity matching scores. The study results indicated a higher prevalence of depressive symptoms among migrant communities compared to non-migrant community groups. The study also found little support for selection as an important source of migrant depression. Instead, the study found strong evidence that migration itself was primarily responsible for depressive symptoms mainly due to the disruption of social networks that it entails. Family separation was found to be the strongest predictor of depressive symptoms and could account for a significant proportion of the poor mental health among migrants.

Akresh and Frank (2008) sought to quantify the extent of health selection among contemporary US immigrant groups. This entails checking the degree to which potential immigrants migrate, or fail to migrate, on the basis of their health status. Data for the study came from the New Immigrant Survey 2003 cohort which included unique series of questions to evaluate the health of immigrants in the United States to that of citizens in their country of origin. The study found that the extent of positive health selection differed significantly across immigrant groups and was related to compositional differences in the sociodemographic profiles of immigrant streams.

Past studies on migration highlight four key sociodemographic risk factors for depression among the general population: (i) low sociodemographic status; (ii) female gender; (iii) being unmarried; and (iv) undesired life events (Alegria et al., 2007). Mental health outcomes were found to be worse for immigrants who are unemployed, young, and female (Ai et al., 2015). However, in a completely different finding, Bauer et al. (2020) found that a high sociodemographic status does not necessarily protect refugees from the negative influences during migration and the first months or years in the new country.

There are several theoretical models and perspectives mainly focusing on rural-urban and international migration. However, migration research lacks theoretical advancement with empirical research disconnected from the theories (Kureková, 2010; Bircan et al., 2020). The existing migration theories do not adequately capture the dynamics of internal migration and depression. In the presence of these theoretical gaps, this study looks at confirming the hypothesis that migrants report greater rates of depressive symptoms than non-migrants after controlling for sociodemographic factors. Also, while there is extensive empirical literature on the impact of mental health on international migration, relatively little is known about internal migration and mental health outcomes, especially in the South African context. There is a paucity of research examining the mental health consequences of migration in South Africa, and the factors that compound the relationship between the two variables. Therefore, the key objective of this empirical research is to examine whether internal migrants are more likely to report poor mental health outcomes compared to non-migrants in South Africa, and if they do, to also determine the sociodemo-

graphic predictors of migrant status and mental health outcomes.

METHODOLOGY

Data

The study used data from the five waves of the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) survey: wave 1 (2008), wave 2 (2010–2011), wave 3 (2012), wave 4 (2014–2015) and wave 5 (2017) (SALDRU, 2020). The NIDS is a face-to-face, longitudinal, nationally representative panel survey of individuals and households focusing primarily on sociodemographics, labor market participation, grants received, education and health in South Africa. The NIDS adopted a stratified, two-stage cluster sample design in sampling the households and individuals identified in the 2008 base wave. In waves 2 to 5, the survey included the original sample members as well as new members who had joined the original households. Response rates in the NIDS survey were high, with over 81% of households being successfully interviewed in wave 5. This study considered only respondents who were 18 years of age or older at the time of the interview. For the data analysis, the dataset was weighted to account for attrition and under- or over-sampling errors.

Measures/Instruments

Depression variable

The depression variable was derived from responses to the emotional health questions in the survey questionnaires. Across all the waves, respondents were asked 10 questions relating to their mental well-being. The responses were scored on a 4-point Likert scale indicating the frequency of experiencing the depressive symptom. To calculate a total score for depressive symptoms, the survey responses were summed up using the 10-item version of the Centre for Epidemiological Studies-Depression (CES-D) scale (Radloff, 1977). This study used the threshold of 10 and above to define the presence of significant depressive symptoms (SDS). The threshold was also recommended by Radloff (1977). The same scale was adopted by other studies assessing depression using the NIDS such as Mungai and Bayat (2018) and Dowdall et al. (2017). The CES-D scale is a common psychiatric measurement tool for assessing depressive symptoms and has good psychometric properties (Dowdall et al., 2017; Mungai and Bayat, 2018). The Cronbach's alpha for this scale in the sample was 0.75. Following from Schuckit et al. (1993: 5), who asserted that "symptoms are not diagnoses", and the methodology employed by Mungai and Bayat (2018), the study did not attempt to diagnose depression but rather assessed the symptomatology that suggests significant vulnerability to being depressed.

Migration variable

This research followed Hall's (2016) methodology in defining migrants as those who

moved across municipal boundaries. It is a single variable that captures movements between waves 1 and 5, or any of the intervening waves. For instance, persons who moved between waves 1 and 2, but not between waves 3 and 4 are defined as migrants, on the basis that they had moved place at some time between waves 1 and 5.

Empirical model

The study uses logit models to analyze the likelihood of migration status to impact on mental health status. The adoption of logit models is appropriate, given that the dependent variables can be structured as binary outcomes. Logistic regression allows the research to predict the probability of the outcomes falling between the unit intervals. The technique can be used to model a response variable as a function of one or more explanatory variables. The study follows the approach of Chear (2015) and formulates the logistic model in the general form below:

$$\log \frac{P}{1-P} = \alpha + \beta_i X_i + \varepsilon$$

The regression equation considers depression status as the dependent variable. In the equation, P is the probability that the participant exhibits depressive symptoms and 1-P is the probability that the participant does not exhibit depressive symptoms. P/(1-P) is the odds that the participant exibits significant depressive symptoms. X is the vector of independent variables hypothesized to impact the probability of demonstrating significant depressive symptoms. The model included several sociodemographic characteristic indicators such as age, race, gender, educational attainment, and marital status. β are the coefficients of the independent variables and ε is the error term. After fitting the logistic regression model to the survey data, the study conducted model diagnostic tests for goodness of fit of the fitted model. The Hosmer-Lemeshow (HL) test was used to check the goodness of fit of the specified models. The independent variables were tested for symptoms of multi-collinearity through the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test. All the statistical tests were based on a p-value of a less than 5% level of significance.

Data analysis

The data analysis included the use of descriptive analysis and regression analysis to assess the association between depressive symptoms and migration status. The study applied multivariate logistic regression analysis to assess the likelihood of sample members to experience significant depressive symptoms taking into account their migration status and controlling for sociodemographic characteristics. The study used race, gender, educational attainment, age, marital and occupational status as indicator variables for sociodemographic status based on prior literature such as studies by Moussavi et al. (2007), Atwoli et al. (2013), and Mungai and Bayat (2018).

Ethical considerations

Ethical approval was not needed for the study due to the use of secondary data that was anonymous.

RESULT

Table 1 provides an overview of the sociodemographic characteristics of the study population. The sample consisted of more females compared to males in both the migrant and non-migrant population groups. The sample majority is also predominantly African, with 76% of the study sample being of the African race. Over 60% of both the migrant and non-migrant population groups have secondary school education. The unemployed comprised a bigger proportion of the study sample across both migrant statuses. More than half of the sample were aged between 18 and 44 years. Within provinces, the majority of the sample members were from KwaZulu-Natal.

Table 1: Characteristics of the study sample

	Migrants		Non-migrants		Overall	
	n	**Proportion %**	**n**	**Proportion %**	**n**	**Proportion %**
Gender						
Male	743	46%	3,983	39%	4,726	40%
Female	884	54%	6,146	61%	7,030	60%
Race						
African	1395	86%	7500	74%	8895	76%
Coloured	138	8%	1771	17%	1909	16%
Asian/Indian	24	1%	195	2%	219	2%
White	70	4%	663	7%	733	6%
Educational attainment						
No schooling	98	7%	1220	14%	1318	13%
Some primary	171	12%	2198	26%	2369	24%
Some secondary	555	40%	2813	33%	3368	34%
Completed secondary	341	25%	1205	14%	1546	16%
Tertiary or more	211	15%	1107	13%	1318	13%
Employment status						
Employed	537	39%	4,007	47%	4,544	46%
Unemployed	839	61%	4,536	53%	5,375	54%
Age group						
18-24	695	43%	1748	17%	2443	21%
25-34	458	28%	2320	23%	2778	24%
35-44	221	14%	2211	22%	2432	21%
45-54	143	9%	1855	18%	1998	17%
55-64	64	4%	1158	11%	1222	10%
65+	46	3%	837	8%	883	8%
Province						
Western Cape	130	8%	1653	16%	1783	15%
Eastern Cape	186	11%	1134	11%	1320	11%
Northern Cape	72	4%	772	8%	844	7%
Free State	85	5%	644	6%	729	6%
KwaZulu-Natal	487	30%	2528	25%	3015	26%
North West	149	9%	852	8%	1001	9%
Gauteng	211	13%	1007	10%	1218	10%
Mpumalanga	90	6%	689	7%	779	7%
Limpopo	217	13%	850	8%	1067	9%

Source: Authors' own calculations, based on NIDS 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014/15 (SALDRU, 2020)

Figure 1 displays the overall distribution of depressive symptoms by migration status and gender. Based on the information in the figure, the pattern is similar for females with roughly the same distribution within both the migrant and non-migrant groups. For females, roughly 25% reported depression scores between 10 and 20 across both the migrant and non-migrant categories. It is also evident that there are more female outliers reporting higher depression scores for migrants compared to non-migrants.

Figure 1: Distribution of symptoms in CES-D depression screening by migration status and gender



Source: Authors' own construction, based on NIDS 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014/5 and 2017 (SALDRU, 2020)

However, there is a marked difference between the distribution of depressive symptoms in the migrant and non-migrant groups of males. More migrant males displayed higher depressive scores compared to non-migrant males. Over 25% of migrant males reported depressive scores greater than 10 compared to about 15% for non-migrant males.

In Figure 2, we report the distribution of symptoms by migration status and race. The migrant sub-population group reported higher depressive scores across all the races. A total of 25% of migrant Asian/Indians had depressive scores above the cut-off of 10, followed by African migrants at slightly below 25%. Close to 20% of migrant Coloureds also reported depressive scores higher than 10. Despite a high number of outliers, the proportion of non-migrants reporting depressive scores of 10 or higher was less than that of migrants.

Figure 2: Distribution of symptoms in CES-D depression screening by migration status and race



Source: Authors' own construction, based on NIDS 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014/5 and 2017 (SALDRU, 2020)

Figure 3 provides an overview of the distribution of symptoms in CES-D depression screening by migration status, race and gender. Based on information in the figure, there is no significant variation in the distribution scores of both migrants and non-migrants across both genders within the African racial group. About 25% of female migrants, male migrants and male non-migrants exceeded the threshold of 10 to qualify as displaying significant depressive symptoms. The only exception is the category of African non-migrant females who have more than 25% displaying significant depressive symptoms. The African race constituted the group with the highest depression scores compared to the other racial groups followed by Coloureds and lastly, the White racial group.

Figure 3: Distribution of symptoms in CES-D depression screening by migration status, race and gender



Source: Authors' own construction, based on NIDS 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014/5 and 2017 (SALDRU, 2020)

The figure shows that overall, the African population group exhibits the highest intensity and prevalence of depressive symptoms followed by the Coloured group and the White group. The female non-migrant African group accounted for the highest depression scores. The same group also constituted the group with the highest proportion of members with depression scores greater than 10. Within the Coloured racial group, females reported higher depression scores compared to males across both the migrant and non-migrant categories. White non-migrants across both genders reported similar patterns of depression in both intensity and distribution. However, female White migrants reported higher depression scores compared to male White migrants.

The study employed logistic regression analysis to ascertain the association between the depression status, migrant status and their sociodemographic characteristics. Table 3 displays the results of the logistic regression analysis, using data from the NIDS waves 1 to 5, pooled into cross-section. Model 1 is specified to control for migrant status only. Model 2 is a specification that controls for gender as well, while Model 3 controls for educational attainment, age, income groups, employment status, marital status and province of domicile. The majority of the predictors were statistically significant. An exception was race and migration status (White non-migrants) across all three models, race and migration status (Coloured non-migrant),

educational attainment (some primary education) and province (Free State and North West) in Model 3.

Table 2: Logistic regression on depression status by migration status and sociodemographic characteristics

Variables	**(1) Model 1: Simple specification**	**(2) Model 2: Some controls**	**(3) Model 3: Full specification:**
Race and migration status (Base: White migrant)			
African migrant	1.1135*** (0.2149)	1.1177*** (0.2151)	0.9459*** (0.2327)
Coloured migrant	0.7303*** (0.2423)	0.7401*** (0.2425)	0.5825*** (0.2632)
African non-migrant	1.2246*** (0.2132)	1.2054*** (0.2134)	0.8826*** (0.2309)
Coloured non-migrant	0.586*** (0.215)	0.5737*** (0.2152)	0.2679 (0.233)
White non-migrant	0.1736 (0.2243)	0.1702 (0.2245)	0.0631 (0.2418)
Gender (Base: Female)			
Male		-0.2688*** (0.022)	-0.157*** (0.0257)
Educational attainment (Base: No education)			
Some primary education			-0.0614 (0.0388)
Some secondary education			-0.2407*** (0.0425)
Completed secondary education			-0.3777*** (0.0529)
Tertiary or more			-0.4269*** (0.0533)
Income quartiles (Base: Lowest income group)			
Second quartile			-0.1057*** (0.032)
Third quartile			-0.1555*** (0.0342)
Fourth quartile			-0.2864*** (0.0416)
Age			0.0038*** (0.0011)
Marital status (Base: Married)			
Widowed			0.2541*** (0.0414)
Separated			0.3512*** (0.0679)
Never married			0.1914*** (0.0288)
Employment Status (Base: Unemployed)			
Employed			-0.1466*** (0.0265)
Province (Base: Western Cape)			
Eastern Cape			-0.1835*** (0.0582)
Northern Cape			-0.3437*** (0.0608)
Free State			-0.0628 (0.0655)
KwaZulu-Natal			-0.164*** (0.055)
North West			-0.1188* (0.0624)
Gauteng			-0.1502*** (0.0601)
Mpumalanga			-0.627*** (0.0693)
Limpopo			-0.5398*** (0.0636)
Constant	-2.0228*** (0.2128)	-1.9128*** (0.2132)	-1.3231*** (0.2439)

Source: Authors' own calculations, based on NIDS 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014/15 (SALDRU, 2020) *** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level

The regression results in Table 2 reveal that all other racial groups in both migrant and non-migrant groups were more likely to be depressed compared to White migrants in models 1 and 2. The results were statistically significant except for White non-migrants across all 3 models. However, there were no statistically significant differences between White migrants and Coloured non-migrants, as reflected in Model 3.

On gender, being male compared to being female, reduces the likelihood of being depressed and this is apparent in both Model 2 and Model 3 results. Using 'no education' as the base category, moving into a higher educational attainment category reduces the odds of being depressed. With age, each year-increase in age, increases the chances of being depressed. The same patterns extend to income brackets. Taking the lowest income quartile as the base category, being in a higher income category reduces the chances of being depressed. Compared to being married, all other marital statuses are associated with higher odds of being depressed. Being employed rather than unemployed reduces the chances of being depressed. On province of residence, if we take the Western Cape province as the reference point, residing in any of the other 8 provinces is associated with lower odds of being depressed.

The study then appraises the determinants of mental health status in South Africa by gender and sociodemographic variables. Table 3 summarizes the logistic regression models to give a clearer picture of how gender influences the risk of depressive symptoms. Model 1 evaluates the effects of migrant status and sociodemographic variables on depression status for males. Model 2 undertakes a similar analysis for females, with Model 3 reporting the combined effect.

Table 3: Logistic regression on depression status by migration status, gender and sociodemographic characteristics

Variables	(1) Model 1: Male	(2) Model 1: Female	(3) Model 1: Combined
Race and migration status (Base: White migrant)			
African migrant	1.767*** (0.52)	0.6128*** (0.2667)	0.9344*** (0.2326)
Coloured migrant	1.4524*** (0.5522)	0.2241 (0.3128)	0.5762*** (0.2631)
African non-migrant	1.6585*** (0.5182)	0.5735*** (0.2639)	0.8791*** (0.2309)
Coloured non-migrant	1.0548*** (0.5208)	-0.046 (0.2669)	0.2717 (0.233)
White non-migrant	0.9152* (0.5305)	-0.3063 (0.2796)	0.0629 (0.2418)
Educational attainment (Base: No education)			
Some primary education	-0.085 (0.0718)	-0.059 (0.0463)	-0.0616 (0.0388)
Some secondary education	-0.2784*** (0.0755)	-0.2274*** (0.0518)	-0.2367*** (0.0424)
Completed secondary education	-0.4106*** (0.0893)	-0.3667*** (0.0664)	-0.3741*** (0.0528)
Tertiary or more	-0.4642*** (0.0905)	-0.4146*** (0.0668)	-0.4145*** (0.0532)
Income quartiles (Base: Lowest income group)			
Second quartile	-0.1183*** (0.0601)	-0.1055*** (0.0379)	-0.1098*** (0.032)
Third quartile	-0.1497*** (0.061)	-0.1704*** (0.0418)	-0.1686*** (0.0342)
Fourth quartile	-0.2617*** (0.0696)	-0.3058*** (0.0533)	-0.3097*** (0.0414)
Age	0.0044*** (0.002)	0.0039*** (0.0013)	0.0039*** (0.0011)
Marital status (Base: Married)			
Widowed	0.5763*** (0.1145)	0.2014*** (0.0462)	0.2967*** (0.0408)
Separated	0.5291*** (0.1238)	0.2539*** (0.0815)	0.371*** (0.0678)
Never-married	0.2686*** (0.0543)	0.1419*** (0.035)	0.1929*** (0.0289)
Employment status (Base: Unemployed)			
Employed	-0.2408*** (0.0461)	-0.0817*** (0.0327)	-0.1658*** (0.0263)
Province (Base: Western Cape)			
Eastern Cape	-0.2079*** (0.0994)	-0.1764*** (0.0719)	-0.1858*** (0.0582)
Northern Cape	-0.3788*** (0.1007)	-0.3214*** (0.0765)	-0.3511*** (0.0608)
Free State	-0.041 (0.1106)	-0.0776 (0.0816)	-0.0643 (0.0655)
KwaZulu-Natal	-0.1021 (0.0943)	-0.1952*** (0.0679)	-0.1591*** (0.055)
North West	-0.1269 (0.1038)	-0.1172 (0.0785)	-0.1258*** (0.0624)
Gauteng	-0.2097*** (0.1003)	-0.1063 (0.0755)	-0.1502*** (0.0601)
Mpumalanga	-0.6952*** (0.1183)	-0.5913*** (0.0859)	-0.6271*** (0.0693)
Limpopo	-0.4139*** (0.1093)	-0.5976*** (0.0783)	-0.5367*** (0.0636)
Constant	-2.2792*** (0.5375)	-0.9999*** (0.2807)	-1.3709*** (0.2438)

Sources: Authors' own calculations, based on NIDS 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014/15 (SALDRU, 2020) *** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level of significance

Based on the regression output, the overall finding was that compared to White migrants, male Africans across both migrant and non-migrant categories had

significantly higher chances of being depressed. This finding is evident from the significant results of all the 3 models. The impact is more pronounced for the male group compared to the female group with significant association for Coloured and White males and insignificant effect for their female counterparts. Poor sociodemographic status was significantly associated with reduced probability of good mental health across all 3 models. The factors include poor educational attainment, lower income, higher age, being widowed, separated or never married (using married as the base category), being unemployed and residing in any province other than the Western Cape ceteris paribus (except for Free State and North West across both genders and Gauteng province for females).

DISCUSSION

The aim of this study was to determine whether the prevalence of depressive symptoms is higher among migrants than non-migrants in South Africa. The study also sought to examine the association of migration status with a wide set of sociodemographic factors in the same context. The a priori expectation was that migrants would report higher depressive symptoms compared to non-migrants. In supporting findings, the study found that both migrant and non-migrant African groups were more vulnerable to depressive symptoms than Coloured and White migrants and non-migrants. The result had greater effect for males compared to females. The findings were consistent with the existing literature that suggests migration as a risk factor for depressive symptoms in South Africa with sociodemographic status having a modifying effect. This finding is consistent with the research by Ajaero et al. (2017) who found a similar association between migrant status and depressive symptoms in South Africa, using the 2012 NIDS data (SALDRU, 2020). These results were also consistent with findings by Bhugra (2004), Hwang et al. (2010), Gkiouleka et al. (2018), Gutierrez-Vazquez et al. (2018) and Carroll et al. (2020), who identified migration as a risk factor for depressive symptoms in various contexts.

The study also hypothesized that depressive symptoms would be more prevalent among those with low sociodemographic status after controlling for the migrant status. The research found significant associations between low sociodemographic status and the risk of poor mental health. Poor mental health was associated with lower educational status, unemployment and being part of a lower income group, in findings consistent with Alegria et al. (2007) and Gkiouleka et al. (2018).

The current study found significant gender disparities in mental health status with females, especially African migrant women, who displayed poorer mental health status compared to males across both migrant and non-migrant communities. The result is consistent with findings by Dalgard and Thapa (2007). A possible explanation for this, is that in South Africa, women have less economic and social power than males, yet they carry heavy family responsibilities (Mungai and Bayat, 2018). This factor can have a modifying effect on the risk of depressive symptoms when combined with the challenges of social integration for migrants.

Furthermore, age appears to be a significantly strong predictor of depressive symptoms with an increase in age being associated with increased risk of depressive symptoms. This finding is consistent with the study by Ardington and Case (2010), who also found that the likelihood of depression increases with age. This result can be explained in part, by older adults being more troubled by poverty compared to the relatively young members of the society.

This study found that marital status was significantly associated with depressive symptoms. It is apparent from the study results that all marital status categories have poorer mental health relative to the married category. This is consistent with the findings of Das et al. (2007) who also found that respondents who were separated, divorced or widowed, reported worse mental health compared to those who were married. This could be linked to the lack of social support, which adds to stress and lowers mental health.

The place of residence was also identified as a significant determinant of mental health status in the study. Compared to the Western Cape, residing in the rest of the South African provinces was associated with a lower risk of poor mental health after controlling for migration status.

LIMITATIONS

Notwithstanding the robust findings, the study has some limitations. First, the numbers in some of the racial sub-categories such as Whites and Indians/Asians constitute very few respondents, which makes it difficult to draw inferences from the results for these groups. Second, the available data makes it difficult to determine if a move represents a 'return' rather than 'migration'. Future research should consider employing more representative data for inferences regarding under-represented racial groups such as Whites and Indians/Asians.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The aim of the study was to evaluate whether there are differences in the mental health status of migrants and non-migrants in the South African context, considering sociodemographic factors. The results highlighted significant associations between migrants and non-migrants with the relationship being compounded by sociodemographic characteristics. The study found empirical evidence that African migrants are at heightened risk of depressive symptoms, compared to other races. Both migrant and non-migrant African groups were more vulnerable to depressive symptoms than Coloured and White migrants and non-migrants. There were also significant differences in the way sociodemographic characteristics were associated with mental health status. Migrants with lower sociodemographic status were more susceptible to poor mental health, highlighting the unique challenges and threats that are faced by economically-deprived migrants. The gender analysis revealed significant differences in the mental health status of males and females, with male migrants

being impacted more than females. Being married was significantly associated with better mental health status. These findings provide insights into the racial, gender and sociodemographic dimensions of poor mental health in the migrant community in South Africa, which policy-makers can incorporate into intervention strategies. A key insight of the results is that strategies that impact on migration, such as local employment, housing and urban planning are likely to have important mental health outcomes at the population level. Therefore, there is a need to address neighborhood-level material deprivation and unemployment to reduce migration, which ought to impact positively on mental health.

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Externalization and Securitization as Policy Responses to African Migration to the European Union

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This paper examines how African migration to the European Union (EU) has become externalized and securitized and the implications this has for migration management for both the EU and Africa. To accomplish this, the paper employed a qualitative research approach which reviewed current literature on the topic under study. It found that the externalization and securitization of African migration to the EU have failed to prioritize and address the different socio-economic and political conditions that are driving irregular migration. Additionally, externalization and securitization as policy responses do not stop irregular African migration; rather, they prolong the misery of migrants who are at the mercy of smugglers who prey on their desperation. The paper concludes that migration management between the EU and Africa needs to be anchored on policies that address the core 'push' factors driving irregular migration from Africa, rather than policies which do not stop migration (even though they have slowed it down) but rather indirectly empower smugglers and leave considerable room for the abuse of migrants.

Keywords: Africa, development, management, migrants

INTRODUCTION

There have been growing debates not only on African irregular migration to the European Union (EU) as a phenomenon but also on how it could be reduced. Since the 1970s, more than 2.5 million migrants have crossed the Mediterranean Sea to enter Europe without visas (IOM, 2018). However, the attacks in March 2004 in Madrid and on 7 July 2005 in London became a defining moment as to how the EU responded to migration. Even though the number of Africans arriving irregularly at EU shores has been on the decline, this has not coincided with the decline in anti-immigrant attitudes in some EU states. For Ivanova (2016), the Visegrád Group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) has at times, incorporating the concept of state sovereignty, vehemently disagreed with the European Commission's directive how migration ought to be handled collectively. The EU does not operate in a vacuum, and thus the European Commission has to take into consideration the interests of member states. Despite a decline in those arriving (over a million in 2015 and 140 000 by June 2019) (Mbiyozo, 2019), EU member states have been torn apart by bitter disagreements over how to collectively manage irregular migration without infringing on the territorial sovereignty of member states while also adhering to international human rights practices (Farrell, 2015).

The EU (through the European Commission) has attempted to pressure Africa (majority sending countries of migrants) to cooperate on migration management. For example, the EU introduced a new visa code which will continue to regulate the short-stay entry of third-country nationals. The new visa code introduced restrictive processes for countries that fail to cooperate on readmissions. However, the African Union (AU) and most African states say that returns must be voluntary and people cannot be forced to go to countries against their will (Mbiyozo, 2019). The above reflects that the current migration and refugee crisis in Europe requires an understanding of the different drivers of migration and how they can be addressed collectively. It is not a question of opening or closing borders, but rather, there is a need to understand the complex and overlapping relationship between forced and economic drivers of migration to Europe as this can better shape an appropriate policy response to the phenomenon.

This paper discusses the extent to which EU initiatives (securitization and externalization) have been successful in reducing this irregular flow which has been deemed an influx by EU media. The common narrative has been that socio-economic and political factors are drivers of irregular migration; however, such narratives have missed the point by not focusing on the often-ignored factors driving migration. This paper is based on a review of the literature on irregular African migration to the EU. The paper aims to provide a sound basis for a more evidence-based discussion of this highly debated and politicized issue, i.e., what drives African migration to the EU, how has the EU responded and how effective have these responses been. Irregular African migration to the EU as a process flows into Europe along land and sea routes under the control of human smugglers, and migrants in the process face further

marginalization and exploitation. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: after this introduction, the paper reviews EU migration management policies such as the EU charter, the EU trust fund and the new pact relating to migration. Subsequently, it discusses securitization and externalization as policy reactions to irregular African migration, their effectiveness, shortcomings and finally, how the African Union needs to play a more important role in the quest to reduce irregular migration to the EU. This is followed by the policy implications and conclusion of the paper.

Many African migrants who try to reach Europe (using the North African route which cuts through Libya) by boat are often intercepted by the Libyan coast guard and handed over to criminal gangs that traffic them. Nearly 20,000 people have been detained in Libya according to Amnesty International. Therefore, it becomes imperative for this paper to examine whether EU policies with regards to migration management have contributed to the abuse and deaths of migrants.

EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is a legally binding treaty for member states which outlines fundamental rights for everyone within the borders of the EU, regardless of their migration status. However, the EU does not exist in a vacuum or operate detachedly from the member states or the people. The European Commission is a politically independent institution that proposes legislation, policies and programs of action. It represents the collective interests of member states (Laine, 2020). It is also responsible for implementing the decisions of the European Parliament, the voice of the people, and the Council (of Ministers), the voice of the member states. There is also the European Council, comprising of the heads of state or government of all the EU member states. It is the highest-level policy-making body in the EU, which defines the overall political direction and priorities of the Union, but it does not exercise any legislative functions. While it is the European Commission that initiates procedures and proposes new laws, it is the European Parliament and Council that adopt them. Members of the European Parliament are directly elected by EU citizens to represent their interests and the Council consists of government ministers, i.e., elected officials, from all the EU member states (Laine, 2020). However, the issues of irregular migration have divided opinion in the EU, with disagreements blocking agreements on reforms of EU asylum laws and fair distribution of responsibility for processing migrants and asylum seekers entering and already present in EU territory. The focus remains on keeping migrants and asylum seekers away from the EU, including through problematic proposals for offshore processing and migration cooperation with non-EU countries with fewer resources, human rights abuses and less capacity to process asylum claims. While European attempts to 'secure' or 'protect' its borders have reduced irregular migration from Africa, considerable efforts are needed to address the factors facilitating irregular African migration. These revolve around understanding the drivers of migration, enacting policy (jointly by EU and Africa) to address these drivers. Apart from policy development concerning

addressing the drivers of migration, from an African perspective, good governance and economic development are key necessities in the continent's drive to reduce irregular migration.

Framing migration as a problem in the EU was a result of the upsurge in anti-migrant and right-wing political parties, and thus migration was observed as a border security issue that needed to be addressed (Laine, 2020). Seeking to debunk the common misconceptions about migration and suggest an alternative narrative that is based on mutual interests, this paper observes that from the onset, the EU and the AU acknowledged that cooperation is greatly needed to address the problem. However, contentions have arisen about how this cooperation ought to take place. For the EU, securitization and externalization initiatives have received their share of criticisms, for either not doing enough to help those in need or doing too much in trying to protect its borders.

THE EU TRUST FUND FOR AFRICA

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF for Africa) was established as a mechanism to address the root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration and to contribute to better migration management in Africa (Castillejo, 2016). The EU Trust Fund was born out of the implementation of the Action Plan adopted at the Valletta Summit. The EU committed 1.8 billion euros from the EU budget and the European Development Fund (EDF), to be complemented by contributions from the EU member states and other donors (Hunt, 2015). For the EU, irregular migration from African and the Middle East, coupled with the rise in right-wing populism, warranted an intervention to stem the inflow of migrants. The EU Trust Fund was anchored on soliciting cooperation from third parties through financial support. Programs under the EU Trust Fund are spread across three regions in Africa (involving twenty-six partner countries) mainly the Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa and North Africa (Cangas and Knoll, 2016). The EU Trust Fund undertakes a number of activities related to strengthening the rule of law, creating economic and educational opportunities, building better governance, and ensuring the effective and sustainable return, readmission and reintegration of irregular migrants not qualifying for protection. The support of the EU Trust Fund in Africa requires a firm commitment to supporting capacity-building of third countries in the field of migration and border management, as well as to the stabilization and development of these regions of Africa. The EU with its financial support solicits cooperation from African states who are most fragile and those most affected by migration. Cangas and Knoll (2016) explain that the EU Trust Fund is anchored on four types of interventions. Firstly, economic programs, which are focused on creating employment and also to integrate returnees. Secondly, resilience projects, which are meant to improve food security and provide services for local communities and refugees. Thirdly, migration management, which is geared towards fighting irregular migration and smuggling, focusing on return, readmission, international protection and legal mi-

gration. Fourthly, governance and security, which is premised on the need for good governance, through strengthening the rule of law, security and development, border management and conflict-prevention systems. However, pouring billions of euros into countries which are characterized by political instability, human rights abuses and disregard for civil liberties, raises questions about the EU's commitment to the respect and support for international human rights. Therefore, this means that the lack of clarity over funding could mean that EU aid money is repackaged as border security with no development goals. Moreover, tackling 'the root causes of irregular migration' is a lengthy, non-linear, unpredictable process, depending on many more contextual factors than support from financial and technical development partners. However, the narrative around the EU Trust Fund for Africa suggests that aid can buy partner countries' cooperation (in readmission and strict border management), and hence curb migration flows to the EU (Cangas and Knoll 2016). While the EU Trust Fund envisions a cooperative framework with regards to migration management, the EU however, with its financial muscle, has the upper hand with regards to policy development and soliciting cooperation through financial means.

THE EU MIGRATION PACT

On 23 September 2020, the European Commission announced it's New Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is underpinned by strengthening border security (Kirisci et al., 2020). The new pact (European Commission, 2020) consists of three layers. Firstly, the pact advocates for the development of policies to keep people in their countries. However, such policies ignore the positive benefits of migration, in both Europe and countries of origin. In addition, the investments in addressing the 'root causes' of migration within these partnership agreements have, to date, done little to prevent onward movement (Kirisci et al., 2020). From an African perspective, Abebe and Mbiyozo (2020) explain that the increased emphasis in the New Pact on migrant returns is contrary to Africa's position and could affect negotiations around the Post-Cotonou Partnership Agreement (ACP) and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Even though the number of those arriving in the EU from Africa has decreased, the EU has turned its attention to returning migrants who do not have legal rights to remain. Thirteen of the 16 priority countries under the European Commission's 2016 New Partnership Framework are in Africa (Abebe and Mbiyozo, 2020). The new pact aims to increase returns through strengthening border control, signing returns agreements with third countries and allowing EU member states to choose between resettling refugees and sponsoring returns. However, African states have resisted intensified returns policies, maintaining that returns must be voluntary. The second layer of the new pact involves the investment in increased border security and deterrence. From an African perspective, incorporating the EU's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, processes such as the Africa-EU Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME) Partnership, the Rabat Process, The Rome Declaration and Programme for 2015-2017, The Khartoum Process, and the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020

are all processes that are geared towards strengthening border security (European Commission, 2015). The third layer of the pact proposes rules to resolve the long-standing challenge within the EU to achieve a more balanced distribution of responsibilities and promote solidarity among EU members in dealing with asylum seekers and refugees. This has however, been met with considerable rebellion from within the EU (Abebe and Mbiyozo, 2020).

Critics of the pact argue that it is so inward-oriented that it fails to recognize the policy implications of the dire state of forced migration globally. Secondly, the pact makes little allowance for how the COVID-19 pandemic is going to impact the EU's migration and asylum policies, since the pandemic has profoundly affected the capacity of host countries to manage the presence of refugees and ensure their protection (Kirisci et al., 2020). From an African perceptive, the call by the EU's New Pact on Migration and Asylum for revamping partnerships with third countries is reminiscent of the EU's long-standing policy of externalizing the cost and responsibility of managing its external borders. Critiquing this approach, Abebe and Mbiyozo (2020) contend that cooperating with third countries with regards to migration by tying policy issues such as development assistance, trade concessions, security, education, and visa facilitation has long been criticized as asymmetrical. The pact takes this relationship to a new coercive level by suggesting the possibility of "apply[ing] restrictive visa measures" to third countries unwilling to be cooperative (European Commission, 2020).

SECURITIZATION AND EXTERNALIZATION OF AFRICAN MIGRATION

Migration control is typically seen as a natural part of legitimate nation-states' exercise of sovereign power. External border surveillance is, according to the European Commission, a necessity because of the relaxed internal borders within the Schengen region (Palm, 2020: 10-14). Contrary to EU media reporting, labeling the arrival of African migrants as an invasion, such reports fail to take into consideration that most African migrants move within the continent – they are not overwhelming Europe or the rest of the world. African migration to the EU is complex and characterized by complex factors which present numerous dangers to migrants. A study by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2019) explains that irregular migrants who made the fraught journey from Africa to Europe would do so again despite knowing the dangers of the trip. The report further reveals that getting a job was not the only motivation to move, not all irregular migrants were 'poor' in Africa, nor had lower education levels. Additionally, 58 per cent were either employed or in school at the time of their departure, with the majority of those working earning competitive wages. Even though the UNDP study shows that economic need was not the main driver of migration, other studies (Dinbabo and Nyasulu, 2015; Marie-Laurence, 2016; Mlambo, 2017; Giménez-Gómez et al., 2019) argue that key to migration is the need to maximize economic opportunities that do not exist in countries of origin. Nevertheless, this paper argues that tackling irregular migration requires a consider-

able understanding of the other drivers of migration (political factors, family ties, socio-cultural determinations, etc.) beyond economic consideration.

Irregular immigration from sub-Saharan Africa has created considerable tensions between the EU, North African countries and sub-Saharan states. From general observation, North African governments seem to have undoubtedly bowed to EU pressure and were swift in adopting dominant European public discourses on 'combating illegal migration' (Dagot, 2020). However, some North African states openly opposed several elements of these policies, partly because they were seen as reinforcing their position as transit countries, e.g., being reluctant to readmit large numbers of irregular migrants from third (sub-Saharan) countries and establishing offshore 'processing centers' for immigrants and asylum seekers. Nevertheless, the paper considers what informs these securitization and externalization initiatives. The question may seem inconsequential, but the migration to Europe has not always been a problem. In fact, in the 1950s and 1960s, migration was seen mainly as an extra workforce in most western European countries. However, today, migrants are viewed as the 'other' and incompatible with EU culture. Sensationalist media reporting gave rise to right-wing populism and sadly, political campaigning in the EU on anti-immigrant slogans have succeeded in sowing more discord across the continent, with many centrist and liberal politicians having difficulty formulating a response (Hameleers et al, 2017). The rise and popularity of the far-right in the EU and ways in which they use the securitization of migration and the alleged threat migrants pose to 'their' state, economic and ontological security and identity, as a conduit to justify and legitimize their anti-immigration, racist and xenophobic rhetoric and praxis are not based on current migration patterns from Africa to the EU (Lazaridis and Wadia, 2015). Reinforcing the notion that Africa–EU migration is misunderstood, Jobson (2017) reasons that Europe's panic over migration alienated many of its African partners, this driven by media-fueled perceptions of European countries being 'swarmed' by Africans, arouse deep-rooted insecurity about national identity, mistrust of the 'other', racism, and xenophobic attacks, thus giving way to securitization and externalization of African migration.

It is imperative to acknowledge that the externalization and securitization policies are not a new phenomenon; rather they are a response to the increasing rates of migration worldwide which have evoked nationalist politics. Examples have been observed in the USA/Mexico border area, with regards to irregular migration. They have also been observed in the EU's cooperation with the Middle East, failing to stem the outflow of migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. In Africa, West and North Africa have been central to the EU's securitization and externalization policies and these policies have become entrenched, largely due to the financial support that comes with them. Border agencies and police officers in cooperating countries (Libya, Mali, Niger, and Chad) have received training in border operation and migration management and hence this has allowed for the consolidation of securitization and externalization policies. Although the EU and many of its member states, have

committed themselves to protecting the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, such commitment has been overshadowed by the EU's prioritization of restrictions rather than addressing the drivers of migration. Populism reinforced the securitization and externalization as key to curbing migration and even though these approaches have reduced irregular African migration to the EU, they have also contradicted the EU's commitment to protecting refugees and asylum seekers (Laine 2018: 290).

This contradiction has been driven by the ever-changing public and political opinions with regards to migrants in the EU. For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel's open-door policy, which allowed approximately a million refugees and migrants, faced backlash and forced the German government to backtrack on the policy. This suggests that irregular migration has been seen as being negative within the EU, which has caused a lot of anxieties. Sadly, these anxieties have become intertwined with deep insecurities, triggered by originally unrelated societal changes, such as the precarization of the labor market and dissolving social security (Laine 2018: 292). Consequently, Laine (2018) argues that the debate and public opinions concerning immigration have not been discussed in isolation; rather they have been in tandem with the above issues. Walls, whether on paper or on the ground, may seem effective, but seldom are. Once a wall is erected, people will soon try to cross it and this creates a fencing self-referential – a vicious cycle – which feeds itself, and sadly, enforcement pressures on third countries can increase the difficulty of crossing borders for asylum seekers and refugees as well as the ability to seek or access procedures for determining refugee status (Laine, 2018).

Arguably, the rise of populism has fed into the nationalistic ambitions of right-wing parties. To an extent, this has side-lined the EU's commitment to freedom, democracy, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. This is evident in the humanitarian and moral appeals that have been consumed by debates and outright fear-mongering about economic security and national identity (Kupe, 2019). Moreover, nations that have been at the forefront of developing rights-sensitive standards and procedures for assisting and processing asylum seekers within their jurisdictions, have suddenly created barriers that prevent asylum seekers from setting foot on their territories (Palm, 2020: 12). As a result, migrants have effectively been prevented from even attempting to undertake the journey to the EU, let alone reaching EU shores, seemingly freeing the EU member states from the human rights obligations that they have accepted.

The media reporting on the inflow of irregular African migrants has been overstated, partly because populists, anti-migrant parties and the EU media have been able to frame African migration as a threat to the values and traditions of the EU, discounting the fact that most African migrants migrate continentally. This paper therefore argues that the media can also provoke controversy, for strategic editorial and economic reasons, even without any particular social need for it. Controversy which generally forces political parties and those in charge to take a stance on certain issues, notably immigration and the threat of invasion by the 'other' in

Europe, has imposed itself into the media and political sphere. Laine (2020), Palm (2020), Moreno-Lax (2018), and McAuliffe and Ruhs (2018) observe that there is a strong causal connection between the EU's exercise of power and the many lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea. Firstly, the EU closed legal avenues of entry, which compelled migrants to undertake risky irregular journeys and rely on human traffickers and smugglers to relocate. Secondly, extreme measures were undertaken to block the remaining irregular exit paths and detain those who did not utilize heavily surveilled borders. As a result, both casualties at sea and atrocities in detention camps were foreseeable harms that, with proper measures, could have been avoided.

While the EU is within its sovereign right to protect itself from what it deems security-related threats, which are driven by Africa's failure to reduce irregular migration, it is also duty-bound to protect migrants. Palm (2020: 9-18, citing Altman and Wellman, 2011) asserts that sovereign states have, according to them, foremost obligations towards themselves and their citizens and immigration control as a matter of self-determination, and while the deaths and abuse of migrants in detention centers are condemnable, Africa has left the EU no choice but to unilaterally prioritize the protection of its integrity. This paper however, refutes such assertions and contends that while protecting one's integrity is important, securitization and externalization are not the right way to go about it, as they do not stop migration, and, in many cases, they have a reverse effect.

De Haas (2008) observes that there are two problems associated with securitization and externalization. Firstly, increasing border controls has led to a diversification of trans-Saharan migration routes and trans-Mediterranean crossing points and in turn, has led to an unintended increase in the area that EU countries have to monitor to 'combat' irregular migration. Secondly, increasing surveillance has led to the professionalization of smuggling methods. Smugglers now use larger and faster custom-made boats and zodiacs. Additionally, the huge length of land and maritime borders, coupled with the widespread corruption among border guards and other officials, make it virtually impossible to prevent people from crossing. As more and more restrictions are introduced, this benefits smugglers because it increases the need (and the cost) for their services. Every time a fence goes up, access to the European dream gets a little more expensive (Abebe, 2019). Securitization and externalization have failed to take into cognizance the plethora of drivers of migration and do not address structural inequality, which means that marginalized individuals and communities will continue to migrate (Herbert, 2019). Furthermore, the EU with its securitization and externalization of African migration has not only failed to dissuade migrants from taking the strenuous journey, but it has also resulted in unintended consequences, with migrants being abused and held in inhumane detention centers Libya; centers which are ironically funded by the EU (Andersson, 2016; Abebe 2019).

Disputably, externalization and securitization, coupled with populism, have allowed for the migration policy to become an increasingly politicized issue. Benedicto

and Brunet (2018: 17-18) argue that the far-right have manipulated public opinion to create irrational fears of refugees. This xenophobia sets up mental walls in people, who then demand physical walls. This is because externalization is often deceptively framed as either a security imperative or a life-saving humanitarian endeavor (or both) even though such responses to migration pose serious human rights concerns and threaten the integrity of the international refugee protection system (Frelick et al., 2016: 193). Even though initiatives of externalization and securitization involve investing funds in technology-related equipment and ensuring the training of local law enforcement are welcomed, their association with human right abuses has cast doubt over their effectiveness. However, externalization and securitization do not take into consideration the drivers of migration from Africa, hence, the focus should be on addressing the root causes of migration first rather than narrowing the focus on border capabilities.

Theo Francken, Belgium's Secretary of State for asylum and migration, revealed that the EU should stimulate economic growth and employment, to boost the buying power of the African population (Politico, 2018). Michael Clemens, co-director of migration at the Center for Global Development, posits that no amount of financial assistance can stop migration. He maintains that the EU should rather invest in creating skills among potential migrants in Africa — specific skills that the EU needs. Paul Collier, an economics professor at the School of Government at Oxford University, argues that Europe should indeed spend €6 billion to bring jobs to Africa through investment by the European Investment Bank which would support European firms in Africa, thus helping reduce irregular African migration (Politico, 2018).

This paper agrees that while European investments would contribute positively towards the development of the continent, they would, however, find it cumbersome to address the drivers of migration (political instability, porous borders, corruption, smuggling and trafficking syndicates), hence irregular migration will likely persist, although in far fewer numbers. Furthermore, rather than promoting the externalization of migration controls, the EU and other donors could also increase support to regional and international organizations that provide or promote the protection of migrants' rights, including the rights of asylum seekers, in third countries and countries of origin, especially considering that borders in Africa have many entry and exit points (Frelick et al., 2016: 195); hence the question of how to strengthen the capability of one entry point without neglecting the other.

The AU, and by extension African states, are important role players. The AU argues that migration is inevitable, and needs to be better governed in an integrated manner through comprehensive, human-rights based and gender-responsive national migration strategies and policies (AU, 2018). However, the deaths of African migrants in the Mediterranean Sea coupled with their abuse in Libyan detention camps (funded by the EU) have become a thorny issue for the continental body, giving rise to the need to address irregular migration through policy cooperation with the EU.

Moreover, criticisms against the AU have dwelt on the notion that expecting the AU to take the lead in curbing irregular migration is quite unrealistic, since within the AU many decisions are made, but very few are implemented. This lack of consensus, therefore, allows the EU to enforce its externalization and securitization policies, even though such initiatives may not be largely welcomed.

Palm (2020: 20) contends that today privileged nations are, due to their affluence, capable of almost hermetically sealing their external borders using massive investments in sophisticated surveillance systems and financial means to reach agreements with transit countries that secure their interests in keeping 'aliens' out. However, rather than keeping 'aliens' out and hoping that poor countries can help in stemming irregular migration if rich countries want fewer immigrants, their best shot might be to help poor countries become rich so that fewer people feel the urge to leave. This is not to say, however, that Africa has not done anything to reduce irregular migration. The European Commission (2015) notes that the continent has cooperated with the EU on a number of policies such as the Migration EU Expertise (MIEUX), EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue, the Dakar Strategy, European-wide African diaspora platform for development, and Addressing Mixed Migration Flows in Eastern Africa. Nevertheless, criticism against Africa has been premised on the notion that it is the EU which takes the lead on these initiatives. It is the EU which comes up with policies to stem migration (rightly so, because Africa does not consider migration to be a threat, but rather as a way to boost continental integration development), often pouring money into the continent to solicit the cooperation of African countries. African countries have little interest in putting in place barriers to stop migration; hence, it makes sense for the EU to intervene as it observes irregular migration as a threat to its sovereignty.

This paper also argues that irregular migration to the EU is not an isolated incident. Since independence, the role of external actors has, of course, destabilized Africa. Unwarranted interventions from a socio-political perspective have further complicated the political and economic challenges African governments face today. Interventions constantly overlap, with one crisis influencing another, marking the never-ending nature of foreign intervention, especially militarily, which gives way to conflict, forced displacement and migration. While both the EU and AU are eager for a practical and jointly-undertaken solution, it is not going to be that simple. As a point of departure, African and European leaders must now lay the foundations for such a relationship by agreeing on a forward-looking strategy that addresses structural imbalances, harnesses the benefits of migration, and delivers tangible benefits to their citizens. The first step to address such structural imbalances is to ensure adequate opportunities for young people who are at the core of migration. Altogether, the EU should help Africa strengthen democratic and transparent processes and institutions in Africa which will improve the socio-economic and political environment.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper was not an empirical study but rather it relied extensively on the available literature to draw its conclusions. The policy implications and concluding remarks are therefore based on literary works that the paper has summarized. Externalization and securitization have focused on the need to reduce irregular migration to the EU but have not addressed the issues driving these migratory patterns. This signals that externalization and securitization do not speak to the current realities on the ground in an African context. Political instability across the continent has given way to the consolidation of smugglers, who fuel irregular migration. The discourse on irregular African migration to the EU has ignored the observation that most African migrants migrate within the continent. While Marie-Laurence (2016) asserts that Europe remains the main destination for African-born migrants who seek to maximize the economic opportunities that may be available, the European media has failed to take note of vast and increased migration within the continent. The media has instead focused on framing migration from Africa as a threat, even though most Africans migrate within the continent. These migration patterns are informed and driven by an array of factors which include economics, family, networks and individual choices. In its quest to reduce these irregular inflows, the EU has opted to externalize and securitize migration.

This paper maintains that for the EU to reduce migration, there is a need for it to understand the different drivers of migration rather than believing externalization and securitization are a one-size-fits-all solution. The rise of populism linked to migration has changed how liberal parties view migration. Under pressure from right-wing populists, they have sought to externalize and securitize migration even in the face of human rights violations. The EU media also contributes to the observations of migrants as thugs and incompatible with EU culture, leading to the consolidation of racism and the 'othering' of migrants (Wodak and Krzyżanowski, 2017). Even though African countries have committed to working with the EU to reduce migration, the financial imbalance favors the EU to be the major player, which often side-lines African states.

Finally, the external intervention in the affairs of Africa has also indirectly contributed to population displacement and citizens becoming refugees. Migration is an ever-evolving phenomenon and putting a complete stop to it is virtually impossible. While there is no quick fix to this situation, this paper contends that from an EU perspective, there is a need to think beyond the funding of securitization and externalization. The EU needs long-term, sustainable alliances with key partners — and with those in Africa in particular. For these to be meaningful, cooperation should go beyond migration, as it is a consequence of much broader shared challenges, including geopolitical instability, demographic developments, climate change, and socioeconomic issues. Secondly, while EU developmental aid to Africa is needed, another form of action would be to prepare migrants for work in Europe. The reality is that there is no amount of financial assistance that can stop migration; hence, the EU

should invest in creating skills among potential migrants in Africa — specific skills that the EU needs. From an African perspective, stopping illegal migration seems cumbersome, especially from a socio-economic point of view. However, stable governance is the crucial issue that needs to be addressed and this requires that, cooperation between Africa and the EU is prioritized, if this matter is to be resolved, in the interest of all parties.

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