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Editorial

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The African Human Mobility Review (AHMR) regularly provides up-to-date, high-quality, and original contributions – research papers, reviews, and syntheses as well as book and conference reviews – dealing with all aspects (socioeconomic, political, legislative, and developmental) of human mobility in Africa. AHMR is served by a very competent Editorial Board along with a network of scholars from all around the world and with an interdisciplinary field of study helping to secure high quality, originality, and utility of the contributions toward evidence-based policymaking.

This issue consists of a book review and five articles that promote the practice of original research and policy discussions and provides a comprehensive forum devoted exclusively to the analysis of contemporaneous trends, migration patterns, and some of the most important migration-related issues in Africa.

Daniel Tevera made an insightful review of a book entitled *Migration in Southern Africa* edited by Pragna Rugunanan and Nomkhosi Xulu-Gama. The reviewer gave the entire work a critical and academic appraisal. He claims that the book addresses two flaws in migration and mobility studies in Southern Africa and it tries to facilitate migration studies through an Africanist contextual framework. First, it critiques the tendency to perceive African rural-urban migration as benign, intimate, feminine, and local, while cross-border migration is considered risky, masculine, exploratory, and global. Second, it foregrounds the plight of migrant children and the complicated situations that women with children find themselves in as both internal and international migrants, and highlights that these crucial areas remain neglected and under-researched. The reviewer further indicates that the different chapters of the book focus on the scholarship on the sociology and geography of migration and mobility in Southern Africa. The reviewer concludes that this book makes a significant contribution to migration and mobility studies and is well worth reading if one wants to comprehend South-South migration outside of the conventional Western lens.

The first article by Farai Nyika and Debra Shepherd is entitled *Impact of Internal Migration on School Enrollment and Completion Rates in South Africa*. Using a quantitative method of research, which involved the analysis of South African census data for 1996, 2001, and 2011, the researchers applied the probability regression models that include the First Difference and System Generalized Method of Moments with instrumental variables. Accordingly, the study found that internal migrants have a positive effect on both school enrollment and completion rates of non-migrants. Besides, the results of this study further indicate that internal migrants also provide job market competition,

which influences non-migrants to complete secondary schooling. The researchers argue that this study provides evidence from a country with a history of persistent internal migration. According to them, most prior research has focused on the relationship between immigration and education outcomes in the developed world. This study also suggests that the South African government should improve the quality of secondary-school education in both rural and urban areas and increase study loans for students at tertiary institutions.

The second article by Sean Sithole is entitled *Migrant Networks, Food Remittances, and Zimbabweans in Cape Town: A Social Media Perspective*. Sithole applied quantitative and qualitative methods of research throughout the study and effectively identified the key evolving connections between migrant networking on social media and cross-border food remittances in Southern Africa. This study used a social capital theory to examine the utilization of social media in food remittances. The findings of this research uncovered the role of social media in facilitating a regular flow of food remittances back to urban and rural areas of Zimbabwe. The study provides valuable insights for academics, researchers, and development practitioners interested in the evolving migration, remittances, and food security nexus in the global South.

The third article by Joseph Makanda is entitled *South Africa's Counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado: Examining the Role of Mozambican Migrants to Establish a People-Centric Approach*. Methodologically, this paper is based on a qualitative study that relies on secondary data sources to offer a critical survey of the work done in the context of terrorism in Cabo Delgado. Using the counterinsurgency theory, the research provides an in-depth analysis and argues for the inclusion of the voice of Mozambican migrants in South Africa. The result of this study indicates direct and indirect ways of securing the population's support, thereby isolating the insurgents in Mozambique. An awareness of the views of these migrants can shed light on what perpetuates the insurgency in Mozambique. The study recommends new empirical studies that include the seemingly forgotten role of migrants, in a non-military and people-centered approach in seeking to undermine global terror networks.

The fourth article by Tunde Alabi and Bamidele Olajide is entitled *Who Wants to Go Where? Regional Variations in Emigration Intention in Nigeria*. This study investigated the factors associated with emigration intention and used a logistic regression model to describe data and to explain the relationship between variables. The analysis allowed the researchers to quantify the amount and direction of one or more independent variables on a continuous dependent variable. Accordingly, the study discovered that having political involvement, residing in the south, having a college degree, often using the internet, and tolerating homosexual persons were all factors that enhanced the chances of having an emigration intention. However, being old, employed, and having religious tolerance reduced the odds of emigration intention. Moreover, the study indicates that the regional models revealed notable differences in the influence of age, education, employment, tolerance, and political participation.

The fifth article by Gracsious Maviza and Lorena Núñez Carrasco is entitled *Mobility, Gender, and Experiences of Familyhood among Migrant Families in Tsholotsho,*

Zimbabwe. The research employed a qualitative research design to explore the views, experiences, beliefs, and motivations of individuals on how ongoing contextual transformations due to migration actively shape narratives about families. The qualitative research design helped to understand how families and familial relationships have been constructed through the everyday interactions and roles within the family. The findings of this research show that the meaning of family for left-behind women has remained confined to the normative parameters of kinship, biological, and marital ties. Furthermore, the findings reveal that in the past, while away, migrant men's family-linking practices were very minimal, and limited by distance. These assumptions notwithstanding, migrant men still thrived on maintaining links with their families to retain their dignity and legitimacy.

Best wishes and thank you in advance for your contribution to the Journal of African Human Mobility Review.

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Book review

Migration in Southern Africa

Migration in Southern Africa is the title of the book edited by Pragna Rugunanan and Nomkhosi Xulu-Gama, whose stated aim is to facilitate migration studies through an Africanist contextual framework that aims to disrupt easy explanations for the migrant and refugee crises experienced in the region. This book is an output from the July 2019 workshop that brought together a diverse range of migration and mobility scholars based mainly in Southern Africa. It contends that South-South migration will continue to dominate future global migration trends, making it imperative for Southern-based scholars to theorize local, regional, and international migration from a South-South perspective.

The book identifies two weaknesses of Southern Africa's migration and mobility studies. First, is a tendency to perceive African rural-urban migration as benign, intimate, feminine, and local, while cross-border migration is considered risky, masculine, exploratory, and global. Second, the plight of migrant children and the complicated situations that women with children find themselves in as internal or international migrants continue to receive insufficient attention.

Rugunanan and Xulu-Gama produced a readable six-part book consisting of 18 chapters that draw from narratives emerging primarily from qualitative research methodologies involving in-depth interviews with participants. In the introductory chapter, Rugunanan and Xulu-Gama reiterate that there is a strong and urgent need for migration research from a Southern African perspective.

The three chapters in Part 1 propose ways of theorizing migration in Southern Africa. In chapter two, Kezia Batisai discusses how migration and migrant identity issues can be studied and understood. She does this by examining the contextual specificities to provide a Southern perspective to analyze African migrant worker experiences. Chapter three by Pragna Rugunanan provides a refreshing case study on South Asian and African migration to South Africa. In chapter four, Samukele Hadebe argues that although South Africa remains the migrant destination of choice in Southern Africa, a combination of factors, including restrictive legislation,

xenophobic violence, coupled with high unemployment and crime rates, are making the country a less attractive destination for some migrant groups.

Part 2 focuses on legislation and policy frameworks governing migration and consists of three chapters. In chapter five, Steven Gordon discusses anti-immigrant behaviors in South Africa and provides insight into public attitudes toward migrants. In chapter six, Khangelani Moyo and Christine Botha draw on migration policy and governance literature to comprehensively discuss how the South African state handles refugees and asylum seekers. They conclude that refugee governance faces challenges resulting from a palpable discord between the policy intentions of the South African government and implementation on the ground based on an inadequate migration infrastructure for processing refugees and asylum seekers. In chapter seven, Nomkhosi Xulu-Gama, Sibongile Ruth Nhari, Musawenkosi Malabela, and Tebogo Mogoru contribute to the debate on South African labor legislation, migration, and the effect of worker education programs on workplace struggles, household challenges, and community struggles.

The focus of Part 3 is internal labor migration and regional mobility. In chapter eight, Anna Oksiutycz and Caroline Azionya explore the experiences of internal and cross-border migrants residing in the Zandspruit informal settlement in South Africa. In contrast, in chapter nine, Nomkhosi Xulu-Gama uses a feminist epistemology to unpack the often-painful experiences of migrant women whose livelihood struggles remain under-researched across Southern Africa.

Part 4 consists of three chapters focusing on children's and mothers' migration and mobility experiences. In chapter ten, Kearabetswe Mokoene and Grace Khunou discuss the ugly face of migration when mothers in historically migrant families are compelled by circumstances to migrate, leaving their children behind. In chapter eleven, Chioma Joyce Onukogu employs the conceptual lens of resilience theory to unpack the experiences and the challenges facing second-generation Nigerian children confronted with identity issues and the burden of being "migrant children" or "refugee children." In chapter twelve, Betty Chiyangwa and Pragna Rugunanan show how interwoven structural and social factors in the rural area of Bushbuckridge in Mpumalanga (South Africa) shape the lived experiences of Mozambican migrant children.

Part 5 discusses the role of identity politics in migration studies, and it consists of three chapters. Chapter thirteen by Karabo Sitto examines how African migrants in South Africa are reconstructing their identities in transnational spaces. In chapter fourteen, Anthony Kaziboni's discursive analysis of the social problem of xenophobia in South Africa explores the connections between apartheid racism and post-apartheid xenophobia. However, some readers might find his argument that xenophobia is rooted in the country's racist past unconvincing, especially when one considers that most victims of xenophobic violence by Black South Africans are migrants from other African countries. In chapter fifteen, Biniam Misgun explores

how Ethiopian migrants in South Africa construct their social identities and livelihoods in urban spaces where xenophobic violence continues to be challenging. Part 6, on workers' rights and new forms of work, consists of the book's final three chapters, which examine the challenges African foreign migrants experience in their efforts to make a livelihood through formal employment in South African cities. Chapters sixteen and seventeen, by Johannes Machinya and Aisha Lorgat, respectively, provide nuanced analyses that reveal the dynamics of migrant worker exploitation and exclusion from various forms of worker associations, including trade unions. Finally, in chapter eighteen, Nomkhosi Xulu-Gama and Pragna Rugunanan provide a well-crafted conclusion to the migrant question that calls for new ways of theorizing migration in Southern Africa and telling women's and children's migration stories.

Migration in Southern Africa is an informative book that brings a Southern conceptual focus to the scholarship on the sociology and geography of migration and mobility in Southern Africa. The book has gone a long way in providing a unique lens through which the challenges that both internal and international migrants experience are exposed. It is worth reading if one seeks to understand South-South migration beyond the traditional Western gaze.

Prof Daniel Tevera*,* University of the Western Cape, South Africa

Impact of Internal Migration on School Enrollment and Completion Rates in South Africa

Farai Nyika[1] and Debra Shepherd[2]

Abstract

South Africa struggles with low secondary-school completion rates and this has a negative effect on poverty and inequality. In this study, we examine the relationship between internal migration (international migrants were excluded) and non-migrant educational outcomes (secondary-school enrollment and completion rates) in South Africa between 1996 and 2011. We use census data for 1996, 2001, and 2011 (at district and municipal levels) in several linear probability regression models that include the First Difference (FD) and System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM-SYS) with instrumental variables. We find that internal migrants have a positive effect on both the enrollment and completion rates of non-migrants. These results vary in intensity depending on the level of education of both internal migrant and non-migrant household heads. These results have implications for the local labor market and for income inequality in South Africa; internal migrants provide positive peer effects that contribute to raising non-migrant school enrollment and completion. Internal migrants also provide job-market competition, which can influence non-migrants' decisions to complete secondary schooling. While prior research has tended to focus on the relationship between immigration and education outcomes in the developed world, there is scant empirical evidence on the impact of internal migration on education outcomes in African countries. Our paper provides evidence from a country with a history of persistent internal migration. We recommend that improvement of the quality of basic education – in both rural and urban areas – be a high priority of the South African government, as well as increased financial access to tertiary institutions.

Keywords: migration, education, completion rates, enrollment, South Africa

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INTRODUCTION

South African secondary-school completion rates are very low, as evidenced by the fact that half of all pupils born during the period 1992–1994 had not completed Grade 12 by 2018 (BusinessTech, 2020). In comparison, countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) had an 80.3% average rate of upper-secondary-school completion (OECD, 2019), while in Southern Africa, Botswana and Mauritius have completion rates above 90% (Mwale et al., 2022). Additionally, black, and bi-racial South African learners are more likely to drop out of school than are white pupils, indicating the enduring legacy of apartheid in accounting for educational inequality, particularly with regards to access to quality schooling (Moses et al., 2017; de Clercq, 2020; Amin and Mahabeer, 2021). School quality generally remains poor despite relatively high levels of public spending on education since democratization in 1994 (Moses et al., 2017; Mlachila and Moeletsi, 2019). If the household head achieves some higher education in South Africa, the risk of poverty declines substantially compared to households where the head has no schooling (World Bank, 2019). With the nation's racially oppressive history, access to inclusive and affordable education is a key pathway out of poverty for black South Africans (Borgen Project, 2022; Walker et al., 2022).

The low completion rates mentioned above contribute to the wastage of large portions of the education department's budget. For example, the government allocated R249 billion in 2018/19 to the Department of Education budget alone; R20 billion of that budget was spent funding over one million repeating students in primary and secondary schools (van der Berg et al., 2019: 1). This additional expenditure could have been used to target other South African developmental goals (e.g., improving access to basic sanitation, healthcare, and building infrastructure in poorer provinces) (Maphumulo and Bhengu, 2019; Mazele and Amoah, 2022). Despite relatively high levels of public spending on education since democratization in 1994, education quality remains poor (Moses et al., 2017; Mlachila and Moeletsi, 2019).

In South Africa, slow grade-progression and poor completion rates can be attributed to supply-side factors related to the quality of basic education, which include class size, school quality, teacher availability, and infrastructure (UNICEF, 2020). Pupils also drop out because of demand-side factors, such as financial constraints, pregnancy, death of parents or guardians, and conflicting perceptions of the benefits of completing school (Spaull, 2015; Moses et al., 2017).

Migration is another possible explanation for low completion rates as it has consequences for both origin and destination areas (Brunello, 2021; Akyol and Erikci, 2022). Much of the economics literature that links migration to education outcomes has focused on immigration, which has been shown to have ambiguous effects on the educational outcomes of non-migrant residents (see, e.g., Hunt, 2017; Brandén et al., 2018). This ambiguity likely stems from the fact that there are both increasing costs, such as school resource constraints and negative peer effects, and

benefits, such as greater returns to relatively scarce higher levels of schooling, to a changing school-age population.

Research in internal migration and child schooling has been largely restricted to high-income and Global North countries, although increasing evidence on the effects of mobility on educational progression and achievement in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) is emerging. For example, studies on the impact of the *hukou* household registration system in China have consistently indicated significantly worse educational outcomes of rural-urban migrant children compared to their urban counterparts (see, for example, Goodburn, 2020; Kim et al., 2021). This outcome has been attributed to institutional barriers of poor access to quality schooling and the lack of social capital – the latter taking time to build up (Hung, 2022; Xu and Wu, 2022).

In this paper, we study the impact of South African internal migration on non-migrant secondary enrollment rates and school completion of 19-21 year-olds over the period 1996 to 2011, at the local municipality and district levels using census data for the years 1996, 2001, and 2011.[3] We specifically focus on migrants from the Eastern Cape (EC) province given a strong historical connection between the space-economies of the former homelands and South Africa, beginning with the annexation of these territories to the Cape Colony in the late nineteenth century.[4] These policies contributed to turn particular areas of the EC into what would effectively become a labor reserve for various industries. The colonial and apartheid legacy of separate development, labor migration, Bantu education, and social displacement (Hartnack, 2017: 3), combined with lasting spatial and structural inequalities have meant that predominately black individuals who live in former homelands and townships remain the poorest and most marginalized (Moses et al., 2017). In this setting, access to quality education becomes very difficult and community-related factors that impact dropout and non-completion carry weight. However, the lifting of migration control in South Africa beginning in the late 1980s (Collinson and Wittenberg, 2001; Kok and Collinson, 2006) led to increased permanent household migration and urbanization, both internal and external to the Transkei and the EC (Kalule-Sabiti and Kahimbaara, 1995; Reed, 2013). To the best of our knowledge, only two studies to date have analyzed the impact of internal migration on child educational outcomes in South Africa. Firstly, Ginsburg et al. (2011) provide evidence that mobility in South Africa may enable children to access improved educational opportunities, school choice, and living circumstances. Secondly, Zoch (2016) shows that black pupils' outcomes improved substantially after moving from poorer neighborhoods to much wealthier ones. Both studies focus on intra-district migration while our study centers on inter-district migration.

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[3] These are the three censuses that have been completed to date in South Africa. The 2021 Census is underway as of June 2022.

[4] We define a space-economy as comprising adjoining spatial regions that share related flows and markets for labor and land as well as infrastructure platforms.

The empirical analysis closely follows the approaches taken by Berker (2009), Hunt (2017), and Kollamparambil (2017). Specifically, we calculate municipality- and district-level schooling outcomes adjusted for individual characteristics and conduct the main analyses on a panel of local and district municipalities using national census data for 1996, 2001, and 2011. We employ First Difference (FD) and System Generalised Method of Moments (GMMSYS) estimators to deal with issues of dynamic panel bias (Ullah et al., 2018) and endogeneity.

In the empirical analysis, we find a positive relationship between internal migration and non-migrant secondary-school enrollment that varies depending on the education levels of the internal migrant and the non-migrant household heads. A single percentage point increase in the share of internal migrants in the population aged 16–64 from a household whose head has less than 12 years of education, increases the non-migrant probability of enrollment by 0.352 percentage points. Larger effects are seen as follows: a single percentage point increase in the share of internal migrants in the population aged 16–64, from a home with more than 12 years of education, increases the non-migrant probability of secondary school enrollment by 0.909 percentage points.

We closely follow the approaches taken by Berker (2009), Hunt (2017), and Kollamparambil (2017). Specifically, we calculate municipality- and district-level schooling outcomes adjusted for individual characteristics and conduct the main analyses on a panel of local and district municipalities using national census data for 1996, 2001, and 2011. We employ First Difference (FD) and System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM-SYS) estimators to deal with issues of dynamic panel bias (Ullah et al., 2018) and endogeneity.

We also find a positive effect of the share of 19–21-year-old internal migrants on non-migrant secondary-school completion. Specifically, a one percent increase in the lagged share of the population aged 16–54 – that is, internal migrants with less than 12 years of education – increases the probability of non-migrant secondary-school completion by 1.474 percentage points. This relates to the labor market, as young internal migrants compete with non-migrants for jobs and the latter upgrade their education in response by completing Grade 12. Additionally, a higher share of young working-age migrants is likely to change the wage structure and wage inequality, adding to our understanding of income and educational inequality in South Africa.

This study complements the work by Kollamparambil (2017), who used the 2008, 2012, and 2014 waves of the National Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS) data to analyze the effects of internal South African migration on inequality, finding that internal migrants are more likely to be unemployed than non-internal migrants before and after migration. Kollamparambil also reports that migration increases income inequality in urban centers, because internal migrant unemployment adds to existing unemployment. Our decision to use South African census data, was made as

it is more representative of the population at disaggregated district and municipality levels, but also covers a longer period of post-1994 migration than the NIDS data.

In the following section we contextualize South African education in both pre- and post-apartheid. Thereafter, we situate migration in its historical context.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Education is a leading indicator of social mobility and has a positive correlation with increasing income; higher levels of education and income induce migration among the lower-income earners in developing countries (Handler, 2018). Above a certain point, however, rising salaries slow migration down, resulting in an inverted U-shaped association between education and migration (Handler, 2018).

Internal migration of children of school-going age modifies the spatial distribution of the school-age population, and changes the educational opportunities and net benefits for both non-internal-migrant children in destination and origin areas, depending on the relative densities and inflows of internal migrants (Berker, 2009), as well as the internal-migrant children themselves (Swanson and Schneider, 1999; Haveman et al., 2004). For example, a strain on the local school system may be due to an inflow of internal-migrant children and an increase in the average number of learners per input (e.g., strain on teachers), but also to a higher density of less-educated parents among internal migrants (Hunt, 2017). An alternative argument is made by Huang (2022), that internal-migrant children have negligible to no negative peer effects on destination schools because of parental presence. This means that internal-migrant children's behavior would be better compared to children left behind by their parents.

Benefits to non-migrant residents may arise from a shift in relative skills that will allow for higher labor market returns to those with higher levels of education and therefore incentivize investment in education (Betts, 1998). Wages and job availability for non-migrants may decline as a result of migration if the skills of internal migrants and non-migrants are interchangeable; alternatively, migration can increase wages and job opportunities for non-migrants if the skill sets of internal migrants and non-migrants are complementary (Viseth, 2020).

Increased low-skilled migration may increase competition for low-skilled jobs, driving wages down. Thus, non-migrant school completion may increase in response, preventing wages from falling (Hunt, 2017).

Empirical literature

With reference to the United States, McHenry (2015) focused on the eighth grade and found that an increase in low-skilled immigrants leads non-migrant children to increase their secondary school attendance and pass rates, and stay longer in school (obtaining more grades). McHenry identifies the channels of these effects by analyzing non-migrant student responses to questions about their school experiences,

expectations, and attitudes. Hunt (2017) studied the effects of immigration on non-migrant secondary school and her results differed, depending on gender and race. Hunt's study found that immigration increases the likelihood of completing secondary school for both non-migrant black and white Americans while no statistically significant effect was found for Hispanics. Hunt also reports that non-migrant enrollment (particularly for children with low-educated parents) rises in response to immigration (similar to McHenry's findings). According to Hermansen and Birkelund (2015), increased immigrant concentration in Norwegian schools is linked to better prospects of non-migrants completing secondary education; the authors adopted a similar approach to McHenry, as they followed cohorts (from Grade 10), observing their outcomes at age 21. Hermansen and Birkelund, (2015) used data that allowed them to monitor longer-term effects, rather than short-term education outcomes at one point in time. In a cross-country study analyzing the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) results for 41 OECD countries, Silveira et al. (2019) similarly found a positive effect of increased migration on non-migrant children's mathematics scores at age 15.

Other scholars report heterogeneity in school performance of immigrants and non-migrant children that can be attributed to variations in socioeconomic status. For example, Dustmann and Glitz (2011) report that immigrant children to OECD countries generally fare much more poorly academically, than do local children in mathematics and English once they arrive in their destination countries. They also report that Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom are exceptions, as immigrant children perform just as well or better than non-migrant children. This is likely due to these countries' migration policies that are geared toward attracting migrants with better education and language skills. D'Agostino et al. (2021) show that first-year science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) university students who migrated from southern to northern/central universities have lower levels of academic performance than students from the upper parts of Italy and study at institutions in the same region. This is an important contribution, as the authors highlight the challenges posed by migrating over larger distances and the effects on education outcomes.

The literature abounds with studies on negative migration effects. For instance, Brunello and Rocco (2013) conducted a survey of 19 OECD countries and report that increased immigration is associated with the negative impact on non-migrant students' academic performance. Hu (2018) provides evidence for developing countries, by reporting large, negative, spillover effects of Chinese internal-migrant children operating through peers and teacher effects, while Ballatore et al. (2018) report negative effects of immigration on non-migrant children aged 7–10 in Italian schools.

Other studies found minor to null effects of immigration on non-migrant education outcomes (see, e.g., Brandén et al., 2018; Huang, 2022). Huang's (2022) spatial equilibrium model and regression results show that Chinese internal-migrant

children's peer effects contribute to marginally reducing non-migrant school test scores by 0.038 standard deviations – effects that dissipate within one year. China's discriminatory *hukou* system has meant that rural-urban internal migrants face barriers that frustrate access to better paying jobs and promotions, keeping parents in a low-skilled and low-wage cycle (Song and Zhou, 2019; Goodburn, 2020; *China Labour Bulletin*, 2021). Goodburn (2020) in particular, finds that rural-urban migration children have lower education outcomes and end up in lower-quality schools after leaving junior high school, leading to their low-level labor market skills. These disagreements in the literature highlight the need for further scholarship on understanding the channels through which purported effects are said to be occurring. They also highlight the limited evidence on this topic for sub-Saharan Africa, something this paper aims to address.

MIGRATION IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Perennial labor-shortage problems of farmers in both the Cape Colony and Natal were solved by contracting migrant labor from the Transkei and Ciskei. From the 1880s onwards, the colonial government introduced several measures to increase the labor supply to white-owned farms. Bergh (2010) narrates how Cape Colony legislation was used to create "reserves" that provided creating cheap labor for white-owned farms. These included a hut tax on black people in the Cape Colony, as well as a labor tax on those living in the reserves (van der Horst, 1942).

Despite the relative success of these measures, the amount of labor supplied to the agricultural sector remained insufficient. White farmers and Anglo-controlled mining companies advocated for the creation of black reserves through the 1913 Natives Land Act and early pass laws (Schierup, 2016: 1053). The result was the establishment of "influx control," which not only increased labor supply, but also reduced the cost of unskilled laborers, who otherwise would have sought higher-wage employment in urban areas (Mncube and Harber, 2013). It was, however, under the apartheid regime that labor regulation took prominence as an "extreme extra-economic coercion of the majority of the workforce" (Legassick, 1974: 255).

Building upon existing legislation such as the Development Trust and Land Act of 1936, the migrant labor system and spatial allocation of labor became permanently institutionalized following the 1945 Black Urban Areas Consolidation Act, the 1967 Physical Planning Act, and the 1968 Promotion of the Economic Development of the Homelands Act. Former non-migrants were resultantly reclassified as foreigners which, along with the establishment of centralized labor bureaus set up to monitor the movement of this newly "alienized" foreign non-migrant labor force, set in motion a "permanent condition of rural-urban migrancy" (Schierup, 2016: 1053).

Without much productive rural land to farm there was little choice for workers but to seek work as temporary/contract migrant laborers in urban areas. Muller (1983, citing Nattrass (1976) and BENSO (1982)), notes that the number of migrants from rural homeland areas increased threefold between 1938 and 1980. As argued

by Nattrass (1983: 17) such a migrant labor system becomes self-perpetuating, since economic participation outside the homelands, particularly by the youth (young people tend to be innovators of change) undermines economic development inside the homeland. As a result, oscillating migration tripled in scope from around 500,000 in 1936 to just over 1.3 million workers by 1980 (Nattrass, 1976; BENSO, 1982).

In a study of lifetime migration in the former Transkei, Kalule-Sabiti and Kahimbaara (1993) found that prior to 1970, the Transkei experienced net-out-migration to the mines. However, migration dynamics were reversed in the 1970s following internal self-rule and political independence. Between 1980 and 1990 in-migration occurred at a faster pace. Two-thirds of all migrants were aged 15–44, whereas 68 percent of non-migrants were younger than 15. Most internal Transkei migration was from rural to urban centers, with the largest share of these migration inflows coming from South Africa and comprised people aged 55 years and older (Kalule-Sabiti and Kahimbaara, 1993).

Posel and Casale (2006) show that circular labor migration and the reliance of households on remittances from migrant workers remained significant during the first decade of democracy. At the onset of democracy, the Eastern Cape (EC) and its former homelands continued to be one of the largest senders of migrants to other provinces. Between 1992 and 1996, close to 250,000 people left the EC, 80 percent of whom moved to KwaZulu-Natal, Western Cape (WC), and Gauteng. Using the 1996 census, Kok (1999: 42) shows the clear "dominance of the former homeland areas as a reservoir of migrant workers." Kok (1999) found that in several districts of the Transkei, the size of the ex-migrant population is almost equivalent to that of the population who did not migrate. As argued by Posel and Zeller (2010), the continued prevalence of temporary migrant labor post-apartheid might be indicative of deeply entrenched migration patterns that could over time be supplanted by the permanent settlement of individuals and households. Studies by Bekker (2002) and van der Berg et al. (2019) found lower return migration from the WC to the EC. Similar trends are identified using the 2008 NIDS data, which indicates significantly lower estimates of labor migration and remittances compared with the Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the period 2002–2005.

DATA DESCRIPTION

Observations in this study are based on three post-apartheid South African Population Censuses for 1996, 2001, and 2011, which capture information on the change of residence between census years; this is important for distinguishing migrant from non-migrant individuals and households. The combination of these data sets allowed us to capture all the information needed in the study. The nine South African provinces are divided into a panel of metropolitan and district municipalities, which are then subdivided into local municipalities. The non-migrant and migrant status of individuals older than five years is determined using information about mobility across municipalities within five years prior to the census. Non-migrant residents are

defined as individuals reporting to reside in the same municipality five years prior to, and at the time of the census. Recent migrants from this point on are referred to simply as migrants and are defined as individuals residing in different municipalities five years prior to, and at the time of the census. For example, a migrant in the 2001 census would be defined as an individual whose district or municipality changed sometime between 1996 and 2001. The study also distinguishes between those migrants who moved at least three years prior to the census, that is, between 1996–1998 or 2006–2008, in the case of the 2001 and 2011 censuses respectively.

In South Africa, education is compulsory up to and including Grade 9. The primary-school-age population usually consists of children aged 6–13 years, while the secondary-school-age population usually consists of children aged 14-18 years. We focus on two educational outcomes at the municipal and district levels (secondary-school enrollment and completion) and closely follow the approach taken by Berker (2009) and Hunt (2017).

None of the data sets under consideration provides information on where individuals lived when they received education. To increase the chances of matching information on the place of residence and education of children, secondary-school completion rates are computed for 19–21-year-olds – who would have been 14–16 years old five years prior to the census data being collected.

Methods

Following the empirical approaches of Berker (2009) and Hunt (2017), we estimate, as an initial first step, regression models at the individual level to calculate district and municipality education outcomes adjusted for the characteristics of non-migrants and migrants. These baseline models are common in the literature (see, e.g., Wang, 2019; D'Agostino et al., 2021). Specifically, the study estimates the following linear probability regressions:

$$P(E_{ijt} \geq 12) = \phi_0 + \phi_1 F_{ijt} + \phi_2 R_{ijt} + \phi_3 \sum_{a=19}^{21} A_{ijt}^a + \sum_j \sum_t \lambda_{jt}(\delta_j \times \nu_t) + \eta_{ijt}$$

(4.1)

$$P(Enroll_{ijt}) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 F_{ijt} + \gamma_2 R_{ijt} + \gamma_3 \sum_{a=15}^{17} A_{ijt}^a + \gamma_4 X_{ijt} + \sum_j \sum_t \pi_{jt}(\delta_j \times \nu_t) + \xi_{ijt}$$

(4.2)

where E_{ijt} and $Enroll_{ijt}$ are the educational attainment and enrollment status of individual i in municipality/district j at time t, respectively, F is a gender dummy, R are race dummies, A^a are age dummy variables, δ_j are municipality/district dummies and ν_t are time dummies. The vector X contains household-level covariates, including

the educational attainment of the household head, the household composition (number of children, working-age adults, and retired persons) and per capita income. Regressions (4.1-2) are weighted using census person weights.

In a second step, the study uses the coefficients $\hat{\lambda}_{jt}$ and $\hat{\pi}_{jt}$ as the dependent variable in a municipality/district panel analysis:

$$\hat{\lambda}_{jt} = \kappa_0 + \kappa_1 I_{jt}^{19-21} + \kappa_2 I_{jt}^E + \kappa_3 X_{jt} + \delta_j + \nu_t + \varepsilon_{jt} \qquad (4.3)$$

$$\hat{\pi}_{jt} = \mu_0 + \mu_1 I_{jt}^{15-17} + \mu_2 I_{jt}^E + \mu_3 X_{jt} + \delta_j + \nu_t + \varepsilon_{jt} \qquad (4.4)$$

$I^{a_1 - a_2}$ and I^E represent the primary variables of interest, with the former representing the share of the population aged a_1-a_2 in municipality/district j that are migrants, and the latter the share of the working-age population who were migrants with educational attainment E ($E<12, E=12$ and $E>12$). To capture non-migrants' exposure to migrant classmates (peer effects), equation (4.3) makes use of migrants who changed their municipality/district at least three years prior to the time of the census, while (4.4) makes use of migrants who changed their municipality/district at any time during the five years prior to the time of the census.

Although a positive correlation between $I^{a_1 - a_2}$ and I^E is expected (most migrant children move with their parents), it should be possible to identify their effects separately, as not all working-age migrants have children. X_{jt} is a vector of municipality/district-level characteristics that might be related to educational outcomes, including the unemployment rate, average per capita income, proportion of the population living in overcrowded households, proportion of the population that is male and the proportion of the population living in rural areas. All these controls are entered in log form to allow for non-linearity. Regressions (4.3-4) are estimated using weights, w_{jt}, computed as the inverse of the squared standard errors on $\hat{\lambda}_{jt}$ and $\hat{\pi}_{jt}$ from equations (4.1-2).

The regressions above are likely to suffer from endogeneity problems. For example, there are likely to be municipality/district factors that influence both migrant choice and educational outcomes, as well as a bidirectional relationship migration inflows and educational attainment. We follow empirical techniques in the migration literature (see, e.g., Jacobs et al., 2022; Mara and Landesmann, 2022) that include a lagged dependent variable as a control to address issues of persistence and autocorrelation, yielding dynamic models:

$$\hat{\lambda}_{jt} = \kappa_0 + \kappa_1 I_{jt}^{19-21} + \kappa_2 I_{jt}^E + \kappa_3 X_{jt} + \kappa_4 \hat{\lambda}_{jt-1} + \delta_j + \nu_t + \varepsilon_{jt} \qquad (4.5)$$

$$\hat{\pi}_{jt} = \mu_0 + \mu_1 I_{jt}^{15-17} + \mu_2 I_{jt}^E + \mu_3 X_{jt} + \mu_4 \hat{\pi}_{jt-1} + \delta_j + \nu_t + \varepsilon_{jt} \qquad (4.6)$$

An immediate problem with applying ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation to equations (4.5-6) is dynamic panel bias (Hausman and Pinkovskiy, 2017); that is, the lagged dependent variable is correlated with time-invariant municipality/district factors. This can be corrected by purging the fixed effects using a first difference (FD) estimator:

$$\Delta\hat{\lambda}_{jt} = \kappa_0 + \kappa_1\Delta I_{jt}^{19-21} + \kappa_2\Delta I_{jt}^E + \kappa_3\Delta X_{jt} + \kappa_4\Delta\hat{\lambda}_{jt-1} + \nu_t + \Delta\varepsilon_{jt} \qquad (4.7)$$

$$\Delta\hat{\pi}_{jt} = \mu_0 + \mu_1\Delta I_{jt}^{15-17} + \mu_2\Delta I_{jt}^E + \mu_3\Delta X_{jt} + \mu_4\Delta\hat{\pi}_{jt-1} + \nu_t + \Delta\varepsilon_{jt} \qquad (4.8)$$

The FD specifications use $1/\left(\dfrac{1}{w_{jt}} + \dfrac{1}{w_{jt-1}}\right)$ as weights.

However, even though fixed effects have been eliminated, the lagged dependent variable continues to be potentially endogenous through its correlation with $\Delta\varepsilon_{jt}$. Further endogeneity bias may also arise due to simultaneity between educational outcomes and migrant inflows, as well as the predetermined nature of several variables included in X (that is, correlated with past and potentially current realizations of ε_{jt}). These issues could be addressed using an Anderson and Hsiao (1982) levels estimator, which takes First Differences (FD) and then instruments potentially endogenous variables using lags of their own levels. However, lagged levels are often shown to be poor instruments if variables are close to a random walk (Roodman, 2020). To improve efficiency, the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998, 2000) System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM-SYS) estimator introduces more instruments through combining a system in the difference estimator (equations 4.10-12) with levels as instruments, with the estimator in levels (equations 4.7-9) with First Differences as instruments.

Empirical results and discussion

In Table 1, we show the effects of migrant age and education on non-migrant probability of secondary-school enrollment, by education of the household head. We report the results in four separate panels (a) to (d). In the first rows of panels (a) to (d), when considering the migrant share of the population is aged 15–17, we found an initial positive effect on non-migrant enrollment in OLS specification, regardless of parental education on non-migrants. This effect dissipates by the time the GMM-SYS is adopted. This suggests that there are no significant positive or negative peer effects of migrants on enrollment.

We analyze this further by studying how migrants from households with varying parental education levels interact with non-migrants from households with varying parental education. In panel (a), where the enrollment rates of all non-migrants aged 15–17 are considered, a higher share of migrants from a home

where the head has less than 12 years of school, is related to significantly higher educational enrollment in the GMM specifications (coefficient = 0.391 at 10 percent significance). Migrants from homes with higher-educated parents have a larger positive effect on non-migrant enrollment (coefficient = 0.879).

These findings are nearly identical to what we find in panel (b) when considering the enrollment rates of non-migrants aged 15–17 residing with a household head who has less than 12 years of education, are the dependent variable. Migrants with less than 12 years of education have a positive effect on non-migrants' secondary-school enrollment (coefficient = 0.352), while migrants with more than 12 years of education have a much stronger positive effect on non-migrants' enrollment (coefficient = 0.909). The latter finding is similar to that reported by Hunt (2017) and shows that there is a positive effect on non-migrants from low-education households, from migrants coming from high-education homes. In panels (c) and (d) that consider the enrollment of non-migrants aged 15–17 residing with household heads with at least 12 years of education or higher, the migration effects are mostly insignificant. What may be happening here is that non-migrant parents from households with a low education could be encouraging their children to enroll, as they feel that migrants are their competition for future opportunities. Our result is also related to Jackson's (2015) study, that reports that increased migration of unskilled labor drives wages and prompts an increase in enrollment, as students register in anticipation of greater earning potential.

Table 1: Effect of migrants by age and education on non-migrant probability of secondary-school enrollment (15–17 years) by household-head education

	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	Dynamic OLS (3)	First difference (4)	GMM-SYS (5)
(a) All non-migrants aged 15-17 dependent variable					
Share population aged 15 to 17 that is migrant	0.413*** (0.069)	-0.190 (0.348)	-0.193 (0.280)	-0.123 (0.445)	0.512 (0.311)
Lagged share population aged 16 to 54 that is migrant with…					
… <12 years of education	0.438*** (0.143) -0.108	0.385*** (0.127)	0.240** (0.100)	0.228 (0.176)	0.391* (0.201)
…12 years of education	(0.102) 1.960***	-0.678 (0.490)	-0.685* (0.354)	-0.130 (0.646)	-1.324 (0.837)
…>12 years of education	1.960*** (0.561)	-0.020 (0.305)	0.271 (0.208)	0.413 (0.287)	0.879*** (0.243)
(b) Non-migrants aged 15-17 residing with household head who has <12 years of education					
Share population aged 15 to 17 that is migrant	-0.449** (0.213)	-0.385 (0.389)	-0.311 (0.333)	-0.191 (0.471)	0.455 (0.309)
Lagged share population aged 16 to 54 that is migrant with…					
… <12 years of education	0.284*** (0.106)	0.393*** (0.138)	0.274** (0.110)	0.225 (0.195)	0.352* (0.190)
…12 years of education	-0.226 (0.416)	-0.847 (0.539)	-0.867** (0.417)	-0.218 (0.717)	-1.045 (0.929)
…>12 years of education	-0.050 (0.379)	-0.024 (0.341)	0.255 (0.247)	0.446 (0.310)	0.909*** (0.293)
(c) Non-migrants aged 15-17 residing with household head with 12 years of education					
Share population aged 15 to 17 that is migrant	0.653** (0.274)	1.042*** (0.345)	0.919*** (0.337)	0.786 (0.644)	-0.356 (0.590)
Lagged share population aged 16 to 54 that is migrant with…					
… <12 years of education	0.082 (0.141)	0.225 (0.156)	0.180 (0.161)	0.373 (0.278)	0.281 (0.273)
…12 years of education	0.363 (0.515)	0.010 (0.592)	-0.080 (0.596)	0.165 (0.185)	-1.398 (1.129)
…>12 years of education	-0.340(0.385)	-0.712*** (0.256)	-0.769*** (0.254)	-0.880** (0.359)	-0.465 (0.623)
(d) Non-migrants aged 15-17 residing with household head who has >12 years of education					
Share population aged 15 to 17 that is migrant	0.414** (0.181)	0.604** (0.254)	0.606** (0.260)	0.410 (0.436)	-0.374 (0.967)
Lagged share population aged 16 to 54 that is migrant with…					
… <12 years of education	0.289** (0.129)	0.312** (0.139)	0.335** (0.152)	0.250 (0.369)	-0.349 (0.309)
…12 years of education	-1.317*** (0.475)	-1.171** (0.493)	-1.206** (0.523)	0.112 (0.152)	1.745* (1.032)
…>12 years of education	0.655 (0.436)	0.250 (0.371)	0.234 (0.381)	0.475 (0.493)	0.458 (0.697)
Unemployment rates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Share of non-migrant population aged 15–17	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Area dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Economic/sociodemographic indicators	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged dependent variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is the share of non-migrants aged 15 to 17 who are enrolled in secondary schooling, adjusted at the individual level for age, gender, race and household characteristics. Estimation is by weighted least squares with weights w the inverse of the squared standard errors on the district/municipality-year interaction coefficients in the individual regression for columns 1-3 and 5, and 1/(1/wt +1/wt-1) for column 4. All specifications include census-year dummies. Robust standard errors are indicated in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Source: Authors' own work

In Table 2 below, we split the migrant share of the population ages into four categories. The top row shows that there is no OLS effect (equation 4.3) of 19–21-year-old migrants (recent migrants who likely moved for work) on non-migrant secondary-school completion. However, the GMM-IV estimates show that migration benefits secondary-school completion of non-migrant children as wealthier, more capable students are more likely to migrate. These migrant students could also have received better-quality education prior to migrating, and be harder working than non-migrant students, resulting in positive peer effects that improve secondary-school completion rates (resonating with the findings of McHenry, 2015; Hunt, 2017; and Brunello et al., 2020). Brunello et al. (2020) further interrogate the professions that these students pursue after school completion. They show how immigration increases the shares of non-migrant Italian students who continue to college and those who complete high school and do not study further. What is significant about our positive result is that it provides nuance to discussions about low South African school completion rates mentioned in the introduction.

The mixed results of migration on school completion reveal something that is missing in this literature – that is, controlling for attitudes and perceptions of the populations being studied toward migrants and immigrants. In the outline of the theoretical framework we mentioned how migrants may be viewed as complementary or competition, but models are not capturing this phenomenon.

The second row of Table 2 shows that the overall effect of migrants aged 6–17 (with a high probability of having studied with non-migrants) on non-migrants completing 12 years of schooling is negative and statistically significant in the GMM regression. That is, the greater the lagged share of young migrants present in school, the less likely non-migrants are to have completed secondary school (in consonance with Ballatore et al., 2018). This could be due to an increased strain on school resources, holding all else constant. What could also be happening here is that many migrant pupils are increasingly registering in areas with poorer quality schools – migrants tend to move to areas where other migrants already reside – crowding out resources. Teachers can also spend more time working with weaker migrant pupils, affording less time to non-migrant students. This has implications for educational inequality and, subsequently, labor-income differences that account for the dominant portion of income inequality in South Africa (Hundenborn et al., 2018; Branson et al., 2012).

Table 2: Effect of migrants by age and education on non-migrant probability of secondary-school completion 19–21-year-olds

	OLS		Dynamic OLS	First difference		GMM-SYS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Share of population aged 19 to 21, that is migrant	-0.013	-0.138	0.139	0.310	2.587***	1.906**	1.563**
	(0.522)	(0.468)	(0.337)	(0.536)	(0.736)	(0.838)	(0.724)
Lagged share of population aged 6 to 17, that is migrant							
Lagged share population aged 16 to 54 that is migrant with…							-1.464***
							(0.565)
… <12 years of education	-0.646***	-0.249**	-0.097	-0.304**	-0.165	-0.162	1.474**
	(0.131)	(0.107)	(0.099)	(0.133)	(0.169)	(0.204)	(0.679)
…12 years of education	1.794***	-0.213	-0.755*	-0.373	0.091	-0.009	0.767
	(0.516)	(0.457)	(0.386)	(0.537)	(0.645)	(0.761)	(0.889)
…>12 years of education	-0.847	-0.513*	-0.403	-0.330	0.375	0.167	-0.353
	(0.526)	(0.284)	(0.263)	(0.274)	(0.347)	(0.466)	(0.464)
Unemployment rates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Share of non-migrant population aged 19–21	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Area dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Economic/ sociodemographic indicators	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged dependent variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.870	0.921	0.947	0.608			
Observations	112	112	112	56	112	112	112
# of instruments					20	22	23
p-value Hansen test					0.233	0.102	0.341
p-value Diff Hansen					0.161	0.149	0.242

Notes: The dependent variable is the share of non-migrants aged 19 to 21 who have completed secondary schooling (12 years of education), adjusted at the individual level for age, gender, and race. Estimation is by weighted least squares with weights w the inverse of the squared standard errors on the district/municipality–year interaction coefficients in the individual regression for Columns 1-3 and 5, and 1/(1/wt +1/wt-1) for Column 4. All specifications include census-year dummies. The instruments in Column 5 include: the levels and first differences of: lagged dependent variable, the share population ages 19 to 21 that is migrant, and share of population ages 16 to 54 with varying levels of educational attainment; levels of: unemployment rate ages 15–24; unemployment rate ages 25–54; share of non-migrant population of age cohort; log per capita income; log overcrowding; log male; log rural; and year dummies. Columns 6 and 7 additionally allow for the unemployment rate, ages 15–24 to be potentially endogenous. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

Source: Authors' own work

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study investigated the relationship between internal migration and secondary-school completion rates in several South African provinces. Following accepted practice, we used the instrumental variables approach to address endogeneity concerns of local internal migration and to control for possible environmental influences related to family socioeconomic backgrounds. This study found that internal South African migration has different effects on non-migrant education outcomes, although the overall effects are indistinct, as indicated in the relevant literature (see, e.g., Schneeweis, 2015; Hunt, 2017; Ballatore et al., 2018).

The empirical results suggest that the impact of migration on non-migration school enrollment is sensitive to education levels of the household heads (migrant and non-migrant). If migrants come from households where the head was educated at least up to the end of secondary school, then these migrants have a positive impact on school enrollment of non-migrants aged 15–17 who reside in households where the head is also educated up to at least Grade 12. This positive migration effect is more pronounced if the migrants come from homes where the head has tertiary-level education. These results have implications for South African higher education policy. Over the past decade, South African higher education has experienced a surge in numbers of students registering to study at the various types of institutions. This has in part been driven by the #FeesMustFall movement and the increased funding of previously disadvantaged groups by the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS). The South African government is encouraged to increase funding support for parents who cannot afford to and who wish to study further than their secondary education, as this will benefit their children. The funding focus for tertiary education is currently on young students.

While increasing secondary-school enrollment is desirable, it means little if students do not complete their studies. This point highlights the importance of the result that internal migration of those aged 6–64 also has an overall large positive effect on secondary-school completion of non-migrants aged 19–21 years. Further investigation of this positive impact of migrants on secondary-school completion (see Table 1), reveals that working-age migrants aged 19–21 positively affect secondary-school completion of non-migrants aged 19–21 years. These migrant students may have higher work ethics and capabilities than non-migrant students; this provides evidence for the labor market channel. Non-migrants upgrade their schooling in response to an increase in similar-aged migrants who are likely to be job seekers, especially when these migrants have a lower level of education (Hunt, 2017). Increased school completion raises students' human capital and labor market potential but will not benefit the economy if there are not enough jobs generated in migrants' origin and destination areas. National and local government authorities are encouraged to develop rural communities and cities to create employment to absorb youth into the economy after they complete their studies. There is a risk of

South Africa emulating its neighbor, Zimbabwe, where thousands complete school and become economic migrants in other countries.

We also reported a negative relationship between the lagged share of young migrants aged 6–17 on the secondary-school completion of those aged 19–21 years. This could be evidence of pressure on school resources (e.g., strain on teachers) due to greater classroom sizes, since migrants of that age group would have been at school with non-migrants for much of their schooling lives. These negative results are important for budgeting and planning in South African education, which is characterized by regional divergences in wealth and inequality (Spaull, 2015; Moses et al., 2017; Weybright et al., 2017). South African public schools are generally oversubscribed, with classrooms that have many more students than policy permits or are feasible for the teacher to manage before factoring in the effects of migration. While the government has been sued by non-profit organizations to increase the number of schools, teachers, and available resources, the situation does not seem to be improving (du Plessis and Mestry, 2019; van Niekerk, 2020). The government is also encouraged to improve the quality of teaching colleges and the programs offered to produce more competent teaching staff.

This work can be extended in the future by researchers in two ways. Firstly, researchers can investigate the effects of South African internal migration on those left behind in communities and focus on other outcomes besides education. Secondly, our results do not demarcate the specific regions where the various migration effects are occurring. Neither do they study differences between private and public schools, nor by race, mother tongue language, nor gender. Scholarship that analyzes migration effects on a micro level can support policymakers in making more targeted interventions.

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Migrant Networks, Food Remittances, and Zimbabweans in Cape Town: A Social Media Perspective

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Abstract

This study examines the evolving connection between migrant networking on social media and cross-border food remittances in Southern Africa. Emerging research and academic debates have shown that social media platforms transform migration networks. But the role and link between migrant remittances and social media are generally overlooked and neglected. This paper contributes to the ongoing debates by examining the role of social media as a valuable networking tool for food-remitting Zimbabwean migrants. The research is founded on a mixed-methods approach, thus utilizing both questionnaire surveys and in-depth interviews of Zimbabwean migrants in Cape Town, South Africa. The research findings uncover the role of social media in facilitating a regular flow of food remittances back to urban and rural areas of Zimbabwe. A related result is how social media enabled information pathways associated with cross-border food remitting when the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown restrictions limited face-to-face contact. This research can provide valuable insights for academics, researchers, and development practitioners interested in the evolving migration, remittances, and food security nexus in the global South.

Keywords: Food remittances, food security, social media, migrant networks, Zimbabwean migrants

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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Social media transforms migration networks (Dekker and Engbersen, 2014), mainly because of the multifaceted ways social media sites such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, and Instagram facilitate inexpensive, accessible, and speedy information pathways for migrants and their networks. Research by McGregor and Siegel (2013) highlights that the utilization of social media initiates and promotes migration, diaspora engagement, integration, and undertaking of migration research. The emergence of social media can offer more prospects for diaspora relations, engagement, discussion, and identity creation (Crush et al., 2011). Dekker and Engbersen (2014) underscore that social media enriches the social networking between migrants and their social ties, such as friends, family, and individuals that can assist in the migration and integration processes. Studies by Pourmehdi and Shahrani (2021), Vilhelmson and Thulin (2013), and Thulin and Vilhelmson (2016) reveal that social media reinforces social networks, which are crucial in impacting migration decisions. Komito (2011) argues that social media also enables social capital among migrants and their networks. Tevera (2014) argues that in Southern Africa, the internet has been pivotal in facilitating transnational urbanism through which the continuity of interrelationships between the country of origin and destination country is maintained. The advancement of social media enables the networking of migrants and their families, relatives, and associates in their home- and host countries.

Social media platforms also minimize the geographical, location, and distance constraints in the communication between migrants and their networks through online interactions. The emerging studies on migration and social media have enriched the comprehension of the role of social media in facilitating migrant networking. However, most of the research and literature that have examined the connection between migration and social media are situated in the global North countries (see Komito, 2011; Charmarkeh, 2013; Dekker et al., 2016; Borkert et al., 2018; Dekker et al., 2018). There is considerably limited evidence on the utilization of social media and information communication technology (ICT) in African migration routes (Stremlau and Tsalapatanis, 2022). According to Akanle et al. (2021), there is a scarcity of research that pays attention to the influential part of ICT and social media in the connections between remittances and international migration in Sub-Saharan Africa. Noteworthy is the emerging attention on the relationship between migration, integration, and social media as a pivotal pathway for communication and information exchange in migration decisions (see Dekker and Engbersen, 2014; Borkert et al., 2018; Akakpo and Bokpin, 2021). But the relationship between social media and migration outcomes – such as remittances – is understudied. To this end, there is a need for research attention on the link between remittances and social media. The latter has the potential to facilitate information flows in migrant networks that can enable the channeling of remittances, such as food transfers.

Previous studies by Crush and Caesar (2018, 2020) have depicted the importance of food remittances, which are commonly overlooked compared to cash transfers. Crush and Caesar (2016) note that the transmission of in-kind remittances, particularly food remittances, has attracted limited attention, mainly because the transfers happen through informal channels. In Africa, there is substantial evidence of vast cross-border and informal transportation of food (Crush and Caesar, 2016) and, more recently, the emergence of digital and mobile technology-based channels to remit food (Sithole et al., 2022). In-kind transfers, such as food remittances are equally important because they reduce food insecurity and enhance access to healthy and adequate food consumption for poor communities. Regarding international transfers to Zimbabwe and the persistent social, economic, and political crisis in the country, studies have illustrated how remittances have been a vital support unit for the livelihoods and consumption of many households (Tevera and Chikanda, 2009; Crush and Tevera, 2010; Sithole and Dinbabo, 2016; Crush and Tawodzera, 2017). This study aims to contribute to the research and dialogues on South-South international migration, remittances, and food security. The article examines the emergence and importance of social media and migrant networks in transmitting food remittance by Zimbabwean migrants in Cape Town, South Africa. The primary facets of the study include the role of social media in the drivers of food transfers, channels of food remittances, characteristics of food remittances, and food remitting challenges.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Narratives on the connection between social media and migration facets have underscored the significance of social networks in human mobility (McGregor and Siegel, 2013; Dekker and Engbersen, 2014). Studies have emphasized how online activity and social media utilization influence migration decisions (McGregor and Siegel, 2013; Vilhelmson and Thulin, 2013; Thulin and Vilhelmson, 2014, 2016; Dekker et al., 2018; Merisalo and Jauhiainen, 2021). Social media enables social networking, group relations, and virtual communities for migrants (Bates and Komito, 2012). Dekker et al. (2018) assert that social media used on smartphones is a vital source of information in migration choices or determinations. Social media causes life to be easier for migrants through the benefits of social networking (Merisalo and Jauhiainen, 2021). Thus, social media platforms are valuable in creating or improving migrant networks, communication, and supplying helpful information. Similarly, Akanle et al. (2021) argue that social media utilization assists international migrants in host locations and their relatives at home to uphold their kinship ties. Social media empowers users to interact and preserve strong links via inexpensive calls/texts and interconnections on numerous sites.

Therefore, ICT facilitates international migration, affords access to sought-after information that stimulates interests, and access to resources, and sustains or reinforces valued kinship networks (Akanle et al., 2021). Correspondingly, social media or social networking tools are crucial in distributing pictures, text, videos,

and voice-supported media – rich for robust social groups of friends and other associations to arise among migrants (Komito, 2011). Komito's (2011) research on migrants in Ireland highlights that social media enables virtual communities, strong relations, and bonding capital. Charmarkeh (2013) indicates that migrants, such as refugees in France, utilize social media, which is vital for navigating migratory routes and settling in locations that accept migrants. A study by Dekker et al. (2016) of migrants in Western European countries shows that online and social media are vital for interaction in migration networks. Alencar (2018) shows that refugees in the Netherlands utilize social media to integrate into the host country and communicate with friends and family in their countries of origin to acquire emotional and social support. Borkert et al. (2018), in their study of migrants in Germany, illuminate that smartphones, online interactive tools, and social media facilitate communication between migrants and their families and associates.

Social media is also significant for forming and sustaining social networks between migrating people and those who migrated before (Borkert et al., 2018). Ulla (2021) illustrates how Filipino transnational migrants in Thailand use social media sites to be updated on occurrences, news, and political events in their country of origin and reconnect with associates, relatives, and families. Ennaji and Bignami (2019) underscore the importance of social media and smartphones in expanding migration movements in Morocco. Mobile technologies and smartphones enable the utilization of social media apps such as WhatsApp and Facebook and global positioning apps and maps, which facilitate access to valuable online information when migrating. The above literature expands the understanding of the link between migration and social media. Nevertheless, most studies have mainly centered on migration and social media; limited attention has been given to migration outcomes such as remittances. For example, the connection between remittances and social media has been scarcely investigated. Studies by Crush and Caesar (2016, 2018, 2020) and Sithole et al. (2022) on food remittances note the role of reciprocity and social networks in transmitting goods. Social networks, ties, and trust between migrants and their networks, such as families and associates, offer helpful information essential for the transfer of remittances. Therefore, social media can enable interactions and information exchange in migrant networks to facilitate the transfer of goods, such as food remittances.

SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY

This paper used the social capital theory as the theoretical basis to examine the utilization of social media in food remittances because it affords insights into how social networking is vital in the food remitting process. Putnam (1993) refers to social capital as the "features of social organisation, such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit." Accordingly, social capital can help people use social ties to access resources (Agbaam and Dinbabo, 2014; Dinbabo et al., 2021). There are three forms of social capital:

bonding, bridging, and linking. First, Woolcock (2001) posits that bonding social capital occurs in homogeneous social ties with strong links like family, neighbors, or close friends. Second, bridging social capital involves weak connections or heterogeneous social links (Mahmood et al., 2018). Third, linking social capital comprises the relations between the public and those in power or authority (Kyne and Aldrich, 2020). Importantly, social capital, especially bonding and bridging, can be utilized to illuminate the significance of social media use in the setting of food remittances. For example, bonding and bridging social capital between migrants and their close and distant ties, such as household and family members, associates, and other compatriots, help to reveal insights into the role of migrant networks on social media in cross-border food remitting.

METHODOLOGY

This study is based on research undertaken in Cape Town, South Africa, on Zimbabwean migrants. South Africa is one of the leading destinations for these migrants (Crush et al., 2015). Also, Cape Town is a popular destination for international migrants (Rule, 2018). South Africa and cities such as Cape Town attract international migrants because of employment and economic prospects. The researcher conducted the primary data gathering in 2020 in the northern and southern suburbs of Cape Town in Bellville, Wynberg, Claremont, Kenilworth, and Rondebosch. The specific study areas are popular spaces among international (African) migrants because of the residential, entrepreneurial, and educational prospects and being social and economically vibrant spaces. To ensure diverse representation in the research, the researcher included respondents from various categories: backgrounds, locations, professions, education, gender, and age.

The study used a questionnaire instrument on 100 participants and in-depth interviews with ten respondents in a mixed-methods approach, collecting and analyzing quantitative and qualitative data. The researcher used STATA 13.0 statistical software for quantitative data analysis, and adopted a thematic approach for qualitative data analysis. The combination of questionnaire and in-depth interviews was valuable in providing comprehensive data on the connection between food remittances, migrant networks, and social media. The sampling techniques employed in the research were purposive and snowballing for the in-depth interviews and questionnaire surveys – interviewed Zimbabwean migrants provided referrals that helped reach more participants. This was decisive in accessing participants, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic environment. The limitation of the study was that the COVID-19 pandemic, lockdowns, and mobility restrictions made it challenging to locate participants. However, social networks and referrals were crucial in reaching the participants. The researcher observed all ethical practices in the study, including obtaining consent, being granted permission, obtaining ethical clearance, and maintaining confidentiality and anonymity.

FINDINGS

Demographic and background data

The respondents in the study were from diverse profiles and backgrounds. The age groups comprised economically active persons between 23 and 60 years old (see Table 1), with 50 males and 50 females (not predetermined). Most respondents (75%) were household breadwinners, with 15% of husbands and 10% of wives as breadwinners. The majority of the participants had one or more dependents, and most of the respondents were married (45%) or single (42%) (see Table 1). The respondents were from varying income groups and diverse economic circumstances.

Table 1: Background and demographic information

Variable	Category	Frequency	Percentage
Age	23 – 26	3	3%
	27 – 30	17	17%
	31 – 34	26	26%
	35 – 38	26	26%
	39 – 45	17	17%
	46 – 50	9	9%
	51+	2	2%
Marital status	Married	45	45%
	Single	42	42%
	Divorced	5	5%
	Widowed	8	8%
Dependents	None	13	13%
	One	19	19%
	Two	22	22%
	Three	31	31%
	Four	11	11%
	Five+	4	4%
N = 100			

Source: Author's field survey, 2020

Table 2 portrays that the participants' occupations ranged from lecturers, teachers, health professionals, and office workers to blue-collar workers such as informal traders and domestic workers. Most respondents (77%) completed university education, 17% attained secondary education, and 6% completed primary education. The researcher obtained the qualitative results from the narratives of individuals aged between 27 and 59 – six males and four females. The participants' occupations

were lecturers, office workers, postgraduate students, teachers, waiters (servers), gardeners, and bartenders.

Table 2: Background and demographic information

Variable	Category	Frequency	Percentage
Occupation	Office worker	18	18%
	Student	22	22%
	Waiter	16	16%
	Bartender	12	12%
	Domestic worker	8	8%
	Health professional	6	6%
	Teacher	6	6%
	Businessman/woman	4	4%
	Lecturer	2	2%
	Informal trader	6	6%
N = 100			

Source: Author's field survey, 2020

Drivers of food transfers and social media

Table 3 depicts the most important motivations to remit food: 43% of the respondents transferred food because of requests from households or family members back in their home country; 33% because the food items were essential groceries that the recipients might need; and 24% because of food shortages or food insecurity back in the country of origin.

Table 3: Most important motivations to remit food

Variable	Category	Frequency	Percentage
Motivation to remit food	Requests from family or household members who receive the food	43	43%
	Basic goods that the receivers might need (short supply or too expensive)	33	33%
	Food shortages or insecurity in Zimbabwe	24	24%

Source: Author's field survey, 2020

The participants' narratives explained that the drivers of transmitting food items were socioeconomic constraints in the country of origin, requests from relatives and family members, and high food prices in Zimbabwe. One of the respondents (Participant 5, 23 August 2020, Bellville) stated, "I am influenced by the shortages, you know, they communicate with me sometimes to say, 'We have run out of basics.'" In addition, a participant (Participant 1, 28 April 2020, Claremont) remarked: "My reasons for sending back food are mainly based on the requests made by my family."

The part played by social media platforms such as WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter as the drivers of the transfer of food was evident in the study. Consequently, 66% of the respondents noted that they were inspired to transfer food items to Zimbabwe because of the communication- or information-sharing on social media by the household or family members in the country of origin. Furthermore, 54% indicated that they are linked to and interact with family or household members, who request them, on social media, to transfer food and groceries. Additionally, 44% revealed that they transmit food items to Zimbabwe because of the content they see on social media, such as socioeconomic circumstances, food prices, food insecurity, food shortages in Zimbabwe, and remitting channels.

Moreover, 40% of the participants specified that the decision to transfer food items was influenced by their interaction with friends and the content they share or post on social media. Similarly, the participants highlighted the influence of the interactions on social media on their reasons for transferring food back home. For example, one participant (Participant 2, 10 September 2020, Bellville) explained:

> So, I communicate with a lot of my siblings through WhatsApp. So, you know, sometimes they tell you about the situation back home, and in that way, you are aware that, okay, maybe you need to try and make sure you can send something and make sure you know, they get something to eat.

The respondents also revealed the importance of news updates on social media that illustrated the challenging conditions back in Zimbabwe that prompted them to remit food items. These challenges included food shortages, food insecurity, and starvation. In this regard, a participant (Participant 1, 28 April 2020, Claremont) explained:

> I have also connected on social media to news reporting. So, you will find that certain things also come up there. But I mean, when I read some things, and you read, you know, the statistics of the individuals or the numbers of individuals that are starving or the individuals that are struggling with food security.

This respondent added that the challenges revealed on social media news updates, such as hunger and food insecurity initiated the decision to find solutions and communicate with family members in Zimbabwe:

> The automatic reaction becomes to engage. I engage with my own family about, you know, the situation that they are in because I have a sibling at home. I also engage about how I can assist. So, the awareness is there. It then triggers me to investigate how much it relates or how the food insecurity in Zimbabwe is affecting my family.

The Zimbabwean migrants explained that the information shared by the digital/mobile food remittance service providers and the content shared by the companies influence their decisions to remit. For example, the information shared by Malaicha and Mukuru on their social media pages regarding specials and discounts impacted the food remitting decisions.

Characteristics, channels of food remittances, and social media

Table 4 shows that the transferred food items generally comprised cooking oil, rice, sugar, mealie meal, beans, juice or drinks, peanut butter, meat, flour, and salt, among others. The common foodstuffs transferred are diverse, comprising staple foods in Zimbabwe, grain-based food, perishable and non-perishable foods. The majority of the respondents indicated that they did not predetermine the regularity of the food transfers to their home country. Resultantly, most individuals transferred food remittances whenever possible (59%), whereas only 14% tranferred every month, another 14% once a year, 9% twice a year, and 4% every three months.

Table 4: Remitted food items

Food type	Frequency	Percentage
Cooking oil	68	68%
Rice	62	62%
Sugar	57	57%
Mealie meal	50	50%
Beans	46	46%
Drinks or juice	45	45%
Peanut butter	45	45%
Meat	41	41%
Flour	40	40%
Salt	39	39%
Jam	38	38%
Milk	31	31%

(continued)

(continued)

Food type	Frequency	Percentage
Kapenta (dried small fish)	29	29%
Soups and spices	28	28%
Tinned tomatoes and onions	27	27%
Nuts	26	26%
Cereals	26	26%
Tinned fish	24	24%
Bread	22	22%
Honey	21	21%
Vegetables	20	20%
Tea	20	20%
Eggs	17	17%
Fruits	15	15%
Margarine	14	14%

Source: Author's field survey, 2020

Noteworthy in the research was an association between the amount used on purchasing food each time they remitted food and the average monthly incomes. For instance, all those who had monthly incomes of R0–R4,000 transmitted food items priced at R1,000 or less, and most of those who transferred food items valued between R3,001–R4,000+ had monthly earnings of R15,001 or more (see Table 5).

Table 5: Amounts spent on purchases of food remitted to Zimbabwe

Monthly income	Average expenditure on food remittances to Zimbabwe					
	0 – R1,000	R1,001 – R2,000	R2,001 – R3,000	R3,001 – R4,000	R4,001 +	Total
R0 – R4,000	10	0	0	0	0	10
R4,001 – R8,000	29	3	1	0	0	33
R8,001 – R15,000	8	9	5	1	0	23
R15,001 – R20,000	0	6	3	3	2	14
R20,001+	0	2	6	5	7	20
Total	47	20	15	9	9	100
N = 100						

Source: Author's field survey, 2020

The research results specified that 48% of the participants primarily transferred food items to Zimbabwe through digital/mobile channels, 33% via transport carriers, 11% via family, relatives, friends, or associates, and 8% personally. To demonstrate the importance of digital/mobile channels, one participant (Participant 9, 19 September 2020, Wynberg) indicated that, "I was using buses to send my family

some groceries. But because the pandemic caused the border to close, I decided to use the Malaicha and Mukuru services on my phone." The significance of digital/mobile channels as reliable, inexpensive, accessible, and speedy channels was also highlighted in the narratives of the Zimbabwean migrants. Informal channels were also crucial, particularly during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, restrictions, and lockdowns. These migrants displayed resilience and coping strategies by using uncommon channels of transmitting food remittances to their home country. For example, one respondent (Participant 3, 20 May 2020, Kenilworth) revealed that,

> … so, the regular forms of transportation I used could not work because the borders were closed, but because funeral companies were allowed to move around for repatriation purposes, I also had to resort to using that [channel] …

The respondents explained that the information sharing and interaction on social media sites such as Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp provided helpful information or awareness of the dependable, accessible, and inexpensive channels to use for sending food. For example, one respondent (Participant 3, 20 May 2020, Kenilworth) explained:

> On the Zimbabweans in Cape Town's Facebook page, and when we were under level-five lockdown, many people were also asking on social media how people who have urgent requests from Zimbabwe are sending through the things … somebody wrote that they were also working with a funeral company that repatriates bodies of deceased Zimbabweans. And that's how they were getting their goods through…

The participants used social media sites like Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp to communicate and acquire valuable information related to food remittance transfers. Social capital and social networking in social media groups proved to be invaluable. For instance, 69 participants were in various social media groups. Among the 69 participants in social media groups, several groups were with friends (24.64%), family or household members (53.62%) and fellow Zimbabweans (21.74%). Interaction and information in social media groups assisted remittance-sending migrants in choosing the channels to remit food (46.38%), the frequency of food transfer (15.94%) and the types of food to transmit (37.68%) (see Table 6).

Table 6: Helpful information related to food remittances in social media groups

Category	Frequency	Percentage
How to send food to Zimbabwe	32	46.38
Types of food to send to Zimbabwe	26	37.68
When to send the food items to Zimbabwe	11	15.94
Total	69	100.00%
N = 69		

Source: Author's field survey, 2020

Nearly three-quarters (74%) of the respondents in the study indicated that social media interaction through texts or voice-messaging influenced their choice of most-frequently used channels to remit food. Additionally, 58% of the participants noted that social media content such as news and posts influenced their choice of preferred food transferring channels. Furthermore, the study showed the significance of social media communication and content in accessing the channels deemed dependable (19%), reachable (27%), affordable (29%), and the speediest (25%) (See Figure 1).

Figure 1: Social media and choice of channels

Source: Author's field survey, 2020

Also, the findings confirmed that social media plays a central role as a pathway to remitting food. For example, one Zimbabwean migrant explained that digital/mobile remittance service providers like Mukuru allow consumers to complete orders and create transactions on social media platforms like WhatsApp. Another respondent

(Participant 3, 20 May 2020, Kenilworth) indicated how social media helped channel food to Zimbabwe by saying, "When I had to decide who to use and how to send [food], I needed to do some social media research to find out what people are saying about the service that I'm intending on using." Another participant (Participant 1, 28 April 2020, Claremont) explained how social media facilitates interactions, information flow, and the purchase of proposed food items to remit:

> Social media enables individuals to communicate via WhatsApp even, you know, engaging and making purchases. You can find links on social media to shops you might want to buy from. And also, you can share all of this information via WhatsApp and social media.

The narratives of the Zimbabwean migrants emphasized the crucial nature of social networking and social capital in social media groups on platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook in transferring food remittances, as expressed by this participant:

> I mean, on almost all the groups I'm part of, I think we have several family groups with different family members. I mean, we have a group for our nuclear family, we have groups who are extended families from the mother's side, from the father's side, we have church groups that I'm part of, I'm in groups with friends. And in all those groups, at some point, we discussed the escalating food prices in Zimbabwe (Participant 3, 20 May 2020, Kenilworth).

The discussions in the social media groups included transfer channels, food prices, and the circumstances in the migrants' home country. For instance, this participant (Participant 3, 20 May 2020, Kenilworth) added:

> … as those conversations go, we talk about how we, as migrants in South Africa, can send things home, and we also get the opportunity to ask how other people are also sending home, so in all those groups. I can't think of any group where at some point, we have not had a discussion on sending things to Zimbabwe and just sharing ideas and suggestions on which way or method is best to use.

Social media is also helpful in facilitating the transfer of remittances through interactions between migrants and their networks. For example, because of the long distance between Cape Town and food delivery locations in Zimbabwe, migrants use social media to facilitate the cheaper transfer of remittances from other South African cities closer to Zimbabwe, such as Johannesburg. A respondent (Participant 4, 12 July 2020, Claremont) said:

You could get information, for example, who's in Joburg, and who's going back home. And some of the contacts of the people that I used to check stuff in Joburg, and people that I've met on social media, and I get information from them, or they give you contact details of the cheapest driver, or they are the ones that go and collect the stuff for me or buy stuff for me. So social media has provided the human resources and information.

Food remittance challenges and social media

Informal ways of transferring food remittances present problems such as confiscation of goods by border officials, import-duty issues, delivery delays, and broken/destroyed/stolen/misplaced goods. In this study, the challenges encountered when transferring food remittances comprised: delivery delays (22%), broken/destroyed goods (11%), misplaced/stolen goods (11%), high remittance costs (21%), while 35% of participants experienced no challenges. Other challenges were internet problems, erroneous transactions, and bureaucratic registration to use digital/mobile channels. This study's findings highlighted the importance of social media platforms in addressing the challenges encountered by Zimbabwean migrants when transmitting food back to their home country. In this regard, 44% of participants indicated that social media posts, exchange of information, and communication assisted in solving some of the challenges they encountered when sending food to Zimbabwe. This was corroborated in the narratives of the Zimbabwean migrants. For instance, a respondent (Participant 3, 20 May 2020, Kenilworth) remarked:

> Sometimes you find a post that somebody would have posted; we encounter a similar problem by the same person or with the same person. And sometimes you'll find that the person is in the habit of lying to people to say, "I've been arrested, and I need you to pay an extra 500." You get people that will also tell you, maybe five or ten people will come up and say, "No, this guy is a crook; he's not telling the truth."

The narratives of the Zimbabwean migrants also revealed the importance of content sharing, feedback, and reviews on social media regarding the remittance channels. For example, the above participant added:

> Because sometimes their service is not good. And when there is an outcry on social media, people call out the bus company, naming and shaming them. It always invites the top or senior management of those bus services to come up and say, "You know, we apologize."

The respondents demonstrated how social media helps address challenges, such as access to specific channels during the COVID-19 pandemic and resultant border

closures. This was done by asking questions on social media and using feedback to make decisions. For example, the above participant also said:

> On Facebook, we have done that, asked the question, and people responded to say, "Well, use this person or use this company, they can move"… During the lockdown, I asked how I could send groceries since the borders were closed.

The use of mobile devices, smartphones, and social media was valuable in online communication and facilitating the information flow in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions and limited physical contact. A participant (Participant 1, 28 April 2020, Claremont) stated:

> I think, you know, the biggest challenge with food remitting on the basis of COVID is human-to-human contact. So, social media assists in communicating specific information …

Social media also facilitates virtual communities and online interactions for migrants and their networks that enable the transfer of food remittances. This proved to be useful in overcoming the practicality and challenges of having face-to-face communication. The above respondent added:

> … social media allows people to remit and send their items without physical contact. By this, what I mean is, be it via courier or even via a family member, you don't necessarily have to get in physical contact with anyone to get the food you would like to courier across.

DISCUSSION

Diasporas utilize social media or social networking sites (SNSs) for various online networking actions (Crush et al., 2011). Borkert et al. (2018: 8) note that "migrants are digital agents of change who themselves post and share information in social media and digital social networks." The Zimbabwean migrants demonstrated the vital role social media platforms, such as Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter, play in migrant social networking and the transfer of food remittances. The study results are consistent with the studies that have drawn attention to the importance of social media, migrant networks, and migration decisions (McGregor and Siegel, 2013; Dekker and Engbersen, 2014; Akakpo and Bokpin, 2021). From the perspectives of the Zimbabwean migrants, their decisions to transfer food remittances were influenced by content viewing, information sharing and communications on social media with household or family members, friends, and associates. Notably, the information sharing and interactions on social media important to the transfer of food were about food requests, food shortages, food insecurity, food prices, socioeconomic situations in the country of origin, remittance needs, and transfer

channels. Similar perspectives emerge in previous studies by Crush and Tevera (2010), Tevera and Chikanda (2009), Ramachandran et al. (2022), and Sithole et al. (2022) that underscore the persistent economic crisis (including unemployment, food insecurity, food shortages, and hyper-inflation) in Zimbabwe as one of the main drivers of remittances to Zimbabwe. Migrant remittances support households and family members back in Zimbabwe, especially during economic shocks.

Additionally, the Zimbabwean migrants highlighted that news updates, posts, and reviews on social media influenced food-remitting decisions. The interaction and content on social media platforms also consisted of issues related to food remittances, such as food promotions or discounts by remitting businesses. The marketing, promotions, and discounts on social media can attract consumers to use food-remitting services. Thus, the advertising and marketing by food-remitting companies can drive migrants to utilize their affordable services and purchase food to remit. Social media is resourceful for valuable information flows that impact the decisions to transfer food items, such as sharing information within or between the host and origin locations. The study corroborates Dekker and Engbersen's (2014) assertion that social media platforms transform migrant networks and provide a wealthy base for insider information on migration that is distinct and informal. Hence, social media sites offer valuable tools that facilitate the flow of information and trigger the decisions to remit food. From the standpoint of the Zimbabwean migrants, social media enables the formation of online communities that enhance mutual decision-making. Hence, it facilitates a collective sense of obligation to support and transfer food remittances to family members back home.

The Zimbabwean migrants utilize various channels to transfer food remittances, such as digital/mobile and informal sources (personally, associates, family members, relatives, and transport carriers). This study mirrors the viewpoints in earlier works by Nzima (2017), Nyamunda (2014), Maphosa (2007) and more recently by Sithole et al. (2022), that Zimbabwean migrants utilize both formal and informal channels to transfer remittances to their family members and households back home. Also, in Southern Africa, new patterns show that mobile and digital technologies are now facilitating the transmission of groceries, including food remittances through companies such as Malaicha and Mukuru Groceries (Sithole, 2022; Sithole et al., 2022). A study by Tevera and Chikanda (2009) posits that social ties, social networks, information flows and personal relations between migrants, family members, and associates impact the decisions to use specific channels when transferring remittances to Zimbabwe from neighboring countries. Strikingly, the Zimbabwean migrants illustrated that social networking on social media with family and household members, friends, and companions helped them decide on the most accessible, cheapest, speediest, and most reliable channel to use in transmitting food. Social media sites also facilitated the interaction between Zimbabwean migrants and transport carriers at various stages before and after the transportation of food items. For instance, the communication between food-sending migrants and transporting

carriers comprised the channeling costs, border tariffs, delivery status, and situation in Zimbabwe.

Social media is an essential source of information for migrants (Dekker et al., 2018). The Zimbabwean migrants narrated that their preferences for specific channels were based on social media reviews, sentiments, and information regarding the dependability of these channels. Remarkably, social media was used as a channel to transfer food. Accordingly, it was illustrated that digital/mobile remitting companies have alternatives to complete transactions or make orders on social media platforms. Social media provides informative information on the most accessible channel, especially during crises like the COVID-19 pandemic and resultant limitations such as movement or transport restrictions. For example, information on social media provided insights into border closures and limited transport movement. And decisively, social media information provided details on how funeral firms were permitted to carry on their business. And in turn, the Zimbabwean migrants were clandestinely transferring foodstuffs through the funeral companies. Social media enables the virtual interaction and flow of information that facilitates the channeling of food remittances.

Scholars have indicated the connection between migration, remittances, and social capital (Akanle et al., 2021). The study highlighted the significance of social capital and social networking on social media sites like WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter among the Zimbabwean migrants and their associates, which are essential in transferring food remittances. Accordingly, the article indicated that personal and group ties were beneficial in deciding on the foodstuffs to remit, the period to remit, and choosing the dependable, inexpensive, and accessible remittance channels. For example, communication and exchange of ideas on social media groups between the Zimbabwean migrants and their strong and close relations, like friends, household and family members, were crucial in transmitting food. Social networking with strong and close ties, such as among family members and friends, is described as bonding social capital (Dressel et al., 2020). Social media efficiently enables strong relations and bonding social capital, indicating a new manifestation of virtual migrant communities (Komito, 2011). Also, social media can assist migrants and their networks in navigating the spaces and places they occupy by enabling communication and exchanging helpful information. Social media networking and content exchanges are not restricted by location and distance because contact occurs online.

Social networking on social media groups between the Zimbabwean migrants and distant ties, like other Zimbabweans and associated church members, was crucial in providing helpful information on low-cost and accessible food remittance channels. The distant or weak links in social capital are known as bridging social capital (Woolcock, 2001). Thus, bonding and bridging social capital on social media were essential in providing valuable information on food remittance and facilitating the channeling of food items. Correspondingly, a study by Merisalo and Jauhiainen (2021) demonstrates that social media usage is associated with social ties and social

capital among migrant networks. Social media promotes networking and social capital that assist in channeling food remittances. Zimbabwean migrants operate in transnational spaces and engage in virtual communities on the internet that enable them to maintain ties between origin and destination spaces (Tevera, 2014). Social media groups facilitate the creation of online networks for migrants and their family members, relatives, and associates, which generate a rich source of helpful information on migration and remittance issues.

When remitting food through informal channels, the challenges included delivery delays, and broken, lost, or stolen goods. The study's findings support previous studies by Tevera and Chikanda (2009), Maphosa (2007), and Nzima (2017). They note that migrants who transferred remittances to their households and families in Zimbabwe through informal channels regularly encountered challenges, such as theft, delivery delays, and undependable remittance carriers. However, undocumented and unbanked migrants without regular jobs continued to depend mainly on informal channels because the passages were cheap and more accessible. Digital/mobile or formal channels presented challenges, such as poor internet access, transaction problems, and costly charges. Social media plays a crucial role in addressing some of the difficulties encountered when remitting food because of being accessible, affordable, and speedy. Pourmehdi and Shahrani (2021) concur on the importance of social media sites by indicating that they are essential to migrant networks because they offer smooth, accessible communication resources. The capability of social media as a resource that facilitates information flow was vital for the Zimbabwean migrants. Social media reviews and posts also addressed the challenges of poor service delivery and unreliable transfer channels. For example, reviews on social media uncovered undependable remittance carriers and provided valuable information on reliable remittance carriers. The posts, reviews, and communication on social media can provide information on untrustworthy transport carriers and afford suggestions on the cheapest, dependable, and accessible transport carriers to use when transmitting food. Therefore, social media can link virtual communities and offline activities, such as arranging and transferring food remittances.

Scholars have indicated how the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the food systems and the movement of people and goods (Crush and Si, 2020; Paganini et al., 2020; Crush et al., 2021). Dinbabo (2020) asserts that the COVID-19 pandemic threatens the stability of people's economic and social well-being, as well as their overall health care. Some of the challenges encountered because of the COVID-19 pandemic, such as movement restrictions, were lessened by social media. For example, social media enabled virtual communication between Zimbabwean migrants, associates, and transport carriers. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, social media can offer valuable and speedy distribution channels for vital information (Chan et al., 2020). Social media can lessen the hindrance of the distance between migrants and their networks by providing online communication opportunities. Also, social media facilitated the online purchase of food items and enabled the remitting of the food

items. Social media sites can assist in the buying and transferring of food remittances through their capacity to facilitate transactions, content sharing and information flow in text, image, video, and audio forms. Social media has valuable tools that offer inexpensive, instant, and reachable channels for unlimited information pathways, which migrants and their networks can utilize to facilitate undertakings such as remittances. However, as highlighted in the study, access to social media sometimes has constraints such as limited access to smartphones, mobile devices, mobile data, power, or internet connectivity.

CONCLUSION

This study has contributed to the discussions and research on South-South migration, remittance flows, and food security. At the center of the study is the influence of social media on how Zimbabwean migrants in Cape Town are transferring food remittances to their families left behind in their home country. Social media enables online interactions and virtual communities for migrants and their networks, which are valuable for migration and remittance choices. The study illustrated how the drivers, channels, and nature of transferring foodstuffs back home are influenced by the content sharing, information flow, and communication between the migrants and friends, associates, family members, and carriers. A noteworthy finding of the research was that social media offered reachable, convenient, and inexpensive communication channels during the COVID-19 pandemic when movement restrictions and lockdowns disrupted face-to-face interactions. Social media can provide rapid, affordable, reliable, and accessible communication passages that are useful for migrant communities and the transfer of remittances. This article provided insights into how social media facilitates information pathways for migrants and their networks when transferring food remittances. Accordingly, researchers and development policymakers need to pay more attention to food remittances and digital innovations, such as social media, that facilitate the cross-border flow of food. Social media influences migrant networks and transmission of cross-border remittances, such as food transfers, which are essential for food security in the global South.

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South Africa's Counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado: Examining the Role of Mozambican Migrants to Establish a People-Centric Approach

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Abstract

Most scholarship on terrorism in Cabo Delgado (Mozambique) has focused on the nature and causes of the insurgency, who the insurgents are, where the insurgents come from, their underlying needs, and how the current military operations may be successful from a state-centric perspective. As a result, the role of non-state actors, such as migrants, has been left out. This is a qualitative study that relies on secondary data sources to offer a critical survey of the work done in the context of terrorism in Cabo Delgado. Using the counterinsurgency theory, the paper argues for the inclusion of the voice of Mozambican migrants in South Africa's involvement in counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado as one of the ways of developing a population-centric non-military approach. This is founded on direct and indirect ways of securing the population's support, thereby isolating the insurgents in Mozambique. An awareness of the views of these migrants can shed light on what perpetuates the insurgency in Mozambique. The paper suggests new empirical studies that include the seemingly forgotten role of migrants, in a non-military and people-centered approach in seeking to undermine global terror networks.

Keywords: Al Shabaab, insurgents, Cabo Delgado, counterinsurgency, migrants, Mozambicans, South Africa

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INTRODUCTION

This paper explores South Africa's involvement in the fight against insurgency in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. This insurgency has created an ongoing conflict in the province, shaped by religion and fought between Islamist militants and Mozambican security forces with the former aiming to establish an Islamic state in the region. Although Mozambique is a Christian-majority country, Matsinhe and Valoi (2019) point out that the two northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado have an Islamic majority population – the former has 61 percent Muslims and the latter has 54 percent Muslims.[3] Northern Mozambique's administrative centers are also predominantly Muslim. The main militant group is Ansar al Sunna (supporters of the tradition), which is also known by its original name 'Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo' (ASWJ) translated as "adepts of the prophetic tradition." Locals refer to these Muslims as Al-Shabaab even though they are a separate organization from the Somali Al Shabaab (Bukarti and Munasinghe, 2020). According to Sithole (2022), the Islamic State (ISIS) has claimed ties with the Al-Shabaab in Mozambique. The militant group was originally a religious movement when it was formed in 2008 by followers of Sheikh Aboud Rogo, a Kenyan Muslim cleric who advocated for the formation of an Islamic State in Kenya in a peaceful manner. There are claims that Sheikh Rogo assisted in the bombing of the Embassies of the United States of America (USA) in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 and was later sanctioned by the USA and the United Nations (UN) for providing support to Al-Shabaab (Neethling, 2021). Saalfeld (2021) adds that following the death of Sheikh Rogo in 2012, many of his followers settled in Tanzania before moving to Mozambique's northern district of Cabo Delgado around 2015. In Cabo Delgado, members of the group encouraged mosques in Mocimboa da Praia to adopt Sheikh Rogo's interpretation of Islam (Hanlon, 2022). To date, most members of the Al-Shabaab group in Cabo Delgado are Mozambicans, although there are some foreign nationals from Tanzania and Somalia.

This paper assesses and offers a critique of the militaristic approaches that have framed the Southern African Development Community (SADC)[4] counterinsurgency efforts in Cabo Delgado. This paper is set against the backdrop of insurgent activities in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado region and the subsequent involvement of the SADC mission, which South Africa commands. South Africa contributes over half of Southern African Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) forces (Bussotti and Coimbra, 2023). At the same time, it is important to clarify that South Africa hosts a high number of Mozambican migrants. The SADC heads of state and government in an extraordinary Troika Summit of Botswana of 27 November 2020 observed that terrorist activities in Cabo Delgado have increased exponentially and sought to deploy a Standby Force (Svicevic, 2022). South Africa contributed 1,495 out of 3,000 military troops to this SAMIM to counter the insurgents. This paper

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[3] http://www.ine.gov.mz/iv-rgph-2017/mocambique/03-religiao/quadro-11-populacao-por-religiao-segundo-area-de-residencia-idade-e-sexo-mocambique-2017.xlsx/view. Accessed on 5/3/2023.
[4] SADC countries include: Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

argues that while counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado has usually been framed as militaristic and enemy-centric, on 7 September 2022, Mozambique's President Filipe Jacinto Nyusi said that the Islamist militant movement in northern Mozambique is spreading to new territory despite efforts by local and international military forces to contain it.[5]

These experiences have revived interest in alternative non-military approaches. There is compelling evidence, mainly from European countries, suggesting that there is a possible link between migrants and terrorism (Brouwer, 2002; Schmid, 2016; McAlexander, 2020). According to Brouwer (2002), Schmid (2016), and McAlexander (2020), the European experience is that in many countries, migrants have committed terrorist acts against their host countries. By focusing on migrants as security threats in Europe, these scholars reveal how the role of migrants in perpetuating terrorist acts in their home countries has rarely been studied. Hence, this is one of the gaps in the literature that this paper aims at filling. This paper is among the first attempts to draw on the counterinsurgency theory to develop a conceptual discourse foregrounding a need for empirical studies that explain the seemingly forgotten role of Mozambican migrants, to gain a fuller understanding of the ongoing insurgency in Cabo Delgado.

The paper draws primarily on a desktop review of literature on the nexus between migrants in South Africa and terrorism. To be clear, this article is not about the evolution of terrorism in Cabo Delgado. Instead, the objective here is to raise two new questions in the migration literature: What is the nexus between Mozambican migrants in South Africa and the operations, dynamics, and governance of the ISIS in Cabo Delgado? What can Mozambican migrants contribute to South Africa's counterinsurgency efforts in Cabo Delgado? While studies of this nature need empirical data, the arguments of this paper are grounded in a desktop-based review of discourses on the role of migrants in counterinsurgency. As such, this article uses a non-empirical qualitative research approach, relying heavily on literary sources as a primary reservoir for its data.

The paper begins by providing a conceptual discourse related to the counter-insurgency theory. The first section presents an overview of the counterinsurgency (CI) theory to assess how the difficulties encountered by the current kinetic military approaches in Cabo Delgado are reviving interest in alternative non-military approaches. The second section closely scrutinizes the combustible situation of increasing numbers of migrants in South Africa and their potential involvement in both global terror activities and terror threats against South Africa. The section pays particular attention to claims in South Africa's mainstream media that some migrants had been sanctioned by the US government for their alleged links to Islamic State (ISIS) operations in Mozambique and for using South Africa as a haven for seeking financial resources and recruiting those who can facilitate or execute global terror activities. The last section suggests an introspection, interrogation, and analysis of

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[5] https://www.voanews.com/a/mozambique-struggling-to-contain-violence-in-troubled-northern-regions/6735287.html. Accessed on 10/10/2022.

South Africa's involvement in the current militaristic approach in Cabo Delgado by suggesting a more encompassing non-military framework that encapsulates the roles of marginalized non-state actors, such as Mozambican migrants.

COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORY

The US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2010:12) describes counterinsurgency as a "blend of comprehensive military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat any form of insurgency." Components of counterinsurgency campaigns include political, societal, military, economic, legal, informational, and intelligence aspects (Cassidy, 2008). The counterinsurgency theory, therefore, signals a movement away from exclusive reliance on killing the "enemies" towards targeting the people for political support. Contemporary counterinsurgency theory emphasizes the role of civilian efforts of re-integration and reconstruction in insurgency-stricken areas. Therefore, in this paper counterinsurgency is understood as a blend of all comprehensive civilian and military efforts to contain insurgency and address its root causes simultaneously. It involves a careful balance between constructive dimensions (building compelling and legitimate government) and destructive measures (destroying the insurgent movements).

Galula (1964) and Kilcullen (2007) along with the US Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009) contend that there are conventionally two principal philosophies of counterinsurgency: (a) the "population-centric" philosophy, which puts an emphasis on the populace as the sea in which the insurgents swim. This dimension of counterinsurgency holds that if the population and its surroundings are adequately controlled, the insurgents will be denied the necessary sustenance and support to survive. It can be summarized as, "first protect the population, and all else will follow" (Nagl, 2005); and (b) the "enemy-centric" dimension perceives counterinsurgency as similar to conventional warfare and stresses the military conquest and total defeat of the insurgents. Moore (2007:20) argues that the focus of the "enemy-centric" approach is on the physical defeat of the insurgents. The enemy-centric approach has several variations, including "hard vs. soft," "direct vs. indirect," "violent vs. non-violent," and "marginalization vs. decapitation" strategies. This approach can be précised as "first defeat the enemy, and all else will follow."

This paper uses the population-centric approach because it has proven to be most effective at succeeding in the long term, and it endeavors to resolve conflict by incorporating all dimensions. According to Nagl (2005), the population-centric dimension of counterinsurgency emphasizes the "direct and indirect" non-military ways of securing the population's support, thereby isolating the insurgents. The paper is cognizant that although military action against the militants will undoubtedly be on the cards, this approach recognizes that the center of gravity is the population. Although the counterinsurgency theory emphasizes minimum force, population-centric concepts, political and democratic processes, and winning the hearts and

minds of the population, the practical application of these principles is hardly observed on the ground.

Although terrorism in Cabo Delgado has been occurring since 2017, interventions so far have not been informed much by political and democratic processes of winning hearts and minds as espoused by population-centric approaches in the counterinsurgency theory. Most interventions in Mozambique have been enemy-centric, using military force by those who are interested in the country's gas reserves or private military contracts (Demuynck and Weijenberg, 2021). Several countries, including the United States, France, and Portugal have offered military support to the Mozambican government to combat international criminal syndicates. For instance, in May 2021, Portugal and Mozambique signed a military cooperation accord to help confront a growing jihadist threat, by beefing up training, notably of Special Forces (News24, 2021). Both the United States and France tried to intervene by contributing troops to patrol the coast of Cabo Delgado (Hanlon, 2020). According to Hanlon (2020), the US government believed that counter-narcotics efforts were needed to disrupt some of the transnational organized crime at sea. Also, the USA believed that terrorists in Cabo Delgado were thriving because of proceeds from narcotics. The French intervention in Mozambique entailed a military maritime cooperation agreement and training of Mozambican forces so that they are able to fight the Al Shabaab. Similarly, Nhamire (2021) asserts that the European Union (EU) subsequently set up an EU military training mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique). The aim of the mission is to train and support the Mozambican armed forces in protecting the civilian population and restoring safety and security. The Mozambican government also signed agreements with the Russian Wagner Group mercenaries, the Dyck Advisory Group (DAG), and the Rwandan army to help ameliorate the problem (Peters, 2020).

Regionally, the SADC attention has focused almost exclusively on isolating and fighting the terrorists by military means. For instance, the SADC heads of state and government, in an extraordinary Troika Summit in Botswana on 27 November 2020, acknowledged that terrorist activities in Cabo Delgado had increased exponentially, and sought to deploy a standby military force (Svicevic, 2022). According to Sithole (2022), the standby force falls under the framework of the SADC Mutual Defense Pact and is in line with the United Nations' s "responsibility to protect principle" to prevent human catastrophe. Cilliers et al. (2021) argue that the decision to deploy troops to Cabo Delgado also aimed at preventing the risk of non-African solutions in the Southern African region where lucrative natural resources are prompting fears of the "Iraqification" (militarization and foreign agenda) of Mozambique. Other arguments that were made in favor of the SADC kinetic military intervention, included the fear of the attacks spilling over into Mozambique's neighboring states, and the need for a coordinated response, including tough cross-border intelligence to manage jihadist infiltration (Sithole, 2022). As a result, on 9 August 2021, the national governments in the SADC region launched kinetic military operations

known as the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), with troops from Lesotho, Botswana, South Africa, and Tanzania (ISS, 2021). South Africa contributed about half of the troops (about 1,495 out of 3,000 SAMIM troops).

Hanlon (2020), Obaji Jr. (2021), and Sithole (2022) are doubtful that the deployment of military forces to counter insurgents in Cabo Delgado is succeeding. These scholars argue that despite all the military counterinsurgency efforts, the insurgents have carried out their acts of terrorism with strength and confidence. For instance, on 7 September 2022, the Mozambican President, Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, announced that Islamist militants had spread to the country's northern Nampula province, killing six people by beheading, and abducted three others. According to President Nyusi, the Islamist militant movement in northern Mozambique is spreading to new territory despite efforts by government and regional forces to contain it. This prompted the assertion that, like in Somalia and Nigeria, the enemy-centric militaristic approach in Mozambique was becoming counterproductive. For this reason, the current SAMIM military operations may not be able to stem the threat of insurgency in Mozambique, like other kinetic military operations that failed elsewhere. Whittall (2021) argues that there are fears that the SAMIM military focus is on the physical conquest and total defeat of the insurgents while overulooking the social, economic, and democratic political processes of winning the hearts and minds of the people in Cabo Delgado and elsewhere in Mozambique. According to Whittall (2021), military counterinsurgency efforts have opted for a militaristic approach that targets the enemy in Cabo Delgado rather than addressing the root causes of the insurgency, such as poverty, marginalization, expropriation, and lack of jobs. The enemy-centric approaches in Cabo Delgado are accused of failing to address the fact that Cabo Delgado province is one of the poorest in the country despite its rich gas reserves. According to Demuynck and Weijenberg (2021), the region harbors major gas reserves worth more than USD 50 billion, which foreign energy companies have been extracting without any of the profits benefiting local populations. Furthermore, the predominantly Muslim population in the region feels neglected by the largely Christian ruling elite in Maputo.

At this point, it can be argued that the difficulties encountered by kinetic enemy-centric military approaches as expressed by the above views of President Nyusi are reviving interest in alternative approaches to counterinsurgency in the region. Alternative counterinsurgency is the main aim of this paper. It is important to note that SADC has introduced a multi-dimensional approach, although the military approach is still the most privileged. Additionally, by contributing almost half of the military personnel in the SAMIM, South Africa's involvement in counterinsurgency operations in Cabo Delgado is raising new fundamental questions. One such question is what else South Africa can do to counter insurgents in Cabo Delgado. According to Makonye (2020), Mabera and Naidu (2020), and Sithole (2022), South Africa might be contributing the highest number of military personnel within the SAMIM operations because it is the regional power and has most interest in Cabo

Delgado, including contracts to South African companies in constructions on the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal. The LNG terminal and park are proposed to be constructed in the Afungi peninsula area in Cabo Delgado, constituting the onshore element of the larger Mozambique Gas Development Project. The above scholars also mention that there are several South African banks that have invested in Mozambique LNG. At the same time, South Africa is host to many Mozambican migrants. While there is compelling evidence, anchored substantially on case studies from European countries, suggesting that there is a strong link between migrants and terrorism, how then can South Africa go beyond the limitations of conventional enemy-centric military interventions and prevent violent jihad groups from finding havens within South Africa's borders where they can reorganize and thrive? Hence, this paper asserts that some Mozambican migrants in South Africa are to some extent aware of the nature and operations of insurgents in Cabo Delgado and can contribute toward a greater understanding of the factors perpetuating the insurgency and what South Africa can do to counter it. In this regard, this study draws on the counterinsurgency framework to explore how South Africa may potentially use the views of Mozambican migrants as a resource for developing a people-centric non-military approach to undermine terror networks in the SADC region.

SOUTH AFRICA AS A MIGRATION DESTINATION FOR MOZAMBICANS

Historically, the first half of the nineteenth century saw forced migrations of people from modern-day South Africa to other parts of Southern Africa during the war period known as the Mfecane. Migration in the second half of the nineteenth century was spurred by the discovery of diamonds and other minerals in South Africa (Muanamoha et al., 2010; Pasura, 2014; Isike, 2017). Even though migration has continued unabated, the different phases had different dimensions. Some migrants were forced to flee to South Africa due to war. Others migrated to South Africa because of the promise of a better life there (Dinbabo and Nyasulu, 2015). However, migration has become a fraught issue that threatens to tear the fabric that holds South Africans and migrants together (Pineteh, 2017; Moyo, 2020). Economic and political instability in Zimbabwe and war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are contributing to burgeoning numbers in South Africa, with a significant number of such immigrants arriving without proper documentation or involving themselves in criminal activities (Crush and Peberdy, 2018; Mlambo, 2019). There is a possibility that terrorism in Mozambique is also increasing the number of Mozambican migrants to South Africa via Tanzania. This has brought into sharp relief the potential threat that both legal and illegal immigration could cause in South Africa. According to Sichone (2020) and Chiyangwa and Rugunanan (2022), negative attitudes toward immigration have partly been bred by economic difficulties, unemployment, and exaggerated numbers of immigrants. As a consequence, xenophobic violence has become common in South Africa.

Moyo et al. (2021) observe that estimating the total number of migrants currently residing in South Africa is a difficult task due to lack of accounting for undocumented migrants by South Africa's Department of Home Affairs (DHA). The large number of migrants is attributed to the fact that South Africa is the most industrialized and stable economy in the region and a particularly attractive destination for those in search of education and better opportunities in the SADC region. For example, Statistics South Africa (2021)[6] estimates that there were about 3.95 million migrants in South Africa in mid-2021. The UN DESA (2021) and DHA (2021) reports estimated a total of about 4.1 million migrants.

The migration of Mozambicans to South Africa date from the colonial period, based in contract between the Portuguese and the then government of South Africa for workers to South African mining. However, the civil war that took place from the 1970s to the 1990s spurred the highest wave of migration of Mozambicans to South Africa.[7] According to Mubai (2015), and Mabera and Naidu (2020), this was a 16-year conflict that occurred between 30 May 1977 and 4 October 1992 in Mozambique. The war occurred two years after Mozambique officially gained its independence from Portugal. The main belligerents were the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), which controlled the central government under President Samora Machel, and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) led by André Matsangaissa (Mubai 2015; Mabera and Naidu 2020). An estimated one million people died during the conflict in a country, which in 1990 had a population of 14 million. Additionally, 250,000 to 350,000 Mozambicans crossed the border from Mozambique into South Africa fleeing the civil war ravaging their country (Moagi et al., 2018; Chiyangwa and Rugunanan, 2022). According to the IOM (2020) report, it is estimated that over 11 million Mozambicans are now living abroad, with South Africa being one of the top destinations. Currently, there are more than 800,000 Mozambican migrants in South Africa, most of them in the provinces of Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, and Limpopo. According to Lazzarini (2017), mining and farming jobs are the norm for Mozambicans in South Africa, especially for those working in the formal sector, with about 24,000 Mozambicans working in the mining sector. Data for the farming sector is incomplete, but in Mpumalanga province alone, the 2020 census estimates over 200,000 Mozambicans were working on farms. The report estimates that there were over 150,000 Mozambicans working in the informal sector in KwaZulu-Natal, concentrated mostly in the northern parts of that province. In Limpopo, there were over 100,000 Mozambicans (Machele, 2022).

According to Isike (2022), the mass migration of Mozambicans to South Africa is attributed to lack of economic opportunities in Mozambique and to demands for cheap labor in South Africa. However, the terrorism in Cabo Delgado has exacerbated a new form of forced migration of Mozambicans to South Africa. According to Neethling (2021), on 5 October 2017, when the Cabo Delgado province

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[6] Risenga Maluleke (2021). Statistics South Africa. https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14569. Accessed on 11/10/2022.

[7] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/YLS.htm. Accessed on 5/03/2023.

of Mozambique was battered by bloody jihadist attacks, the insurgents killed over 3,100 and more than 800,000 were displaced. Again, when the group resurfaced in March 2021, Langa (2021) asserts that the insurgents attacked Palma, killing over 2,500 people and displacing over 700,000 people. According to Mangena and Pherudi (2019), the overwhelming majority of people displaced by war in Cabo Delgado are internally displaced. Few of them migrated to neighboring countries such as Malawi and Tanzania. There are reports indicating that some Mozambicans who migrated to Malawi and Tanzania due to terrorism in Cabo Delgado are finding their way to South Africa. What can be said here is that currently, it is the economic situation in Mozambique that has turned Mozambicans into displaced "subalterns" in South Africa, to borrow a famously deployed term of Spivak (2003). Although outside the immediate scope of this paper, the struggle for survival and livelihoods by the Mozambican migrants in South Africa, bears testimony to this agency.

A survey of the cited literature shows that South Africa is the leading destination for most economic migrants from other Sub-Saharan African countries. However, there are emerging claims in current South African media that some of the migrants have been sanctioned by the USA for their alleged links with terror networks. Although none of these migrants sanctioned by the USA are Mozambican nationals, media reports indicate that they were using South Africa to seek resources, finances, and recruits for global ISIS's struggle, including that of Cabo Delgado. For instance, in March 2021, News24[8] and the Mail and Guardian[9] reported that the USA had sanctioned two South African men, an Ethiopian national, and a Tanzanian, for helping the ISIS terror group to secure funding. According to News24 (2021), Farhad Hoomer, Siraaj Miller, and Abdella Hussein Abadigga were wanted for playing an increasingly central role in facilitating and promoting terrorist activities. Farhad was sanctioned for having established an ISIS cell in Durban. Siraaj was sanctioned for being the leader of a group of ISIS supporters in Cape Town. Abdella Hussein, originally from Ethiopia, was sanctioned for being responsible for recruiting young men in South Africa to send them to an ISIS weapons-training camp. Also, Peter Charles Mbaga, a Tanzanian based in South Africa, was identified by the USA for being responsible for recruiting, transferring funds, and procuring weapons and equipment from South Africa to aid ISIS activities (News24). Furthermore, on 17 September 2022, the Sunday Times[10] reported that South Africa could soon be grey-listed. At the time of writing this paper, South Africa has indeed been grey-listed. While there are many reasons for this grey-listing, the Sunday Times of 17 September 2022 alleges that there are some foreign-owned spaza shops funding brutal terrorist groups, such as ISIS and Al Shabaab. Moreover, these spaza shops are allegedly

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[8] https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/us-sanctions-sa-men-two-others-for-allegedly-supporting-isis-securing-funds-20220302. Accessed on 20/9/2022.
[9] https://mg.co.za/news/2022-03-02-four-alleged-isis-members-in-south-africa-sanctioned-by-us-treasury/. Accessed on 20/9/2022.
[10] https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times-daily/news/2022-05-08-sas-is-crisis-how-r6bn-got-from-spaza-shops-to-african-terrorists/. Accessed on 20/9/2022.

also responsible for increasing the illicit cigarettes market, whose proceeds end up funding acts of global terrorism.

While it may be argued that most Mozambicans who have migrated to South Africa are seeking economic survival, there is a possibility that in one way or another, they know the dynamics of insurgents in that region. A possible rebuttal to my assertion, might be that there are no Mozambicans fleeing Cabo Delgado to South Africa because of the distance. Another rebuttal could be that the majority of Mozambicans who migrate to South Africa come from the southern region of the country, which is not experiencing any terrorism. I am cognizant that while people from southern Mozambique are historically linked to South Africa (Smith, 1973; Madalane, 2014) and even speak similar languages (tsiTsonga and tsiShangane), in northern Cabo Delgado where the insurgents are attacking, people are closer to Tanzania and speak the shared Swahili language (Bonate, 2018; Alden and Chichava, 2020). However, it cannot be ruled out that there are Mozambicans in South Africa with relatives or social ties with those in Cabo Delgado or those who have migrated from the northern part of Mozambique via Tanzania.

It is not within the realm of this paper to gainsay the apparent tenet of counterinsurgency that all Mozambicans (among others) who have come to South Africa are linked to terrorism or potentially contribute to counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado. However, it can be said that the above unverified media claims bridge that link. Moreover, due to the subaltern position of migrants, it is possible that scholars have barely studied the link between migrants in South Africa and operations of ISIS and other terror groups. Similarly, scholars are yet to offer a more empirical and constructive analysis of the nexus between Mozambican migrants and the operation, dynamics, and governance of ISIS in Cabo Delgado. Perhaps the lack of literature stems from scholars' failure to see the links of empirical evidence. Using the population-centric component of counterinsurgency, this paper maintains that studying the views of these refugees and migrants can provide an enhanced understanding of the factors perpetuating the insurgency in Cabo Delgado, and shed light on what else South Africa can do.

INCLUSION OF MOZAMBICAN VIEWS ON SOUTH AFRICA'S INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTERINSURGENCY IN CABO DELGADO

South Africa is the dominant regional power and has significant interests in Cabo Delgado, including contracts of South African companies in constructions on the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal. Additionally, several South African banks have invested in Mozambique LNG (Makonye, 2020; Mabera and Naidu, 2020; Sithole, 2022). It is therefore plausible to argue that South Africa's involvement in counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado is the result of the country's pursuit of economic interests. Contextualized within the realists' perspective, the success that can be made by SAMIM intervention in Cabo Delgado asserts, preserves, and improves the prestige and powers of South Africa as the regional power with the most interests in

Cabo Delgado. At the same time, any failure of SAMIM military operations in Cabo Delgado weakens and ruins South Africa's status as regional power and its related economic interests in Mozambique (Schmidt, 2005; Gbaya, 2015). The underlying rationale here is the supposition that by contributing more troops to SAMIM military operations in Cabo Delgado, South Africa promotes its own interests and economic prosperity. It can also not be ruled out that it is within the South African government's desire to avoid an incessant influx of insurgent groups in Mozambique and the SADC region that might threaten South Africa's economic interests. What can be said here is that South Africa's involvement in counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado takes the form of economic expansion. According to Salimo et al. (2020), Makonye (2020), Mabera and Naidu (2020), and Sithole (2022), South Africa has greater interests in Mozambique's LNG terminal construction in Cabo Delgado's gas industry through its SASOL deals, than any other country in the region.

South Africa's interests in Mozambique are so vivid that on 18 July 2022, while addressing the media at Luthuli House – the African National Congress (ANC) headquarters in Johannesburg – the governing party's head of international relations, Lindiwe Zulu, referred to the document dubbed "In Pursuit of Progressive Internationalism." Zulu asked the party branches to discuss solutions to terrorism and cross-border terror networks on the African continent.[11] According to Zulu, the spike in terror attacks in Mozambique is likely to cause political and economic instability in South Africa if not stopped. Zulu asserted that South Africa's bid for political leadership in the region, and its attempts at economic integration and expansion have consistently implied that it should help resolve African conflicts and play a more active role in peace missions. Hence, this paper underscores the idea that South Africa's involvement in counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado may rest on an assumption that kinetic military operations constitute a means of protecting its interests in Mozambique's gas industry, as espoused by Makonye (2020), Mabera and Naidu (2020), and Sithole (2022). However, the recent assertion by President Nyusi of Mozambique on 7 September 2022 reveals that kinetic military operations might be failing and that the Islamist militant movement in northern Mozambique is spreading to new territory despite efforts by the current local and international military operations to contain it.

Using the population-centric counterinsurgency theory, this paper suggests that the inclusion of the voice of the actual Mozambicans may be one of the alternatives of developing a counter-terror approach that emphasizes direct and indirect ways to secure Cabo Delgado's populations, thereby helping South Africa to isolate the insurgents in that region. The paper acknowledges the difficulty of finding migrants from Cabo Delgado in South Africa due to the region's distance from South Africa. A further constraint is that very few Mozambicans might have reliable knowledge about terrorism in the northern part of the region. These constraints notwithstanding,

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[11] https://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/news/anc-warns-spike-in-mozambique-terror-attacks-likely-to-cause-political-instability-in-sa-fa2d189f-707a-4f92-a86d-a399165417f9. Accessed on 5/3/2023.

studies done by Sinatti and Horst (2015), Galipo (2018), and Arrey and de la Rosa (2021) reveal that migrants can contribute towards both instability, or building sustainable peace in their country of origin through political or economic means. A common thread among the above studies is that through financial remittances to their home countries, migrants, with a particular focus on those in Europe, can be viewed as positively or negatively affecting the peace processes. Galipo (2018) for instance, says that financial remittances can be used to fund the actions of militant, rebel, or insurgent groups in migrants' countries of origin. Positively, Sinatti and Horst (2015) opine that migrants may use their financial means to fund development projects in their countries of origin, thereby promoting stability. Furthermore, Sinatti and Horst (2015), Galipo (2018), and Arrey and de la Rosa (2021) comment that sometimes migrants use lobbying and public demonstration to bring awareness of their home countries on the international stage or in their host countries. "The lobbying usually takes place in the country of settlement, but it may be that diaspora manage to network with international agencies, regional organizations and NGOs" (Galipo, 2018:10). According to Rempel (2013), since 1990, the Palestinian refugees appealed for a voice in negotiations between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel to secure a lasting solution of the Gaza conflict. An equally important case is that of South African exiles during the fight against apartheid. Ellis and Sechaba (1992), Freund and Padayachee (1998), Gilbert (2007), and Thörn (2009) point out that many South Africans in exile played an important role in pressuring their host countries in Africa, Europe, Asia, and North America to support their struggle against the apartheid regime. For instance, after going into exile in 1961, Oliver Tambo, the then president of the ANC, established several anti-apartheid missions across Europe and Africa. It was in some of the established missions that many South Africans had their military training, and developed strategies on how to dismantle the apartheid government. Freund and Padayachee (1998) point out that many South Africans solicited funding for arming and training uMkhonto we Sizwe (the military wing of the ANC) in the USA and the UK. The main aim of uMkhonto we Sizwe was to fight and dismantle the apartheid regime militarily.

In relation to terrorism, a study done by Menkhaus (2010) shows how Somalian migrants, especially in England and the USA, are both assets and liabilities in the fight against terrorism in Somalia. As assets, some Somalian diaspora members have become civil society activists who fund and advocate for good governance, progressive principles, and ensuring that the states intervening in the Somalian conflict put the interests of the locals at center stage. As liabilities, Menkhaus (2008) argues that there are groups of Somalians in the diaspora who use their resources to finance the escalation of the ongoing terror activities in that country. According to Anderson and McKnight (2015), some of the Al-Shabaab funding emanates from contributions from Somalis in the diaspora. Hence, this paper foregrounds ways of doing new types of empirically based research on the role of Mozambican migrants in South Africa in exacerbating terrorism in Cabo Delgado. Although there might be

very few Mozambicans with knowledge of terrorism in Cabo Delgado, listening to their narratives might play a role in any attempt of finding a lasting solution to the insurgency situation in Mozambique.

While the above segment has shown that there is compelling evidence, based on case studies from European countries suggesting that there is an increasing link between migrants and terrorism, some studies argue that the link has been decreasing since the defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria (Paasche and Gunter, 2016; Speckhard et al., 2017). However, with emerging claims in South Africa's media that some migrants are being sanctioned by the USA for their alleged links with terror groups, this paper is cognizant that the enactment of the foregoing claims reveal that there might be a corresponding link between Mozambican migrants and the ongoing insurgency in Cabo Delgado and other parts of Africa. In this case, the people-centric, non-military component of counterinsurgency theory calls for the inclusion and incorporation of the views of Mozambican migrants within the current South African counterinsurgent strategies in Mozambique. This paper acknowledges that the issue of insurgency in Cabo Delgado is a complex one and that it has developed from a range of many factors, including structural and ideational. The paper is also cognizant of studies that have compared the situation in Cabo Delgado to the rise of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria, the Tuareg rebellion that has seen the Islamists take over Northern Mali (Azumah, 2015; Adela, 2021), and the rise of Al Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia (Githigaro and Kabia, 2022; Papale, 2022). The foregoing scholars attribute the causes of insurgency in Cabo Delgado to socioeconomic dynamics and the influence of radical Islamic preachers. This paper concurs with the views of the foregoing scholars and contends that structural and ideational factors might be defining the context of insurgency in Cabo Delgado. For instance, Okunade et al. (2021) and Mutasa and Muchemwa (2022) argue that social and economic factors behind the terrorist attacks in Cabo Delgado are exclusion, marginalization, youth unemployment, rising inequalities, widespread corruption, and poverty of the local communities, who see no real gains from the gas megaproject.

From the foregoing reasons, this paper posits that the current enemy-centered military counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado is mere Band-Aid – a quick and impetuous solution to an intractable and convoluted problem. Instead, the paper suggests that South Africa's involvement in counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado should move away from exclusive reliance on killing the "enemies" towards targeting the people for political support. Fundamentally, the paper calls for the need for empirical studies that include the seemingly forgotten role of Mozambican migrants as an alternative people-centric non-military approach that is more subtle and patient in seeking to undermine terror networks in the SADC region. Implicit here is that some Mozambican migrants have some knowledge of the dynamics of terrorism in that region and they may aid South Africa's policymakers in crafting an all-encompassing people-centric and non-military South African counterinsurgency strategy. This paper does not rule out the possibility of empirical studies that

pay attention to those left behind in Cabo Delgado or those who were forced to migrate to Tanzania because they are the ones who are in direct contact with the insurgents. However, the paper argues that by taking inventory of some Mozambican migrants' insights, perceptions, and attitudes on insurgency in Cabo Delgado, South Africa might revoke and presuppose the rethinking of the current militaristic counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado and other parts of the world that are failing to bear fruits. Specifically, this paper asserts that the stultifying effects and the non-inclusion of Mozambican migrants in South Africa's counterinsurgent interventions in Cabo Delgado do not sufficiently challenge the culture of structural injustices and violence that characterize the genesis of terrorism in that region. For that reason, this paper suggests that South Africa should take cognizance of the roles played by non-state actors, including Mozambican migrants, in producing specific outcomes that define the trajectory of terrorism and counterterrorism in Cabo Delgado and the SADC region.

From an empirical point of view, there are several organizations that researchers can work with to generate qualitative research from Mozambican migrants themselves. For instance, Southern African Migration Management (SAMM),[12] Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (SIHMA),[13] Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS),[14] and the Muslim Refugee Association of South Africa (MRASA)[15] are some of the organizations that are potentially valuable as research sites for future scholars. SAMM, SIHMA, JRS, and MRASA assist all categories of migrants in South Africa. While these organizations are broad in their scope and attempt to assist all migrants, there are other organizations that more specifically provide basic information and assistance to Mozambicans. Many Mozambican organizations in South Africa are run by Mozambican activists and can potentially offer valuable connections to research participants for grounded qualitative studies seeking to consciously include the perceptions and insights of Mozambican migrants in South Africa.

CONCLUSION

The main aim of this paper was to explore how the inclusion of the voices of Mozambicans in South Africa are potential resources for developing a population-centric approach that emphasizes direct and indirect ways to pacify Cabo Delgado by isolating the insurgents. It further argued that due to the likely difficulty of finding Mozambican migrants from Cabo Delgado in South Africa and also the lack of many Mozambican migrants with the required knowledge about terrorism in the northern part of the region, scholars are yet to offer a more constructive analysis on their contribution to the ongoing war against terrorism in Cabo Delgado. In this regard, this paper sought to potentially pave the way for more (hopefully new) empirical research trends into Mozambicans's role in the fight against insurgency

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[12] https://www.sammproject.org. Accessed on 17/11/2022.
[13] https://sihma.org.za. Accessed on 17/11/2022.
[14] https://jrs.net/en/home. Accessed on 17/11/2022.
[15] http://www.mrasa.org.za. Accessed on 17/11/2022.

in Cabo Delgado. To this end, the paper suggests that particular qualitative and ethnographic studies, by drawing on the experiences, insights, and arguments of the Mozambican migrants, can substantively contribute to the alternative approaches to the current militaristic counterinsurgency in Cabo Delgado. This kind of focus, from a qualitative perspective with Mozambican migrants' voices included, allows for the question of whether or not the ongoing participation of South Africa in the militaristic counterinsurgency in Mozambique rests on the imperative of securing its own benefits rather than the benefits of the Mozambicans.

This paper strongly recommends that such a focus should seek to ascertain whether or not the involvement of Mozambican migrants can offer a grassroots-based contribution to the fight against terrorism in Mozambique. Like in the studies done elsewhere suggesting that there is a link between migrants and terrorism, this paper sees the possibility of some Mozambican migrants in South Africa doing the same in Cabo Delgado. Thus, an argument to include the subaltern voices of Mozambican migrants as an alternative approach to the current militaristic counterinsurgency approaches in Cabo Delgado, cannot but deepen the discourse on how counterinsurgency initiatives are perceived and bolstered.

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Who Wants to Go Where? Regional Variations in Emigration Intention in Nigeria

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Abstract

There has been an increase in the number of Nigerians desperately leaving the country. In the absence of accurate data on the rate of actual emigration, this study investigated emigration intention in Nigeria, and how it varies between northern and southern Nigeria – two regions with perennial sociocultural differences that have been neglected in migration research. The study also investigated the factors associated with emigration intention. It utilized secondary data from the Afrobarometer survey, including 1,600 Nigerian adults aged 18 and above. Logistic regression models were fitted to address the study objectives. The study found that the emigration intention rate in Nigeria was 35.5%, but it varied from 30.3% in the north to 40.3% in the south. The rate ranged from 26% in the north-east to 46.4% in the south-eastern part of the country. The most preferred destination for northern Nigerians was another country in Africa (32.4%), but it was North America for southerners (43.2%). At the multivariate level, the study found that living in the south, being educated, using the internet frequently, having tolerance for homosexuals, and participating in politics increased the likelihood of emigration intention. However, being old, employed and having religious tolerance reduced the odds of emigration intention. The regional models revealed notable differences in the influence of age, education, employment, tolerance, and political participation. The study discusses the implications of the findings.

Keywords: migration intention, Afrobarometer survey, regional and cultural differences, "japa"

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INTRODUCTION

Migration is one of the important factors in population change. While migration of Africans to the West has been on the increase, there is also evidence that many Africans migrate within the African continent and to other countries in the Global South (see Crawley et al., 2022). Despite the increase in intra-African migration, many young Africans are still yearning to migrate to Europe. This is to the extent that some Africans risk their lives to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe despite regular media reports of loss of lives on such journeys. The United Nations' 2019 World Population Prospects shows that the net migration rate in Africa is negative, indicating that more people are leaving the continent than those coming in (United Nations, 2019). Eight of the top 15 refugee-sending countries in the world are from Africa, including Nigeria (Milasi, 2020). With the increasing social unrest, youth unemployment, and political corruption, there is a likelihood that more persons will emigrate upon the slightest opportunity, and this has implications for inequality and development of Nigeria and the African continent. To be clear, this is not to say that migration is a negative phenomenon. Migration has been part of human history (Harzig and Hoerder, 2013), and it has numerous advantages (such as cultural exchange) for the countries of origin and destination. However, the circumstances under which many Nigerians emigrate are concerning. These include the selling of their assets to meet visa costs and other travel expenses (Nwosu et al., 2022; Aina, 2023) and irregular migration as a means of survival (Ikuteyijo, 2020).

Local jargon used to connote the desperation to emigrate in Nigeria is "japa." Although the jargon is yet to be well used in academic literature, it has attracted the attention of local and international media. "Japa" is a Yoruba term, which literally means to escape or flee from danger or unpleasant situations. According to Bernard (2023), the jargon became popular in Nigeria after it was used by a hip-hop artist in his musical video to connote fleeing police arrest and running into different cities and countries. In the context of migration, it is used to mean emigrating by all means possible to escape the hopeless situations of insecurity and economic turmoil in Nigeria, according to a CNN report (see Madowo et al., 2023). Despite the exodus of young Nigerians, there is lack of reliable and accurate data on the actual number of people who have emigrated, considering that a number of persons emigrate through unconventional routes and are undocumented.

The lack of accurate data on actual migration has drawn the attention of researchers to emigration intention because migration intention may help predict actual migration behavior (Wanner, 2021). In addition, migration intention, to a considerable extent, may be useful in determining future migration trends (Tjaden et al., 2019). Investigations of migration intention have taken different forms, from the use of large global data such as the Gallup World Poll (Migali and Scipioni, 2019; Tjaden et al., 2019; Milasi, 2020) to the collection of primary data among college students within and among countries (Santric-Milicevic et al., 2014; Abuosi and Abor, 2015; He et al., 2016). The choice of the study population in the latter could have been

informed by the emigration of fresh graduates in developing countries to the West. However, there has also been an increase in the emigration of skilled professionals, including those in the health sector. The attraction of Nigerian health workers by countries such as the United Kingdom (UK) during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic is an example. Hence, studies on emigration intention in the country are now focusing on medical doctors and other health workers (Oluwatunmise et al., 2020; Adebayo and Akinyemi, 2022; Adeniyi et al., 2022; Akinwumi et al., 2022; Onah et al., 2022; Yakubu et al., 2023).

The studies that used the global data show evidence of variations in emigration intention rate across continents (Migali and Scipioni, 2019; Milasi, 2020). Evidence of variation also exists across countries within regions. For example, Afrobarometer Data (2017) shows that in Africa, the emigration intention rate ranges from 13.1% in Madagascar, to 30.9% in Mozambique, to 58.4% in Sierra Leone. This suggests the importance of understanding emigration intention within the local context of each country. Recent studies in Nigeria investigated factors associated with emigration intention in Nigeria (Obi et al., 2020; Adebayo and Akinyemi, 2022; Adeniyi et al., 2022; Akinwumi et al., 2022; Onah et al., 2022; Yakubu et al., 2023). However, there is little emphasis on (1) the regional differences on the rate of emigration intentions between northern and southern Nigeria; and (2) the regional variations in the influence of the factors. Meanwhile, the northern and southern regions have distinct sociocultural differences that shape their views, behaviors, and reactions toward phenomena. For example, there is empirical evidence that the two regions significantly differ in their political behaviors (Alabi, 2023), health behaviors (Alabi et al., 2022; Adejoh et al., 2023) and social behaviors (Alabi and Ramsden, 2022). But such differences have not been well established in the area of migration intentions in the country. This study investigates regional variations in emigration intentions in Nigeria, with a focus on the northern and southern parts of the country. The study also explores regional differences in the preferred countries of destination. Importantly, the study investigates the influence of socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, religion, and employment), perceived level of corruption, internet use, out-group tolerance, and political participation on emigration intention and how the influence varies between the northern and southern parts of the country.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In Nigeria, there is evidence that emigration intentions vary by geographical location and among social groups (Adeniyi et al., 2022; Akinwumi et al., 2022; Onah et al., 2022; Yakubu et al., 2023). Although the study by Yakubu et al. (2023) did not attempt a detailed investigation of north-south differences in Nigeria, the authors found that the south-south geopolitical zone recorded the highest rate of emigration intention (67%), while the south-east recorded the least (43%). However, their study comprised a small sample of fewer than 300 people and focused only on health workers. There is also evidence that the preferred countries of destination for intending migrants

in Nigeria are diverse. In Onah et al.'s (2022) study, the most preferred country of destination was the UK (40%), followed by Canada (17.6%), United States of America (USA) (15.7%), Australia (13.4%), and Saudi Arabia (13.1%). In the study by Adeniyi et al. (2022), Canada was the most preferred country of destination (39.9%), followed by the UK (25.2%), USA (20.3%), and South Africa (6.6%).

Earlier studies documented the influence of socio-demographic factors on emigration intention. Regarding gender, traditionally, the finding has been that males have a higher tendency than females to intend emigrating (Chort, 2014; Burrone et al., 2018; Dibeh et al., 2018; Migali and Scipioni, 2019; Milasi, 2020). However, there has been an increase in the rate of female migration. Hence, the study by Adeniyi et al. (2022) in Nigeria did not find a significant association between gender and emigration intention. The study by Yakubu et al. (2023) found that 61% of women in their study sample have emigration intention compared to 54% of men. Similarly, a report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2022) shows that women and girls constitute the majority of migrants in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. A reason for this is the search for economic equality (Kenny and O'Donnell, 2016; IOM, 2022).

While global data and large data sources within countries have reported an inverse relationship between age and migration intention (Hoti, 2009; Migali and Scipioni, 2019), a survey of 938 first- and fifth-year medical students with a mean age of 19 and 24 respectively in Serbia shows a positive association between age and emigration intention (Santric-Milicevic et al., 2014). In Nigeria, there is evidence that young people have significantly higher migration intention than older people (Obi et al., 2020; Akinwumi et al., 2022; Onah et al., 2022; Yakubu et al., 2023).

Research findings are consistent in that intentions to migrate increase with the level of education (Dako-Gyeke, 2016; Obi et al., 2020; Gevrek et al., 2021). Educated people are more aware of the differences between the ideal opportunities abroad and the current economic and political situation in their country of origin, which may trigger emigration intention (Dako-Gyeke, 2016; Gevrek et al., 2021). In addition, major receiving countries are becoming increasingly restrictive and are more likely to allow the entry of those who are more educated. Studies on the influence of religion on emigration intention are scarce. But earlier studies have shown that religious affiliation may be associated with actual migration. For example, Connor (2012) found that Christians constitute almost half (49%) of international migrants worldwide, compared to 27% of Muslims and 9% of religiously unaffiliated people. In addition, the study by Akinwumi et al. (2022) in Nigeria reveals that Christians reported emigration intention more than Muslims. Also, a report by Pew Research Center (2012) shows that destinations for international migrants may vary by religion.

Regarding employment status, there is evidence that unemployment and underemployment may trigger emigration intention (Adebayo and Akinyemi, 2022; Nwosu et al., 2022; Yakubu et al., 2023). Nwosu et al. (2022) note that unemployment and poverty leave young Nigerians with few options but to embark on irregular

migration because they are unable to afford the cost of regular migration. In addition, underemployment, poor remuneration, and unfair working conditions are the reasons why some skilled workers want to leave the country (Adebayo and Akinyemi, 2022; Yakubu et al., 2023).

The internet and social media may facilitate young people's knowledge of different places within and outside their country. An empirical study by Iwana et al. (2022) found a positive association between internet usage and migration intention. This may be because the internet and social media facilitate communication between young people and migration networks and migration brokers (Dekker et al., 2016; Obi et al., 2020), thereby increasing intentions to migrate. With access to the internet, young people are able to see some differences between their own living conditions and those of their counterparts in other locations. Consequently, intention to migrate may be motivated by an awareness of better opportunities elsewhere observed through the internet, communication with online friends, and access to information about the country of destination (Vilhelmson and Thulin, 2013; Dekker et al., 2016).

The literature is in agreement on the influence of corruption on emigration intention. Poprawe (2015) notes that there is a growing connection between corruption and emigration. Frouws and Brenner (2019) report that corruption motivates regular emigration in at least two ways. One, persistent corruption and poor governance fuel emigration by suggesting failure and hopelessness to educated elites who may migrate to escape the negative consequences happening in their home country. Two, corruption triggers irregular migration – especially in Africa – through bribery of government officials. Directly related to emigration intention is an empirical study by Crisan et al. (2019) who found a positive association between perceived level of corruption and migration intention. The authors report that "Romanian employees who perceive a high level of corruption in the country, have a low level of career satisfaction, and want to find another job are disposed toward migration rather than finding another job in Romania" (Crisan et al., 2019: 1).

Political participation may be an important political driver of emigration. Studies in this regard have not directly linked political participation to emigration intention but in other interesting ways. For instance, Umpierrez de Reguero and Finn (2023) investigated how international migration affects voter turnouts in both sending and receiving countries. Interestingly, they found that the higher the interest in politics, the higher the intention to vote in both sending and receiving countries. From another perspective, Hiskey et al. (2014) found that the quality of the democratic system drives emigration desires in young people. This resonates with what happened in Nigeria after the national elections held in February and March 2023. Many young people alleged that the electoral process was not free and fair and that political thugs openly intimidated perceived opponents and stopped them from voting. This was followed by expressions of hopelessness on social media and the consequent trending of #japa on Twitter.

Studies on the link between tolerance and emigration intention are rare. This study views tolerance from three dimensions: tolerance for homosexual persons, people of other religions, and foreign nationals. Studies in this regard have focused on migrants' attitudes toward members of out-groups in the host countries and migrants' adjustment to tolerance of behaviors that are deemed unacceptable in the country of origin (Röder and Lubbers, 2016; Röder and Spierings, 2022). Homosexuality is proscribed in Nigeria. In addition, Nigeria is a religious country. Therefore, people who have favorable attitudes toward homosexuality may desire to emigrate to another country where homosexuality is allowed.

Some lessons and gaps from the literature review, include: (a) most studies conducted in Nigeria did not use nationally representative data; hence, it is not easy to generalize their findings to the entire country; (b) recent studies on emigration intention in Nigeria tend to focus on health workers, and their explanatory variables are limited to socio-demographic characteristics and push-pull analyses; (c) there is little empirical evidence to establish the roles of perceived corruption, tolerance, and political participation on emigration intention in Nigeria; and (d) to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate Nigerian north-south differences in emigration intention, preferred places of destination, and associated factors.

METHODS

Data and population

The study utilized the 2017 (i.e., the seventh round of) Afrobarometer survey in Nigeria. Afrobarometer collects survey data across 34 countries in Africa, including Nigeria.[3] Afrobarometer survey data are nationally representative, and they have been analyzed in academic papers, including doctoral theses (Isbell, 2022) and journal articles (Diallo, 2022). Afrobarometer collects data on a range of issues, including perception of democracy and governance, political participation, and economic outlook, among others. In Nigeria, the latest round of Afrobarometer (round 8) survey was conducted in 2021 and released in 2022. However, the latest round did not capture issues around emigration intention in Nigeria.[4] Hence, this study analyzed the 2017 (round 7) Afrobarometer survey data.

The survey is nationally representative and samples all 36 states in Nigeria plus the federal capital territory (FCT). The 36 states and the FCT are subdivided into 6 geopolitical zones, namely: North East, North Central, North West, South East, South South, and South West. This study groups all 36 states and the FCT into north or south. Figure 1 shows the map of Nigeria with all the states in each of the two regions. In all, the northern region houses 19 states and the FCT, while the south is comprised of 17 states.

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[3] See https://www.afrobarometer.org/
[4] https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/afrobarometer_questionnaire_nig_r8_en_2019-11-01.pdf

Figure 1: Map of Nigeria showing the states in northern and southern regions

Operationalization of variables

The main dependent variable is emigration intention measured by whether a respondent is considering relocating to another country. Respondents were asked, "How much, if at all, have you considered moving to another country to live?" with response options like, "not at all," "a little bit," "somewhat," "a lot," and "don't know." The responses were categorized into two, with "not at all" recoded as "0" and labeled "no emigration intention," while "a little bit," "somewhat," and "a lot" were recoded as "1" referring to respondents with emigration intention. Respondents were also asked about the preferred destination countries. The question was: "If you were to move to another country, where would you be most likely to go?" The options included countries within and outside Africa. Respondents were also asked about the actual plans they made toward migration, reasons for possible emigration, and preferred destination country.

There are nine independent variables that comprise five socio-demographic variables: gender, age, education, religion, and employment. The four other variables are: perceived level of corruption, frequency of internet use, tolerance (from three dimensions) and political participation. Age, which was captured at ratio level, was categorized according to the World Health Organization's standard age groups, into "less than 30," "30–44," and "45 and above" (Ahmad et al., 2001). Education was recoded into four categories in line with the Nigerian education system. The

categories are: "no formal education," "primary education," "secondary education," and "tertiary education." Religion was recoded into the two popular religions in the country – Christianity and Islam. Other smaller categories were not considered for analysis in this study. Regarding employment, respondents were asked whether they have a job that pays cash income, with options like, "No (not looking)," "no (looking)," "yes, part-time," and "yes, full-time." The first two options were treated as being unemployed, and the other two as being employed. For the perceived level of corruption, respondents were asked: "In your opinion, over the past year, has the level of corruption in this country increased, decreased, or stayed the same?" There were five options: "increased a lot," "increased somewhat," "stayed the same," "decreased somewhat," and "decreased a lot," which were recoded into three categories: "increased," "the same," and "decreased." Similarly, the options to the question on frequency of internet use were: "never," "less than a month," "a few times a month," "a few times a week," and "every day." The first and last options remained the same, while the second to fourth options were treated as "sometimes."

Regarding out-group tolerance, there were three variables, namely: tolerance of "people of a different religion," "homosexuals," and "immigrants or foreign workers." Respondents were asked, "Please tell me whether you would like having people from this group as neighbors, dislike it, or not care." Those who would dislike having them were treated as "intolerant;" those who would not care were regarded as "neutral;" while those who would like to have them were regarded as "tolerant." Regarding political participation, the study adopted the earlier operationalization used by Dim and Asomah (2019). Respondents were asked if they had done any of the following things during the past year: "Join others in your community to request action from the government;" "contact the media;" "contact a government official for help;" and "attend a demonstration or a protest march." The response format was: "No = 0;" "No, but would do if had the chance = 1;" "Yes, once or twice = 2;" "Yes, several times = 3;" and "Yes, often = 4." The responses were summed and treated as a scale variable at the inferential level of analysis, and recoded accordingly (i.e., 0–1 as "No" and 2–4 as "Yes") where necessary in the analysis.

Data analysis

The analysis began from the descriptive level where we presented the frequency distribution of all the variables by regions (i.e., north and south) as shown in Table 1. The study used simple frequencies, percentages, mean, standard deviation, and column and bar charts to present graphical illustrations of results at the univariate level. At the inferential level, we computed a series of logistic regression (LR) models. First, we ran bivariate logistic regression to show how each of the nine predicting factors are associated with emigration intention. In addition, we put all nine independent variables in a single model to observe effects of covariates at the multivariate level. The results of bivariate and multivariate regression are presented in Table 2. Later, we computed two separate multivariate models (i.e., one for each

region); these results are presented in Table 3. We ran the correlation matrix to test for multicollinearity but found no evidence of such, as no correlation coefficient was up to 0.7. The LR models were fitted at 95% level of significance. In Table 4, we present a summary of all the results to enhance clarity.

RESULTS

Findings from descriptive analyses

Table 1: Frequency distribution of all variables

	North (779)		South (822)	
Gender	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Male	391	50.2	411	50.0
Female	388	49.8	411	50.0
Age				
Less than 30	390	50.2	408	49.6
30-44	253	32.6	264	32.2
45 and above	134	17.2	149	18.2
	Mean age: 33.8;	SD: 37.856	Mean age: 32.9	SD: 13.025
Education				
No formal education	212	27.4	18	2.2
Primary education	119	15.3	96	11.8
Secondary education	239	30.8	461	56.2
Tertiary education	206	26.5	245	29.8
Religion				
Christianity	188	25.1	689	86.6
Islam	559	74.9	107	13.4
Employment				
Unemployed	454	58.2	358	43.5
Employed	325	41.8	464	56.5
Perceived level of corruption				
Increased	193	25.0	491	60.0
The same	98	12.6	126	15.4
Reduced	483	62.4	202	24.6
Frequency of internet use				
Never	489	62.7	336	41.1
Sometimes	147	18.8	243	29.7
Everyday	144	18.4	239	29.2
Religious tolerance				
No	159	20.7	119	14.6
Neutral	145	18.9	165	20.2
Yes	464	60.4	536	65.3

(continued)

(continued)

Tolerance of homosexuals				
No	703	91.0	754	92.0
Neutral	39	5.0	42	5.2
Yes	30	3.9	23	2.8
Tolerance of immigrants/foreign workers				
No	157	20.4	80	9.8
Neutral	209	27.2	186	22.7
Yes	403	52.4	552	67.5
Political participation				
Join others to request for government action	262	33.7	196	23.8
Contacted the media	182	23.6	189	23.0
Contacted a government official	220	28.3	166	20.3
Attended a protest	137	17.7	149	18.2
Emigration intention				
No	540	69.7	489	59.7
Yes	235	30.3	330	40.3
Planning/preparation for emigration*				
Currently making any specific plans or preparations	124	53.2	172	52.2
Planning to move in the next year or two but not yet making preparations	86	36.7	114	34.8
Currently making preparations to move, like getting a visa	33	10.0	43	13.0

* Not inclusive of those who have no intention to emigrate

Source: Authors' own calculation from Afrobarometer Data, 2017.

There is evidence of considerable regional differences in the variables. The rate of emigration intention in Nigeria was 35.5%. But it varies from 30.3% in the north to 40.3% in the south. As shown in Figure 2, the North East (26%) and the North West (29.7%) had the least emigration intention rates. The South East and the South West had the highest rate of intention to migrate (46.4% and 43.1%, respectively). Out of the respondents who indicated an intention to emigrate, more than half in both regions (53.2% in the north and 52.2% in the south) were making specific plans. More than one-third (36.7% in the north and 34.8% in the south) were yet to prepare but were planning to move in the next two years. At least one-tenth (10% in the north and 13% in the south) had made sufficient preparations, such as getting a visa.

Figure 2: Emigration intention by geo-political zones

Source: Afrobarometer Data, 2017.

We found differences in the preferred destination country between the two regions. Figure 3 shows that the most preferred destination country for northern respondents is Ghana (17.8%), a neighboring country, followed by Europe (17.3%), North America (17%), and the Middle East (9.4%). In all, 32.4% of northern respondents preferred migrating to another country within Africa. In contrast, the preferred destination places for southern respondents were North America (43.2%), Europe (23.9%), and Central and South America (6.3%). The Middle East was the least preferred destination place for southern respondents (1%), while Australia emerged as the least preferred destination country for northern respondents (5.3%).

Figure 3: Preferred destinations

Source: Afrobarometer Data, 2017.

Factors influencing emigration intention in Nigeria

Table 2 shows that respondents from the south had a higher likelihood of emigration intention than those from the north at both bivariate and multivariate levels (OR: 1.549; AOR: 1.613, p<0.001). Age had a significant influence on emigration intention, and people aged 30 and above had lower odds of emigration intention than respondents younger than 30. In the multivariate model, however, people aged 45 and above did not differ significantly from those who were younger than 30. At both bivariate and multivariate levels, respondents who had secondary or tertiary education were significantly more likely to have an emigration intention than those without formal education. At the multivariate level, for example, those who had secondary education were 1.7 times more likely to have emigration intention than those with no formal education (reference category). The odds were 1.9 for those who had tertiary education (p: 0.009). At the bivariate level, Muslims were significantly less likely to intend to emigrate than Christians (OR: 0.686, p<0.001), but the association was not significant at the multivariate level.

Table 2: Regression model showing the predictors of emigration intention in Nigeria

Predictors	Bivariate logistic regression					Multivariate model 1 Model X2 (p): 162.534 (<0.001); H & L Test (p): 7.270 (0.508); Nagelkerke R²: 0.141				
	β	p	OR	95% C.I.for EXP(B)		β	p	AOR	95% C.I.for EXP(B)	
				Lower	Upper					Upper
Region										
South	.438	<0.001	1.549	1.259	1.906	.478	.002	1.613	1.188	2.189
Gender										
Female	-.011	.919	.989	.806	1.215	.068	.571	1.070	.846	1.354
Age										
30-44	-.450	<0.001	.638	.504	.806	-.362	.007	.696	.535	.906
45 and above	-.525	<0.001	.592	.441	.793	-.171	.322	.843	.601	1.182
Education										
Primary	.376	.089	1.457	.944	2.249	.340	.181	1.405	.854	2.312
Secondary	.747	<0.001	2.112	1.487	2.999	.522	.021	1.685	1.081	2.627
Tertiary	1.071	<0.001	2.919	2.024	4.209	.645	.009	1.905	1.174	3.093
Religion										
Islam	-.377	.001	.686	.554	.849	.228	.140	1.257	.928	1.702
Employment										
Employed	-.251	.017	.778	.633	.956	-.262	.030	.769	.607	.974
Level of corruption										
The same	.062	.694	1.064	.780	1.452	.167	.332	1.182	.843	1.659
Reduced	-.264	.021	.768	.614	.960	-.025	.859	.975	.742	1.283
Frequency of internet use										
Sometimes	.415	.002	1.515	1.171	1.959	.090	.563	1.094	.807	1.484
Every day	1.040	<0.001	2.829	2.198	3.641	.859	<0.001	2.361	1.695	3.288
Religious tolerance										
Neutral	-.276	.102	.759	.545	1.056	-.357	.089	.700	.463	1.057
Tolerant	-.475	.001	.622	.474	.816	-.725	<0.001	.484	.343	.683
Sexual orientation tolerance										
Neutral	.473	.039	1.605	1.024	2.517	.291	.263	1.338	.804	2.227
Tolerant	1.079	<0.001	2.940	1.675	5.161	1.004	.002	2.729	1.435	5.190
Tolerance of foreign nationals										
Neutral	-.030	.864	.970	.687	1.370	.071	.749	1.073	.696	1.654
Tolerant	.215	.163	1.240	.917	1.678	.425	.029	1.529	1.044	2.240
Political participation	.085	<0.001	1.089	1.055	1.124	.070	<0.001	1.073	1.035	1.112
Constant	--	--	--	--	--	-1.556	<0.001	.211		

Reference category; Male; Less than 30 years; No education; Christianity; unemployed; increased; never; intolerant. β: Beta coefficient; p: p-value

Source: Created by authors

Respondents who were employed were significantly less likely to have emigration intention than those who were unemployed (AOR: 0.769; p: 0.030). At the bivariate level, perceived level of corruption was associated with emigration intention. Respondents who felt that corruption had reduced had lower likelihood of having emigration intention compared to those who thought that the level of corruption had increased (OR: 0.768; p: 0.021). But the association was not significant in the multivariate model. We found evidence that the frequent use of the internet had a significant influence on emigration intention at bivariate and multivariate levels. Model 1 shows that Nigerians who used the internet daily were 2.4 times more likely to have emigration intention compared to those who had no access to the internet. The three types of out-group tolerance were significant predictors of emigration intention but the directions of association differed. At the multivariate level, respondents who exhibited religious tolerance were less likely to have emigration intention compared to those who were intolerant (AOR: 0.484; p<0.001). But the reverse was the case for tolerance for homosexuals and tolerance for migrants. Respondents who expressed tolerance for homosexuals were 2.7 times more likely to have emigration intention than those who were intolerant (p: 0.002). Similarly, respondents who expressed tolerance for migrants were 1.5 times more likely to have emigration intention than those who were not tolerant. The model also shows that intention to migrate increased with political participation at both bivariate and multivariate levels.

Differences in the factors influencing migration intention

Table 2 shows that respondents from northern and southern Nigeria significantly differed in their emigration intention. We computed separate models for each region and present the results in Table 3.

Table 3: Logistic regression models showing regional differences in the predictors of emigration intention in Nigeria

Predictors	North (Multivariate Model 2)					South (Multivariate Model 3)				
	β	p	OR	95% C.I.for EXP(B)		β	p	OR	95% C.I.for EXP(B)	
				Lower	Upper				β	Upper
Gender						p				
Female	.289	.139	1.335	.911	1.956	AOR	.425	.881	.646	1.202
Age										
30-44	-.212	.301	.809	.541	1.209	-.445	.016	.641	.446	.921
45 and above	.017	.950	1.017	.602	1.719	-.342	.143	.710	.450	1.122
Education										
Primary	.582	.065	1.789	.964	3.319	-.707	.218	.493	.160	1.517
Secondary	.437	.127	1.548	.884	2.710	-.269	.611	.764	.270	2.159
Tertiary	.829	.010	2.292	1.224	4.291	-.286	.602	.752	.257	2.200
Religion										
Islam	.032	.884	1.032	.675	1.577	.441	.056	1.555	.989	2.444
Employment										
Employed	-.448	.018	.639	.441	.925	-.122	.453	.885	.643	1.218
Level of corruption										
The same	.308	.305	1.360	.756	2.449	.058	.790	1.060	.690	1.628
Reduced	-.056	.800	.946	.616	1.452	.036	.851	1.037	.712	1.509
Frequency of internet use										
Sometimes	.268	.296	1.308	.791	2.163	-.033	.869	.967	.650	1.439
Every day	.726	.008	2.066	1.204	3.545	.848	<0.001	2.334	1.509	3.610
Religious tolerance										
Neutral	-.159	.628	.853	.448	1.623	-.534	.063	.586	.334	1.029
Tolerant	-.669	.020	.512	.291	.902	-.789	.001	.454	.285	.724
Sexual orientation tolerance										
Neutral	.606	.134	1.833	.831	4.048	.067	.851	1.069	.533	2.143
Tolerant	1.958	<0.001	7.088	2.556	19.656	-.029	.955	.972	.361	2.616
Tolerance of foreign nationals										
Neutral	.028	.932	1.028	.543	1.948	-.002	.994	.998	.536	1.859
Tolerant	.633	.030	1.884	1.063	3.339	.150	.587	1.162	.677	1.993
Political participation	.045	.107	1.046	.990	1.104	.085	.001	1.088	1.035	1.145
Constant	-1.710	<0.001	.181			.114	.859	1.120		

Reference category; Male; Less than 30 years; No education; Christianity; unemployed; increased; never; intolerant. β: Beta coefficient; p: p-value

Source: Created by authors

Model X² (p) 89.611 (<0.001)
H & L Test (p) 14.211 (0.076)
Nagelkerke R²: 0.167

Model X² (p)   80.958 (<0.001)
H & L Test (p) 5.657 (0.686)
Nagelkerke R²: 0.133

We found that gender, which was significantly associated with emigration intention in model 1 (national model) is not a significant predictor at the regional levels. Age did not show any significant association with emigration intention in the north. But in the south, respondents aged 30–44 were less likely to have emigration intention compared to those who were younger than 30 (AOR: 0.641; p: 0.016).

We observed regional differences in the influence of education. In the south, education did not show any significant influence on emigration intention. However, in the north, respondents who had tertiary education were 2.3 times more likely to have emigration intention compared to those who had no formal education (p: 0.010). Religion was not a significant predictor of emigration intention at regional levels.

The perceived level of corruption did not show any significant association with emigration intention in the two regions. We found similarities in both regions regarding the influence of internet use – those who used the internet every day were more likely to have emigration intention than those who did not use the internet at all (North: AOR: 2.066; p: 0.008; South: 2.334; p<0.001). Religious tolerance was a significant predictor of emigration intention in both regions. The indication was that those who had religious tolerance were less likely to have emigration intention than those who were intolerant (North: AOR: 0.512; p: 0.020; South: AOR: 0.454; p: 0.001). However, differences were evident in the influence of tolerance of homosexual persons and foreign nationals, as seen in Table 3. In the north, respondents who tolerate homosexuals were 7.1 times more likely to have emigration intention than those who were intolerant (p<0.001), but the association was not significant in the south. Similarly, in the north, respondents who had tolerance for foreign nationals were 1.9 times more likely to have emigration intention than those who were intolerant (p: 0.17). But the association was not significant in the south. We found evidence that political participation was significantly associated with emigration intention in the south (AOR: 1.088, p<0.001), but not in the north. Table 4 below presents a summary of the results.

Table 4: Summary of results

S/N	Independent variables	Bivariate	Multivariate (Nigeria)	Multivariate (North)	Multivariate (South)
1	Region	✓	✓	-	-
2	Gender	X	X	X	X
3	Age	✓	✓	X	✓
4	Education	✓	✓	✓	X
5	Religion	✓	X	X	X
6	Employment	✓	✓	✓	X
7	Perceived level of corruption	✓	X	X	X
8	Frequency of internet use	✓	✓	✓	✓
9a	Religious tolerance	✓	✓	✓	✓
9b	Tolerance of homosexuals	✓	✓	✓	X
9c	Tolerance of migrants	X	✓	✓	X
10	Political participation	✓	✓	X	✓

✓ Significant predictor at 95%

X Not a significant predictor at 95%

DISCUSSION

This study investigated regional variations in emigration intention in Nigeria and associated factors. The study found that the rate of emigration intention is higher in the south than in the north. Specifically, South West and South East recorded the highest rates of emigration intention. Our results contradict the study of Yakubu et al. (2023), who report that health workers in the South East geopolitical zone have the lowest emigration intention.

There are plausible reasons why the south has higher emigration intention rates than the north. It should be noted that the explanations here are in the context of international migration, because people from the northern and the southern regions move within the country. One, it may be that, in totality, the north is more protective and preserving of its culture than the south. Hence, the idea of "japa" is taken more seriously in the south than in the north. Two, there is a possibility of perceived cultural differences. Northerners may perceive that some of their cultural practices (such as polygyny, adolescent marriage, etc.) may not be allowed in the West, and that may explain why they have lower emigration intention than those in the south. Perceived cultural differences and similarities may also explain why the majority (32.4%) of northern respondents preferred Ghana or elsewhere in Africa as destination countries, as there is the greater possibility of cultural similarity within Africa than outside the continent. Cultural dis(similarity) emerged as an important factor in migration decisions and patterns (Lanati and Venturini, 2021).

Three, many states in Nigeria rely on agriculture. However, the northern region (as shown in Figure 1) has a larger landmass to engage in agricultural activities than the southern region. Since land is immobile, northerners may prefer to stay back. Four, international migration requires education. In fact, education is the route through which many young Nigerians emigrate (Mbah, 2017). Since the

level of formal education is higher in the south than in the north, as seen in Table 1, it is reasonable to expect that the emigration rate will be higher in the former than in the latter.

Five, Reynolds (2002) established that the Igbo people of the South East have been migrating to the USA since the 1970s. They have formed associations such as the Organization for Ndi Igbo (ONI) that attract people to the USA from the Igbo regions in the south-eastern part of Nigeria. It is common to see Igbo people who have achieved success in the diaspora return to South East in Nigeria every December to celebrate Christmas in a plush manner. This practice may entice people at home to also want to emigrate. Furthermore, it may explain why the region has the highest emigration intention in the country. Van den Bersselaar (2005) observes that the Igbos, resting on the claims of the colonial masters, believe that migrating to the West will bring progress to their local community of origin. The author (2005: 3) notes that "successful migrants appropriated these claims as part of a strategy to achieve power, influence or at least recognition in the community of origin. By introducing what they perceived as progress and modernity, they intended to change the village materially." The fact that the South West region has the second-highest emigration intention rate may be explained by the fact that education is prevalent in the region and tenacity to the local culture is not common. This is in line with the position of the cosmopolitan-success and conservative-failure hypothesis (CSCFH) (Kunnuji et al., 2017; Alabi et al., 2022) that people from conservative regions of the north may be more protective of traditional culture and may be less willing to explore foreign lands than those in the cosmopolitan south.

Our regression models found no significant influence of gender on emigration intention. This supports the finding of Adeniyi et al. (2022) and testifies to the fact that women are currently migrating as much as men. This study found that people younger than 30 have higher odds of emigration intention than those aged 30 and above. This is consistent with the earlier studies (Migali and Scipioni, 2019; Akinwumi et al., 2022; Onah et al., 2022; Yakubu et al., 2023) that report a negative relationship between age and emigration intention. This may be explained by the fact that younger people are usually considered more mobile and have a greater urge to explore than older people. Additionally, since they are more likely to be single than older people, there is the ease of intending emigration considering that they have no immediate dependants (such as wives and children) whom they have to consider in their plans.

The finding on the influence of education in the overall model and northern Nigeria is consistent with previous studies (Migali and Scipioni, 2019; Milasi, 2020; Gevrek et al., 2021). Higher emigration intention among the highly educated may be due to potential better job opportunities for them than those who are less educated. Another possible reason is the language barrier. English is the official language in Nigeria but not everyone can speak or write it fluently. Chances are that the highly educated will be equipped with these skills, thereby increasing their chances of

potential successful integration, more so than for the less educated. The language factor may explain why those who have tertiary education have the highest likelihood of emigration compared to those with no formal education, especially in the overall model and in the north. The finding that unemployed persons were more likely to intend emigrating is supported by Milasi's (2020) study. However, this should be treated with caution, as the association may not hold for the actual migration. Being employed is a stepping stone for many young Nigerians. Chances are that those who have had a few years of work experience may have more opportunities to emigrate than those who are unemployed.

The finding that those who use the internet are more likely to want to emigrate is supported by previous studies (Vilhelmson and Thulin, 2013; Dekker et al., 2016; Obi et al., 2020). Using the internet suggests that the users may be exposed to a foreign culture, networks of Nigerian immigrants abroad, and are more aware of better living opportunities overseas.

Surprisingly, in this study, religious tolerance is a significant predictor of emigration intention. In all our models, those who are religiously tolerant were less likely to have emigration intention than those who are intolerant. This appears counterintuitive as one will expect tolerant respondents to want to emigrate, more than the intolerant ones. Further studies are required in this regard. Perhaps, what could explain this surprising finding is that, although the intolerant group indicates emigration intention, more so than their tolerant counterparts, the majority of them prefer Ghana or another country in West Africa (27.2%) compared to 13.2% of tolerant groups. It shows that some religiously intolerant persons prefer another country within Africa where they can continue to practice their religion and interact more with in-group members.

In contrast to religious tolerance, respondents who tolerate homosexuality are more likely to have emigration intention than those who are intolerant in the overall model and in the north. The finding that the tolerant group expressed emigration intention, more so than the intolerant ones is understandable. In line with the similarity-attraction theory, it is expected that someone who tolerates homosexual persons will want to emigrate, especially to the West, where the laws of those countries accommodate homosexual persons.

This study found that political participation increases the likelihood of emigration intention in the overall model and in the south. The finding is consistent with the research conducted by Umpierrez de Reguero and Finn (2023). Common sense suggests that those who participate in politics would choose to remain in Nigeria, as opposed to those who do not participate in politics. What this indicates is that those who participate in politics are dissatisfied with the democratic process. Hence, they want to go elsewhere.

CONCLUSION

This study has contributed to the wave of recent studies exploring north-south differences from different perspectives in Nigeria (Alabi and Ramsden, 2022; Alabi et al., 2022; Adejoh et al., 2023; Alabi, 2023). The study has shown that indeed the northern and southern Nigerian regions may have some differences that are noteworthy to policymakers. The study has shown that southerners want to emigrate from the country more than northerners. In addition, the two regions have differences in their preferred migration destinations. The northerners seem to prefer intra-African migration and the Middle East, while the southerners prefer Europe and North America. It appears that potential migrants from the north favor destination countries that are culturally similar to their own. We believe that this may have implications for return migration intention, that is, whether or not Nigerian migrants abroad intend to return to their home country. This may be an interesting area of research for future studies.

A major lesson for future studies is the need to reconsider analyzing data on Nigeria as a single entity. Future studies should not assume that a certain predicting factor applies across regions. This study has shown that some predicting factors in one region may not be significant in another region. Hence, future studies may need to disaggregate their data into regions (as we have done in this study) or into six geopolitical zones for more in-depth analysis. In conclusion, this study has shown that the regular use of the internet increases the likelihood of having emigration intention across the two regions. Moreover, religious tolerance reduces the chances of emigration intention in the regions. Finally, the effects of other factors, such as age, education, political participation, and tolerance of homosexual persons and migrants are not the same in the northern and southern regions.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study has a few limitations. One, the north and the south are broad entities and comprise diverse and multi-ethnic groups. This study does not account for the variations among different groups within each region. Two, factors associated with emigration intention are endless and this study does not claim to have captured all of them. Emigration intention may not necessarily translate to actual migration, especially in developing countries like Nigeria where the currency has a low value against major foreign currencies. The increasing costs of flights and obtaining visas hamper potential migrants from translating their intention into reality. However, there is a higher tendency for someone who has emigration intention to eventually move, than one who never considered it, *ceteris paribus*.

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Mobility, Gender, and Experiences of Familyhood among Migrant Families in Tsholotsho, Zimbabwe

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Abstract

Migration has a long-standing history in Southern Africa. This paper aims to understand how ongoing contextual transformations due to migration actively shape narratives about families. Specifically, how families and familial relationships have been constructed through the everyday interactions and roles within the family. Through the family histories method, we generated novel data that shows how family accounts transcend normative boundaries of familyhood and how they change in time and across place, which, we argue, are required to understand migrant families. We adopt a multi-sited and gendered approach to gather data from left-behind women in Tsholotsho and migrant men in Johannesburg. The findings show that the meaning of family for left-behind women has remained confined to the normative parameters of kinship, biological, and marital ties. In the past, with husbands and fathers who migrated, families invoked substitute authority in decision-making, where power was conferred onto other men, perpetuating patriarchal dominance and gender inequality. Furthermore, the findings reveal that in the past, while away, migrant men's family-linking practices were very minimal, limited by distance. For migrant men, migration invoked a reconceptualization of family that differs from the normative assumptions of family composition. These assumptions notwithstanding, migrant men still thrived on maintaining links with their families to retain their dignity and legitimacy.

Keywords: families, migration, gender, Tsholotsho, Johannesburg

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INTRODUCTION

In Southern Africa, human mobility within and between countries has a long history (Yabiku et al., 2010; Posel and Marx, 2013). This mobility has been crucial in shaping the socioeconomic order of the region (Musoni, 2020). While governments in the region have attempted to control migration between countries, it continues to be a vicious cycle driven by deteriorating economic conditions in some countries leading to the search for better livelihoods by new generations of migrant families in relatively better-off countries in the region (Potts and Mutambirwa, 1990; Ncube et al., 2014; Zack et al., 2019). Through family histories, this paper explores how mobility actively shapes familyhood in Zimbabwean migrant families as they construct familyhood between Johannesburg and Tsholotsho. We use gender, space, and time as parameters of analysis. By appealing to respondents' memory, this paper explores what evolving relationships have shaped their familyhood in three generations of migrants and whether new forms of familyhood emerge as members move. If so, we inquire whether new practices conflict with or replace forms of familyhood. Are these new "families" hidden from the more normative ones? Do they supplement or enrich the earlier structures? This paper shows how time, space, and gender in the context of mobility shape the experiences of familyhood for both left-behind women and migrant men. Through the current lens of transnationalism, this paper explores the different ways that migration has shaped families over time, revealing different nuances of relatedness and familyhood. The time approach through generations of migrants reveals the realities of the disconnect between families in the past and the connections in the current transnational social space of family life.

The next section presents background literature on experiences of familyhood and the conceptualization of familyhood in Southern Africa. The subsequent sections explain the methods used, provide a brief description of the respondents, and present and discuss the study's key results; this is followed by the conclusions.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Experiences of mobility and familyhood in Southern Africa

Throughout the history of migration in Southern Africa, mobility has actively shaped the experiences of familyhood. During the colonial era, men moved from their rural homes to urban areas searching for wage employment (Potts and Mutambirwa, 1990). For example, in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), the colonial regime favored the contractual employment of single (male) migrants in cities, yet it prevented them from permanent settlement (Potts and Mutambirwa, 1990). The colonial government promoted institutionalized division of families by restricting the mobility of other population groups, especially women and children, to protect settler minority interests (Mlambo, 2010). This labor system forcibly divided families through influx control (Potts and Mutambirwa, 1990), leading to social strain on familial relationships.

The system of migrant labor in Southern Africa took many forms. These included the institutionalized and regulated contract labor system servicing the mines in the 1800s and the informal, clandestine – often undocumented – irregular migration between countries (Mlambo, 2010). As people moved within the region, the most popular destinations were South Africa and Zimbabwe. On the one hand, South Africa received migrants from neighboring countries like Malawi, Mozambique, and Lesotho, under the administrative arrangements between the then Rhodesian government and the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) of 1974. In this arrangement, younger men were preferred for contracts in the mining industry, while no contracts were available for women (Murray, 1981). On the other hand, Rhodesia's booming manufacturing and mining industry made the country a net importer of labor. The labor recruitment agency known as the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) supplied approximately 13,000 workers a year to the different industries in the country (Wilson, 1976; Mlambo, 2010). The workers were recruited from Nyasaland (now Malawi), Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), and Mozambique (Scott, 1954). Just like in the case of the mining industry in South Africa, the labor system in Rhodesia also preferred men while women remained in the communal lands (Potts and Mutambirwa, 1990).

During the post-independence era, most governments in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) inherited functional and booming economies within which migration continued. Despite the independence, the colonial migration systems in the region left indelible marks that continued to shape the form of mobility in the SADC (Delius, 2017), for example, uneven spatial development in rural and urban areas (Takyi, 2011). Resultantly, after independence, this spatial differentiation of development initiatives fueled rural-urban migration in most countries in the region (Munzwa and Wellington, 2010). In post-independence Zimbabwe, when mobility restrictions were lifted and the black majority gained the "right to the city," rural-urban migration increased due to the shift toward family migration and independent migration of women in search of employment in the urban centers where economic activities were concentrated (Potts and Mutambirwa, 1990; Potts, 2010). Although the internal migrant labor system became family-friendly, some women had to return to the communal areas during farming to till the family land. In this way, migrant families maximized economic security by protecting their rights to land while maintaining wage employment in the city (Potts and Mutambirwa, 1990). Although there was a sense of family unification, families remained significantly divided as some men did not have enough accommodation for their families in the cities (Potts and Mutambirwa, 1990).

Although countries like Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Lesotho inherited prosperous economies after independence, a few years later, they experienced a long spiral of economic decline (Murray, 1981; Platteau, 2009; Mlambo, 2010; Kwenda and Ntuli, 2014; Adekoye and Kondlo, 2020). The deteriorating economic performance and the reduction in agricultural productivity in most countries perpetuated internal and

external mobility (Maviza, 2020). This resulted in changes in household livelihood strategies as families shifted from primary familial subsistence systems to capitalist production systems that reinforced a growing dependence on wage employment (Crush and Frayne, 2010). From Murray's (1981) work on the impacts of labor migration on families in Lesotho (and, by inference, on other marginal areas within Southern Africa) and other similar works in the region, for example, Zimbabwe (Crush and Tevera, 2010), Namibia (Hishongwa, 1992), and Mozambique (Yabiku et al., 2010), it is evident that migration typically divided families (Murray, 1981; Potts and Mutambirwa, 1990), yet is not clear how these movements have shaped familyhood in migrant families.

In the contemporary landscape, mobility continues to divide families. However, the effects are not as pronounced as in historical times due to improved technologies of connection that traverse geographic boundaries (Collyer and King, 2012). Technological developments have led to transnational migration, defined as "a process of movement and settlement across international borders in which individuals maintain or build multiple networks of connection to their country of origin while at the same time settling in a new country" (Fouron and Schiller, 2001: 60). This is unlike in the past, where migrants' contact with their families was very irregular and nominal because migrants were uprooted from their families and integrated into the host countries with limited means to facilitate links with families back home (Maviza, 2020). Although there was some form of bidirectional mobility then, it cannot compare to the contemporary simultaneous embeddedness of migrant members enabled by the modern-day structuring of the world economy and the technological advancements in transport and communication. These have allowed migrants to remain virtually present in their families despite physical absence (Helmsing, 2003). The transnational approach that focuses on the fluidity of social life and relationships facilitated by technology, has various strands of theorization. First used in the 1990s and pioneered by Schiller et al. (1992) and Basch et al. (1994), the latter define transnational migration as:

> The processes by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement. Immigrants who build such social fields are designated ["transnational migrants"] … [who] develop and maintain multiple relations—familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political that span borders. [Transnational migrants] take actions, make decisions, feel concerns, and develop identities within social networks that connect them to two or more societies simultaneously (Basch et al., 1994: 1–2).

Vertovec (1999: 447) defines transnational migration as the "multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states." Thus, transnationalism creates notable degrees of interconnectedness between people,

communities, and societies straddling across borders and fostering changes in the socio-cultural, economic, and political landscapes of both migrant-sending and receiving societies (IOM, 2010). Within these linkages, transnational migrants can maintain, build, and reinforce relations with their families in their countries of origin (Schiller et al., 1992; Dunn, 2005). The simultaneous embeddedness of migrants allows them and their descendants to participate in familial, socioeconomic, religious, political, and cultural processes that transcend borders (Schiller et al., 1992; Basch et al., 1994; Portes et al., 1999; Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007). This simultaneous embeddedness affords transnational migrants novel ways of being and belonging to their families (Levitt and Schiller, 2004).

Family dimensions emerge as a critical component of the resultant relationships and practices of migrants as they maintain multiple attachments across nation-states. Within these transnational social spaces, families have transformed, and migrants have adapted to new forms of being family that include care arrangements (McGregor, 2010; Kufakurinani et al., 2014) that in migration scholarship are referred to as transnational parenting (Carling et al., 2012; Kufakurinani et al., 2014). Thus, transnational social spaces facilitate their virtual presence, allowing them to continue to participate in family activities and their parenting role (Bryceson and Vuorela, 2002). Transnational family life emerges as a form of transnational social space with continued participation in family life by family members who are situated remotely. This leads to new family formations known as transnational families (Bryceson and Vuorela, 2002: 3), ones that render geographical distance less of a barrier to movement and involvement (Faist, 2006; Pries, 2006).

During both the historical migration and currently, the transnational migration era, family structures and experiences of familyhood changed due to mobility and social change processes, not only in terms of the way in which family life is sustained by its members but also in terms of its structure. In Lesotho and other countries of the region, Murray (1980) highlights a notable move toward the nucleation of families. Although family organization and structure were fundamentally altered by mobility and by the fact that males played minor social roles, the extended family remained a valued safety net, and familial reference remained patrilineal (Atmore, 1982). In South Africa, for example, studies sought to establish whether left-behind families viewed migrants as members of their families or not (Posel and Marx, 2013). For most of these, results show that absent members expressed their membership and belonging through continued contribution to the maintenance and well-being of the left-behind family (Murray, 1980). This is a common thread in most of the studies done in the region.

Adding to the existing knowledge on migration and families in the region, this paper focuses on practices of familyhood across three generations of migrants. It adopts a generational perspective within historical migrant families, and applies a gender perspective that combines the viewpoints of men as those who move and of women as those left behind. In most instances, women initially move when they leave

their natal families to join their marital families. They have recently become active players in cross-border migration (Thebe and Maviza, 2019). On the other hand, men have always been the ones moving across borders, making them more prominent as migrants. The following section offers a conceptualization of familyhood in Africa.

A conceptualization of family and familyhood in Africa

In Africa, a family normatively refers to a social organization where people are related by blood, marriage, or adoption (Haralambos and Holborn, 1995; Nyoni and Dodo, 2016). Conceptions of African families are expansive, flexible, and accommodative of the extended members (Nyoni and Dodo, 2016). Notwithstanding these conceptions, belonging to a family is affirmed by public endorsements through ritualistic practices such as marriage (Nyathi, 2005). Within families, familyhood is depicted, practiced, and experienced through cooperative unions, resource sharing and reciprocal exchanges of care and support. Familyhood is further denoted by unity, closeness, oneness, and morality among members, demonstrated by the closely knit relations where everyone is a sister, brother, father, or mother, among others (Nyoni and Dodo, 2016). Through care, new members begin to be integrated as part of families. Within these systems of organization, descent follows the patrilineal line, which emphasizes tracing relationships from the senior male's side (Gwakwa, 2014; Strassmann and Kurapati, 2016). As such, when a woman marries, she is subsumed into her husband's kin group (Lowes, 2020). There is also an emphasis on patrilocality, where women move to their husband's kin after marriage (Scelza, 2011; Ji et al., 2014; Hirschman, 2017). Familyhood is also shaped by polygyny, where a man is allowed to marry more than one wife (Gwirayi, 2017; Muchabaiwa, 2017). In Zimbabwe, although polygyny is common, it is prohibited under civil law and only allowed under customary law (Gwirayi, 2017). Among the Ndebele, although a man is customarily allowed to have multiple wives, he cannot do so without the permission of the first wife (Ndlovu et al., 1995; Nyathi, 2005).

Furthermore, familyhood in the region is shaped by kinship organization that emphasizes the ideals of reciprocity and collective effort among members. These can be through caregiving arrangements that bind family members in a web of reciprocal obligations, love, and trust, as well as tensions and relations of unequal power (Baldassar and Merla, 2014; Vanotti, 2014). These caregiving and kin-keeping practices demonstrate the diverse factors that shape familyhood – reciprocal, multidirectional, and asymmetrical care exchanges. This blurs the boundaries between nuclear and extended families, as the essence of who counts as family is shaped by various socioeconomic factors. For example, Murray (1980), writing on migrant labor in Lesotho, proffers that there is no point in emphasizing the nuclear delineation of the family as the basis of familial conceptualization in Southern Africa. He argues that many husbands and wives live apart due to mobility, and grandparents raise many children because their parents are migrants.

Reflections on family history as a method

Understanding the experiences of familyhood in the context of mobility needs suitable methodological approaches that address the spatial, time, generational, and gender dimensions, including those who have moved and those left behind. The family history method – a biographical research approach based on individuals' narratives – seems suitable to assess the changes and historical continuities in family structures, lives, and organizations due to migration and transnationalism. Therefore, what the respondents give in family histories is neither history nor biography but an account of many histories emanating from intersections of different families and experiences interlinked to form one family through the eyes of the history teller (Nelson and Fivush, 2020). Family histories reveal that family life is not a linear account of systematic lived realities but rather a complex web of social relations punctuated by transitions in time and space (Lazar, 2011).

The approach emphasizes the individual as a conduit and source of information in a complex network of familial associations that change over time (Miller, 1999). This approach reconstructs situational realities based on narratives whose standpoints or points of view are fluid and actively shaped by continuing contextual transformations and developments (Miller, 1999). Although this perspective has been criticized and questions raised on the adequacy, authenticity, and epistemological validity of the reality presented (Roberts, 2002), its usefulness has not been discredited.

As such, memories are constructed in hindsight and manifested as narrative accounts – a critical form of human consciousness – of both the current and past individual and collective family experiences and identities (Phoenix and Brannen, 2014; Nelson and Fivush, 2020). Family history addresses the paucity of methods that trace intergenerational processes within migrant families and simultaneously allows for the open concept of family. It enables researchers to explore the role of memory and narrative in understanding familyhood among migrant communities and how members appeal to their memories to create coherent narratives of self and their families (Lazar, 2011; Nelson and Fivush, 2020).

METHODS

This is a qualitative study[3] that comprised multi-sited fieldwork to gain insights into transnational families' lived realities and to avoid methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Schiller, 2003). This methodological design responds to the reality of the simultaneous embeddedness of family members in transnational settings. It adapts, in methodological terms, to the dynamics of migration and transnationalism. In the next subsection we present the study area, population, sampling, and data collection methods.

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[3] This paper is based on the first author's PhD study on transnational migration and families, that sought to understand the changes and continuities associated with transnational migration as experienced by families in Tsholotsho, Zimbabwe.

Study area

The researchers conducted fieldwork in Tsholotsho (Zimbabwe) and Johannesburg (South Africa) over six months. Tsholotsho is a rural district in the Matabeleland North Province of Zimbabwe, characterized by poor rainfall patterns and adverse economic conditions (Maphosa, 2012; Maviza, 2020). In response to these challenges, the district has significant outbound migration, especially to South Africa, as a coping strategy to secure family livelihoods. Although current migration trends depict that women are now active players in migration, in Tsholotsho, most of the women aged 50 and above constitute a significant percentage of those left behind. At the same time, men have been migrants for years (Thebe and Maviza, 2019; Maviza, 2020). Johannesburg has become known as a gateway to South Africa and a transitional city (Moyo, 2017). This is mainly attributed to the fact that most migrants transit through Johannesburg to other South African provinces (Kihato, 2013). It has been the destination of choice for Zimbabwean migrants for a long time.

Study population and sampling

In Tsholotsho district, the researchers conducted the study in villages 2 and 5 of Ward 19. It targeted families with migrant members in Johannesburg who communicated and visited regularly. In Johannesburg, the study did not focus on any specific locations and it targeted only migrants who fulfilled the characteristics of transnational migrants. In Tsholotsho, the researcher selected migrant families using purposive snowball sampling. The village head made the initial referrals to some of the families who had emigrant members residing in South Africa. From the referrals, the researchers selected respondents through filter questions that defined the parameters of a transnational family, i.e., whether the emigrant members were in constant communication and visited them regularly. In the qualifying families, the researchers targeted household heads. In the absence of the head, the research team targeted members over 18 years of age who were willing to participate. Those interviewed referred the researchers to other migrant families. All the respondents in Tsholotsho were women. The process was repeated until thematic saturation was reached at respondent number 10.

In Johannesburg, the researchers similarly used purposive snowball sampling to identify migrants originally from Tsholotsho. The initial referrals were from burial society leaders who referred the researchers to some transnational migrants from Tsholotsho. The migrants also had to meet the qualifying criteria, viz., having families in Tsholotsho, Zimbabwe, residing in Johannesburg, and being in constant communication with and regularly visiting their families in Tsholotsho. Only those who satisfied these criteria were selected to be part of the sample as they met the defining characteristics of a transnational migrant. Those interviewed referred the researchers to other migrants from Tsholotsho living in Johannesburg. The transnational migrants in Johannesburg were both men and women who grew up in

Tsholotsho in families with migrant fathers. Later, as adults, they became migrants and were in regular contact with their families back home. The process was repeated until respondent number 10.

Thus, the research team reached 20 respondents – 10 each in Tsholotsho and in Johannesburg. From the 20 families interviewed, the researchers selected 10 for further inquiry on the history of migration in their families (five from each site). In Johannesburg, family history respondents were men only, as they were available and ready to participate further in the research. While women were also part of the transnational migrants' group, those invited to continue into family histories excused themselves from sharing their family histories due to domestic and childcare-related chores they had to perform at home. On the contrary, men had wives or partners taking care of their homes and had more free time to participate in this study. Therefore, we could not gain insight into women's experiences as migrants. This aspect is worthy of further exploration.

The study did not aim for a representative sample or seek to generalize the findings to the rest of Matabeleland and Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg. Rather, it aimed for an in-depth understanding of the changes and continuities that had occurred within families in the context of long-standing migration.

Data collection methods

The research team conducted in-depth interviews with the 20 participating families, and further engaged 10 of the 20 families in gathering their family histories through in-depth interviews. The respondents did not belong to the same families. The researchers made this decision based on the need to maintain confidentiality within families. It aligns with the approach taken in this study, where family histories are gathered through the perspective of those who account for them. Although this affected what we could gather about the families and that we could not know the extent to which members' views in origin and destination countries differed, it did not interfere with gathering family histories based on individual accounts. Instead, our approach allowed for free discussion of sensitive issues that respondents may not have wished to expose to their families.

Researcher positionality

The first author comes from Tsholotsho and spent a significant part of her life living there and had also done some observations during fieldwork. She was able to deal with some idealized scenarios where respondents may have misrepresented the reality on the ground. Among transnational migrants in Johannesburg, the first author enjoyed the privilege of an insider, being a person from Tsholotsho and also a Zimbabwean immigrant researching other Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa. However, the migrant community did not regard her as one of their own, as belonging and sharing in their struggles as migrants in South Africa. Rather, her professional position as a

researcher put her in the position of an outsider. To deal with this sensitized position, she depended on personal networks and connections to gain access to the migrant community in South Africa.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Family life and familyhood in the context of mobility

The family history offers rich insights into the dynamics of family life where migration has been normalized and embraced as the norm. These insights provide a privileged look at the experiences of familyhood within processes of social change. The personal reflections highlight the creative means and ways through which families deal with the negative legacy of the migrant labor system, which drove many African men and women to settle outside their communities and countries of origin.

The meaning of family

From the findings, it is evident that mobility has, over time, altered the organization, structure, and meaning of families in Tsholotsho. When the research team asked respondents what family meant to them, their responses highlighted a far-encompassing definition of family that embraced biological and social relations. Accounts from the left-behind women had overlaps of their maiden/natal families and the families they were married into. MaSiwela[4] is a grandmother in her mid-50s and wife to a migrant. She is a subsistence farmer living with her grandchildren. She has five grown-up children, all girls. Very outspoken and confident, MaSiwela offered the following narration when responding to the question on what family meant to her, both as a child and in her current circumstances:

> I remember ngikhula emzini kababamkhulu (growing up in my grandfather's homestead), a big homestead where all his children lived. Our grandmothers, our parents and us, the grandchildren, all lived there. We would always visit my mother's parents, and impilo yayimnandi (life was good); that was my family then; it was a big, big family. Looking at it now, my family has sort of shrunk, although similar to then, the intimacy and closeness of relationships are no longer there. It is more like the immediate family matters most; all our extended family members are there but somehow distant.

Similarly, MaNdebele, a 63-year-old grandmother currently living in Tsholotsho with her husband and hired helpers, has five highly accomplished children scattered worldwide – to use her own words. For her, her family is:

> *Mntanomntanami, kimi imuli nguye wonke umuntu olegazi lami, lawowonke umuntu oyisihlobo sikababa, ngitsho umkami* (Everyone who shares the

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[4] The research team assigned pseudonyms to participants.

same blood as me and everyone related to my husband). *Yikho lokhu engakufundiswayo ngikhula, lanxa izinto sezatshintsha, mina ngilokhe ngibona imuli yami kuyibo laba* (This is what I was taught growing up; although things have changed a lot […] I still view my family as all these).

MaSiwela's and MaNdebele's accounts were typical of the responses by other participants, who also defined family starting from their natal families and intricately transitioning into the families they married into. Although this hybridity could not be directly linked to migration, it adds a critical dimension to how these women actively shape the conceptualization of familyhood. It reveals untold frictions in constructing women's identity and belonging within complex social relations. Women maintain belonging to their natal families while embracing the new families created through marriage. They create familyhood in the face of their mobility based on the principles of patrilineal locality. As with women's making of familyhood across lineages and space, families are contextual, fluid, subjective, and imbued with symbolic meaning and lived realities of the individual involved (Trask, 2009; Gwenzi, 2020).

As for the migrant men, most gave a wide-reaching and all-encompassing definition. For example, Mr Nyathi, a 60-year-old migrant whose wife is in Tsholotsho, explained:

> *Imuli igoqela abazali bami, abafowethu, obafowabo babazali bami labobabamkhulu labogogo kunhlangothi zombili, kubaba lakumama kanye labazali labafowabo bakankosikazi* (Family includes my biological parents, siblings, aunts, and uncles, grandparents from my father's and mother's sides and my wife's parents and siblings).

> But again, when you travel too far from home, you meet new people, and they become friends that eventually become family. Sometimes we also cohabit with women to keep us company, and that person automatically becomes family. So, my small house and some friends become family because they are the people I live with and interact with daily while away from home. (Interview, Johannesburg, 2017).

The mention of "small houses" demonstrates the regular cohabitation or *masihlalisane* practices by migrant men who set up new romantic relationships away from home. These are semi-permanent sexual relationships usually formed among migrants or between migrants and locals (Maphosa, 2012). This led to "cross-border concurrent multiple sexual partnerships" for married men. For some, these relationships were eventually formalized into marriage through payment of lobola. Writing on a similar practice by Mozambican immigrant men in South Africa, Lubkemann (2002) uses the phrase 'transnationalised polygamy' to refer to these sexual relationships that the men develop in South Africa while their wives are back home. As a result,

the family back in Tsholotsho may be compromised, as the man's attention and resources are diverted to the new living arrangement sustained in Johannesburg. Transnationalism also enables other unsanctioned forms of families to coexist with conventional family formations.

Newman, a young transmigrant residing with his wife and children in Johannesburg while his mother was in Tsholotsho, put it this way:

> I used to think that family was only about blood ties, about my people back home. *Kodwa ngemva kokubuya eGoli ngafunda ukuthi imuli iyahamba idlule kuzihlobo zegazi, abantu engikhonza labo labo bayimuli kimi* (But coming to South Africa has taught me that over and above my blood relatives, the people I go to church with are also my family). *Laba yibo abantu engilobudlelwano obuseduze kakhulu labo, kwesinye isikhathi ukwedlula abegazi* (These are the people I have close relations with, some of whom are even closer than some of my blood relatives). (Interview, Johannesburg, 2017).

Mr Ndiweni, a migrant in Johannesburg for over 30 years, narrated how he was lonely when he got to Johannesburg, which had very few people from Zimbabwe at the time. He recounted how he made friends with some migrant men from elsewhere and they became very close. To him, those men became his family because they were the ones who knew whether he slept warmly, had food to eat, or had medical care if he was sick. This demonstrates how, within these relationships, the care element is central to shaping familyhood. Mr Ndlela, one of the immigrants who had been in South Africa for over 40 years, expressed himself thus:

> *Ngemva kokusuka kwami etsholotsho ngisiya eGoli, ngananzelela ukuthi abakibo kamama bayingxenye eqakathekileyo kakhulu eyempilo yami. Lanxa silezibongo ezehlukeneyo, labo bayingxenye yempilo yami* (After the experience of moving from Tsholotsho to Johannesburg, I realized that my maternal relatives were also a significant part of my life; they are my family. Although I may not have the same surname, they are also a part of my family).

In defining their families, migrants, like the left-behind women, emphasized relations on both their paternal and maternal sides. Their narrations depart from the normative conception of families that emphasizes blood and marital ties based on their experiences of the family as children living with their kin. Their accounts then transition into their adulthood, where the definition broadens to include people outside of their kinship system, for example, friends and neighbors in the host country. Notably, new practices of familyhood emerge as men move away from their homes. For both the migrant men and the left-behind women, their family accounts are influenced by experiences of mobility, being removed from familiar environments and people, and exposure to new places and people.

In the past, migrants were entirely removed from their families and could not participate in family life until they returned (Maviza, 2020). While away, their belonging to a family was maintained when other male family members became de facto heads. This practice ensured the reproduction and safeguarding of authority for the absent men. Although disguised as care for the left-behind women, it perpetuated patriarchal dominance and control over women and children through other men in the family. This is unlike transnationalism, where family life is transacted in transnational social spaces (Pries, 2001; Maviza, 2020). Within these transnational social spaces, care manifests through remittances, visits, and regular communication with the absent husband. Although this emancipates the woman from patriarchal dominance as she is now liberated from de facto headship by men other than her husband, the migrant man still has the final say as the woman makes decisions in consultation with the husband.

In the past, as migrants moved, their absence greatly affected family life, organization, family structures, and, importantly, their practices of relating to one another. In their narratives, migrants emphasized how they strive to keep in touch with those left behind, unlike their fathers, who could not link with their families due to several restrictions. This may signify a strong effect of their upbringing – their lived experiences with absent fathers, and hence the desire to right the wrongs they lived through while their fathers were migrants.

For left-behind women, family histories reveal the family-making processes through marriage. At the same time, the migrant men, on the other hand, demonstrate how mobility pushes those who move to forge new relationships. Njwambe et al. (2019) record similar findings, noting that migrants develop social networks made of new links and connections to cope with social isolation. Therefore, the care aspect of the new relationships transforms them into familial bonds. The new relationships fill the gap created by separation from their families left behind, while aiding integration into a new community, in the process reconfiguring familyhood and the meaning of family. These findings are in sync with Gwenzi's (2020) study, that proffers that significant scholarship now acknowledges non-biological conceptualizations of a family rooted in connectivity, co-residence, and affective practices, among others.

It is noteworthy, in the context of mobility, that space and frequency of contact, interaction, and care exchanges between family members have shaped gender relations and familyhood within the family. For left-behind women, mobility shapes their experiences of familyhood through sanctioned and normative ways of either biological affinities or marital ties legitimated through ritual performances. Yet, for migrant men, the notion of familyhood includes the normative forms of who belongs (biological and marital relations) and non-familial relationships that are neither sanctioned nor confirmed back home through blood or marital ties or ritual performances. Instead, migrant men created new and sometimes hidden families in South Africa. Beyond friends who became family, there were other hidden relationships where married migrant men cohabited with women in South Africa

and created families that conflicted with the normative and legitimized families back home. This is conflicted, in that there was no consent from the first wife back home as per customary expectations (Ndlovu et al., 1995; Nyathi, 2005). The new relationships, however, did not replace older familial links but supplemented them because migrant men still maintained relations with their family members back home.

i. Gender and decision-making power

Gender and space emerge as part of the major dimensions that shape familyhood in the context of mobility. From the narrations, when the respondents were still children and their fathers migrated, decisions on capital goods directly bearing authority, rights, and power were delegated to other male members of the extended family. MaNyathi's account evidences this dynamic. She is a widow and grandmother living with her grandchildren and hired workers. Her husband had been a migrant since they married over 50 years ago, and he died as a migrant. With a somber face, she recounted her life as a young married wife who only saw her husband after every three years. Her tales of a young life devoid of sexual pleasure and the beauty of companionship provoked sad memories. She had lived with her in-laws all her life. Now a widow, she recounted how, in the past, the extended family had so much control over the family's affairs, with paternal uncles and grandfathers wielding decision-making power over the left-behind wives and children in the absence of migrant husbands and fathers.

MaSibanda's case is similar. She is a 60-year-old widowed grandmother whose father was a migrant. She was also married to a migrant who visited every three to four years. Her husband returned home after retirement, and they lived together for 10 years before he died. She currently lives with her grandchildren, and all her children are now migrants. She recounts:

> *Ngathi ngisiyakwenda, ubabazala wami wayevele eseseGoli. Umama lomamazala babethembele kuboyisezala ekwenziweni kwezinqumo emzini yabo ngoba yibo ababelelungelo lokwenza lokho njengamadoda. Omama babelandela lokho okunqunyiweyo kuthi obaba eGoli baziswe ngalesosinqumo mhlazana babuyayo ekhaya bezovakatsha* (When I got married, my father-in-law was also a migrant. My mother and my mother-in-law depended on their fathers-in-law as they had the final say [on making decisions]. They both complied with what was decided, and the emigrants would be informed later when they eventually visited).

Mr Nyathi expressed similar sentiments, highlighting the role of patriarchy in families:

Our paternal uncles and grandfather helped when there were discipline challenges with the children or assisted in the fields during the plowing season and helped when there were major decisions to be made while our father was away. (Interview, Johannesburg, 2017).

Newman's narration demonstrates the gendered roles within families. It reflects the patriarchal nature of family organization where men make decisions:

Izinqumo eziphathelane lezomhlabathi lezifuyo zikhangelwa njengngomlandu wabobaba. Ngakho nxa ubaba wayengekho, umama wayethemba ubabamkhulu ukuthi amenzele izinqumo lezo (Decisions regarding land and livestock are always considered men's responsibility. So, when our father was away, our mother relied on our grandfather and uncles to make such decisions for her). (Interview, Tsholotsho, 2017).

Furthermore, Mr Ndlela explained:

You see, back then, things were different. The extended family had so much control over the affairs of the family. Unlike now, when these young wives stay in their homesteads and make decisions with their husbands over the phone. (Interview, Tsholotsho, 2017).

The preceding accounts show that historically, when husbands and fathers migrated, leaving their wives and children behind, a power vacuum was created. When this happened, families devised ways to fill it by activating the inherent provisions of kinship systems. According to Yabiku et al. (2010), the indefinite absence of the husband or the father was offset by the reorganization and reconfiguration of familial relations and power and authority, which resulted in the practice of substitute authority. This entailed other men or the mother-in-law exercising authority and decision-making power over the left-behind wife and children. Although some studies have indicated that the husband's migration resulted in autonomy for the left-behind wives (Abadan-Unat, 1977), findings from historical migration experiences in Tsholotsho indicate otherwise. Rather, they portray a reinforcement of patriarchal dominance where gender inequalities within families are deeply entrenched.

Moreover, historically, patriarchal dominance was compounded by residence patterns. Historically, in Tsholotsho, families lived in one big homestead; and usually, wives were left living with in-laws. This lack of residential independence meant the left-behind wives were assimilated into the patriarchal system of the bigger family (Abadan-Unat, 1977; Yabiku et al., 2010). It reinforced gender inequalities, as power remained with men and women remained perpetually subordinated. Although this was the case, the women then did not have any challenges with the arrangements as this was the norm they were socialized into.

ii. Migrants' linking practices

For most respondents, in the past, it was difficult for migrants to maintain regular contact with their families due to the challenges presented by distance. The findings show that most migrants made efforts to communicate with their families back in Tsholotsho, through letters. The letters took a long time to reach the intended recipients. Furthermore, it emerged that typically, migrants only visited their families after a minimum of two years' absence. These limitations had an impact on the migrants' ability to remit, visit, and communicate with their families. Reflecting on their childhood, most respondents recounted experiences of prolonged separation from their fathers, with minimal to no links during their absence. MaNdebele narrated it this way:

> *Ngesikhathi sikabab wami, kwakunzima ukuba ngumuntu wezizweni. Ephenduka okwakuqala, wasilandisela ngokubotshwa kwakhe lokuhlala kwakhe iminyaka emibili ejele. Esekhululiwe, wadinga umsebenzi ukuze laye abuye ekhaya ephethe okuncane. Wayesitshela ukuthi babehamba ngenyawo lesitimela besuka eGoli bezovakatsha ekhaya* (During my father's time, it was challenging to be a migrant. When he returned, he narrated how he was arrested and spent two years in prison. After his release, he had to get a job to go home with something. He told us that they traveled on foot and by train when visiting). (Interview, Tsholotsho, 2017).

For MaNkiwane, she only got to know her father when she was five. She reminisced on how life was before, when she was a child and her father was a migrant:

> When I was a child, my father left us with our mother and the extended family, and he used to communicate occasionally through letters sent via postal services. These took time to reach us. (Interview, Tsholotsho, 2017).

Similarly, Mr Ndiweni reflected on his childhood experiences when his father was a migrant and recalled his father's stories of his migration venture:

> Our fathers sacrificed their families in trying to fend for their families. My father traveled on foot to South Africa, and when he got there, he would stay for a minimum of two years without visiting. If ever he communicated, it would be through a letter that would take more than two months to get to my mother. (Interview, Johannesburg, 2017).

Although left-behind members battled daily with anxiety that their family member could be dead, the hope for reunification someday kept the families going:

> *Engakabuyi ekhaya ukuzovakatsha, sasisizwa ngaboyise babanye ababevakatsha ukuthi uyaphila [...] sasihlalela ethembeni ukuthi ngelinye ilanga laye uzabuya njengaboyise babanye* (Before he came back, we would only hear from other people's fathers who visited that he was fine [...] we just kept waiting in anticipation that one day, like others' fathers, he would also come [home]. (Interview, MaSiwela, Tsholotsho, 2017).

From the preceding accounts, it is evident that when fathers and husbands migrated in the past, they were totally uprooted from their families and only managed to link up occasionally through letters and when they eventually visited or returned. The linking mechanisms available to them were very slow and ineffective. This demonstrates the difficulties migrant men endured in trying to be part of the transactions that make up family life. Njwambe et al. (2019), writing on Mozambican migrant men and the autonomy of left-behind women, indicate that, in such scenarios, the drive to maintain links with home and attempts to maintain social relations with those left behind was a reflection of the desire to belong. Some scholars also indicate that keeping links with families was the only way a migrant man could evade social death (Kankonde, 2010), thereby retaining and asserting his dignity and authority (Njwambe et al., 2019). Moreover, enduring the challenges was evidence of the breadwinning burden that migrant men carried while away. They could not risk returning home empty-handed, as this would have been a sign of failure (Abadan-Unat, 1977; Donaldson and Howson, 2009). This emanates from the gendered divisions of labor within families where the masculine roles placed the burden of material provision on men, which motivated them to migrate (Abadan-Unat, 1977). Finally, their linking practices went beyond framing who is family to demonstrate how families are made by the everyday relationships that characterize a family.

Importantly, this is in direct contrast to the current transnational landscape where migrants' lives are characterized by embeddedness and simultaneity – migrants' acts of actively living their lives "here and there" in both the sending and host countries (Vertovec, 1999). They maintain strong socio-cultural, political, and economic ties or relationships with their homeland while physically away (Khagram and Levitt, 2008; Faist et al., 2013). Technological developments have allowed migrants to engage in transnational family life, maintain contact with their families through regular communication, visits, and remittances. Through simultaneity, migrants can also participate in family rituals, whether in person or virtually, as one of the ways to enact familyhood and affirm belonging. Thus, in transnational migration, familyhood is negotiated in transnational social spaces through several socio-cultural and economic activities facilitated by space-shrinking technologies, regardless of the separation of members by distance, dispersal, and translocality (Yeoh et al., 2005; Vanotti, 2014).

CONCLUSION

This paper concludes that, during historical migration, gender, space, and time actively shaped familyhood in migrant families, which is our contribution to the study domain of families in the context of mobility. Through the current lens of transnationalism, this paper explored the different ways that migration has shaped families over time, revealing different nuances of relatedness and familyhood. The time approach through generations of migrants reveals the realities of the disconnect between families during the pre-transnationalism epoch. Historically, the migration of men, with minimal to no linking practices, dramatically changed the traditional family structures and organization leading to other men taking responsibility in place of those who migrated and migrant men setting up new relationships in the host country. This profoundly influenced the normative views on who and what is family, leading to the acceptance of new ways of doing and being family. It is evident that migration pushed male members' horizons and exposed them to new dimensions that provoked them to rethink the conceptualization of families outside the normative assumptions of what is already known and to enact these new formations through bonding and relating in familial terms outside of the traditional family formation. For the left-behind women, the definition of family remained confined to the normative boundaries framing families, which emphasize kinship, biological and marital relations.

Regarding gender and power dynamics within families, we conclude that although migration removed men from their families, gendered relations did not evolve toward gender equality. Instead, migration perpetuated patriarchal dominance by invoking substitute authority through the extended family system. Although faced with challenges, the desire to fulfill familial obligations and avoid being labeled a failure urged migrant men to endure hardships and excel in their breadwinning roles and the practice of familyhood. In the present time, transnationalism has helped migrant families deal with the disconnect that characterized historical migration. In the process, there has been a realization of gender equality, to some extent, as women have also found space to influence family decisions within the transnational social spaces.

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