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SIHMA
Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa

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AHMR Editorial Board

AHMR is an interdisciplinary peer-reviewed journal created to encourage and facilitate the study of all aspects of human mobility in Africa, including socio-economic, political, legal, developmental, educational and cultural aspects.
Through the publication of original research, policy discussions and evidence-based research papers, AHMR provides a comprehensive forum devoted exclusively to the analysis of current migration trends, migration patterns and some of the most important migration-related issues.

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Editorial

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This issue consists of six articles. The first article by Adebayo Makanju and Alex Uriri, entitled "Aging, Resilience, and Migration in the Sudano-Sahelian Ecological Belt in Nigeria", examines the relationship between environmental changes and non-migration outcomes. Statistical data was used to examine the resilience of older non-immigrant households in geographic areas. The results showed that structural factors such as the environment, economic factors, agricultural practices, etc. affect the resilience of households and cause more immigrants. The study also found that factors such as social and political factors support environmental non-migration between households. The research concludes that any poor treatment experienced accessing health care can easily be associated with 'medical xenophobia'. As a result, the study suggests that the government develop effective environmental and socioeconomic policies to reduce environmental change and improve aging people's resilience in the future.

The second article by Jacqueline Nakaiza is entitled "Surviving Human Trafficking: A Case for Strengthening the Escape Routes Adopted by Victims of Trafficking in Uganda". Data was collected from twenty-six survivors of trafficking on the ways through which they escaped and the factors that supported their escape. The findings revealed that victims of human trafficking escaped by: (a) acquiring the (financial) resources they required to free themselves from the bonds of forced labor; or (b) being referred to organizations that provided the assistance they needed to free themselves from the bonds of forced labor. The study also discovered that information on support for victims of human trafficking is often unavailable, and that victims only found out about it after they had been trapped in a trafficking position for some time. The research found that the scarcity of this information is a crucial element in keeping victims of human trafficking enslaved since it prevents victims from seeking and receiving aid, even when it is available.

The third article is by Ada Adoley Allotey and Leander Kandilige and is entitled "The Conundrum of Birth Tourism and American 'Jackpot Babies': Attitudes of Ghanaian Urban Dwellers". The goal of this study was to gain a better understanding of a complicated and diverse phenomenon known as 'birth tourism' to the United States. This study gives insight into the desire of urban inhabitants in developing countries to have so-called 'American jackpot babies'. The study concludes that ensuring each country's citizenship operates as an opportunity-enhancing tool, is a viable strategy to addressing global inequality maintained by hierarchical citizenship,

which leads to the desire to have an American 'jackpot kid'.

The fourth article by Mary Muyonga, Alfred Otieno, and George Odipo is titled "Impact of subnational migration flows on population distribution in Kenya". The goal of this study was to investigate subnational migrant movements and how they affect population redistribution in Kenya. The data confirms a change in migration trends in the country during the last 10 years, as well as the impact on population redistribution. Migrants are concentrated in counties with large, urbanized areas, yet suburbanization is gaining popularity as secondary cities and metropolitan areas entice migrants. According to the findings of the geographical study, migration intensities are clustered in ways that reflect similar intensities in surrounding locations, two hotspots are visible, i.e., high-high hotspots in Nairobi and Vihiga, and low-intensity clustering in Mombasa and neighboring counties. The study concludes that internal migration efficiently contributes to population redistribution; however, the effect is diminishing as more regions become urbanized.

The fifth article by Tekalign Ayalew is entitled "The State, Families and Disappeared Migrants in Ethiopia". The author has paid special attention to investigating the causes and conditions of missing persons, identifying the challenges and needs of Ethiopian families. According to the findings of this study, despite the presence of national laws and resources dedicated to migration management, as well as the adoption of relevant international human and migrant rights conventions, the domestic legal and policy framework does not directly address the phenomenon of missing migrants and the needs and concerns of their families. The study indicates that multi-dimensional, evidence-based, community-based measures are urgently needed to better support families of the missing migrants in Ethiopia, despite profound financial precarity and weak social protection mechanisms.

The sixth article by Samuel Okun and Stella Shulika is entitled "The Dynamics of Child Trafficking in West Africa". The article discusses the efforts of West African states to combat the threat of human trafficking across borders. According to the findings of the study, there is still a gap in the domestication of the United Nations Protocol on Human Trafficking by West African states, as the West African Network of Central Authorities and Prosecutors Against Organized Crime (WACAP), which is tasked with leveraging the resources of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) member states to combat the menace, lacks the capacity needed to meet the set goal. Furthermore, because the efforts of the various states in the region have been largely reactive and legislative rather than proactive, the study recommends that ECOWAS states take proactive measures such as strengthening regional and national law enforcement institutional capacities and incorporating respect for fundamental human rights of women and children into West African sociocultural philosophies.

In general, the authors have produced sound research outputs that include scientific evidence, empirical work, critical reasoning, policy debates and argumentation as well as competent presentation. I am convinced that the African Human Mobility Review, Volume 7, Number 3, 2021, will be a significant resource for researchers, practitioners, and students.

I'm also pleased to announce the appointment of Professor Daniel Tevera as one of the Editorial team members of the African Human Mobility Review. Professor Tevera is a Human Geographer with a wide range of teaching and research experience in the area of migration studies. He has also published several edited books and over a hundred scholarly papers on migration, urban food security and environmental security. He has actively participated in the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) and the African Food Security Urban Network (AFSUN), a research, policy and capacity-building network of Canadian and African universities, NGOs and municipal governance networks. Professor Tevera is a former editor of the Zimbabwe Geographical Journal. I look forward to the continued contributions of Professor Tevera to the African Human Mobility Review.

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Aging, Resilience, and Migration in the Sudano-Sahelian Ecological Belt in Nigeria

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From the Sudano-Sahelian Zone to the coast, Nigeria is experiencing a variety of environmental change impacts, whether resulting from slow-onset changes or sudden shocks. These uptakes in events are significantly influencing migration decisions and livelihood resilience. The Sudano-Sahelian Ecological Zone, where natural resources form the foundation of livelihoods and food security, is a critical part of the environmental non-migration discussion. This study examines the relationship between environmental changes and non-migration outcomes. It also explores the household resilience of older non-migrants in the geographical area. The study utilized the LSMS-ISA datasets 2010-2018 (920 respondents, persons aged >50). The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) RIMA-II methodology was adopted and remodeled to measure a household's migration resilience and the level of relational variation among multi-faceted drivers of migration. The findings revealed that structural factors such as the environment (soil toxicity, average mean temperature and water security), economic drivers, and agricultural practices were observed to harm households' resilience and trigger more out-migration. On the other hand, drivers such as social and political factors were found to aid environmental non-migration among households. Furthermore, findings from the trend analysis (2010-2018) revealed that the non-migratory resilience of households was low, although it increased significantly during the examined period. Evidently, due to the heightened impact of environmental stressors, agricultural values and practices would continue to threaten food security and poverty levels, leading to increased cases of the "trapped" aging population.

Keywords: non-migration, environmental change, resilience, greying population, Nigeria

INTRODUCTION

Scientific evidence has revealed that climate change is already occurring across space, place, and time (IPCC, 2013). The unprecedented levels of these environmental changes have dire implications not only at the global level but also are nestled within regional, national and sub-national levels. The immediate impact is being experienced more in the least developed countries (LDCs), small island developing states (SIDS), and landlocked developing countries (LLDCs), where the majority of the localized population are poor and more vulnerable to the impact of these environmental stressors (Black et al., 2013; IPCC, 2013; IOM, 2019). These earth-shattering variations mirror the overloading of the earth's ecological and biophysical systems, leading to the direct loss of water resources, desertification, stratospheric ozone depletion, and biodiversity caused by an unprecedented explosion in the human population, that has led to an uptake in economic activity and damaging environmental practices (Warner et al., 2013).

According to findings of the IPCC (1990: 22): "The greatest effect of climate change may be on human migration as millions of persons will be displaced due to shoreline erosion, coastal flooding and agricultural disruptions." Since the past decade, on an annual basis large populations of persons are displaced by events of drought, flash flooding, and tropical storms. Following these statistics, the IDMC (2020) reported that an estimated 24.9 million persons were displaced by non-anthropogenic disasters alone in 2019, which included 95.9% weather-induced displacement cases across 140 countries and territories. Furthermore, a recent World Bank forecast projected that environmental change due to climate variability will be the leading determinant of migration flow with an estimated 143 million environmental migrants over the next three decades in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Rigaud et al., 2018). What is most noteworthy, is the reality that a large population in the global South who are susceptible to climate risks do not migrate but remain in-situ (see for example, Foresight, 2011; IOM, 2018; Mallick, 2019).

The majority of the climate change environmental and social impact assessment studies have concentrated on the fast hydrological changes and impact on small island developing states (SIDS) in the Pacific Ocean and Indian sub-continent such as in Tuvalu, Fiji, and the Maldives, alongside regions with mega delta such as in Bangladesh and Nigeria. However, gradual and slow-set changes which are often attributed to desertification will continue to affect large populations in the long term. For example, data showed that towards the end of the last century (1970-2000), an estimated 718 million people were directly affected by storms compared to 1.6 billion persons affected by droughts (Cutter, 2009). According to the IOM (2019), population displacement related to environmental stress events, whose intensity and frequency are often magnified by climatic change, has become the ever-present and the biggest humanitarian challenge being confronted especially within poorer and more vulnerable nations. This is a concern co-shared among academia and policy-

makers as depicted by the growing number of scientific studies investigating the potential links between climate change, extreme environmental events, and human migration (Black et al., 2013).

Studies show that the global migration landscape is being adversely altered by environmental change, specifically via its influence alongside a range of traditional drivers of human mobility such as economic, social, and political factors. It has long been established that the source of human migration causation is not linear-oriented but multi-causal. However, the range and complexity of the interactions between these drivers mean that it will rarely be possible to distinguish between economic and environmental migrants (IDMC, 2020; Mallick and Schanze, 2020). These migratory processes are generated and swayed by complex and dynamic interactions between direct and indirect proximate factors leading to a decision on whether to migrate or not (Foresight, 2011). This is differentiated from other well-known theories such as the simplistic push-pull models, NELM (Stark, 1978; Stark and Taylor, 1991) or the migration transition theory (Zelinsky, 1971; De Haas, 2010; Skeldon, 2012).

As aforementioned, the majority of the world's population directly impacted by environmental change in poorer nations do not migrate. For instance, Foresight (2011) terms non-migrants impacted by environmental change as "trapped populations". This generalization is biased, and it hinders the understanding of migration triggered by environmental change (Black et al., 2011; Adams, 2016). Having these complexities in mind Schewel (2019) classifies non-environment migrants into four categories: left behind (involuntary), stayers (voluntary), non-migrants (voluntary) and immobile (involuntary). To limit inherent mobility bias and to enhance simplification, this study does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary non-migrants. Thus, understanding the complexity and variability associated with the drivers of migration is matched by comparable uncertainty as regards the broader relationships between environmental change and migration. This has contributed towards the dearth of empirical studies assessing the relationship between climate-related environmental events and migration (Black et al., 2008).

A research gap exists in the understanding of how and why greying populations opt not to migrate and understanding the implications of their non-mobile state, degree of resilience and locations depends on a detailed analysis of interrelated environmental, political, economic, demographic, and social structures operationalized at multiple levels. This study seeks to answer the following pertinent questions relating to the drivers of non-migration in the environmental change context: Does a household's resilience play a significant role in making non-migration decisions? Why are greying cohorts in these stressed areas less impacted by traditional drivers of migration? To support a more detailed analysis of environmental and other migration drivers, this study seeks to explore the role of resilience in mediating the relationship between household vulnerability to environmental change and (im) mobility in the Sudano-Sahelian zone of Nigeria. The study is divided into five sections which consist of the introduction, material and methods, result, discussion,

and conclusion.

METHOD AND DATA

Study area

The study is positioned within the Northern Guinea and Sudan-Sahel Savanna Ecological Zone (SEZ) of Northern Nigeria. This SEZ is geographically located between Latitudes 6˚ 27′ N to 140 001 of the Equator and Longitudes 2˚ 411 E to 140 42′ E of the Greenwich Meridian (see Figure 2). The zone outspreads from the Chad Basin passing through the Northern highlands to the Sokoto plains at its western boundary (Odekunle et al., 2008). This SEZ occupies one-third of the total land area of Nigeria (Aremu and Olatunde, 2013).

Figure 1: Map of Nigeria showing the Sudano-Sahelian Ecological Zone



Source: Authors' compilation

Data source

The secondary data for this study came from the General Household Survey-Panel (GHS-Panel) executed in partnership with the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) in conjunction with the Integrated Surveys on Agriculture

(ISA) programme – LSMS-ISA. The GHS-Panel, a nationally representative survey of approximately 22,200 households from 500 enumeration areas (EAs), was selected for the panel component; 2018/19 is the most recent round of the survey with prior rounds conducted in 2010/11 and 2015/16 (NBS, 2019). The selected study population consisted of about 920 (n=920) respondents aged 50 years and above, selected on the conditionality that they all reside within Sudano-Sahelian Ecological Zone and have also not migrated since the first survey in 2010.

Study models

The context-specific resilience indicators used in this research, mitigate against the inherent bias of migratory causation linearity. This enables the analysis of multi-causal issues that are combined, with attention paid to the interaction and interconnection of the different facets of households' resilience to environmental and other migration drivers. The aim is to examine what drives and fosters aging household non-migration resilience. The study aimed to capture the level of interactions of the varying drivers of migration and the resilience of aged persons to these factors (pull and push). The selection of variables to construct the latent non-migration resilience measure is bedrocked on well-grounded mobility-centered literature (see the conceptual framework in Figure 2).

To conduct the analysis, this study used structural equation modeling (SEM).[1] The study adopted and augmented this framework, that was developed by the FAO (2016) and tested in a variety of contexts (RIMA-II measures household resilience). It builds on the existing resilience framework by assessing both temporal and spatial trends. The analysis factored in the multi-causal drivers of environmental migration. The observed variables were selected specifically for the case of Northern Nigeria to reflect both theoretical factors (Foresight, 2011) and contextual factors (Zickgraf, 2018; 2019; Mallick and Schanze, 2020; Schewel, 2020) in the literature as well as data availability.

As a result of persistent environmental shocks, a series of coping strategies are activated by the household such as assets smoothing, consumption smoothing, and in some cases, households opt to migrate. Over the long term, the strategies could lead to an increase or decrease in ***Y***. Any change in ***Y*** affects a household's non-migration resilience capacity and, consequently, can limit future capacity to react to shocks (see Figure 2).

1 Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a general modeling framework that incorporates many common statistical techniques, such as factor analysis and multiple regression analysis used to analyze the structural relationship between measured variables and latent construct.

Figure 2: Non-migration resilience (MGR-Res) conceptual framework



Source: Adapted from FAO (2016)

Description of variables

The model assumes that change is constant. Thus, the non-migration resilience of an individual or household can be described by the adaptive capacity concerning traditional drivers of migration, such as economic, social, demographic, and policy factors (Black et al., 2011), and how the affected individual or household copes amidst environmental change.

$$MGR_{RES} = \underbrace{f(EVD_{it}, ED_{it}, PD_{it}, SD_{it}, DD_{it}, APT_{it})}_{\text{Latent Variables}} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

The combined scores in this index can be expressed in the equation as follows, where: MGR_RES=Migration Resilience; EVD=Environmental Drivers, ED=Economic Drivers; PD=Political Drivers; SD=Social Drivers; DD=Demographic Drivers, and APD=Agricultural Practices Drivers.

Table 1: Description of study variables

INDICATOR	VARIABLE	OBS	MEAN	STD DEV
APT	Herbicide	920	1.52	.50
	Pesticide	920	1.88	.32
	Inorganic Fertilizer	920	1.61	.49
	Organic Fertilizer	920	1.90	.30
	Machinery	920	1.90	.30
DD	Distance (Pop center)	920	22.23	8.60
	Population Density	920	3422.2	265.5
	Age Distribution	920	60.6	9.55
	Gender	920	1.45	.50
ED	Remittance	920	1.98	.12
	Housing	920	3.24	.92
	Income	920	1.97	.17
	Non-Foodexp	920	1.75	.43
	Foodexp	920	1.96	.18
	Depend	920	1.75	.43
	Coping	920	4.24	4.44
EVD_A	Fuel	920	5.23	1.82
	Sanitation	920	1.99	.37
	Water Source	920	8.67	1.08
	Water Security	920	1.85	.61
EVD_N	Wetness Index	139	14.51	1.61
	Toxicity	131	1.00	.00
	Avg Temp	920	261.4	3.63
	Avg Precipitation	920	1424.8	250.1
PD	Insurance	920	1.97	.08
	Health Service	920	3.59	1.07
	Internet	920	1.22	.36
	Electricity	920	1.73	.23
	Assistance Food	920	1.91	.29
	Assistance Cash	920	1.94	.24
SD	Marital	920	2.43	3.193
	Relationship HHhead	920	2.65	1.932
	Religion	920	1.49	.24
	Migrate	920	5.43	1.22
	Literate	920	1.38	.45
	Morbidity	920	1.93	.22

Source: Computed by authors from LSMS-ISA data

RESULTS

Table 2: Basic characteristics of respondents

VARIABLES	FREQUENCY (%)	VARIABLES	FREQUENCY (%)
AGE n=920		**LITERACY STATUS *n*=742**	
50-59	487(52.9)	Yes	457(61.6)
60-69	262(28.5)	No	285(38.4)
70-79	118(12.8)		
80-89	43(4.7)		
90-130	10(1.1)		
GENDER *n*=920		**RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION *n*=920**	
Male	531(57.7)	Islam	677(73.6)
Female	389(42.3)	Christianity	241 (26.2)
		Traditionalist	2(0.2)
GEO-POLITICAL ZONE *n*=920		**HIGHEST QUALIFICATION ATTAINED *n*=553**	
North East	366(39.8)	None	254(45.9)
North West	554(60.2)	Primary education (FSLC)	102(18.4)
		Secondary education(SSCE)	135(24.4)
		NCE/OND/Nursing	26(4.7)
		BA/BSC/HND	26(4.7)
		Ph.D./MASTERS	2(0.4)
		Vocational Studies	8(1.5)
LOCALE *n*=920		**MARITAL STATUS *n*=920**	
Urban	184(20.0)	Married (Monogamous)	402(43.7)
Rural	736(80.0)	Married (Polygamous)	344(37.4)
		Divorced	5(.5)
		Separated	5(.5)
		Widowed	154(16.7)
		Never married	10(1.1)

Source: Computed by authors from LSMS-ISA data

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

Households' livelihood strategies and ways of coping with economic, political, social, or environmental change (- or + or ±) are anchored upon a broad range of factors, including location; relative wealth; security regimes; kinship structures and

other informal institutions; the nature of local governance and social networks; and access to land, food, roads, markets, water, and other resources. Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics of the socio-economic realities of the respondents. The age of the household head determines the security of younger household members in times of climate-related hazards. Based on the age distribution of respondents, those aged 50-59 (52.9%) constituted the largest cohort, followed by those aged 60-69 (28.5%), while persons aged above 90 years (1.1%) were in the minority in line with life expectancy. Gender-wise, males had a 57.7% representation compared to 42.3% of females. In terms of place of residence, 80% of respondents were living in ruralized settings compared to 20% resident in urban locales. Furthermore, respondents in the Northwestern region constituted about 60.2% compared to 39.8% of respondents in the Northeastern region (see Table 2).

Figure 3: Distribution of sampled households by wealth quintile (2010–2018)



Source: Computed by authors from LSMS-ISA data

The result in Figure 4 indicates that household wealth inequalities are widening year-on-year. These dire economic situations could be partly attributed to reduced household revenue accrued from agriculture. This is particularly telling, considering that the bulk of household income is agro-centric, leading to the consequent decline in the share of labor employed in the agricultural sector. This distribution of household wealth trajectory conforms with the results of previous studies (see for example, NPC, 2013, 2019; NBS, 2019). The prevailing economic reality greatly diminished the capability of poorer households to migrate, although certain literature suggests that even at lower-level wealth disparities, households with better socio-economic

standing are most likely to migrate (Bhandari, 2004), while some households may opt not to migrate (Jain, 2010).

Table 3: Household migratory flow over period 2010-2018 due to arable land loss

Age	**2010** Migration (%)	**2015** Migration (%)	**2016** Migration (%)	**Total**
50-59	32.0	41.0	49.0	40.6
Male	27.4	34.7	32.8	31.6
Female	4.6	6.3	16.2	9.0
60-69	43.0	43.0	42.0	42.7
Male	34.1	34.5	32.9	33.8
Female	8.9	8.5	9.1	8.9
70-79	18.0	10.0	8.0	12.0
Male	14.3	7.3	5.9	9.2
Female	3.7	2.7	2.1	2.8
80-89	7.0	3.0	1.0	3.7
Male	5.6	1.7	0.63	2.64
Female	1.4	1.3	0.37	1.1
90-130	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Male	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Female	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Computed by authors from LSMS-ISA data

Table 3 shows the year-on-year trend in households' migratory responses to environmental stress (agricultural income risk) by households within the study area. The result shows that environment-induced migration increased year-on-year among younger-aged households but reduced among older-aged households, likely due to more place-confidence among stay-put factors. Moreover, the findings also revealed that the proportion of female migrants increased within younger households, indicating a tightening of gender-based migratory disparities within the study area. Of significance, is the perception that most men are economic migrants while females are predominantly non-economic migrants, as exemplified in the case study conducted in Ethiopia (Ezra, 2001).

Figure 4: Reason for non-environmental migration among the study cohort



Source: Computed by authors from LSMS-ISA data

NB: P.O.B: Place of birth; P.O.R: Place of retirement; Participate: Communal participation; Finance: Lack of finance; Assistance: Government (local and foreign)/ NGO assistance; Asset: Ownership of farm/animal

This study examines the reason for non-migration decisions among aged individuals/ households based on ecological and socio-economic effects. The result, as presented in Figure 5, shows that 32.4% of the studied individuals indicated that the ownership of land and animals (Warner and Afifi, 2014) was the driving force behind their decision not to migrate despite the effect of desertification. This finding is not out of place when compared with the result of other studies (see for example, Gray, 2010; Mallick and Vogt, 2012). Furthermore, in a region such as the Sudano-Sahelian Zone that is highly ruralized and poor, households without land are more susceptible to environmental migration. Also, 21.3% of the aged non-environmental migrants associated financial accessibility to their non-migration status; this finding is in line with many studies (see Black et al., 2011; Mallick and Vogt, 2012) that suggest that financial opportunities play a significant role in households' decisions to stay put. The results of this study show that 18.2% of aged people opted not to out-migrate from their place of birth, revealing that length of residency breeds more place confidence and social attachment, as these factors promote immobility (Adams and Adger, 2013) and foster adaptive capacity (Lewicka, 2011; Adams, 2016). In all scenarios, the ultimate decisions of older individuals to refrain from migrating, were found to be intertwined and highly associative with economic and social factors within the study area.

Table 4: MIMIC estimation results for resilience measurement

OBSERVED VARIABLE	PARAMETER ESTIMATE (STANDARD ERROR)	OTHER STATISTIC
DD	1	Chi squared
	(Constrained)	18.84
APT	.061	RMSEA
	(.064)	0.051
ED	-.037	
	(.014)	
EVD	-1.853	Average Resilience Score
	(.124)	(2010-2018)
SD	4.126	2010: 21.84(+Non-migration)
	(1.012)	2015:15.26(-Non-migration)
PD	2.571	2018: 26.81(+Non-migration)
	(1.055)	
n = 920; log likelihood = -1156.77 *Significant at *p*<.05; ** Significant at *p*<0.001		

Source: Computed by authors from LSMS-ISA data

Table 4 presents the household resilience score per driver. The Agriculture Practice scores (A) do not show any clear relationship in terms of household migration resilience levels. The lowest APT scores (where no APT was present) reflect a wide range of resilience scores, suggesting that when risk is not a significant indicator for the household, the association is void and other factors drive resilience levels. There is a very clear negative linear relationship between Economic Driver (ED) scores (B) and overall household migration resilience. The Environmental Driver scores (C) indicate a negative non-linear relationship with household migration resilience. For households in locales with higher risk scores, resilience levels were lower. The lowest EVD scores (where no hazardous risk was present) reflect a wide range of resilience scores, suggesting that when risk is not a significant indicator for the household, the association is void, and other migratory drivers influence households' resilience levels. Political Driver scores (D) are quite low for the entire population of households; however, the relationship with the outcome variable is positive, with some indication of small changes in each predictor variable producing very large changes in resilience.

In the case of Social Driver (SD) scores (E), there is a very clear positive linear relationship between SD and overall household resilience to migration, based on the result (see Table 4). It appears that the elements (observed variables) within the SD indicator may be the strongest drivers of overall household migration resilience. There is great merit in considering the temporal effects of resilience measurement, and patience to observe the actual changes that emerge. As more data becomes available, this will help refine the practice and improve the accuracy of measurement

(see Table 4).

The time series results of the household migration Resilience Index changed over the considered period,[2] household migration resilience decreased (↓43.2%) between 2010–2015, indicating that there was a very high likelihood of households migrating during this time frame. Furthermore, the household's resilience rebounded between the years 2015–2018 (↑43.1%), demonstrating an upturn in the adaptive capacity of households in the Sudano-Sahelian region. In a nutshell, there is a very likelihood of the studied population being trapped in the long term (see Table 4). However, a household's differential and changing vulnerability to or protection from trends, hazards, and shocks among households make it a tricky endeavor because of the complex and transient nature of migration.

Figure 5: Household non-migration resilience by multi-causal drivers (2010-2018)



NB: DD: Demographic driver; ED: Economic driver; EVD: Environmental driver; PD: Political driver; SD: Social driver; APT: Agricultural practices

Source: Computed by authors from LSMS-ISA data

When comparing the contributions of the studied migration drivers, interesting findings emerge. It is noteworthy that the composition and the intensity of these drivers are more skewed between ED, EVD, APT, SD, PD, and DD in the longitudinal analysis. However, the benefit of examining resilience over time revealed that

2 The Resilience Index has been rescaled in order to make a comparison over a three-time period (2010-2018).

additional variables begin to contribute in varying capacities to the overall resilience score. ED, together with EVD, are consistently the most relevant dimensions in all three time periods, accounting for more than 40% of imports. DD and PD are the only pillars that significantly change their relevance over time. DD increases from 2010–2015 but then decreases from 2015–2018 (see Figure 5). In terms of chipping-off household resilience to migration, ED and EVD were found to be the leading determinants of out-migration across time and space in the study area. Considering that the majority of the households' income and livelihood is dependent on agricultural productivity, APT was found to be the driver of weakened household resilience to environmental stressors leading to out-migration (see Figure 5).

DISCUSSION

The study's quantitative findings demonstrate that ownership of land and animals for agricultural uses, and accessibility to finance were the lead determinants of non-environmental migration among older people living within the Sudano-Sahelian region of Nigeria. The result further revealed widening wealth inequalities among households within the space of eight years. The level of regional poverty was observed, considering that the share of employment in agriculture remains over 50% in the socio-ecological zone. This finding is consistent with that of the NBS (2019). It is generally acknowledged that the agricultural sector is the hardest hit by climate change. The majority of households (>60%) in the SEZ consist of rural-based smallholder farmers practising rain-fed agriculture in a dry/semi-arid zone and marginal lands that are highly susceptible to rainfall scarcity, as experienced in other locales within the Sahel region (Alinovi et al., 2009; Alinovi et al., 2010; FAO, 2017; D'Errico et al., 2020). This finding is also consistent with those of De Longueville et al. (2016) which also found that the majority of farmers in the Sahelian arid zone believe that precipitation changes have occurred during the past 20–30 years, whereas in wetter areas (Guinean zone) effects were felt during the past decade, with a resultant impact on productivity and earnings. Also, the effect on a household's resilience is further impacted by the indirect nature of many environmental changes (Foresight, 2011; Warner and Afifi, 2014; Zickgraf, 2018).

Other focal findings are that a household's resilience to migration is extremely impacted by the structural conditions (economic and agricultural practice values). It follows from the above discussion that a range of agricultural practices and economic drivers are highly significant in affecting the relationships between environmental change and migration. These effects are real and observable among the examined households, such as large-scale land acquisitions which increase the vulnerability of populations while decreasing their resilience to future environmental and socio-economic shocks. The study affirmed that economic factors are major push factors in the study area. The major source of the income of the households in the study area is based on rain-dependent agricultural activities where more than 50% of households are fully employed by this sector. These livelihood realities adversely affect the

households' resilience to non-migration. This finding is consistent with observations communicated in several previous studies (see for example, Black et al., 2011; De Sherbinin et al., 2012; Mallick and Vogt, 2012). The result further revealed that social drivers (Ayeb-Karlsson, 2018; Ayeb-Karlsson et al., 2018) such as networks, household structure, place attachment, and health services were found to contribute to the aging population "staying put" within the Sudano Sahelian Economic Zone by assisting these individuals to adapt and also undergo significant (negative or positive) transformations as a consequence of environmental changes.

CONCLUSION

Environmental non-migration decisions are relatively understudied in Nigeria. This study explored the role of resilience in mediating the relationship between household vulnerability to environmental change and (im)mobility in the Sudano-Sahelian Ecological Zone of Nigeria. The result identified three key structural factors that heightened out-migration and two factors that promote non-migration decisions in the study area. Firstly, the study found a household's economic status to be a key decision-making factor – aging persons in the richest households are more likely to migrate away, compared to the majority of poor households, many of which would become trapped because of high migratory costs. Secondly, the environmental stress factors that result from farmland loss, water, and food insecurity, are serious push factors, as exemplified by the mass migratory surge of Fulani cattle-grazing herdsmen southwards in search of green spaces. Thirdly, the evidence revealed that agricultural values and practices in the area which have bonded people and steered their livelihoods in the past are being threatened, thus negatively impacting local food security and heightened out-migration within the Sudano-Sahelian Ecological Zone. On the other hand, factors such as social and political drivers were found to be significant in making the population stay. This trend indicates that both social and political factors were significant in causing households to remain in-situ in the Sudano-Sahelian region. In conclusion, the trend analysis (2010-2018) revealed that the non-migratory resilience of households, although relatively low, has increased significantly during the examined period. This study therefore recommends that the Nigerian Government articulates effective environmental and socio-economic policies that would mitigate against environmental change and improve aging people's resilience going forward.

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Surviving Human Trafficking: A Case for Strengthening the Escape Routes Adopted by Victims of Trafficking in Uganda

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Characterized as modern-day slavery, human trafficking has attracted the attention of scholars, legislators and law enforcers in many countries. A major gap in efforts to curb the problem, however, relates to the fact that attention is being paid primarily to legislation; prosecution and punishment of traffickers; and rehabilitation of the survivors of trafficking. Efforts to support people who are still trapped in trafficking situations are generally non-existent. This paper reports the findings of a study that attempted to respond to the need to support these people by generating information on the routes by which victims of trafficking in Uganda escape bondage. Using interviews, data was collected from twenty-six survivors of trafficking on the ways through which they escaped and the factors that supported their escape. The findings showed that the victims of trafficking had escaped by: (a) acquiring the (financial) resources they needed to escape the bondage of forced labor; or (b) getting referred to organizations where they obtained the support that they needed to exit the bondage. Yet, it was also found that information on support for the victims of trafficking is generally unavailable and victims accessed it after they had been bonded in trafficking situations for a while. The paper concludes that the limited availability of this information is a major factor in sustaining the bondage of the victims of trafficking because it ensures that victims are unable to seek and obtain help even if it is available. Hence, the study urges the government, faith-based organizations and civil society organizations providing support for victims of trafficking to expand the reach of information on the support services that they offer.

Keywords: Escape routes; Human Trafficking; Opportunities; Strategies; Surviving; Victims

INTRODUCTION

Over the last three decades, a rapidly expanding body of literature has emerged on the subject of human trafficking (Adepoju, 2005; Lee, 2007). For instance, while writing on best practices to counter human trafficking in Africa, Truong and Angeles (2005) reference a rich body of literature and resources. Among others, two key things are prominently discernible from this literature. First, the fact that the problem of human trafficking is intricate, horrendous and rising. Human trafficking is intricate because it touches on a wide range of issues including, as Truong and Angeles (2005) observe, migration management, crime control, labor standards, poverty reduction and communities at risk. According to Nambatya and Gubo (2016: 159), "child trafficking is one of the fastest growing global crimes against children, placing children more and more in danger". Among other authors, Kasirye (2007) expositions the horrendous and rising aspects of trafficking (with specific reference to children in Uganda) thus:

> Children are mainly taken to work as child domestic workers, bar/restaurant attendants, sex workers, strippers, and vendors. Others are taken to work at fishing/landing sites and agricultural plantations, between 25,000-30,000 children were abducted and recruited in [to] the Lord's Resistance Army rank and these children usually suffer a myriad of problems including depression and trauma. Others actually are killed. Cross-border trafficking appears to be increasing. Trafficked children from Uganda are usually taken to Sudan, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and DRC, while others are taken to Dubai, UAE, Europe and America. Trafficked children were subjected to intolerable, inhuman and [the] worst forms of degrading treatment. Children were forced to fight as combatants, kill innocent people, smuggle drugs and work as drug conduits while others were sexually abused many abducted children were involved in other hazardous activities including carrying heavy luggage, ammunitions, wounded soldiers, merchandise and loot. Most children were maimed and suffering from a myriad of psychosocial depression and sexual trauma (Kasirye, 2007: v).

The second theme notable from the literature on human trafficking is that actors at local, national, regional and international levels are working to prevent human trafficking and to liberate its victims from the scourge. In Uganda, for instance, the 1995 Constitution (as amended in 2002 and 2006), The Children Act 2000 (Cap 59), The Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Act 2009, The Employment Act (2006) and the National Action Plan for Prevention of Trafficking in Persons in Uganda (RoU, 2020), among other laws and policy instruments, all seek to prevent human trafficking in various ways (cf. Walakira et al., 2015).

The literature further indicates that the intricacy of the problem of human trafficking is multifaceted, considering both the victims and the perpetrators of the

vice as well as pertinent policies and the implementers of these policies (see, for example, Kasirye's (2007) exposition of the assumed role of guardians in facilitating the trafficking of vulnerable children). Thus, actors working towards eliminating human trafficking need quality information about each of these facets, to develop and implement effective panaceas against the problem (Nambatya and Gubo, 2016). To address this need, organizations like the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations (UN) and United Nations African Research Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (UNAFRI) regularly generate and disseminate information on human trafficking with a view to highlight its increasing magnitude and excesses and to empower policy-makers and implementers to confront it.

In Uganda, this information has been the basis of useful interventions against human trafficking. Notwithstanding these interventions, a notable gap in the information relates to the fact that it focuses primarily on the incidence of human trafficking – describing why and how people are trafficked and victimized. Four country-level studies from Kasirye (2007), Nambatya and Gubo (2016), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (2014) and Walakira et al. (2016), reference this point. Walakira et al. (2016) focus on estimating the incidence of human trafficking, with an attempt at understanding the enormity of the problem of human trafficking and how victims are trafficked from the north-eastern to the central parts of the country. Specifically, their report highlights the scale and nature of trafficking in children; recruitment, transport means and destination of child trafficking; victims, factors contributing to and sustaining child trafficking; knowledge and perceptions on child trafficking; and programs and resources to address child trafficking. On the other hand, in a rapid assessment, Kasirye focuses on the incidence of child trafficking into the worst forms of child labor, discussing in detail the recruitment, transporting, deployment and confinement of trafficked children. Articles by Nambatya and Gubo (2016) and Ondieki (2017) are largely similar in content scope. These and other reports typify Truong and Angeles' (2005: 1) observation that, "in general, the existing body of knowledge about human trafficking serves to raise public consciousness about the issue, but remains insufficient to lend support to a more comprehensive action program for addressing different dimensions of the problem".

In all these reports the current ones on trafficking in the country, little (in some cases no) attention is paid to the strategies that the victims of trafficking adopt to deal with and to escape their enslavement. Consequently, legislation and interventions against human trafficking that are being adopted are targeted at prevention – primarily by prosecution and punishment of perpetrators (cf. RoU, 2009). As Truong and Angeles (2005: 2) point out, "current policy for counteracting human trafficking falls into three categories: (a) prevention and deterrence, (b) law enforcement and prosecution of traffickers, (c) protection of trafficked persons, 'rehabilitation' and assistance in social reintegration".

Scant attention has been paid to the need to strengthen the strategies through which the victims of trafficking cope with and liberate themselves out of

the trafficking. This paper contends that this is an important knowledge/policy gap because despite the indisputable need for preventing human trafficking from occurring in the very first place, people continue to be trafficked. Additionally, owing to the intricate nature of trafficking, many victims may not access formal support mechanisms against the problem, the inference being that they have to navigate their own escape pathways. Moreover, although policy and legislative attention is paid primarily to deterrence, prosecution and punishment, 'profits' emanating from trafficking remain high and risk of arrest and conviction remain low (Fitzgibbon, 2003), which serves to sustain the victimization of people into trafficking. The inference here is that in addition to what is being done to prevent trafficking, greater efforts should be made to strengthen escape routes, so that those who are trafficked could benefit from regaining their freedom.

In that case, governments and others involved in mitigating the incidence of human trafficking, need to strengthen these pathways. However, this need has not been addressed, because information on the coping strategies and escape routes adopted by victims of human trafficking (especially those trafficked locally within their own countries) are generally non-existent. It is within this context that this paper reports on the findings of a recent study that undertook to generate this information, cognizant of the need to "channel the narratives as well as insights of trafficked persons as 'knowing subjects' into scholarly knowledge and the policy field" (Truong and Angeles, 2005: v). Grounded on a tracer study of former victims of human trafficking and actors involved in mitigating the practice, the study presents qualitative data on the coping strategies and escape routes adopted by victims of human trafficking in Uganda. In the discussion that follows, the data is cross-referenced to related literature, legislation and policies. Subsequently, pertinent gaps are exposed and recommendations are articulated.

METHODOLOGY

The study involved 26 participants (see Table 1). These included both males and females who originated from over six districts of Uganda. Most (42%) of them were aged 15 or above, had some formal education – primary (46%) or secondary (31%) – and hailed from single parent-headed households (46%). The geographical spread of the districts from which the respondents originated, which covered all the regions of the country, suggests that the incidence of human trafficking is likely in all the parts of the country. The sample also suggests that trafficking is likely for both males and females, especially teenagers. The modal age group of the sample appears to link the problem of trafficking to child labor in a way that most of the persons who had been trafficked tended to fall in the group that has been deployed in child labor in the country.

Table 1: Profiling of the victims of child trafficking (%, n = 26)

Gender	**%**
Male	58
Female	42
Total	100
Age	**%**
5–10	23
10–15	35
15+	42
Total	100
Origin	**%**
Luwero	8
Iganga	12
Mbale	23
Kyotera	12
Masaka	15
Kabale	8
Others	23
Total	100
Occupation	**%**
Bar attendant	12
Sex worker	23
House girl	27
House boy	8
Petty trader	12
Others	19
Total	100
Education	**%**
Never attended school	15
Primary	46
Secondary	31
Vocation	8
Total	100
Family type	**%**
Child-headed household	11
Married	15
Widowed	46
Single parent	15
Others	12
Total	100

All the participants were survivors of child trafficking. Survivors were characterized using the definition of trafficking given in the United Nations Protocol to Prevent,

Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons and the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Trafficking in Persons in Uganda. This includes the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons by means of threats, use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or a position of vulnerability, giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Therefore, this paper assumes victims of trafficking to be persons who, as Walakira et al. (2016) explain, had been subjected to any of the following: (a) an employer who threatens the person's family if he/she left; (b) isolation from the public by being kept under confinement or surveillance; (c) an employer who confiscates the identity card, academic papers, or travel documents of the person; and (d) bonded servitude.

Participants were identified through snowball methodology. The snowballing started at a non-governmental organization that provides support to victims of child trafficking. This method was extended to three civil society organizations and two faith-based organizations, where survivors of trafficking had been traced. Data was collected during the first quarter of 2017 (January to March). This was done using structured interviews, during which the survivors of trafficking were asked to describe their experiences. They provided details of their backgrounds (before trafficking), the trafficking process, and the strategies and opportunities they exploited to escape the trafficking situations.

Eleven key informant interviews were also conducted with policy-makers and staff of some of the organizations through which the survivors of trafficking were traced. These interviews were conducted with the view to make better sense of the responses that the survivors of child trafficking had provided. To this end, they were conducted after analyzing the data elicited from the survivors of child trafficking. The qualitative data collected was analyzed using content analysis and NVIVO 11– a qualitative data analysis computer software package – and the results were presented following an interpretative and constructivist approach. The study found the general lack of understanding of the concept of trafficking among the key informants as a limitation because a significant amount of time was spent clarifying what constitutes trafficking.

STRATEGIES AND OPPORTUNITIES EXPLOITED TO ESCAPE TRAFFICKING

In relating their experiences, the survivors of trafficking described the confinement and vulnerability that held them in bondage. Regarding confinement, at least a quarter of the respondents explained that their captors restricted their movements and interactions with the public. Two respondents indicated that in addition to holding them in an environment where interaction with members of the public was highly restricted, their captors threatened them with physical harm if they contemplated leaving (see the responses cited below).

On the other hand, respondents related their vulnerability from a more familiar

perspective. They described being held under conditions of forced labor after being trafficked. That was primarily because they did not have the means to strike out on their own, to return to where they had been trafficked from or to start new lives in the neighborhoods where they were being held in the trafficked situations (see Table 2).

Table 2: Factors of vulnerability in trafficking situations

SN	Source	Count
1	Ignorance of where I was	9
2	Ignorance of where I came from	3
3	Lack of money (to travel back to where I came from)	17
4	Lack of money (to consider a life of my own)	9
5	Lack of contacts (friendly and familial) that might help	10

Note: N = 26; Multiple responses elicited

In their quest to escape from the bondage of their ordeal, the former victims of trafficking described two main opportunities that they exploited: (a) attainment of independence; and (b) connection to support towards exiting the trafficking situation.

Attainment of independence

The victims of trafficking developed the ability to strike out on their own and they exited from the trafficking situations. Typically, the respondents explained that they obtained money that enabled them to either return to their home villages or to start small businesses and sustain livelihoods of their own. The young people spoke candidly:

> After working for about 4 months, I managed to save 30,000 Uganda shillings which I used to buy a charcoal stove, charcoal, a packet of baking flour, cooking oil, a tray of eggs and other ingredients which I used to start my own rolex business which is similar to the one I was running for my boss. I did not even move very far away from the place where I was working from, so I retained a bigger percentage of my customers (15-year-old boy who had been trafficked from Bugiri).

> I was collecting scrap and I would save my daily earnings in a small savings box. In the evenings I would go to a nearby garage that repairs motorcycles. I befriended one of the men working at this garage and after some time I asked him to teach me how to repair motorcycles. Luckily, he accepted; so, every day after collecting scrap, I would go to this garage and learn about repairing motorcycles. I also learnt [about] the different spare parts and where I can

> buy them easily because my friend would send me to buy them for him from different places, which helped me to get connected to the industry. So, now I am a motorcycle mechanic (15-year-old-boy from Mbale).

> I worked as a nanny for 3 years. In these years I never went back to the village to see my family. My boss was very tough and would quarrel about anything small. But I knew I had a target that I was working to achieve. I was saving all the money I was being paid in a small box. I used not to buy clothes or even send my family money. Actually, they did not even know where I was because we had lost touch. But after the 3 years when I went back for Christmas, I never returned to my workplace. Instead, I went to a lady who I had befriended in the neighborhood where I used to take my boss' daughters for hairdressing. I paid her 1.5M for teaching me and accommodating me. She taught me for 6 months and after the 6 months, because I had learnt hairdressing, she gave me a job. I plan to work here for the next 3 years as I save money to start my own salon (16-year-old girl from Masaka).

It is evident that in the majority of these instances, the respondents raised the monies from the very work in which they had been deployed while under bondage. It is noteworthy that the respondents would leave to continue practicing the same trades, albeit on their own. This usually happened after they were fairly acclimatized to both the trade and the environment in which they conducted this trade, often including or having built a possible client base. The respondents who cited this exit route had been bonded for a period ranging between two and five years.

Connection to support

This pertains to a situation in which the respondent received information from someone who directed them to a place where they might obtain assistance that liberated them from the trafficking situation. This 'connecting' person was typically an acquaintance or neighbor who happened to learn of the victim's plight but also had some idea about where the victim might obtain support. The different respondents narrated their experiences thus:

> Our neighbor was a good lady; she would greet me kindly once in a while. Then one day we had a conversation and I explained to her what I was going through and that my boss would not be happy if she got to know that I had talked to her. Because my boss was not giving me any money, she gave me money for transport, advised me to go and report to a nearby police station and even directed me where to find it. I went to the police station and a police probation officer in charge of family and children took me to a child welfare NGO (15-year-old girl from Kabale).

> One of the girls who used to work close to where I was staying, used to see how abusive my boss was and the way she used to mistreat me. She was 'born again' and used to pray from a nearby church. She advised me to go and talk to the senior pastor of that church. I went there and explained to the pastor what I was going through. He welcomed me and told me to go and bring my clothes and offered me accommodation at the church. He told me to work with the other people who were staying at the church in cleaning that church, washing church linen, washing the chairs and setting up the church for the different services. I have lived here for the past seven months (15-year-old girl from Kyotera).

> When I was in P6, I was forced to drop out of school because my step-mother was mistreating me and I did not have scholastic materials like books and a uniform. So, one of the teachers at school got me a job at his friend's farm in Mubende to go and look after his cattle and goats. But while at the farm, I was working hard and I was also humble. One of the people who used to come to the farm frequently with the boss to supervise, had observed me for some time. He was also a very good man. He called me and advised me to go back to school. He even got me a place and a bursary in a church school. So, starting next year, I will be going back to S2. I am still working at the farm, as I save up money to buy myself the necessary requirements like a mattress, bedding and other requirements (13-year-old boy from Mbale).

It is clear that the above respondents were informed about a place from which they obtained assistance (typically police, civil society organizations and faith-based organizations). Unsurprisingly, therefore, access to information played a pivotal role in creating opportunities for exiting trafficking situations. The respondents were asked to specify when they obtained this information, to gain insights into how likely victims of human trafficking were to have the information they required to avoid or exit trafficking situations. The findings showed that the respondents got the information once they got into contact with the people who gave it to them. They did not know about the availability of this support until they were told about it. This is an important finding, considering that, as indicated in Table 2, their captors endeavored to confine them, thereby limiting their likelihood to learn about the availability of support.

During the key informant interviews, staff of the organizations that helped the victims of trafficking to exit forced labor were asked to explain whether and how they routinely disseminate information on the availability of support for victims of trafficking. The salient responses are captured below:

> We as an organization, our mandate is to support the children and youth who are vulnerable to all forms of exploitation. So, we periodically go to places

> which we suspect to have the victims of trafficking. We sensitize the youth and the community about the programs we offer that can help those who are experiencing exploitation and even those who are at risk of exploitation out of their current situation. Actually, community leaders know our work and many times have referred victims to the organization. We also have specific programs intended for trafficked girls involved in transactional sex and sex workers. These programs are geared towards skilling them (hairdressing, tailoring and baking) to enable them to become financially independent as well as to rehabilitate them psychologically, empower and boost their esteem (Community Development Officer, Uganda Youth Development Link – UYDEL).
>
> The police and other community leaders know our work with protection of child rights. We also invite them to our sensitization meetings periodically which we hold in communities with other stakeholders (Social Worker, African Network for the Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect – ANPPCAN).
>
> We work with different media houses, newspapers, radio stations and television stations who broadcast community sensitization programs and talk shows with partner organizations on the availability of support services for the victims of trafficking and how to access support for the victims (Family Affairs Officer, Ministry of Gender).

These findings suggest that on the whole, the organizations that provided support to the victims of trafficking do not routinely provide information on the support that they offer in this regard.

DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The finding that the victims of trafficking exit the bondage of trafficking when they are informed about organizations providing support, corroborates the findings of authors like Bell and Banks (2018: 363) affirming that these organizations "are in a strong position to influence trafficking outcomes and policies". However, since these organizations do not routinely provide information on this support, this finding points to an insight that has implications for efforts to salvage and support the victims of human trafficking. People are held in the bondage associated with trafficking due to information asymmetry between them and their captors, who endeavor to confine them from the public (where they may obtain the information that they need on the availability of support). This observation rhymes well with the studies on human trafficking in Uganda (see for example, Kasirye, 2007; Walakira et al., 2016) wherein the authors conclude that disempowerment arising from the lack of information on support, bonds victims of trafficking in abusive situations.

The finding that some of the respondents had escaped bondage through gaining the financial capacity to strike out on their own, concurs with Truong (2005), who links bondage in trafficking to poverty and vulnerability. While some of the respondents indicated that they escaped the trafficking situations by developing the capacity to get out and survive on their own (typically through devising means of earning a livelihood), promoting this approach to escaping trafficking situations is difficult because of the intricate (in principle cloak-and-dagger) nature of trafficking. It is inherently challenging to reach the persons trapped in trafficking situations, to provide them with the economic empowerment they may need to escape their bondage. In fact, some of the activities by which the victims of trafficking escaped (e.g., prostitution) are deemed maladaptive and illegal.

Despite the practical challenges, the dissemination of information on the availability of support for victims of human trafficking is not impossible. If implemented through the mass media, the dissemination of such information will ensure that the victims of trafficking are connected with the information that they require to obtain support in good time. However, the study found that the organizations that provided support to the victims of human trafficking were not routinely disseminating information about their services. Indeed, a review of the literature on human trafficking in Uganda (in particular the work of Walakira et al., 2016) shows that attention has been paid primarily to legislating against the practice (cf. Republic of Uganda (RoU), 2009), prosecution and punishment as deterrent measures but not on the provision of information that is targeted at supporting the escape routes that those who are already victimized, might benefit from. This observation concurs with Truong and Angeles (2005) who decry the incidence of discrepancies between the needs of the victims of human trafficking and the approaches of organizations working to support them. Therefore, the organizations providing support for the victims of human trafficking in the country (e.g., Uganda Police, civil society organizations and faith-based organizations) are urged to integrate a strong component of public information in their programing, to ensure that persons requiring their support are aware of its availability and means of accessing it. Informing the leaders of these organizations that would-be beneficiaries of their support are not aware of the existence of this support, is an important starting point.

Beyond Uganda, it is recommended that wherever they are in the world, organizations providing support for victims of trafficking, integrate a strong component of public information in their programing. This is because there is ample evidence that the disconnect of the victims of trafficking from support noted by this study, exists in other societies, given the covert nature of human trafficking and the broad syndrome of vulnerability that typifies the experience of the victims of human trafficking.

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The Conundrum of Birth Tourism and American 'Jackpot Babies': Attitudes of Ghanaian Urban Dwellers

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Some contemporary international migration literature highlights the practice of the acquisition of privileged citizenship by temporary migrants who give birth in a country other than their home country (birth tourists) and the inherent benefits that accrue to this category of migrants. However, scholars tend to rely solely on the subjective accounts of birth tourists to measure attitudes toward the practice of deliberately migrating to a preferred destination country at an advanced stage of pregnancy to secure citizenship rights for the child. This study employed concurrent triangulation design – a survey and semi-structured in-depth interviews – to collect data from 260 urban dwellers in three metropolises in Ghana – Accra, Cape Coast, and Kumasi – who were yet to give birth in the United States and 15 parents who already had a total of 25 American 'jackpot babies', to measure a broader spectrum of attitudes toward this phenomenon. This paper records a nuanced continuum of attitudes to the concept of American 'jackpot babies', ranging from favorable, to neutral/indifference, to objection to this phenomenon among Ghanaian urban dwellers.

Keywords: birth tourism, attitude, intention, jackpot baby, anchor baby

INTRODUCTION

Birth tourism to the United States of America (the "United States", "USA" or "US") has grown in popularity (Heaton and Dean, 2016). However, little is known about the attitudes toward this travel trend in the home countries of its participants. Birth tourism is travel undertaken by an expectant woman to a foreign country that practices *jus soli* (right of soil) citizenship to bear a child and return with the child to her country (Lollman, 2015; Ji and Bates, 2017). Feere (2010) and Arthur (2018) observe that there are about 40 countries in the world that practice *jus soli* citizenship. Canada and the United States are the only developed countries that offer unrestricted citizenship to children born to irregular and temporary immigrants. The only exception is in the instance of children born to diplomats. The US version of *jus soli* citizenship has been described as more inclusive compared to the other countries and is enshrined in the US Constitution; specifically, the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth (14th) Amendment (Schuck, 1998; Ho et al., 2009; Feere, 2010).

Birth tourists to the United States come from all over the world, in particular from Latin America, Eastern Asia and Europe, with smaller numbers from Africa (Tetteh, 2010; Guerrero, 2013; Grant, 2015; Altan-Olcay and Balta, 2016; Heaton and Dean, 2016; Nori, 2016; Wang, 2017). Also, Pearl (2011) indicates that statistics on foreign visitors and anecdotal evidence suggest that tens of thousands of women who are on tourist or business visas give birth in the USA every year. A decade ago, Reasoner (2011) estimated that nearly 200,000 children were born annually to short-term visitors to the USA. The Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) in the USA has also reported that out of 300,000 children who are born to foreign citizens in the USA every year, 40,000 are born to birth tourists who are legally in the country (Grant, 2015). Furthermore, Altan-Olcay and Balta (2016) estimated that in 2011 600 Turkish women traveled to the USA during the later stages of their pregnancy to give birth to their children. The number of Chinese women who travel to the USA to give birth has more than doubled over the years, that is, from 4,200 in 2008 to about 10,000 in 2012 (Heaton and Dean, 2016; Arthur, 2018). While the above statistics hardly agree on the exact number of birth tourists who travel to the USA in a year, they confirm that there are large numbers of foreign pregnant women from the different parts of the world who give birth in the USA every year. Wang (2017) has, however, indicated that the global number of birth tourists is small in comparison to immigrant populations at large.

Birth tourism to the United States has attracted much empirical attention because of its worldwide popularity, motivations, and implications for the US society. To date, very little attention has been paid to attitudes of the home countries of the birth tourists toward the decision to give birth in the United States. Andriotis (2005) posits that an investigation into the attitudes of residents toward tourism can determine the extent to which the community will support or not support tourism. The objective of this study is to examine the attitudes of the Ghanaian urban population toward their female compatriots who travel to the United States to have

US-born citizens. This paper sheds new light on the intentions to embark on this practice from the perspective of the Ghanaian urban dwellers who are yet to have US-born citizens and Ghanaian parents of US-born citizens, using their attitudes toward Ghanaian birth tourists to the United States as an independent variable. Two reasons accounted for the focus of this paper on the Ghanaian urban population. First, it has been established that most international migrants from Ghana are from the most urbanized regions, especially from the Greater Accra and Ashanti regions (GSS, 2013). Second, middle-class women from urban areas in Ghana travel to the United States to give birth (Tetteh, 2010).

MOTIVATIONS BEHIND BIRTH TOURISM TO THE UNITED STATES

Scholars and the media both within and outside the United States have reported that birth tourists to the country come from all over the world, in particular from China, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey (Feere, 2015; Wang, 2017). Tetteh (2010) observes that several pregnant women from Ghana travel to the United States to have US-born citizens. Several other scholars have also deliberated on these women's motivations for giving birth on US soil (Tetteh, 2010; Guerrero, 2013; Grant, 2015; Altan-Olcay and Balta, 2016; Heaton and Dean, 2016; Nori, 2016).

The first motivation for most of the mothers is the right that their US-born citizens would have from the legal age of 18 onwards as stipulated in the Immigration and National Act (INA) of 1965 to guarantee a path to legal immigration through a sponsorship process for the immediate family members (Feere, 2010; Nori, 2016; Kerwin and Warren, 2019a). This sponsorship process is known as family reunification (Kerwin and Warren, 2019b; Sironi et al., 2019). Others refer to it as 'chain migration' (Feere, 2010) but this reference is deemed by some as nativist and offensive. The INA grants this child, at the legal age of 18, a right to sponsor an overseas spouse and his or her unmarried children for permanent residency. Also, at the age of 21, the child can legally sponsor the parents and any siblings (Feere, 2010). For this reason, this US citizen is called, by mostly anti-immigrant scholars, an 'anchor baby' (Ward, 2009; Feere, 2010). Interestingly, most of the country's growth in immigration levels emanates from family-sponsored immigration. Kerwin and Warren (2019a) found that in 2017, 87 percent of all immigrants obtained legal permanent residency through the various categories of family reunification. Contrary to popular belief, Nori (2016) and Kerwin and Warren (2019a) argue that having US-born citizens do not guarantee the fastest path to legal immigration because the sponsorship process for immediate relatives is lengthy. Even though there is no limit on the number of visas issued to immediate relatives, Kerwin and Warren (2019a) assert that these relatives face barriers to securing visas such as the high cost of application and attorney's fees. An application fee for naturalization and biometric processing is reported to cost $725 (Kerwin and Warren, 2019b). The sponsorship process can only start when the US-born child is 21 years old, has a middle-class income and it also depends on whether the immediate family members are residing

in or outside the USA (Stock, 2012; Nori, 2016). Aside from these impediments, as of 1 November 2018 nearly 3.7 million intending applicants were in family-based visa backlogs (Kerwin and Warren, 2019a).

The US passport provided shortly after the registration of the child's birth is the second motivation (Feere, 2010). It is advantageous for a family to have a member being a holder of a US passport as it entitles the holder to enter and reside in the United States, travel whenever and wherever he or she chooses, and enjoy almost unrivaled protection (Castles, 2005; Feere, 2010; Reasoner, 2011; Altan-Olcay and Balta, 2016). Yet, this claim does not entirely represent the reality in contemporary times because Americans require a visa to travel to certain countries like Ghana. Also, being an American in the era of terrorism does not grant unrivaled protection in certain parts of the world.

Other motivations include: having access to better maternal care (Tetteh, 2010; Nori, 2016), securing the benefits of dual citizenship for the child – from the parent's country and the United States (Grant, 2015) and having access to the country's improved systems of education for their offspring (Nori, 2016). Hence, the expectation of earning these benefits has become a magnet for birth tourists to travel on valid visas to the United States and the emergence of a birth tourism industry (Feere, 2010; Reasoner, 2011; Ji and Bates, 2017; Arthur, 2018). The use of the pejorative term 'jackpot baby' to refer to a US-born citizen who was born as a result of birth tourism to the United States, has become widespread (Guerrero, 2013).

ATTITUDES TOWARD BIRTH TOURISTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY

This paper first investigates American citizens' attitudes toward birth tourists who travel to their country. From the extant literature, the attitudes of American citizens have mostly been expressed as negative appraisals. The most widely discussed negative appraisal is the disapproval that some immigration experts in the United States have against the right that US-born citizens have and use in sponsoring their immediate relatives for American citizenship and receiving other economic benefits (Feere, 2010; Reasoner, 2011). These immigration experts believe that these women are abusing the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution (Ward, 2009; Lederer, 2013). This disapproval has led to the use of potentially derogatory terms such as 'anchor baby' and 'jackpot baby'. However, these terms differ in definitions because of the mothers' immigration status at the birth of their babies (Ward, 2009; Feere, 2010; Guerrero, 2013).

Ward (2009) explains that the term 'anchor baby' is used to refer to the speculative possibility that a US-born citizen at the age of 21 will use his or her right to sponsor the extended family members who are non-citizens for permanent residency in the United States. This child becomes an 'anchor' for the entire family to reside legally in the country (Feere, 2010). The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) also defines an 'anchor baby' as the offspring of an illegal immigrant

or a non-citizen, who under the current legal interpretation becomes an American citizen at birth but can only sponsor his or her parents for immigrant benefits at the age of 21 (Culliton-González, 2012). Ho (2006) and Ho et al. (2009) dispute FAIR's assertion that the legal interpretation of the 14th Amendment is recent but affirm that *jus soli* citizenship has been enshrined in the US Constitution for the past 150 years. Also, the Southern Poverty Law Center reported that FAIR has links with racist groups with a white nationalist agenda (Culliton-González, 2012). On the contrary, Guerrero (2013) uses the urban dictionary to describe a 'jackpot baby' as a child planned and conceived abroad and delivered on US soil solely for the parental desires of becoming US citizens indirectly and receiving other economic benefits.

For purposes of this paper, the term American 'jackpot baby' is used to highlight the contested and anti-immigrant sentiments espoused by a section of academia, while acknowledging the immigration-related benefits expected to be earned by both the US-born citizen and his or her family. More specifically, the paper uses the term American 'jackpot baby' to refer to any child who was born in the United States to either Ghanaian parents admitted as short-term visitors or to birth tourists, solely for the child to have access to better opportunities available to American citizens.

Opponents of birth tourism, including anti-immigration politicians, immigration reform activists, and some scholars hold the belief that birth tourists use deceptive reasons to apply for a visa, gain entry and give birth to earn American citizenship and a social security number for their offspring (Tetteh, 2010; Grant, 2015). They maintain that these foreign pregnant women are circumventing the legal process of becoming American citizens (Feere, 2010; Reasoner, 2011; Grant, 2015). Furthermore, some Americans regard birth tourism as unethical practice, as they believe that these women have discovered a 'loophole' in the Citizenship Clause, and that they are taking advantage to secure US citizenship for their unborn children (Grant, 2015). However, there is evidence that some birth tourists enter the country legally (Reasoner, 2011; Grant, 2015) and then avail themselves of rights enshrined in the US Constitution. Opponents of birth tourism further argue that some immigrants and US-born citizens do not sufficiently embrace the American values and are not fully assimilated into the society to warrant their inclusion as American citizens (Junn, 2011). The former president of the United States, Donald Trump, also added his voice to this negative appraisal. The former president claimed that the abuse of the US's *jus soli* citizenship provision by the birth tourists has opened the door to unregulated immigration and instant citizenship (Grant, 2015; Nori, 2016; CNN, 2018). He further alleged, without any credible evidence, that these US-born citizens and their families do not contribute, show love and respect to American society.

Consequently, opponents of birth tourism to the United States, including the past president, are advocating for an amendment to or the repeal of the Citizenship Clause to serve as a deterrent to foreign women who want to claim US-born citizenship for their children. This recommendation has ignited debates that, while they are heated, they are by no means novel. As Arthur (2018) observes, these

debates have been ongoing for the past 150 years. During the run-up to the mid-term elections on 6 November 2018, former President Trump ignited these debates again when he announced his plans to sign an executive order to end *jus soli* citizenship (Arthur, 2018). However, such an order had not been signed by the time he left office on 20 January 2021.

Other scholars have recommended other measures since the legal route to amend or repeal the Citizenship Clause is fraught with some challenges (Pearl, 2011; Arthur, 2018). While most scholars agree with the need to amend the US Constitution, they admit that this process is exceedingly difficult. As such, one recommendation is to amend the INA that governs most of the visa rules and eligibility (Pearl, 2011). Pearl (2011) explains that this amendment would in the first instance detect, deter and penalize foreign women from purposely traveling to the United States to have American 'jackpot babies'. Secondly, it aims to prevent the citizen children from sponsoring their families for permanent residency on return to the United States. As a result, on 24 January 2020 the State Department introduced a new travel policy that obliges foreign pregnant women to declare the purpose of their visit to the United States other than for giving birth (BBC, 2020a; Graphic Online, 2020).

Conversely, some American citizens have positive attitudes toward birth tourists who travel to their country. To them, American citizens born to foreign parents would become economic and social assets to the United States in adulthood (Stock, 2012). Stock (2009; 2012) observes that this category of citizens has over the years made contributions to the country in the same way as other Americans. They have joined the military, opened prosperous businesses, served in political office, and worked as diplomats. Grant (2015) agrees that American 'jackpot babies' who stay behind after their studies can become vital assets to the development of the country. In line with this thinking, some legal scholars, politicians, and immigration experts are against the limitation or elimination of the long-standing American provision of *jus soli* citizenship because they believe this citizenship principle is the bedrock that the country prides itself on (Schuck, 1998; Stock, 2012). It is also a demonstration of their adherence to the principle of equality for all. On the other hand, there are scholars who have found that this principle is not a reality for all American citizens. There is a denial among some Americans of the citizenship rights in both law and fact for Native Americans, African Americans, and other ethnic or religious minorities in the American society, even if they acquire their citizenship by birth (Schuck, 1998; Aleinikoff, 2001; Castles, 2005).

Deducing from the attitudes toward birth tourists to the United States, from the destination country's perspective, the negative appraisals confirm what Carens (1987) has pointed out, namely that it is common for citizens born in affluent countries like the United States to assume that they are morally entitled to the citizenship of the countries of their birth or countries in which their parents have citizenship. It follows that any potential immigrant from a developing country does not have any right to claim admission into these developed countries beyond an appeal of generosity

(Carens, 1987). Thus, some Americans are demanding strong border control, reforms to the political and legal systems to protect their 'citizenship privilege' and to determine how new members can be admitted to their country (Choules, 2006). Choules (2006) describes 'citizenship privilege' as the privilege of having citizenship of a safe, stable, and materially affluent country. A distinctive feature of citizenship privilege is that it is acquired through the accident of birth, although it is also possible by naturalization (Aleinikoff, 2001; McIntosh, 2002, cited in Choules, 2006). American citizenship could therefore be regarded as privileged under these circumstances. However, the positive appraisals acknowledge the contribution of US-born children of immigrants (referred to by some as American 'jackpot babies') as one of the factors that has led to the United States attaining a superpower status because these immigrants have become economic and social assets to the country (Stock, 2012).

THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR

An influential model that used attitude toward behavior as an independent determinant in predicting human social behavior is the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 2011; Kor and Mullan, 2011). This theory posits that an individual's intent to behave in a certain way can be predicted by three independent variables – attitude toward the behavior, subjective norm concerning the behavior, and perceived behavioral control (Kor and Mullan, 2011; Ajzen, 2020). Attitude refers to the person's overall evaluation of performing a given behavior where the implication is, the more positive the person's attitude, the more likely he or she will have the intention to perform the behavior (Rise et al., 2010). Also, Nunkoo and Ramkissoon (2010) aver that having a positive attitude toward a behavior is an indication of support while a negative attitude suggests opposition to the said behavior. In this paper, attitudes toward Ghanaian birth tourists who travel to the United States were used to investigate the intention of the country's urban population to have American 'jackpot babies'.

A frequently cited criticism of this theory is that it is too 'rational' and unaffected by emotions (Ajzen, 2011). However, Ajzen (2011) clarifies that behavior can be said to be planned, provided that attitudes toward the behavior follow automatically and consistently from people's beliefs. It follows that attitudes, intentions, and behaviors are consistent with people's beliefs even if they are inaccurate, biased, or irrational (Geraerts et al., 2008; Ajzen, 2011). Therefore, affect and emotions can serve as background factors that can influence intention and behavior directly or indirectly (Ajzen, 2011). The investigation of attitude (i.e., personal evaluation) will reveal a different aspect of birth tourism to the United States among the Ghanaian urban population.

METHODS

Data collection

The data presented in this paper was extracted from fieldwork conducted by the first author between May 2017 and March 2018, into the intentions and experiences of having American 'jackpot babies' among the Ghanaian urban dwellers. The paper uses the term urban dwellers to refer to the Ghanaian urban middle class and adopted the African Development Bank's (ADB) definition of a middle class. The bank's representative for Ghana in 2013, Marie-Laure Akin-Olugbade, suggested that everyone who spends the equivalent of $2 to $20 per capita per day has a middle-class status (BBC World Service, 2013; Lentz, 2016). Accordingly, Akin-Olugbade stated that about 46 percent of Ghanaians have a middle-class status. Data was collected from the three most urbanized metropolises located within the most urbanized regions in Ghana – Greater Accra, Ashanti, and Central Regions, using a cross-sectional survey and semi-structured in-depth interviews. The appropriate ethics committee cleared the data collection instruments before use. Accra, Kumasi, and Cape Coast metropolises were thus purposively selected from the sampled regions because of the consistent status of being the most urbanized regions since Ghana's independence (GSS, 2012; 2013). This method was deemed the most appropriate given that the approach adopted helped to examine the convergence or differences between the attitudes of urban dwellers who were yet to have, and parents who had, American 'jackpot babies' toward Ghanaian birth tourists who travel to the United States (Creswell, 2012; Saunders et al., 2012).

The researchers developed a survey, using a self-completed questionnaire and took care to sequence the questions so that the responses provided were not biased (McBurney and White, 2010; Saunders et al., 2012). The questionnaire design used a combination of different question types like open-ended, closed-ended, Likert scale, among others. Before the research commenced, the researchers piloted the survey instrument and made minor changes. The researchers opted for a multi-stage sampling procedure, which combined both probability and non-probability techniques to select 400 urban dwellers from a sampling frame of 1,526,433. The sample size was reached with the help of Yamane's (1967) formula, which considers a 95 percent confidence level and 0.05 level of precision. The questionnaire was administered to urban dwellers with these key variables: aged 18 years and older, literate in English and a Ghanaian language, and have not given birth in the United States. A total of 260 questionnaires were completed, representing a 65 percent response rate. The breakdown of the 260 respondents across the selected study areas was as follows: 115 from the Accra Metropolis, 55 from the Cape Coast Metropolis, and 90 from the Kumasi Metropolis.

For the semi-structured in-depth interviews, the researchers recruited parents who are Ghanaian citizens residing in any of the three study areas and who had given birth to American 'jackpot babies', through purposive and snowball sampling.

The first author used personal networks to contact the parents, but networks in the Kumasi Metropolis were not able to yield potential interviewees from this city. The initial interviewees were solicited to become de facto research assistants. A de facto assistant is a gatekeeper but also a participant in the study (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). Eventually, three de facto assistants recruited six other eligible participants from their social networks to take part in the research. The researchers decided not to recruit any new participants after the 15th interview, as no additional relevant knowledge was obtained (Bailey, 2007; Creswell, 2012; Saunders et al., 2012). Twelve parents in Accra and three parents in Cape Coast were interviewed. The researchers captured the parents' responses on an audio recorder with their consent and provided assurances of anonymity. Additionally, the researchers took short notes of some key information to allow for further clarification if need be, bearing in mind that the focus of this study is on the parents' attitudes toward other compatriots who also have American 'jackpot babies'. The researchers conducted the interviews in English; these lasted between 30 and ninety minutes each. Locations for the interviews were at the parents' discretion and they chose a variety of locations (i.e., car, homes, and offices).

Data analysis

The researchers analyzed the data from the survey, using SPSS version 20 and Stata 14.1. The major analyses performed were univariate, bivariate, and logistic regression modeling. The results of the univariate analysis described the socio-demographic characteristics (i.e., age, sex, education, employment, marital status) of the respondents, which are presented first. The results of the logistic regression modeling follow next, which assess the strength of the cause-and-effect relationship between the independent variables, some intermediate variables (not discussed within this paper), and the intentions to have an American 'jackpot baby' as the dependent variable (Saunders et al., 2012). The researchers used the urban dwellers' responses to the question about the attitudes toward Ghanaian birth tourists to the United States to determine the intentions. They also tested all associations at a 95 percent confidence level, using the SPSS and Stata.

The researchers then transcribed the audio information from the interviews verbatim into text. Each transcript was then either emailed or hand-delivered to the parents by the first author to read through to ensure their responses were correctly represented and not modified to suit the researcher's agenda and knowledge (Tong et al., 2007). The research team analyzed the qualitative data obtained using a thematic analysis approach (Braun and Clarke, 2012). This process involved the research team manually developing themes from the transcripts and responses to the open-ended questions on the questionnaires about the attitudes toward Ghanaian birth tourists to the United States, which dictated the discussion (Creswell, 2012). Some of the direct quotes from the survey and transcribed interviews also provided the 'spice' for the discussion of the findings within this study (Blumberg et al., 2011). The inclusion of

quotations from different parents ensured the transparency and trustworthiness of the findings and interpretations made (Bailey, 2007; Tong et al., 2007). The research team protected the identities of parents by using pseudonyms. The findings are discussed in the succeeding sections.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Profile of the Ghanaian urban dwellers

Over half (51.5%) of the respondents of the survey were females and a little over 7 out of every 10 (72.3%) urban dwellers sampled were between the ages of 20-34 years. Table 1 below illustrates the key socio-demographic characteristics of urban dwellers who were yet to have American 'jackpot babies'. Out of the overall sample, two-thirds (63.5%) of the respondents were never married whereas about 36.5 percent were ever married. The ever-married category includes currently married (33.1%), informal or consensual union (1.5%), widowed (0.8%), separated (0.7%), and 0.4 per cent were divorced. For the entire sample, 68.8 percent were in salaried or wage employment. Most of the respondents in salaried or wage employment were professionals in academia, administration, banking, health, civil and public service. However, less than a quarter (23.5%) were students, who reflect the social dynamics within the three metropolises, such as being hosts to tertiary institutions (e.g., universities, nursing training schools, among others). Table 1 also shows that most of the respondents (91.1%) had tertiary or higher education, with the majority indicating that they have an undergraduate degree. The target population for this study was urban middle-class Ghanaians who naturally have a higher propensity to have a good education. Additionally, the selected metropolises are popular destinations for Ghanaians who move from rural areas to the cities for better opportunities such as tertiary education and jobs (GSS, 2013; 2014).

The parents interviewed were aged from the mid-30s to the late-60s and only three were fathers. Regarding the marital status, there were eight married women, two marital dyads, one divorcee, one husband, and one single woman. The highest education qualification for five of the parents was a doctorate; six had master's degrees, three had bachelor's degrees, one had a diploma, and one was a doctoral student. Most of the parents were in salaried or wage employment but two mothers were unemployed. Those who were employed, were in the following professions: academia, banking, civil service, horticulture, marketing, nursing, and teaching. One mother was a lawyer in addition to working in the public service. The sampled parents had a total of 25 American 'jackpot babies', whose ages ranged from below 1 year to 32 years. Out of this number, only two were 18 years and above, 13 were males while the rest were females. Thus, each parent had at least one American 'jackpot baby', with the maximum being three American 'jackpot babies'.

Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics of urban dwellers yet to have American 'jackpot babies'

Variables	Frequency	Percentage
Sex		
Female	134	51.5
Male	126	48.5
Age (years)		
<20	22	8.5
20-34	188	72.3
35-49	44	16.9
50+	6	2.3
Educational attainment		
JHS	3	1.2
SHS/VOC/TECH	20	7.7
Tertiary/Higher	237	91.1
Marital status		
Never married	165	63.5
Ever married	95	36.5
Type of employment		
Salary/wage employee	179	68.8
Self-employed	14	5.4
Student	61	23.5
Other	6	2.3
Total	260	100.0

Source: Field data, 2018

1 JHS: Junior High School
2 SHS: Senior High School
3 VOC: Vocational
4 Tertiary: Bachelor's Degree

The research study found that both sample sets of Ghanaian urban dwellers have a few similarities. The majority of the respondents were females, of a youthful age, well-educated, and economically active professionals. The diverse formal occupations of the parents were an indication of having the required motility to give birth in the United States (Kaufmann, 2014). Conversely, there was a noticeable difference in the marital status where most of the respondents of the survey were never married compared to the interviewees who were married. This finding confirms what the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) observed in 2015 – that Ghanaians who partake in international tourism are usually married. Most of the American 'jackpot babies' born to the parents were males below the age of 18 years.

Attitudes toward Ghanaian women who have American 'jackpot babies'

Attitude is a function of an individual's belief that performing a given behavior will result in certain outcomes, either positive or negative (Coleman et al., 2011). Ajzen (2020) similarly describes belief as a person's subjective probability in performing behavior of interest that results in a certain outcome. This study categorized the most frequent recurring responses regarding attitudes into favorable, unfavorable, and neutral (see Table 2).

Table 2: Attitudes towards Ghanaian women who have American 'jackpot babies'

Attitude	Frequency	Percentage
Favorable evaluation		
A strategy to secure a better future for children	90	34.6
American citizenship & its associated benefits	63	24.2
Unfavorable evaluation		
Disapproval	46	17.7
Lack of patriotism & confidence in Ghana	33	12.7
Neutral evaluation		
Indifference & personal choice	28	10.8
Total	260	100.0

Source: Field data, 2018

Favorable evaluation

Two central themes ran through the favorable appraisal: a strategy to secure a better future for children (34.6%); and the acquisition of American citizenship to gain access to its associated benefits (24.2%). Some of the respondents to the survey and most of the interviewees held the belief that giving birth in the United States is a good strategy, driven by parental instinct to guarantee a better future or opportunities for unborn children (Sundari, 2005; Pine, 2014). This could be achieved when the children migrate to the United States in adulthood. This appraisal revealed that parents viewed the travel to the United States to give birth as an exhibition of faith and hope that future migration of the US-born persons to their country of birth will enhance life chances (Pine, 2014). Yet, a father of a US-born child disagreed with this view. He substantiated his objection by comparing the social dynamics within Ghana and the United States. To him, Ghana is far better than the United States:

> What is a better future? Have you seen the statistics on crime in the United States? Your skin might not help you if they are looking for anybody who is black, and you are at the wrong place at the wrong time. Didn't you see the

> bombings? So, if you are in here [Ghana] and there is no crisis; why will you have a reason to go over there [the United States]? (Kingsley, 67 years, Accra).

The above quote alludes to how an American citizen's race might endanger his or her life in the United States. Accordingly, some scholars have acknowledged that not every American citizen would be entitled to full and equal rights. This is more so for US-born children of undocumented parents. Castles (2005), for instance, argues that Native Americans, African Americans, other ethnic or religious minorities encounter challenges in successfully claiming rights as American citizens. Although the legal rights and obligations of American citizens are formally equal, there is a denial of rights in law and fact for American citizens from minority groups (Schuck, 1998; Aleinikoff, 2001). Thus, Aleinikoff (2001) asserts that the representation of American citizenship as a magic circle that entitles those within it to full and equal rights is misleading and worrisome. The northern hemisphere summer of 2020 was characterized by heightened racial tension with attendant anti-racism protests in the United States and around the world. These protests, following the killing of George Floyd on 25 May 2020, demanded justice for minority groups (BBC, 2020b). Floyd died as a white police officer knelt on his neck for almost nine minutes. The recent past has seen the frequent shooting incidents of unarmed African Americans and Africans by the police and other citizens and the subsequent acquittal of the perpetrators of these crimes. Resultantly, civil rights movements like the "Black Lives Matter" movement have been holding protests within and outside the United States since its inception in 2013 to demand equality, access to basic human rights, and dignity for the victims and minority groups. These exceptions in claiming equal rights as American citizens confirm the existence of differentiated citizenship within the American society (Castles, 2005).

The second theme confirmed the perception that certain rights and benefits are conferred on individuals based on their birthplace (Pessar and Mahler, 2003; Shachar and Hirschl, 2007). Therefore, according to the urban dwellers, Ghanaian birth tourists evaluate what the citizenship status of the two countries offers their offspring. They arrive at the conclusion that American citizenship is more beneficial because of the assurances of certain rights and benefits that Ghanaian citizenship does not guarantee (Castles, 2005; Choules, 2006). Some of the benefits and rights enumerated, included: prestige attached to being an American citizen; a passport that allows the holder to travel without any hindrances; and access to a good education. Most of the female respondents were of the view that giving birth in the United States paves the way for their offspring to have undeniable access to those privileges. Comfort's response underscores this position:

> I did that purposely for him to take advantage of the American educational system. America has one of the best educational systems and also boosts confidence in a human being. I realized that here [Ghana] they make us

> [Ghanaians] very timid. A blend of Ghana's timidity and America's confidence was what I wanted for my son (Comfort, 52 years, Accra).

The favorable evaluation confirmed the assertion by Coleman et al. (2011) that individuals holding a positive attitude toward a given behavior, believe that executing this behavior (i.e., having an American 'jackpot baby') will lead to the desired outcomes for the parents, children, and families.

Unfavorable evaluation

Conversely, about a third (30.4%) of the urban dwellers were not enthused that their female compatriots were traveling purposely to have so-called American 'jackpot babies' because this behavior is associated with undesirable consequences. The two dominant themes identified under the unfavorable appraisal were disapproval (17.7%) and lack of patriotism and confidence in Ghana (12.7%). Some of the negative appraisals were, however, described and expressed in strong language, that included: 'cheats'; 'illiterates'; 'ignorant'; 'opportunist'; 'repugnant'; 'disrespectful'; and an 'act of betraying our national identity'. Bianchi and Stephenson (2013) maintain that historically, citizenship has been closely associated with national identity. This category of urban dwellers believes that the travels to the United States to have offspring with an American identity convey the message that Ghanaian identity is not valued (Shils, 1995). Smith (1991) and Lewin-Epstein and Levanon (2005) explain that national identity together with nationality help individuals to define who they are and provide them with a sense of purpose through the prism of collective personality and its distinctive culture. One of the female respondents initially agreed with these sentiments but later offered a justification for why birth tourists like her made a decision to give birth in the United States:

> Yeah, many of us are not proud to be Ghanaians. That is the sad truth. There is no reason to sugar-coat this because many of us [Ghanaians] are trying to get out of the country [Ghana]. But we are afraid for our children. For example, we cannot trust our educational system. So, I think for many of us [parents], we are trying to get the best for our children. In spite of how patriotic we are, the bottom line is that we want what is best for our children (Thelma, 40 years, Cape Coast).

Her narrative suggests that a secure citizenship status in a country is a crucial factor in determining an individual's life chances. Access to privileged citizenship, therefore, perpetuates global inequality (Shachar and Hirschl, 2007; Shachar, 2009; Balta and Altan-Olcay, 2016). Shachar and Hirschl (2007) argue that a child born in a developed country would have far better living conditions than a child born in a developing country. Moreover, citizens born in developed countries are described as having the 'right' citizenship because they are more likely to enjoy better life opportunities, social

conditions, and freedoms compared to the citizens who have the 'wrong' citizenship from the developing countries who are likely to be poor, suffer starvation and disease, and die younger (Shachar, 2009; Orgad, 2011). Additionally, citizenship in Western liberal democracies has been described as the modern equivalent of feudal privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances one's life chances (Carens, 1987; Shachar and Hirschl, 2007).

Neutral evaluation

The last sentence from Thelma's quote above supports the viewpoint of about 10.8 percent of the urban dwellers who participated in the survey, who had an indifferent attitude toward Ghanaian birth tourists to the United States. They believed that having an American 'jackpot baby' is a personal choice and the right of anyone to decide where to give birth and what is appropriate for their unborn children. Thus, the analyses on attitudes indicate that most of the urban dwellers who participated in this study had a favorable evaluation and an indication of strong intentions to have American 'jackpot babies', especially for those who were yet to have one (Ajzen, 2020). Coleman et al. (2011) describe intention as the best predictor of behavior. Moreover, a positive attitude suggests support for birth tourism to the United States (Andriotis, 2005; Nunkoo and Ramkissoon, 2010). Aside from this indication, Ajzen (2020) contends that intentions are dynamic because of access to new information, and people rarely act on their intentions. Furthermore, a favorable attitude at least discloses the motivations of those who are yet to have, and those who have had American 'jackpot babies' (Ajzen, 2020). Apart from the favorable and unfavorable evaluation that the theory of planned behavior indicated that people would express toward a given behavior, this research study established that there is also a neutral evaluation.

Subsequently, a binary regression model was used to analyze attitudes toward Ghanaian birth tourists to the United States and other factors to determine the intentions of Ghanaian urban dwellers to have an American 'jackpot baby' (see Table 3). The model established that 35.4 percent of the intentions to have an American 'jackpot baby' are explained by the socio-demographic conditions of the respondents. Thus, 64.6 percent of the intentions to have an American 'jackpot baby' are not explained by other factors not considered in the larger study. The only significant predictor variable in the model was the attitudes toward Ghanaian birth tourists to the United States. All the other socio-demographic variables were not significant predictors of intentions to have an American 'jackpot baby'. Nonetheless, the effect of attitudes toward Ghanaian birth tourists to the United States on intentions to have an American 'jackpot baby' was negative. The various attitudes exhibited by the sampled population toward Ghanaian birth tourists to the United States were less likely to influence urban dwellers' intentions to participate in birth tourism to the United States compared to those who have the attitude that having an American 'jackpot baby' is a strategy to secure a better future for children.

Table 3: Logistic regession on factors determining the intentions to have an American 'jackpot baby'

Variables						
Socio-demographic characteristics	**Coef.**	**Std. Err.**	**Odds Ratio**	**P>z**	**Confidence Interval**	
Sex						
Male (RC)						
Female	-0.300	0.432	0.741	0.487	-1.146	0.546
Age (years)						
<20 (RC)						
20 - 34	0.209	0.980	1.232	0.832	-1.713	2.130
35 - 49	0.087	1.200	1.091	0.942	-2.264	2.439
50+ years	-0.380	1.401	0.684	0.786	-3.126	2.366
Education attainment						
JHS/SHS/VOC/Tech (RC)						
Tertiary/Higher	0.899	0.795	2.458	0.258	-0.660	2.458
Residence						
KMA (RC)						
Cape Coast	-0.116	0.813	0.891	0.887	-1.708	1.477
AMA	0.040	0.526	1.041	0.939	-0.990	1.071
Type of employment						
Salary/wage employee (RC)						
Self employed	-0.292	0.648	0.747	0.652	-1.562	0.978
Student	0.819	0.749	2.267	0.275	-0.650	2.287
Other	0.798	3.122	2.220	0.798	-5.322	6.917
Ethnicity						
Akan (RC)						
Ga-Dangme	-0.389	0.599	0.678	0.516	-1.562	0.785
Ewe	-0.421	0.614	0.656	0.493	-1.625	0.782
Other	-0.276	0.819	0.759	0.736	-1.881	1.330
Marital status						
Never married (RC)						
Ever married	0.013	0.572	1.013	0.981	-1.108	1.135
Determinants of the intentions to have an American 'jackpot baby'						
Awareness of Ghanaian women participation in birth tourism to the United States						
Yes (RC)						
No	-0.902	0.828	0.406	0.276	-2.524	0.721
Know a Ghanaian birth tourist to the United States						
Yes (RC)						
No	-0.715	0.425	0.489	0.093	-1.549	0.119

Attitudes towards Ghanaian birth tourists to the United States						
A strategy to a better future for children (RC)						
US citizenship & its benefits	-0.328	0.633	**0.721***	0.605	-1.568	0.913
Disapproval	-4.004	0.710	**0.018***	**0.001***	-5.395	-2.613
Lack of patriotism & confidence	-3.340	0.722	**0.035***	**0.001***	-4.756	-1.924
Indifference & personal choice	-1.971	0.611	**0.139***	**0.001***	-3.168	-0.774
Amend American *jus soli*						
Yes (RC)						
No	0.180	0.434	1.198	0.678	-0.671	1.031
Constant	1.600	1.149		0.164	-0.652	3.853
Pseudo R^2	**0.354***					

Source: Field data, 2018. RC: Reference category

As seen in Table 3, respondents who had the attitude that having an American 'jackpot baby' is proof of the lack of patriotism and confidence in Ghana, are 0.035 times less likely to have the intentions of having an American 'jackpot baby' compared with those who think it is a strategy to secure a better future for children. Also, the respondents who disapproved of the idea of having an American 'jackpot baby' were 0.018 times less likely to have the intentions to have an American 'jackpot baby' compared with those who thought it is a strategy to secure a better future for children. Moreover, respondents who had an indifferent view or belief that having an American 'jackpot baby' is an individual choice, were also less likely to have the intentions to have an American 'jackpot baby' compared with those who thought it is a strategy to secure a better future for children. This study thus concludes that compared to having the attitude that giving birth in the United States is a strategy to secure a better future for children, urban dwellers at the three metropolises are less likely to have the intentions to have an American 'jackpot baby'.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper is to build an understanding of a complex and multifaceted phenomenon – birth tourism to the United States – by investigating the attitudes of Ghana's urban population toward Ghanaian parents who have US-born babies. This paper has established that there is a favorable attitude toward Ghanaian birth tourists who give birth in the United States, and this represented almost 59 percent of the survey participants. The positive appraisal spelled out the motivations that would induce an urban dweller in Ghana to give birth in the United States and prompt another to follow suit. The binary regression model also revealed that 35 percent of the intentions are explained by the socio-demographic characteristics of urban dwellers. The attitudes toward Ghanaian birth tourists to the United States constitute

the only significant predictor variable in the model but its effect on the intentions to have an American 'jackpot baby' is negative. This result disproves some scholars' assumption that an attitude toward a given behavior is a sufficient predictor of one's intention to perform a given behavior in relation to birth tourism to the United States, within the Ghanaian context. However, this study recognizes that a missing independent variable in the model could be income. Income could have become a natural predictor in the model since having American 'jackpot babies' is a capital-intensive endeavor. Nonetheless, the educational qualifications and the types of employment of respondents to the survey and interviewees, indirectly allude to the income levels.

Despite the results from the logistic regression model, this paper has provided a deeper insight into the intentions of having so-called American 'jackpot babies' among urban dwellers in a developing country context. That is, the global inequality in the acquisition of citizenship is the primary motivating factor that would drive some Ghanaian urban dwellers to act 'rationally' by using international tourism as a means to acquire the 'right' citizenship from the United States for their offspring. They see American citizenship as a privileged and opportunity-enhancing tool to obtain for the benefit of their children and families (Choules, 2006; Shachar and Hirschl, 2007). Another strength of this paper is that a neutral evaluation should be taken into consideration in addition to the favorable and unfavorable evaluation that the theory of planned behavior had indicated as criteria in evaluating attitude as an independent determinant of intention to perform a given behavior. Ultimately, a reasonable approach to tackle global inequality perpetuated by hierarchical citizenship leading to the desire to have a so-called American 'jackpot baby' is to ensure each country's citizenship functions as an opportunity-enhancing tool.

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Impact of Subnational Migration Flows on Population Distribution in Kenya: Analysis Using Census Data

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In Kenya, internal migration continues to impact population redistribution, although few studies have considered subnational variations of the intensities and their overall impact on this process. This study sought to analyze subnational migration flows and their impact on population redistribution in Kenya. The study used 1999 and 2009 census micro data to generate migration intensities for each county and to map these using ARCGIS software, to show the distributional effects of migration on the population for the period of investigation. The findings confirm a shift in the migration patterns in the country over the ten-year period, and also on the effect on population redistribution in the country. There are wide county variations with net gainers, net losers, and an emergence of inactive migration zones. Migrants are concentrated in counties with large, urbanized areas, although suburbanization is emerging, as secondary cities and urban areas attract migrants. Results from the spatial analysis show that migration intensities are clustered in ways that reveal similar intensities in neighboring regions. Consequently, two hotspots are visible – high-high hotspots in Nairobi and Vihiga – and clustering of low intensities in Mombasa and adjacent counties is evident. The study concludes that while internal migration effectively contributes to population redistribution, the effect is waning, as more regions become urbanized.

Keywords: impact, intensity, migration, subnational migration, county, Kenya

INTRODUCTION

Migration affects the spatial distribution of the population and changes the age and sex structure of receiving and sending populations. There has been significant research on how international migration affects population distribution in sending and receiving areas, with little focus on the role that internal migration plays. Migration leads to suburbanization in national contexts, where migrants move from the metropolitan areas to smaller urban and rural areas. Understanding the patterns of flows and counter flows reveals the impact that migration has on the redistribution of the population over time. Scholars have used measures such as intensity of migration, in addition to rate and volume of migrants, to understand how the subnational dynamics play out. Owing to the paucity of migration data, particularly on the African continent, most countries rely on census data to conduct analyses of migration, focusing on national or regional averages. However, national averages tend to mask subnational variations of migration.

Studies have outlined the importance of internal migration to population redistribution, including the contribution of migration to urbanization processes. Global comparisons have been made with regard to internal migration trends and indicators, acknowledging the challenges of comparability of the data sets (Bell et al., 2002). To mitigate these challenges, researchers established a global repository for internal migration generated from census microdata through the IMAGE project (Bell et al., 2002; Bell and Muhidin, 2009; Bell et al., 2015). Several studies have used the IMAGE database to study migration intensities and their impacts worldwide (Bell et al., 2002; Bell et al., 2015; Rees et al., 2017).

Patterns and impacts of migration flows within national boundaries indicate not only where people move to, but also, the impact that such moves have on the overall residential population in receiving and sending areas. In Africa, internal migration is more predominant than international migration; therefore, scholarly interest has shifted to understanding the dynamics and impacts of internal migration flows (Adepoju, 1995; Okyerefo and Setrana, 2018). The common trend is that internal migration flows mirror the national development patterns; hence, migrants move to the more developed parts of the country and shun the least developed ones (Oucho and Gould,1993; Oucho, 1998). While this is a global trend, it is particularly common in Africa and is responsible for some of the urbanization challenges the continent faces (Turok, 2012; Mberu et al., 2017).

Studies on subnational migration patterns in Kenya are few, with the majority limited to a regional analysis based on previous provincial data. Such studies show wide regional variations in migration patterns and flows within the provinces, which are the old administrative units, resulting in the conclusions that Nairobi, Rift Valley and Coast provinces are the main recipients of migrants, while Western, Nyanza and Eastern provinces are the net losers. Little is said about the North Eastern and Central provinces (Wakajummah, 1986; Odipo, 1994; Oucho, 1996, 1998, 2000). Successive studies revealed little change in these patterns, prompting the conclusion that the

factors determining internal migration in the country are not changing (RoK, 2010, 2012). To determine if this conclusion is true, this study used recent census data to explore migration trends at the subnational levels. This was prompted by a study showing wide differentials in county migration rates (Adieri, 2012), which led to the conclusion that national averages mask these subnational variations.

This study had a twofold objective, of (a) mapping out the subnational patterns of internal migration in Kenya to determine if any changes happened during the 1999–2009 period; and (b) visualizing the spatial effects of these migration flows in the counties. To do this, the study generated measures of migration intensity and undertook spatial analysis using ARCGIS software to map out the patterns and impacts of migration on population redistribution in the subnational units. While the 1999–2009 data used districts as the subnational units, this study reconstructed the districts to counties using a matching process, so that the findings were more relevant for the current administrative structure.

The study is timely, as county governments are currently fully functional administrative units in Kenya, hence migration dynamics within the county level become important for planning and development processes in these counties. While the analysis relied on census data, the availability of geospatial analysis tools helped with the visualization of the spatial effects of migration over time.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The net effect of migration on population redistribution has been captured in several studies globally, although the majority of these studies are based on international migration data. In the recent past, there has been a growing interest in understanding internal migration through comparative global studies, although this has been plagued by numerous problems, including data sources, measurement, and definitional concepts, resulting in comparative studies of internal migration being largely absent from the main literature (Bell et al., 2002, Bell et al., 2015). In response to these challenges, the work of Bell et al. (2002) on the Comparing Internal Migration Across the Globe (IMAGE) project resulted in the development of a global repository of internal migration for global research. By 2013, the contributions of 179 of the 193 United Nations Member States were captured in the repository (Bell et al., 2015). The IMAGE project has revolutionized the discourse on internal migration, enabling global comparisons of migration intensities across the world (Bell et al., 2015).

Several measures of migration intensity have been used in subnational analysis. Bell et al. (2002) propose the use of two measures of the impact of migration, namely the migration effectiveness index (MEI) which extends the migration effectiveness ratio; and the aggregate net migration rate (ANMR). The MEI compares the proportion of total inflow minus outflow into a given geographical area as a proportion of total migrations recorded in the area, as captured by the sum of the total inflows and outflows to the geographical area. The MEI values range between 0 and 100, with high values showing that migration is effectively redistributing the population in the

given area. The ANMR only measures how the net and gross migration flows compare for a given region. Another measure is the crude migration intensity, calculated as the number of levels of spatial disaggregation and computed as the total number of internal migrations at any given time as a percentage of the population at risk (Rees et al., 2000). A newer index of measuring migration intensity, the Index of Net Migration Impact (INMI), which has been proposed by Rees et al. (2017), compares the spatial patterns of migration between migration and population density. The use of migration intensities removes the focus from the rural-urban dichotomy, which complicates comparative analysis of migration data. As Lucas (2015: 6) observes, comparative studies resort to measuring migration rates by the propensities to cross some internal administrative boundaries such as regions, provinces, or districts.

Several studies have used the IMAGE dataset to document the impacts of internal migration across the globe (Bell et al., 2002; Bell et al., 2015; Rees et al., 2017). While this is progressive, there is still low representation of countries in Africa owing to data challenges, as documented by many researchers (see for example, Oucho and Gould, 1993; Oucho, 1998). Several efforts have been made to improve the migration statistics for migration analysis in Africa, including census data, surveys, as well as the limited use of specialist migration surveys in a number of countries, including Egypt and Ethiopia (Muyonga et al., 2020). Using data from the IMAGE dataset, Rees et al. (2017) observe that there are wide regional variations of intensities in Africa – although data is sparse – with low levels of migration impact noted in Egypt, Mali, and Ghana, but more substantial redistribution in Guinea, Senegal, Tunisia, Uganda, and Cameroon. Comparatively, in Kenya, there is a high redistribution effect based on recent migration data (Rees et al., 2017).

Elsewhere, several studies identified the impact that migration has on national population distribution, for example, in China (Fan, 2005; Shi et al., 2020), India (Bhagat and Keshri, 2020), and Latin America (Rodríguez-Vignoli and Rowe, 2018). Migration influences not only urbanization but also reflects the temporal effects of historical events, including migration policy outcomes for Asian countries (Charles-Edwards et al., 2019). In Britain, a study on the ethnic migration patterns reveals the heavy concentration of immigrants in the metropolitan areas in England, while the White population moved to regions with higher concentration to areas with a high share of the white population (Stillwell and Duke-Williams, 2005). In a review of internal migration impacts in 12 European countries, there is evidence of increased urbanization as well as counter-urbanization, specifically in Western European countries such as the UK, the Netherlands and France (Rees et al., 2017).

In Africa, subnational analysis of internal migration and the impact on population redistribution have been conducted widely, with the majority of studies focusing on regional population flows. Oucho and Gould (1993) observe that internal migration contributes to urban growth in Africa, although this effect has been declining over time. The regional studies show that internal migration is largely responsible for urbanization and growth of metropolitan cities, with increased

population numbers in urban settlements due to the influx of migrants, while rural areas report net losses. The fast pace of urban growth in major cities of Africa has also been partly attributed to internal migration and the related challenges of the proliferation of slums (Mberu et al., 2017). While the majority of studies focus on movements from rural to urban areas, Lucas (1997) cautions that the bulk of internal migration flows in least developed countries are mainly between rural areas and not from rural to urban areas. Oucho (1998) agrees, observing that increased internal migration flows within countries is resulting in the blurring of the urban-rural dichotomy. In South Africa, findings show that metropolitan areas remain the greatest attraction to rural migrants, leading to net gains in the urban areas and losses in rural areas (Ginsburg et al., 2016). High internal migration is associated with low development, pushing out rural migrants to urbanized spaces. In Delta State, Nigeria, Onokerhoraye (2013) observes that unequal development, resulting in poor investments in rural infrastructure in the region, is the main push factor for migrants out of the region to the more developed parts of the country.

Previous studies in Kenya

Studies on internal migration in Kenya have largely focused on identifying the typology of flows and determinants of flows, with only a few studies considering the impact of migration on population redistribution. The internal migration flows confirm the colonial legacy of the country, where unequal development resulted in migration flows from poorly-developed areas to the metropolitan areas (Soja, 1968; Gupta, 1979; Oucho, 2007). The seminal works by Ominde (1969, as reviewed by Morgan, 1970) and Oucho (1988) show that migration flows are from rural to urban areas, rural to other rural areas, urban to other urban areas, and urban to rural areas – also known as return migration. However, while such studies focused on the urban-rural dichotomy in the flows of migrants within the country, Oucho (1998) observes that this is largely diminishing as urbanization levels rise in the country.

Wakajummah (1986) offers a different typology of internal migration flows in the country, identifying five major streams: (a) to metropolitan areas, largely representing patterns observed in Nairobi and Mombasa; (b) to settlement areas, in regions where land is available (Laikipia, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, West Pokot, Kajiado, Nakuru, Lamu, and Tana River districts); (c) to nomadic areas, largely found in the northern part of the country (Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Marsabit, Samburu, Turkana); (d) to border areas (Busia, West Pokot, Kajiado, Narok, Garissa, Wajir, Marsabit); and (e) the patterns in Western, Nyanza, and Eastern regions. He notes that a limitation of such earlier studies is that they did not show the inter-regional flows (Wakajummah, 1986: 134).

Several other studies concentrated on the determinants of internal migration in Kenya, although most focused on explaining the patterns of labor migration flows, arguing that the migrants move in search of employment opportunities or better wages (Todaro, 1969; Rempel, 1971,1974; Knowles and Anker, 1977; House and Rempel,

1981). Todaro's study shows that migrants make the decision to move based on the perceived income in urban areas compared to rural areas. In case they do not find the wage differentials beneficial, they are likely to return to their origin areas. Soja (1968) notes that migrants may move to areas with better economic development. However, the distance between districts and destination factors determine how far migrants are prepared to move (Barber and Milne, 1988). Oucho (1996) describes the 'urban bias' of rural migrants who prefer to move to urbanized parts of the country, adding that internal migrants maintain urban-rural linkages with their origin areas through exchange of goods and services, visitation, and remittances. Despite the bias for rural areas, several studies argue that migration patterns mirror the economic disparities between regions (Oucho, 1981, 2000, 2007, 2016). A different perspective is offered by Wakajummah (1986), who notes that migration is motivated by land inequality in the origin areas, resulting in male out-migration to other parts of the country where there is land. In a related study, Ovyat and Mwangi wa Githinji (2017) add that land inequality causes migrants to move initially to smaller urban areas, before eventually reaching the larger urban cities like Nairobi. In addition, the study shows that land inequality affected more males than female migrants.

Internal migration studies in Kenya have relied on regional estimates of migration rates to show the population redistribution in the regions – previously named Provinces – concluding that the net gainers are Nairobi, Rift Valley, and Coast regions, and net losers include Western, Nyanza, and Eastern provinces. The high numbers of outmigrants from the Western region resulted in the region becoming known as Kenya's human capital reservoir (Oucho, 2002; Oucho et al., 2014). Such studies are however, based on a regional analysis of migration patterns based on national averages, which may mask subnational variations, as confirmed in more recent studies (for example, Adieri, 2012). In his analysis of intercensal migration during the period 1999 to 2009 using census data, Adieri (2012) observes that there are wide variations in the county-level migration rates, which were previously masked using regional aggregate measures of migration. His study, that used intercensal migration rates, shows that movements to Nairobi and Mombasa exhibit similar age-sex specific patterns. However, the study did not consider the contingency flows between counties.

The review of the relevant literature confirms that there are regional variations in migration patterns and rates in the country, although none of the studies compared the impact of migration on the spatial distribution of the population. This study sought to fill this gap in knowledge, showing how migration intensities are spread in the 47 counties, and highlighting the impact on spatial distribution of the population in the receiving counties. This study differs from the previous ones in two key ways. First, it focused on county-level analysis using 1999 and 2009 census data. While studies such as Adieri (2012) conducted county-level analysis, the focus was on the migration rates in the intercensal period, showing the age-sex specific rates per county. Previous studies relied on regional analysis that focused on Provinces, which

are currently redundant, following the creation of counties in the country's new constitution (RoK, 2010). Second, the study employed spatial analysis and spatial mapping techniques that visualize the spatial changes to the population in counties for the two respective census years.

The next sections present the study methodology, key findings and a discussion of their implications, followed by the conclusion with some recommendations for policy-makers and future studies.

METHODOLOGY

The analysis required county-level data on migration intensities. The county was the study's unit of analysis, and although data was available for sub-county migration, did not conduct the sub-county migration intensity analysis owing to data limitations and constraints. While the 1999 and 2009 censuses were conducted using the district as the subnational unit, the researchers obtained county-level data by matching the relevant districts to the present-day county. Table 1 shows the district data for 1999 and 2009 with the corresponding county as per the new constitution. The matching process was guided by the data processing team of the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics – the custodian of official statistics in Kenya. The number of districts had increased from 69 in the 1999 census, to 159 by 2009 (RoK, 2001; Odhiambo and Ndilinge, 2007). The creation of administrative units in the pre-devolution period, was largely political with the head of state deciding on the number and location of districts to be created. The new constitution altered the process of creating administrative units in the country and established 47 counties, which have been gazetted. As a result of these changes, the 2009 census, while originally conducted before the promulgation of the constitution in 2010, had the analytical reports prepared with the county as the unit of analysis (RoK, 2010, 2012).

Table 1: Districts to Counties matching

Region (previously Province)	**County (previously District)**
Nairobi	Nairobi
Central	Nyandarua, Nyeri, Kirinyaga, Muranga, Kiambu
Coast	Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi, Tana River, Lamu, Taita Taveta
Eastern	Marsabit, Isiolo, Meru, Tharaka Nithi, Embu, Kitui, Machakos, Makueni
North Eastern	Garissa, Wajir, Mandera
Nyanza	Siaya, Kisumu, Homa Bay, Migori, Kisii, Nyamira
Rift Valley	Turkana, West Pokot, Samburu, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Nandi, Baringo, Laikipia, Nakuru, Narok, Kajiado, Kericho, Bomet
Western	Kakamega, Vihiga, Bungoma, Busia

The map of counties is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Map of Kenyan Counties (KNBS, 2019)

Source: Authors' own work

Researchers derived census micro data from the 1999 and 2009 Kenya Population and Housing census data obtained from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS). The 1999 data included information on the district of birth, district of residence a

year before the census and duration of residence. The 2009 census, by comparison, collected data on place of birth, previous residence, duration of residence and place of enumeration. While the 2019 census had been completed, the data sets were not used in this analysis, as the study commenced before the completion of the census. Moreover, the 2019 census is yet to undergo the detailed analysis of population dynamics, but it included questions on reasons for migrating (RoK, 2019: 250).

The key data for this analysis was lifetime migration data, derived by cross-tabulating the place of birth by the place of current residence from the census. Residents whose place of birth was different from their place of residence, were categorized as lifetime migrants. Depending on whether they had moved into or away from their place of birth, they were labeled as 'lifetime in-migrants' or 'lifetime out-migrants'. Lifetime data was used to compute migration intensities, thus giving insights on the extent to which individuals living in Kenya had moved away from their place of birth. However, this is limiting, as it does not factor duration of residence and may lead to under- or over counts of migration in the long term (UNDESA, 1970).

Method

To determine the net effect of migration on population redistribution, the study used the Revised Weighted Net Migration Rate (RNM*i*) and the Revised Weighted Gross Migration Rate (RGM*i*). These two measures showed how the population had been redistributed through migration. The RGM*i* and RNM*i* values provided different outputs of the impact of migration on subnational population distribution. The RGM*i* presented the proportion of migrants in each county, that is, 1 in X number of the population in a given county was 'in-migrant population', while RNM*i* gave an indication of the overall intensity of migrants in the county compared to the rest of the country, hence, the proportion of net migrants in a given county, in relation to the entire migrant population in the country. Thus, the RNM*i* value weights the individual county migration intensities to the overall national intensity.

The measures are derived from the net migration and gross migration rates, which consider only the difference between in-migrants and out-migrants as a proportion of the total population. The RNM*i* considers the proportion of migrants in the total population and the total migrants, therefore taking care of undercounts or overcounts that would otherwise occur due to huge differences in the total population (Shi et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2011).

The RNM*i* is computed by weighting the net migration rates by the share of migrants in the total population. When the number of in-migrants is larger than the number of out-migrants, the net migration rate gives a positive result, whereas a negative migration rate implies that more people are moving out of an area than coming in. The RNM*i* is computed as:

$$RNMi = ((I_i\text{-}0_i/P_i) * (I_i/\Sigma I_n)) * N$$

Where I*i* is the number of in-migrants in County *i*, O*i* is the number of out-migrants in County *i*, P*i* is the resident population in County *i*, and N is the total number

of counties – in this study's case it is 47. To visualize the changes in population redistribution, this study used ARCGIS 10.5 software to map out the revised weighted migration rates using shapefiles for the 47 counties.

Revised Gross Migration Rate (RGM_i)

This is derived from the gross migration rate, which measures the total flows of migrants, adding in-migrants and out-migrants. Thus, the RGM*i* weights the gross migration rate by the share of total migrants in the total population. Therefore, the RGM*i* is derived by multiplying the gross migration rate by the summation of the total migration in the county, weighted by the total number of counties. The RGM*i* was used in this study to show the overall effect of migration on the total county population. Thus, for a given county, the RGM*i* will show what proportion of the county population is comprised of the migrant population.

$$GMR = (I_i + O_i)/P_i,$$

where GMR is the gross migration rate, I is the number of in-migrants, while O is the number of out-migrants.

Therefore, the RGM*i* is derived as follows:

$$RGMi = ((Ii + Oi)/Pi) * (\sum I_n + \sum O_n)) * N$$

where I*i* is the number of in-migrants in County *i*, O*i* is the number of out-migrants in County *i*, and P*i* is the resident population in County*i* and N is the total number of counties.

Spatial analysis

The researchers conducted a spatial analysis of the migration intensities executed by Spatial Statistics Tools extension found in the Arc Toolbox section in the ARCGIS software. The spatial analysis involved testing if the migration intensities for the counties are randomly distributed or not, and if they are dependent on spatial factors. To do this, the researchers conducted the Moran's I test of spatial autocorrelation of the migration intensities, captured using the RNMis. The Moran's I test of spatial autocorrelation confirms if the values of migration intensity in the country are randomly distributed, or if they have spatial associations. The values of Moran's I test range from -1 to 1, with -1, where the value 1 means there is perfect clustering of similar values, while 0 means there is no autocorrelation, hence, any clusters arising are of dissimilar values. Thus, a positive value of Moran's I indicates that the values being analyzed tend to cluster spatially, either as high values clustering together, or low values clustering together. A negative index implies that high values repel each other and tend to be near low values. The results of spatial autocorrelation analysis using Moran's I present five outputs: the Moran's Index, Expected Index, Variance, *z*-score, and *p*-value. The Moran's Index value ranges from -1 to 1, confirming if the variables – in the case of this study, migration intensity – are either clustered or

randomly distributed. A Moran's I value of 1, indicates that the migration intensities are clustered with similar values together, such as high values in the neighborhood of other high values, or low values together with other low values. When the Moran's I value is close to 0, it shows that the values are not clustered. If the Moran's I value is negative, it indicates that high values are located close to low values. The Moran's Index also generates a *p*-value and a *z*-score that capture the statistical significance of the outputs. The spatial autocorrelation report presents a second output – the Expected Index. This index shows the distribution of migration intensities in case there is no clustering. The p-values and the *z*-scores of the Expected Index are also generated.

To determine if the migration intensities are random or clustered, the *p*-values and the *z*-scores of the Moran's I and the Expected Index are compared. The *p*-values present a probability that the spatial pattern observed is a random process. If p is of low value, then the observed clustering is not a random event, hence, the null hypothesis is rejected. The *z*-scores present the standard deviations, and these tend to vary, based on the distribution. In a normal distribution, the z-values can be extremely high or extremely low with small *p*-values. Thus, to determine the spatial association and the significance of such association the *p*-values and the *z*-scores of the two indexes are compared. Once the Moran's Index is computed, the Expected Index is also computed, and the two values are then compared using the *p*-values and the *z*-scores to determine if the difference is statistically significant. The output of the spatial autocorrelation analysis generates maps of the residuals which reveal the spatial changes to population distribution.

RESULTS

Migration activity: 1999–2009

Table 2 shows the trends in migration activity using the revised net migration and revised gross migration rates.

Table 2: Trends in Migration activity 1999-2009

RNM*i*_1 per 1000				RGM*i* per 100			
County	**2009**	**County**	**1999**	**County**	**2009**	**County**	**1999**
Vihiga	547.46	Nairobi	6740.35	Nairobi	1298	Nairobi	496
Nyandarua	54.06	Mombasa	1302.35	Mombasa	448	Nakuru	147
Bungoma	34.13	Nakuru	1011.54	Nakuru	202	Kiambu	125
Kiambu	18.15	Uasin Gishu	501.39	Kiambu	153	Mombasa	125
Samburu	0.06	Laikipia	397.81	Uasin Gishu	121	Kisumu	103
Mandera	0.00	Trans Nzoia	303.83	Kajiado	90	Siaya	91
Nyamira	0.00	Kajiado	235.74	Machakos	87	Kakamega	83
West Pokot	0.00	Nyandarua	165.72	Kilifi	85	Muranga	80
Kisii	0.00	Narok	78.92	Meru	80	Nyeri	75
Baringo	0.00	Kiambu	53.38	Busia	77	Uasin Gishu	72
Garissa	0.00	Kericho	48.02	Nyandarua	70	Vihiga	72
Laikipia	0.00	Migori	21.94	Trans Nzoia	68	Machakos	59
Homa Bay	0.00	Nandi	16.69	Laikipia	59	Homa Bay	57
Bomet	0.00	Lamu	10.52	Kisumu	58	Trans Nzoia	55
Narok	0.00	Tana River	8.96	Kwale	56	Nyandarua	55
Kericho	0.00	Isiolo	2.30	Lamu	53	Laikipia	50
Siaya	-0.01	West Pokot	-1.84	Makueni	50	Kericho	38
Migori	-0.01	Mandera	-2.20	Tharaka Nithi	48	Nandi	32
Kisumu	-0.02	Wajir	-2.43	Embu	47	Bungoma	31
Kajiado	-0.03	Garissa	-6.06	Bomet	40	Busia	26
Nandi	-0.04	Marsabit	-6.94	Vihiga	38	Migori	24
Trans Nzoia	-0.05	Turkana	-8.15	Nyamira	38	Kajiado	23
Uasin Gishu	-0.06	Kilifi	-8.95	Muranga	34	Kisii	22
Kirinyaga	-0.06	Samburu	-9.08	Taita Taveta	25	Kitui	20
Nakuru	-0.07	Meru	-10.19	Kakamega	24	Makueni	20
Nyeri	-0.09	Tharaka Nithi	-10.58	Narok	23	Nyamira	18
Kakamega	-0.18	Kwale	-10.81	Isiolo	20	Bomet	17
Turkana	-0.40	Embu	-15.97	Tana River	20	Taita Taveta	17
ElgeyoMarakwet	-0.60	Kirinyaga	-19.07	Homa Bay	19	Narok	16
Nairobi	-0.90	Baringo	-22.04	Nandi	19	Embu	12
Wajir	-4.52	ElgeyoMarakwet	-24.82	Migori	17	Kilifi	11
Marsabit	-33.75	Taita Taveta	-29.92	Nyeri	16	ElgeyoMarakwet	10
Kitui	-35.63	Bomet	-39.87	Bungoma	16	Kirinyaga	10
Tana River	-57.82	Kitui	-40.67	Marsabit	15	Baringo	10
Isiolo	-62.14	Nyamira	-43.58	Siaya	14	Kwale	9
Taita Taveta	-75.30	Makueni	-49.30	Kitui	14	Isiolo	7
Tharaka Nithi	-77.02	Kisii	-51.70	Kericho	12	Lamu	7
Muranga	-77.90	Busia	-60.72	Kirinyaga	5	Meru	5
Embu	-119.86	Bungoma	-70.41	Kisii	3	Tharaka Nithi	4
Makueni	-145.13	Kisumu	-71.52	ElgeyoMarakwet	2	Samburu	4
Kwale	-145.83	Homa Bay	-104.63	Baringo	2	Tana River	4
Lamu	-156.79	Vihiga	-104.99	Wajir	2	Turkana	4
Meru	-173.33	Machakos	-144.56	Garissa	1	Marsabit	3
Busia	-236.25	Muranga	-157.55	Samburu	1	Garissa	3
Kilifi	-236.77	Nyeri	-182.60	West Pokot	0	West Pokot	2
Machakos	-266.78	Kakamega	-198.03	Turkana	0	Wajir	1
Mombasa	-1282.82	Siaya	-227.30	Mandera	0	Mandera	1

Shifts in the net in-migration zones

In Table 2, panel one has columns 1–4 capturing net in-migration rates. The positive values indicate where in-migration rates were higher than out-migration rates while the negative values represent counties where out-migration was higher than in-migration. The indicators have been weighted by the share of in-migrants (in-migrants in the county divided by total migrants in the county). The key result from the table is the reversal in the pattern of the county net in-migration rate over the 10-year period.

In 1999, the top counties with high in-migration rates represent three typologies of counties: (a) the urban counties of Nairobi and Mombasa, which attract high rural-urban migrants; (b) counties with agricultural potential, including Nakuru, Naivasha, and Uasin Gishu counties; and (c) counties that have large settlement areas, such as Trans Nzoia and Laikipia counties. In 2009, there was a huge reversal, with the top three counties of high in-migration rates being largely rural counties. Vihiga county, with the highest in-migration rate in 2009 could reflect return migration, as it had a high out-migration in 1999. This may be partly attributed to the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya, with return migration – probably from the neighboring Nandi and Uasin Gishu counties – having had a high out-migration rate in 1999. Bungoma county also gained high in-migration, possibly due to return migration as well as resettlement. Nyandarua, a traditional settlement, could also have gained in migrants from the Uasin Gishu and Nandi counties, which experienced internal displaced of the population following the post-election violence.

Shifts in the net out-migration zones

The negative values of panel one show counties where out-migration was higher than in-migration. Data for 1999 shows high out-migration rates in the counties of Western Kenya including Siaya and Kakamega counties, and Central Kenya (Nyeri and Muranga) that date to the pre-independence period. The patterns seen here arise from the regions with higher education due to early colonial administration and missionary settlement, hence, residents' decision to move, seeking employment, especially in while collar jobs in businesses in urban areas and plantation establishments. A reversal in the 2009 data is evident, with high out-migration from Mombasa, Machakos, Kilifi and Meru counties, although the patterns are mixed. The highest out-migration observed in Mombasa may yet again be attributed to the post-election violence of 2007/08, the decline in the tourism sector that created employment in the hotels along the beach, and a decline in formal employment creation. The decline in tourism could also explain the high out-migration from Kilifi. However, Machakos and Meru County scenarios are still difficult to explain. For Busia County, the net losses could be attributed to reduced informal cross-border trade as the revamping of the East African Community (EAC) formalized border control processes for the exchange of trade between Kenya and Uganda.

The results of the migration intensities, measured using RNMi were mapped using ARCGIS and the results are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Figure 2 presents the outcome of the analysis using 1999 census data. The counties are categorized into five key regions – regions of high in-migration are indicated in red, while those with high in-migration are in green. The counties where migration is inactive are indicated in grey. The results show that net gainers of migrants are counties with metropolitan areas, including Nairobi, Uasin Gishu, Mombasa, Nakuru, and Kajiado counties – all indicated in red. The data shows a pattern of net gainers for counties along the international borders, including Turkana County in the north of the country, bordering Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda; and Kajiado county in the southern part of the country bordering Tanzania.

The lighter green colour denotes counties that are net out-migration zones. There are two distinct regions manifesting this trend. The first is the block of counties in the western part of the country around the Lake Victoria basin, in the Nyanza and Western regions, and parts of the Upper Rift Valley region including Uasin Gishu and Baringo counties. A second block of net out-migration counties is found in the eastern part of the country, especially Kitui, Machakos, and Makueni counties in the Eastern region, and Nyeri County in the Central region.

Figure 2: Weighted migration rates for counties, 1999



Source: Authors' own work

Figure 3 presents the spatial maps generated from revised weighted migration rates from the 2009 data. The map captures those spatial changes in the migration patterns over the ten-year period between the two censuses. The map captures the different impacts of migration, with red indicating high in-migration areas, grey indicating

inactive migration zones and light green indicating counties with high out-migration. At a first glance, the map is predominantly green, implying that there is increased mobility in the country, although there are many counties where migration is inactive, as indicated in the grey zones. It is only in Vihiga county where high out-migration was evident, followed by Bungoma county and parts of Central Kenya.

Figure 3: Weighted migration rates for counties, 2009



Source: Authors' own work

A comparison of data on the two maps, revealed a higher increase in inactive migration zones from the 2009 data, as captured in Figure 3, implying that there was little population redistribution due to migration. There have been shifts in intensities and impacts in some counties. Vihiga county in the western part of the country remains the county with high in-migration, according to the 2009 data, with a few other counties recording moderate in-migration, as noted in Busia, Nyandarua and Kiambu counties. The Eastern region remained an active net out-migration region in 2009, while Mombasa County shifted from being a net out-migration zone to becoming an in-migration zone. Nyandarua, Kiambu, and Kericho counties, which were net out-migration zones in 1999, became net in-migration zones in 2009.

Using the revised weighted gross migration rate, the findings show a higher proportion of migrant population in each county, with those having urbanized settlements recording a higher intensity of migrants. In 1999, a higher influx and concentration of migrants was noted in Nairobi, Nakuru, Kiambu, Mombasa, and Kisumu counties. All these counties host major urban areas in Kenya. The 2009 data shows that the major concentration of migrants is found in Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, Kiambu and Uasin Gishu counties. The data further shows that internal migrants are mainly concentrated in regions with the large, urbanized counties in Kenya, with the major cities, especially Nairobi, being the destination of choice of migrants. Conversely, there is little effect of migration in the overall populations in the counties in the northern frontier of the country, located in the arid and semi-arid areas, as noted in West Pokot, Turkana, and Mandera counties in the data for 2009.

When the data is observed for the proportion of migrants in counties, there is an indication of the importance of secondary urban areas and cities in the absorption of migrants. In 2009, when major urban areas were considered, the next destinations of migrants were Kajiado, Machakos, Kilifi, Meru, and Busia counties. The first four of these counties are those contiguous to major urban areas; they are thus receiving an outflow of the migrant population. For Busia county, the data may contain migrants crossing the national borders from the neighboring countries, as it is located at the border of Kenya and Uganda. Comparing the data for 1999 and 2009 shows a shift in the major destinations for migrants, as the rural-based counties of Siaya, Kakamega, Muranga, and Nyeri which attracted migrants, have a lesser concentration of migrants during the 2009 period. The results of the gross weighted migration rate for the two periods show a migration transition in the country.

Spatial analysis of migration intensities

The study applied spatial analysis using Moran's I to determine if the migration intensities were random or if there was clustering. The results included the Moran's Index as well as a cold-to-hot rendered map of standardized residuals, as shown in Figure 4. The map shows hot and cold spots of migration intensities clustering.

Figure 4: Spatial autocorrelation results



Source: Authors' own work

The output of the analysis, in the top left corner of Figure 4 presents the Moran's Index as 0.105452, the *z*-score is 3.078, while *p*-value is 0.002, implying that the data is spatially clustered and not randomly distributed. The positive value of Moran's I indicates that while the values are spatially clustered, positive values are clustered together and negative values are clustered together. This leads to the conclusion that migration intensity is spatially clustered, with neighboring regions recording similar values.

The residuals of the analysis of migration intensities by county using ARCGIS, are presented in Figure 5. The results confirm the clustering of migration intensities around the country. Nairobi has remarkably high migration intensity and is surrounded by regions with similarly high migration intensities, leading to a clustering of high-high migration. This may be because of the spillover effects of migration to Nairobi, hence migrants move to the next contiguous counties, as

demonstrated by high intensities in Kajiado, Kiambu, and Nakuru counties. There is a clustering of low migration intensities in Makueni, Machakos, Embu, and Meru counties. In the Western part of the country, there is a cluster of high migration in Vihiga county and evidence of high migration in Migori county at the Kenya-Tanzania border. Comparatively, the coastal region shows evidence of low migration clustering in Mombasa and Kilifi counties.

Figure 5: Results of the spatial analysis of migration intensities



Source: Authors' own work

DISCUSSION

This study considered county migration patterns and their impact on spatial distribution in Kenya, using data from successive censuses. The study used two measures of migration intensity to consider the impact of migration on population redistribution, namely, the revised weighted net migration rate and the revised weighted gross migration rate. Each of the measures helps to clarify the effect of migration on the population redistribution in the country. The revised weighted net migration rates show a shift of migration intensity in 2009 compared to 1999. There was high in-migration into several regions in the country, particularly in Busia and Kajiado counties, located on the international borders, and in the central region, in such counties as Laikipia, Nyandarua, and Nakuru, in addition to Nairobi County. Comparatively, the 2009 data shows that there have been higher levels of migration within all the counties, but with a concentration of in-migrants in Vihiga county as well as moderate flows into Nyandarua, Nakuru, and Busia counties. The findings suggest that the effect of migration on population redistribution is waning and implies that other factors such as natural increase may be contributing to the spatial redistribution of the population in the country. The data for Vihiga county warrants further research as it seems to be the main in-migration hub for the Lake Victoria basin, which is a shift from Kisumu and Kericho, identified in earlier studies (see for example, Oucho, 1988).

The data from the revised weighted gross migration rates shows that most migrants are moving into the more urbanized ones, most of these being part of administrative centers in the colonial period and presently have higher economic potential. This corroborates findings of previous studies, especially those conducted during the colonial and pre-independence period (Rempel, 1974; Knowles and Anker, 1977; Oucho and Gould, 1993; Oucho, 2007). The urbanized areas – though districts at the time – are still the same in the present-day counties. The urbanized counties have well-developed infrastructure including schools, health facilities, and public transport systems. Nairobi, the capital city, receives the lion's share of migrants in each successive census owing to the enormous opportunities available in both the formal and informal sectors. The high influx of migrants could strain the existing infrastructure and the provision of social services in the counties, including the proliferation of slum dwellings in the counties, as migrants seek cheap accommodation. This has already been observed in the recent periods, with problems such as waste disposal, traffic congestion, and the proliferation of slums increasingly evident in counties other than Nairobi, Kisumu, Mombasa, and Nakuru, which were the previously urbanized counties.

The findings show that the top counties remain the same, save for the dominance as either an in-migration or an out-migration county. The 1999 census data identified Nairobi as having the highest population gains, dominated by the influx of in-migrants. This is also happening in Nakuru and Mombasa counties (high RGMi, high RNMi). Kiambu has a moderate RNMi but still ranks higher. Meanwhile,

Kisumu and Siaya are dominated by out-migrants (low RNMi), with Siaya reporting the highest out-migration rate in the country. The pattern for 2009 showed Nairobi as having high internal migration activity but with balanced in- and out-migration. Mombasa recorded a high out-migration rate, while Kiambu had a high positive migration rate, while the rest of the counties reported more balanced in- and out-migration. The spatial analysis confirms that migration intensities in the country are not randomized as they are clustered.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study sought to establish the impact of internal migration on the population redistribution in the country. Using several indicators of measuring migration intensity and spatial analysis, the results show that migration has affected the population redistribution in the country with migrants concentrated in counties with urbanized areas, such as Nairobi, Nakuru, and Uasin Gishu. However, much of the concentration of migrants in urban areas, has led to an increase of migrants in the populations in the receiving counties, as confirmed by this study's data from the gross migration rate. These observations lead the researchers to conclude that while migration initially led to faster urban growth in the country, there is evidence of a declining net effect of migration on the population redistribution in the country. There is evidence of suburbanization, as more migrants move to secondary urban areas in the country. The flows and counterflows of migration in the country are clustered with high-high hotspots emerging in the western and central parts of the country, with low-low clustering in the coastal region.

The findings confirm that the migration in the country is concentrated in the more developed regions owing to the colonial legacy, as observed in previous studies. However, shifts in this pattern are emerging, as evidenced from the 2009 census data, with secondary cities gaining importance in attracting migrants. Part of the scenario observed from the 2009 data, confirms the effect of the 2007/2008 post-election violence in the country that resulted in internal displacement of some people, but that also led to return migration from the conflict hotspot regions that were mostly in the Central and Rift Valley regions.

The findings bear evidence that the regional variations in migration rates in the country were masking subnational intensities. The data has shown that urbanized counties are the main receptors of migrants, while non-urbanized counties remain largely sending areas. In the Rift Valley region for example, only a handful of counties are responsible for the high mobility that was previously observed in the region. This confirms the importance of analyzing the migration data to the subnational level.

The findings from this study form the basis of several policy recommendations for county governments, presented here. The researchers maintain that devolution will result in faster growth of urban areas in the country as new counties set up their administrative infrastructure, and this may affect the nature of internal migration flows. The researchers anticipate increased mobility within and across counties

as devolution sets in, and each county is required to set up its administrative infrastructure. Migrants need to be factored into the existing social and development agenda of the counties. This means that information on migration intensities need to be factored in the county planning processes. County statistics departments need to collect migration data to inform the planning and service delivery agenda, including the provision of housing and social amenities for the youthful migrants relocating to the urban centers in search of opportunities. There is also an anticipation of an outflow of the return migrants – usually older people who are retirees – to settle back in their rural places of origin. Adequate planning for this elderly population will be important.

There are several limitations of this study. A discrepancy in census figures was observed in the North Eastern region in the 2009 data; therefore, results from the region needed to be interpreted with caution. The study used Moran's I index to determine spatial clustering in the migration intensities, but the index is limited as it only identifies hotpots within their vicinities, and this may have missed other levels of association between counties that are far apart.

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The State, Families and Disappeared Migrants in Ethiopia

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Each year, thousands of Ethiopian migrants depart the country irregularly towards Europe by crossing the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea, but also traveling to the Gulf States via Djibouti, the Red Sea and Yemen, and to South Africa through the Indian Ocean or several African countries in-between. Regardless of the migration route they pursue, thousands of Ethiopian migrants have died or gone missing. Despite the ubiquitous and regular coverage of migrant deaths in global media, there is limited understanding of the impacts that these deaths and disappearances have on their loved ones and the roles of the state in preventing risky migration that leads to disappearance during fatal journeys. While much has been written about the tragic circumstances leading to their deaths and disappearances, much less is known about how their families search for missing migrants, including the structural and institutional challenges they encounter in the process, and how their overlapping experiences can better inform good practices. This article thus (a) explores the causes and conditions of missing Ethiopian migrants; (b) identifies the challenges and needs of families in Ethiopia who have relatives who went missing or died in the context of international migration; and (c) maps the relevant laws, policy and institutional frameworks already in existence, their gaps as well as the actors and their roles relevant to the topic. Data for this article was generated through interviews with families and stakeholders, policy reviews as well as participant observation and desk research; this work was carried out over three months in 2020 and two months in 2021.

Keywords: Ethiopia, migration, missing persons, borders, human trafficking, family

INTRODUCTION

As safe, dignified and legal migration pathways are limited, quite large number of Ethiopians engage in risky and long journeys towards Europe, the Middle East and to South Africa by crossing dangerous deserts, seas and conflict-prone areas (IOM, 2018a; Horwood and Forin, 2019). These journeys are mostly fatal, with thousands of Ethiopians believed to have died or gone missing, due to criminal attacks, kidnappings, accidents, shipwrecks, or lack of access to medicine, shelter and food along the way. However, very limited empirical knowledge and systematic analysis exist with regard to the context of missing migrants, impacts on families left behind and related challenges in Ethiopia. Much less is also known about the legal and institutional frameworks protecting the rights of missing migrants and their gaps when it comes to missing migrants. Thus, the focus of the article is to explore the needs and challenges of families of missing migrants by taking into account the gaps in existing legal and institutional frameworks.

Families of those missing migrants along the migration routes and in destination countries spend years not knowing what has happened to their loved ones. Families encounter multiple personal, legal and financial challenges when searching for their missing loved ones and when trying to repatriate the remains in the event of death. Even though the Ethiopian state has several national laws and resources dedicated to migration management and has adopted and ratified relevant international human and migrant rights conventions (Estifanos, 2017; Tekalign, 2021), there are gaps in policies, legal frameworks or institutions to deal with the specific needs and concerns of families of missing or dead migrants. Those challenges furthermore include getting help in searching for missing persons, identification and repatriation of remains from abroad, and the emotional and socioeconomic impacts of the loss.

By drawing on this gap, this article explores the factors accounting for disappearing migrants and the challenges and needs of Ethiopian families whose loved ones went missing or died in the context of international migration. The article also maps out and analyzes the legal, policy and institutional frameworks applicable to issues of missing migrants in Ethiopia. The researcher collected data for the article through qualitative interviews with stakeholders and families, as well as participant observation and policy and legal framework analysis, which were carried out over three months in 2020 and two months 2021.

METHODS AND MATERIALS

This article is based on desk research, supplemented by participant observation, face-to-face qualitative interviews, and policy reviews. The desk research involved systematic reviews of legal and policy frameworks. The research design is basically phenomenological. The focus of the researcher was to analyze factors accounting for the disappearance of migrants and identify what families with missing or dead

migrant relatives defined as their challenges and needs in the context of a search or the aftermath of the death or disappearance of a family member. The intention was not to be representative, but to gain insight into the lives of people living with such a loss, through a qualitative methodology. In total, 21 family members, from 21 different households, between the ages of 25 and 66 were interviewed during 2020 and 2021. Twelve of these family members were men (fathers and brothers of missing migrants), and nine were women (mothers and sisters). Ten interviews were conducted in Addis Ababa and eleven in Hadiya. In Hadiya, interviews were conducted in Hadiya language and occasionally in Amharic. In Addis Ababa, all interviews were conducted in Amharic. The interview data was supplemented through a review of the Ethiopian context and included an examination of the country's laws and regulations relevant to the matter of migrant deaths and disappearances. Informants were selected purposively for having a family member missed during migration processes.

In terms of defining research participants, the focus was on the nuclear family (that is, biological parents, mothers, fathers, brothers and sisters) of a person who had gone missing or died in the context of a migratory journey, but the relatives and acquaintances who held close emotional, social and economic ties to the nuclear family were also considered to be nuclear family members. The sample size was not meant to be representative of all families with missing migrants in the country, but rather was explorative to show the trend and nature of the problem.

The selection of rural and urban field sites was done in consultation with the literature reviews. The researcher conducted fieldwork with urban families in the neighborhood of Qirqos in Addis Ababa, and in Hadiya in southern Ethiopia, both of which have historically high levels of out-migration. Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, is a vast metropolis of nearly 5 million inhabitants. It has been a major sending and transit location for Ethiopians embarking on irregular migration to Europe, the Gulf States and South Africa (Belloni, 2019; Kefale and Gebresenbet, 2021). It was also the epicenter of refugee migration to Europe following the conflicts and civil wars during the Dergue regime in Ethiopia (1967–1991) (Girmachew, 2018). The success stories of this Diaspora and their active transnational economic, political and social engagement with people in Addis Ababa have continued to fuel the migration aspirations of the current Ethiopian youth.

Multiple factors such as political repression, demographics, youth unemployment, the availability of technology and the existence of diasporic networks combined with personal aspirations, drive migration from Addis Ababa (Triulzi, 2013; Kefale and Gebresenbet, 2021), and specifically from the working-class neighborhood of Qirqos (Kirkos), the selected research site. Qirqos is known locally for the vast numbers of young people who have embarked on long journeys to Europe through Libya since the early 2000s, relying on the eastern trans-Saharan migration route. Migration to Europe is a socially and morally accepted and deeply rooted practice among youth in Qirqos. Informants in Addis Ababa estimated that each family in Qirqos has lost at least one family member for everyone who has made

it to Europe safely. The familiarity with migrant death and loss was one of the reasons that Qirqos was selected as a site of research for this study.

Hadiya, on the other hand, was selected given its rural context, in addition to being known among informants as one of the regions in Ethiopia with high numbers of migrant deaths (in the migration towards South Africa). Residents here believe that the number of missing and dead exceeds any estimates and that migrant tragedies of families remain unknown and untold. Local officials consulted for this briefing referred to several of these incidents. For example, in 2017, more than 80 migrants from Hadiya and neighboring Kambatta died of suffocation inside containers during transit; however, the case was not made public. Similarly, in 2019, 45 Hadiya migrants died as they traveled from Tanzania to Malawi in an overloaded truck across dangerous highways. While research conducted in either Qirqos or Hadiya cannot be seen as representative of the experiences of all families in Ethiopia or of the challenges Ethiopians face in response to the deaths and disappearances of their migrant loved ones, both contexts provide important insights into the conditions surrounding the loss and the search process in Ethiopia.

Aware of the deeply sensitive nature of the study, the researcher conducted all interviews with the participants' best interests in mind. The researcher followed the ethical guidelines, including securing informed consent and maintaining the privacy, dignity and anonymity of the families (all names used in this article are pseudonyms). Emotionally distressed and economically precarious families were given contacts to relevant charity and state organizations for the immediate or future provision of psychosocial and economic support. While the researcher used an interview guide, the approach was inductive and participatory in nature – in other words, the families were invited to direct the conversations and to identify what they themselves considered important aspects of their experiences with the goal of allowing them to articulate their own authentic reflections.

The study also generated data from the analysis of legal and institutional frameworks, interviews with relevant stakeholders and their roles with regard to the issue of missing migrants. For the legal review and policy analysis, the researcher collected information on global, regional and bilateral instruments/conventions; national laws; proclamations; policies; and regulations/directives. The review was used to identify the existing gaps in national laws, institutions, policies and practices relating to the protection of missing migrants, their families' needs, and the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders relevant to missing migrants. The researcher recorded, transcribed, and translated the interviews and organized the notes taken. The interviews were integrated into legal and policy reviews; gaps in the legislatures were identified; and stakeholders, their roles and responsibilities were mapped. The researcher sorted the data thematically and organized it to ensure the logical flow of ideas and arguments.

LITERATURE REVIEW: GLOBAL TRENDS AND FACTORS ACCOUNTING FOR MISSING MIGRANTS

The literature addresses different dimensions of missing migrants. Some of the existing studies provide trends and statistical estimations of missing migrants at various locations of the world. The International Organization for Migration (IOM)'s Missing Migrants Project tracks and publishes deaths of migrants, including refugees and asylum-seekers, who have died or gone missing in the process of migration towards an international destination. The IOM (2018b) estimated that between 2014 and 2017 about 15,348 deaths occurred at the European Union (EU)'s borders alone. The IOM's reports and publications on fatal journeys have recorded the magnitude of missing migrants in Africa, Middle East and Latin America during the last 15 years (Sanchez Dionis et al., 2021). The IOM has also calculated that at least 60,000 migrants have died between 2000 and 2018 globally (IOM, 2018a).

Many studies identified conditions and driving factors that led to the deaths and disappearance of migrants during fatal journeys. Complex conditions related to immigration controls and border enforcement mechanisms along the migration pathways, compounded by illness and lack of access to medical treatment in detention centers result in the deaths and disappearances of migrants (IOM, 2014; HRW, 2019; MSF, 2020). Other factors related to deportation practices to remote locations in places such as the Sahara Desert in response to the European Union's externalization of borders (Tekalign, 2018; Monella and Creta, 2020), also increasingly place migrants in vulnerable situations that could result in their deaths and disappearances. The incidence of kidnapping or torture for ransom resulting in deaths and disappearances among migrants has been widely documented in Yemen, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Mozambique, and Malawi (Horwood, 2014; Horwood and Forin, 2019). Other conditions that resulted in the deaths and disappearances of migrants include: the experiences of abuse, exploitation or human trafficking on their migration journeys; migration journeys via more remote and distant pathways to reach a destination; incidents of migrants dying of suffocation in containers or lorries during transit; and those – dead or alive – being deliberately thrown into the sea by smugglers from overcrowded boats, have been reported by survivors (UN News, 2017; IOM, 2020; Zakoska-Todorovska and Bartolini, 2020). There are numerous reports that show migrants being abandoned by smugglers after they had run out of fuel, become lost, or encountered law enforcement or border control authorities (IOM, 2014; Hairsine, 2019; Reidy, 2019).

A study by Simon Robins shows the underlining structural factors such as exclusionary border control practices, that ignored missing migrants. He argues that "while living migrants are the object of enormous attention, counted and screened on arrival and throughout their presence in European states … those who die crossing the Mediterranean remain uncounted and largely unidentified, as a result of a failure of European states to collect data from both bodies and from families looking for missing loved ones" (Robins, 2019: 1). This is partly because dead migrants are often

considered as no longer presenting any economic or security threat to European welfare states, compared to those entering clandestinely. Migrant deaths in the Mediterranean waters, resulted from externalization of EU borders; in fact, the externalization serves as a border control tool (Kovras and Robins, 2016). The deaths and disappearances of migrants during fatal journeys demonstrate the structural violence inflicted on migrants, which is manifested via the inequality between citizens of the global north and the global south in accessing safe migration pathways. The everyday violence, suffering and deaths of migrants during irregular journeys are directly related to the strict border controls and securitization of migration by destination states (Holmes, 2013).

Existing studies often focus on these and other driving factors and conditions resulting in the deaths and disappearance of migrants. Despite the pervasive and regular coverage of migrant deaths in the global media, there is limited understanding of the impacts that these deaths and disappearances have on their families left behind. This article therefore strives to fill this knowledge gap by foregrounding the cases of Ethiopian families of missing migrants. There are few emerging studies that documented some of the challenges to families (see for example, Attia et al., 2016; ICRC, 2017; Robins, 2017; Vogt, 2018; Sánchez Dionis et al., 2021). This paper builds on these studies and adds to the empirical knowledge by documenting the experiences of Ethiopian families searching for missing relatives lost in the context of irregular migration journeys to Europe, the Gulf States and South Africa.

Context of irregular migration from Ethiopia

The literature estimates that about half a million Ethiopians migrate annually to destination countries in the Middle East, Europe, South Africa, Australia and the US, fueling a vibrant global Diaspora estimated at approximately three million (IOM, 2018b; Kefale and Gebresenbet, 2021). According to Tekalign (2021) about 70% of Ethiopian migration to international destinations is undertaken by young men and women between the ages of 16 and 22, who embark on irregular journeys across dangerous overland and sea routes (Tekalign, 2021). One third of those making such journeys get lost or die along the routes due to man-made and natural risks and disasters. Families who have lost their loved ones due to migration, experience psychosocial, legal, economic, and administrative challenges.

Ethiopian migrants engage in long and dangerous clandestine migratory journeys to international destinations. There are three major migratory routes along which Ethiopians depart the country. The first one is the north-western route towards Europe, which links villages and towns in Ethiopia to Khartoum, and the Sudan, and proceeds via the Eastern Sahara Desert into Libya and then across the Central Mediterranean Sea. The second is the eastern route to the Middle East and the Gulf States, through Djibouti and Somalia via Yemen, which involves crossing the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The third one is the southern route to South Africa via Eastern and Southern African countries (Estifanos et al., 2019; Williams, 2019).

Local brokers and smugglers facilitate these fragmented and risky journeys.

Structural, social, familial, and individual conditions drive migration in general, and youth migration from Ethiopia in particular. Conflict, displacement, poverty, and unemployment have been cited as the main driving factors spurring young Ethiopians to leave their country (Girmachew, 2018; Williams, 2019). However, contrary to the commonly held assumptions claiming that poverty reduction would directly lead to a decline in outbound migration from Ethiopia, there are some indicators that it may even lead to increased mobility. The poorest people migrate to the nearest destinations (mostly in-country). The number of migrants on a given route are inversely proportional to the length of that route. In financial terms, the main routes used by Ethiopians could be categorized into three major groups: expensive routes (mainly Europe and North America) that require more than USD 7,000; medium-cost routes (Africa and Asia) that require a minimum of USD 4,000; and budget routes (Middle Eastern countries) that require as little as USD 500 (Tekalign, 2021). Migrants traveling to the nearest destinations within the country and outside the country (such as the Middle East) are mostly female (Girmachew, 2018). In addition to the financial capability required, demand in these Middle Eastern countries for specific services and labor – such as domestic helpers and construction workers – also plays an important role in attracting female and low-skilled migrants.

Both internal and external migration from Ethiopia, is primarily a cultural and socioeconomic developmental issue. Young Ethiopians migrate mainly due to the disjuncture between actual living conditions, on the one hand, and the expectation of higher living standards, on the other. Socioeconomic determinants of migration in Ethiopia are related to the following four major factors: (a) the discrepancies between the aspired living standards by the youth and their actual living conditions in their own country; (b) the income inequalities between persons staying in the country and migrants or families with relatives in the Ethiopian Diaspora; (c) the high population growth, increasing unemployment rate, and relatively low incomes in Ethiopia; and (d) the pervasive culture of migration and the collective societal encouragement of even risky and irregular migration (evidenced by the direct moral and financial support accorded to migrants) (Kefale and Gebresenbet, 2021; Tekalign, 2021).

Of all factors, the pervasive culture of migration, often fueled by the Diaspora network in the form of peer pressure, alongside family support, constitutes the most prevalent driver of migration from Ethiopia (Girmachew, 2018; Kefale and Gebresenbet, 2021). Migration is no longer an individual decision and has increasingly become a collective action with the support of relatives in the Diaspora as well as religious and traditional community leaders (Kefale and Gebresenbet, 2021). In migration hotspot areas such as Wollo in northern Ethiopia and Hadiya in the south, communities take collective decisions to encourage members to migrate, so much so, that families in some communities organize parties where the neighbors are invited to bid farewell to departing migrants. Community and religious leaders are invited to attend and 'bless' the party and the migrant or migrants. Such 'migration showers'

or farewell parties are used to seek contributions from the community to cover travel expenses.

Migration from Ethiopia to the Middle East, Europe, and South Africa and within the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) region is of sizable proportion and it is expected to rise in the coming years, particularly flows to the Middle East, neighboring countries and to the East African Community (EAC) countries including Kenya and Uganda. Migration, and more especially mobility within the country and the region, is expected to increase due to a number of factors exhibited by mega-trends such as Diaspora engagements and new migration laws. The information and communications technology (ICT) and aviation connectivity as well as other infrastructural developments in the region will certainly grow at accelerated rates, leading to surges in mobility within the IGAD region and beyond. Increased local job protection and restrictive migration policies as well as potential increases in xenophobic and 'Afro-phobic' attacks against Ethiopians could however increase in countries of destination (De Regt and Medareshae, 2016; Kefale and Gebresenbet, 2021).

FINDINGS

Causes and conditions of Ethiopian migrant deaths and disappearances

Clandestine migration from Ethiopia towards Europe, the Gulf States, and South Africa requires long journeys and can pose many risks en route and it is estimated that of every four migrants undertaking the journey, at least one dies or disappears along the way (IOM, 2014; Botti, 2019; MMC, 2020). However, it is impossible to provide exact numbers of missing or dead Ethiopian migrants. The numbers available constitute an incomplete record, yet are indicative of how many of them go missing on the migration journeys. Although only estimates – since information on nationality is often lacking – Ethiopians are systematically identified among the missing and the dead in the Mediterranean Sea, through gathering information from survivors and DNA tests (IOM, 2014, 2018a). A significant number of deaths have also been reported along the eastern route to the Gulf States and on the southern routes to South Africa (IOM, 2014). Data collected by the Bureau of Labour and Social Affairs (BOLSA) in southern Ethiopia, and the Mixed Migration Centre also reflects the lethality of the route to South Africa (MMC, 2019). According to the Central Statistics Authority's Labor Migration Survey (LMS) 2021, an estimated 51,089 Ethiopians are missing migrants, with the majority of these being males (84.6%), while females account for 15.4% (CSA, 2021).

While these are important sources, statistics concerning deaths and disappearances are not recorded systematically within Ethiopia itself or by any of its government entities, which creates a serious statistical gap. As indicated above, it is only in 2021, with the support from the IOM, that the Central Statistics Authority of Ethiopia has included missing migrants in its Labor Migration Survey data.

Data from the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC, 2019, 2020) and the Missing Migrants Project (IOM, 2017) indicates that migrants departing from Ethiopia have died as a result of the physical hardships encountered during their journeys on foot, on board boats and trucks that deliberately traverse remote mountain ranges, deserts and open seas. Exposure to harsh environments leads to death by dehydration, exhaustion and starvation. Many migrants also die by drowning in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean; by suffocation inside containers; following attacks by fauna; as a result of violent practices by border guards, smugglers and militias; and also, as a result of gender-based forms of violence (Horwood, 2014; Global Initiative, 2018; Horwood and Forin, 2019). The occurrence of kidnapping or torture for ransom resulting in deaths and disappearances among Ethiopian migrants has also been widely documented in contexts like Yemen, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Mozambique, and Malawi. Many Ethiopian women also experience violence and die as a result of harsh working and living conditions or labor exploitation in domestic work or xenophobic attacks in the Gulf States and in South Africa (De Regt and Medareshae, 2016; Busza et al., 2017).

The southern routes to Southern Africa are generally considered the most dangerous to navigate by Ethiopian migrants. This appears to be confirmed by data from the Mixed Migration Centre, indicating that the deaths and disappearances of Ethiopian migrants tripled along the eastern and southern routes between 2016 and 2019, as migration along these routes increased following the restrictions on the northern route to Europe as a result of the EU externalization of border controls towards East Africa (Strange and Oliveira Martins, 2019; MMC, 2020). Between 2012 and 2019, the Bureau of Labour and Social Affairs (BOLSA) in Southern Ethiopia recorded migrant deaths and disappearances along this route from major sending districts including Hadiya and Kambata Tambaro. During this period, the Bureau recorded 4,265 deaths and the disappearance of 1,707 missing migrants (BOLSA, 2020). This data was gathered from testimonies made by families and survivors, and by field reports at Ethiopian embassies along the migration routes. However, many more deaths are neither recorded nor reported, as there is no established institution mandated with this task in Ethiopia.

Challenges faced by families of missing migrants

This section outlines the challenges faced by families while searching for missing or disappeared loved ones who departed Ethiopia with the purpose of migrating to another country and the impacts on living with their loss. After describing how families take action to search for their missing loved ones in both research sites (Hadiya and Addis Ababa), the study examines cross-cutting issues faced by the families, including challenging gender dynamics; outstanding debts; demands for ransom for their kidnapped relatives; mental and physical health problems; and the role of spirituality and social relations. Overall, three challenges emerged as common experiences of the participants, as captured below.

Firstly, it is often impossible to determine when a person left, let alone when (or where) they went missing. Many migrants leave without informing friends or family members, abandoning their neighborhoods or villages without notice, and leaving no details concerning their plans or destination. It is only once migrating groups arrive at points along the migration journey, such as in Sudan or even Libya, that migrants contact their families, or that their co-travelers and companions call with updates, to request money to continue their travel, or to report accidents or fatalities that took place during the journey, or even to return to Ethiopia if they are unable to continue the journey. These delays prevent the timely deployment of a search mission and the likelihood of a positive outcome (that is, the ability to determine the whereabouts of a missing loved one).

Secondly, the search for missing loved ones, and its aftermath, have deeply gendered dynamics. Interviews indicated that the decision of when to start or stop searching tends to often be made by male relatives (fathers or older sons), but also by someone in the family considered to have the ability 'to remain calm' (most often a man). According to the tradition in both research sites, men are considered by families as emotionally stable and have the ability to cope with hardships and hence are given the task of searching. Women (the widows or daughters of missing migrants) reported often having to challenge the decisions made by their fathers or brothers-in-law concerning the search, but also the control of any property or their ability to remarry – all factors impacting on the short- and long-term financial stability of women and their children. These gender dimensions of missing persons are described and analyzed in detail in subsequent sections.

Thirdly, there is a lack of formal institutions or mechanisms to support families looking for migrants who went missing while pursuing their journeys. This has led to the emergence of community-based forms of information gathering and support, but not to the establishment of responses by the state. The following sections discuss these three challenges in more detail.

a. Searching challenges

All interviewees shared their experiences of losing a loved one who decided to embark on a migratory journey, and the initial confusion concerning how to jumpstart a search. Many of them reported being unaware that their loved one had decided to migrate. Many people (particularly young men) reportedly left without informing friends or family members, abandoning their neighborhoods or villages without notice, and leaving no details concerning their plans and destinations. Yet even in the case of migrants who did inform their families about their journeys, or who traveled with their support, it was also difficult to determine when or where the person had gone missing. This was partly the result of migrants themselves being constrained by several factors, such as the lack of financial means or their uncertainty of whether they have to communicate or not to manage information concerning their journeys. For example, many tell their loved ones that they will be in touch once they reach

their destination because they do not know what will happen during journeys. Often, having little information themselves about their itineraries or the locations through which they travel, migrants may opt not to communicate.

Most families expressed respect for the decision of their loved ones to manage the flow of information. However, many others shared they had started their own searches as soon as they received, by way of friends, relatives, smugglers, brokers, news or social media, reports concerning incidents involving migrants, that could involve their family members. Searches also began whenever the pattern of communication with the migrating family member changed or ended without a reason. Still, families indicated it had been difficult for them to decide when, where and how to start searching, because they had limited information concerning their loved ones' journeys.

In Hadiya, rural families reported relying mainly on information shared by people who had traveled with their missing loved ones (other migrants, guides or smugglers,). For most, the first person they contacted was the broker or smuggler who had facilitated the journey, followed by attempts to reach other migrants known to have traveled with their loved one, or any known survivors. If none of these efforts were successful, or if additional information was needed, interviewees indicated they would report the case to members of the Ethiopian Diaspora in the last country the missing person was known to travel through. In the case of migrants traveling to South Africa, interviewees reported calling friends, relatives and South Africa-based smugglers for information about recent migrant journeys over land or through the Indian Ocean. Despite the stigma that surrounds their activities, smugglers are often recognized for their willingness and ability to access contacts and information that could establish or inform the whereabouts of a missing person. Interviewees indicated how smugglers often had information concerning vehicular accidents, could contact border guards for information concerning any migrants being detained or imprisoned while transiting countries such as Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique, or members of smuggling and brokering networks operating from Ethiopia all the way down to South Africa, which expedited the dissemination of information.

Families of migrants from Hadiya also reported relying on the *iddir*[1] system and its social networks to obtain information about missing migrants. *Iddir* plays a vital role in investigating and collecting data about missing and dead migrants since many of their members either have a good rapport with smugglers or are smugglers themselves. *Iddir* leaders broadcast the information to the members and support families using the network as a platform.

Fieldwork in Addis Ababa revealed somewhat different search patterns. Only a few families reported seeking information about relatives from smugglers themselves. Contrary to the experiences of Hadiya families, smugglers operating in Addis Ababa were believed to have limited information concerning specific journeys followed

1 *Iddir* are community-based support networks, common in rural areas of Ethiopia, that garner financial resources to minimize the adverse effects of sudden shocks or crises (Aredo, 2010).

by migrants traveling along the northern route. From the interviewees' perspective, this was due to the fact that the facilitation of migration along the northern route is organized in a different fashion. Interviewees indicated that contrary to the case of the southern route, where a single smuggler or broker tends to be the contact person for the entire duration of the journey, smugglers on the northern route tend to work more independently and do not know each other. They perform specific tasks, charging separate, stand-alone fees, and are therefore less likely to be in contact with a migrant for the entire duration of their journey (see Lucht, 2011). This drastic difference in their modus operandi implies that often, contacts with smugglers operating along the northern route yielded limited or no information concerning a missing migrant. Personal and community ties, as well as interactions with smugglers were also reportedly weaker in the urban context, compared to those reported by families in Hadiya.

Families in Addis Ababa were also more likely than those in Hadiya to follow local and international news coverage for information concerning missing persons. Informants stated that in Addis Ababa interviewees were also more likely to reach out to relatives or friends in other countries whenever they saw reports of shipwrecks involving migrant-carrying boats in the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea or the Indian Ocean. They also seemed more inclined than families in Hadiya to rely on social media networking sites for their searches, screening community groups for information about missing or dead migrants. In Addis Ababa, interviewees reported having learned of the deaths of loved ones from photos posted on Facebook, often made by other migrants (particularly young people) or by government organizations, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ethiopian consulates along migration routes.

Seyum's brother, Eyasu, is believed to have been killed by ISIS in Libya in 2015. Seyum has been searching for details concerning Eyasu on behalf of his family ever since the tragedy. Seyum was notified of Eyasu's apparent death via a phone call he received from a friend he believed had identified Eyasu's death online. This is what he reflected:

> My brother Eyasu left for Libya to reach Europe with his friends. One Saturday night I was watching a soccer game with my friends. Someone called me on Eyasu's phone, which [he had left] with me. They asked if I was Eyasu and I told them I was a neighbor who had borrowed his phone. I did not want to say who I was before I learned who was calling. They asked if I had seen [Eyasu's] picture on Facebook. I left the house and went to the nearby shop. I asked them to check what had been posted on Facebook on their smart phone. That is when I saw Eyasu and I knew immediately it was him. The person who called, thinking I was someone else, had already told me that Eyasu had been captured and killed by ISIS. This was four years ago. We reported the case to the police. I [testified]. But nothing has happened following my testimony.

In Addis Ababa, families also reported reaching out to mass media to search for missing migrants. Helen is the older sister of Abenezer, who went missing in Libya. She reported the following:

> We went to several broadcasting companies such as Fana Television, Ethiopian Television, Josi TV, and Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT). After several times of going back and forth and many appointments, ESAT, the Diaspora-based TV, reported on the case, since at that time many Ethiopians had gone missing in Libya. We [also] heard that the Diaspora raised funds to search for the missing in Libya or to pay [ransoms] in case any of the missing [persons] were alive or found. However, we have yet to receive support or news about our brother. My brother told me he had buried many friends. I think he is [now] dead as well. What can we do if the government does not help? We cannot go to Libya and search for him. We just pray God brings good news to us.

Having exhausted all other options, some interviewees (four family members had traveled to search for missing persons) indicated that on occasion, they had no other option but to embark on separate journeys in an effort to trace the whereabouts of their loved ones, which often implied, however, acquiring additional debt in order to cover smuggling fees. As it is virtually impossible for Ethiopians to obtain visas to travel abroad to search for a loved one or to identify and repatriate their remains, families have no other alternative than pursuing irregular journeys for this purpose. Haile is the brother of Michael, who at the time of the interview had been missing in Libya for three years:

> Even my other younger brother has left; he is now in Germany. He is the youngest of all. He decided to leave after [my older brother] Michael went missing. He went to Libya to search for Michael and at the same time to cross to Europe. He spent one year just looking for [Michael] in Libya. Fortunately, he made it to Germany, but he did not find our brother. In Libya he contacted brokers. [He] talked [to] Eritreans in Tripoli and talked to many other people. But no one told him about his brother.

In sum, the interviews indicate that families actively engage in searching for their loved ones, and that they pursue every path available to them if they suspect something has happened to their migrating family member.

The families interviewed for this research recounted the challenges that they faced when interacting with state officials about their missing loved ones and provided suggestions and appeals for changes that could help them tackle some of the challenges described earlier.

While the relationship between families and smugglers must not be romanticized, the interviews revealed that many families were more likely to trust

smugglers over authorities when it came to solutions or information about their missing ones. This reality is explained by this mother of a missing migrant:

> We don't know which state institution is responsible to offer information regarding missing migrants. I don't know where to go or whom to ask in the government. Secondly, it is impossible to go to the country where [my son] went missing because I can't afford that. What I can do is to get news from the *delala* (broker) who facilitated his journey. Though I am very disappointed in the *delaloch* (brokers), I have never thought to accuse them [of my son's disappearance] also because most of them are my relatives. Also, I am scared to go to the government office because I have heard of families who sent their children through illegal ways and who were arrested and thrown into jail. Thus, what I can do is keep praying, hoping that one day my God may herald me with good news.

What is more, Ethiopian migrants often go missing or die in places such as the Sahara Desert, the Sinai Desert and in Libya, or they get drown into the Mediterranean Sea. The evidence connected to specific people is not collected or catalogued by any entity, nor is it communicated to relatives. There is therefore a need for a systemized documentation and cataloguing of evidence that could allow for the eventual identification of a missing person.

Families also raised the issue of obtaining visas to travel to other countries to search for missing loved ones. There are no special visas issued for the purpose of carrying out a search for humanitarian reasons and obtaining a tourist or medical visa involves a highly bureaucratic and financially unaffordable and inaccessible process for most Ethiopian families. The fact that many disappearances are believed to take place in locations in conflict also compromises the safety of grieving families, who still on occasion (and documented in this research) embark on journeys with the hope of finding information concerning their loved ones. Therefore, the ability to travel safely, legally and in a dignified manner for families searching for their missed relatives has to be supported by the responsible bodies.

Lastly, families indicated that in the event that the remains of their loved one were found, the repatriation process and its cost reduce the possibility that they could be buried according to tradition. As described above, many families are already in debt and impoverished as a result of having to pay smuggling and ransom fees, and therefore cannot access additional money from local lenders to cover repatriation costs. Mechanisms that allow for the dignified repatriation of loved ones are therefore urgently needed.

b. Gendered impacts of a loss

Migrants' deaths and disappearances, and the searches that they result in, have different impacts on men and women. Since most missing and disappeared migrants

are men, it is often the women who stay behind (wives, sisters, and mothers), the ones who perform tasks related to the search, and who most often carry a disproportionate amount of social and financial responsibility.

Among families in Hadiya, the ambiguity and the uncertainty that come with the loss of a family member, carry deep social meaning. It also has strong gender implications. For instance, the death or disappearance of a husband is often blamed on the wife who stayed behind – her 'bad luck' having led to the outcome. Widows are often mistreated, not only by their relative in-laws, but also by the community at large. The wife of a man who died on his migration journey described this as follows:

> Truly, this is the worst moment of my life. I don't know why God tempted me. His (her husband's) relatives frequently blame me because they assume that my husband is dead as a result of my 'bad luck'. In our community, it is very common to blame wives [whenever something wrong happens to their husbands]. That is heartbreaking.

Unable to legally demonstrate that her husband had died, or to obtain a death certificate recognized by the community and state institutions, a woman cannot claim ownership of the properties belonging to her husband and her children cannot apply for state support or legally claim inheritance. The interviewed women indicated that wives of missing migrants do not only face the emotional trauma of not knowing the fate of their husbands, but they also face legal challenges because of their ambiguous marital status. Women also face stigma if they decide to leave the family home or to remarry, as both actions are perceived as betrayal of a deceased or missing husband and his family. If women decide not to remarry, they are likely to face severe economic challenges impacting on their ability to care for themselves and their children, especially if they were reliant on their husbands' income for survival.

The wife of a missing migrant described her legal challenges and lack of independence this way:

> I can't talk about property or inherit the land before I get proof of the death of my husband. According to the tradition, his brothers control the land. I can't go to the courts and get into a fight with his relatives. If they farm the land and give some food to my children, that is fine. I can't go against tradition and fight over inheritance. Land disputes are serious problems in this village. People kill each other over land conflicts. I live with his relatives. I depend on them ... everything is difficult for me.

Asserting ownership over farming land after the death of a husband is complicated for rural women in many parts of southern Ethiopia (see Hussein, 2014). Although national laws recognize women's equal rights to access and control property (including land), community law and tradition still prevent them from inheriting

and controlling farming land in rural areas. In many communities, the ownership of land is given only to husbands at the time of marriage and the rights of women to inherit land is not recognized.

c. The burden of debt

Another aspect with deeply gendered implications is the issue of debt. Migrants often acquire significant debt in order to cover the costs of their journeys. Many others depart already indebted, for reasons ranging from the costs of household expenses, family illnesses, or even the smuggling fees for other family members. However, even in the event of someone's death or disappearance, their debt is not canceled, and many times in Hadiya the responsibility to cover financial obligations fall on migrants' wives if a husband dies or disappears along migration routes. Given the fact that women are often prevented from assuming control over property or other inherited goods, the debt imposes long-term obligations that limit women's ability to care for themselves, their children, and often other relatives.

A widow who lost her husband during his migration to South Africa explained:

> I was left on my own with kids to feed. I was left alone with the debts we acquired to pay for his travel. I would be happy if I got help to pay the debt and save the land we put down as collateral. I want to feed my children. I want to send them to school. But how can I do all this alone? His family should stop blaming me for [my] bad luck. [His disappearance] was not my fault. If they helped me care for these small children I could at least work. His brothers also want to take the land. My problems are many.

Women who lose their husbands or partners encounter difficulties bringing up children on their own. When the death of a missing person has not been confirmed, interviewed women indicated that they were simultaneously expected to continue the search for the missing person as well as to care for family members and children on their own. A widow whose husband disappeared on the route to South Africa explained:

> I gave birth four months after my husband left Ethiopia. You can imagine what happened to me. My heart is broken. He was the only one who took care of me and understood me. He farmed the land. I don't know how I am going to raise these kids. I sold everything we had to search for information and to make international calls to his friends, relatives and sometimes to the brokers. We had also borrowed money with a high interest rate from local money lenders to cover his migration costs. Now the money lenders are asking me to pay back as per agreement or they will take the land. Yet, I can't pay their money and the interest. The debt is increasing every year. Initially, we thought that my husband would pay back the money we have taken when he arrived in South

Africa.

Older relatives also face grave challenges as a result of the death or disappearance of their children, especially when they have invested or mortgaged their property or land to finance their journeys. Older mothers and fathers are often left without the economic support that their children were expected to provide in the event their journeys being successful. These losses are compounded when deaths or disappearances involve multiple children in a single family. The father of two missing sons stated:

> My sons were my hope. One died during an earlier migration [journey]. The second went to search for him and also to try his luck and reach South Africa. He went missing as well. It was last year when he called after arriving in Malawi. He never called again. I am dying twice: [because] I lost them and [because] I lost hope. They used to help me till and farm the land. They were my pride. They were my hope. I am getting older and weaker. I can't work. I rely on my relatives for agricultural labor, but they can only help me after finishing with their own farming. My farm is ploughed late and cannot produce much yield. In the village children change their families' lives through migration. They buy new houses for their family. They buy oxen to plough the land. Everyone's life changed here after migration to South Africa [started]. But look at my life, which is becoming hell. I cannot even pay the money lender. I am living with debt. My wife is already bedridden.

d. Kidnapping fees and ransom demands

For many years, researchers have written about the phenomenon of kidnapping, especially among Ethiopian migrants and their Diaspora. The term 'kidnapping' in the Ethiopian context has been used broadly not only in reference to the abduction of a person for ransom by a criminal group (Tekalign, 2018), but also to the retention or withholding of a person in transit until a fee for a service is paid to a smuggler or broker (Global Initiative, 2018), or as a form of extortion to be released from detention (Horwood and Forin, 2019). Mass killings of migrants are also often linked to kidnapping cases (Reuters, 2020).

While no specific statistics concerning kidnappings of Ethiopian migrant exist, the ubiquity of testimonies related to these experiences (documented in this study and in other publications) indicates that the potential of a migrant to be subjected to a kidnapping is high – one estimate suggests that one in seven people traveling from the Horn of Africa towards North Africa is likely to be kidnapped (McGregor, 2019; MMC, 2020).

During the interviews, families described kidnappings as a common element of the irregular journeys in all three routes out of Ethiopia. Families often paid ransoms (or at least were familiar with this experience from others) to release their relatives

from detention or other forms of confinement, or simply to obtain information on their whereabouts. Paying for smuggling and ransom fees, however, on top of the additional debt acquired to finance a journey, can easily leave a family destitute. Furthermore, the payment of a ransom does not necessarily result in the release of a migrant nor does it generate information about their whereabouts. In fact, most testimonies indicate that despite the payment of a kidnapping fee or ransom, many migrants are never found. The following testimony shows the financial impacts of kidnapping events:

> My brother went missing in Libya three years ago. First, he was kidnapped by rebels and they held him hostage with many other Ethiopians. They asked us to pay 12,500 USD. We tried our best to raise money by begging, but could not put together the required amount. We sent 3,000 USD to keep him alive. The criminals shot on his legs and hands. They sent us the video of him squirming and photos by Imo and WhatsApp [both instant-messaging apps]. For a year we begged in many places and in public. We were unable to [come up] with the money. Then the criminals switched off their phone. Our brother has been missing since. It has been three years now. I think they killed him. My mother does not want to think he was killed. She insists that we keep searching. We went from office to office and even contacted the Libyan embassy here in Addis Ababa. We got nothing. Many families became poor after paying ransom money to criminals. My brother's friend was kidnapped by another criminal group in Libya at the same time. The criminals asked the family to send 50,000 USD. His family sold their house and sent 40,000 USD to save their son. But their son has also been missing in Libya for three years. Many families in our neighborhood (Qirqos) have become poor since they borrowed money to pay the delala (smuggler) who facilitated the migration to Libya and then sold their houses to pay the ransom money for kidnappers and then ultimately lost their sons. They have lost everything.

e. Mental and physical health impacts of loss

The interviews, and field observations attest to the deep psychological impacts related to the loss, disappearance or death of a loved one in the context of migration. Most families interviewed indicated they had been unable to establish whether their missing loved ones were dead or alive, leading them to experience ambiguous loss, which occurs when there is no clear closure or reason (Boss 1999; Vogt, 2018). As a result of their loved ones' disappearance, family members indicated that they experienced a vast range of physical, psychological and behavioral issues ranging from anxiety, depression, hopelessness, stress, sadness and loneliness to sleep disturbance, inability to focus, loss of appetite and paralysis. Families also reported having relatives who attempted suicide following the disappearance or death of a migrant, overcome by the regret of having encouraged or even pressured a migrating family member to

undertake risky migration journeys.

The mother of a missing young woman explained her grief:

> I am really worried about my daughter. I can't stop thinking about her. I don't know what I am going to do. My hopes and dreams left with her. Sometimes I talk to myself just like a mad woman. I have long waited to see her face. But my wishes remain a daydream. Every day I pray, hoping to get her back alive. Whenever someone knocks at my door I run, hoping that will be my daughter who has come back. I know she is not dead because I see her in my dreams. My heart always tells me she is alive.

Similarly, the father of a missing man explained:

> As time goes on, our pain and suffering worsen. I can't work in my farm effectively because [I can see] the face of my son again and again. As a result, I can't even fulfill the basic needs of my family. I don't sleep at night. His voice and image come to my mind every minute. His mother had a heart attack after she heard of his disappearance.

Testimonies clearly demonstrate the multidimensional emotional and psychological challenges families experience due to the loss of their loved ones. As time goes by, the emotional pain increases, having material implications in the everyday lives of families, leading at times even to the loss of livelihoods and personal wellbeing.

The state and missing migrants: Legal and institutional frameworks

a. Legal frameworks

The Ethiopian state has ratified some of the relevant laws to prevent people disappearing in different contexts and to protect their rights, such as the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and specific provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (GC I–IV) and their two Additional Protocols of 1977 (AP I and AP II). However, Ethiopia has not ratified the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED), the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and the African Commission on Human and People's Rights. Domestically the Civil Code (art 153-174), the Criminal Code, and Proclamations 1178/2020 and 923/2016 stipulate relevant laws in preventing missing persons, management of dead and detained populations or procedures of arrest. However, the law has serious gaps in specifically dealing with missing persons. There is a lack of clear definitions of a missing person, a family and disappearance. There is no a clear procedure on how the searching can be initiated and who is responsible for the prevention of people disappearing.

Proclamation 1178/2020 strives to prevent people going missing due to

irregular migration while Proclamation 923/2016 has provisions to prevent people from disappearing or to repatriate bodies and support victims' families, in particular regarding Ethiopian migrant workers legally deployed as domestic workers abroad. Articles 8–14 of Proclamation 1178/2020 detail the prevention, protection and prosecution procedures regarding human trafficking and smuggling of migrants that cause disappearance and death of migrants during migration processes, including overseas labor deployments. The Overseas Employment Proclamation (No. 923/2016) requires foreign employers to have life and disability insurance for their workers. The proclamation holds private employment agencies (PEAs) and employers liable for the welfare of their (Ethiopian migrant) employees.

Despite this legislation, there are no specific directives or ministerial regulations to effectively implement the provisions in the civil code. There is no integrated system for searching for information, or methods for informing the families of persons who have gone missing during migration, or who have died in conflict. Families mostly use their own search mechanisms and strategies to collect information of the missing relatives, due to conflict or due to migration. Law enforcement agents' engagement is often focused on crime detections, investigations and prosecutions of perpetrators. They focus less on searching for missing persons and management of the dead. They have not ensured compliance to IHL with regard to requirements that all persons are protected by the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.

There are some domestic laws which are relevant to missing migrants, as these laws prohibit all kinds of human trafficking, including migrants in Ethiopia, domestically and abroad. For example, article 597 (1) of the Revised Criminal Code (Proclamation No.414/2004) imposes penalties for those who engage in human trafficking and provides compensation for victims of trafficking, including families. The Civil Code also states that victims of trafficking, including families, have the right to claim compensation for damages. These laws are generic laws inclusive of all kinds of victims of trafficking, including migrants who died or disappeared within Ethiopia or abroad. The Proclamation on Overseas Employment (No. 923/2016) stipulates that foreign employers must have life and disability insurance for the workers concerned. The Proclamation holds Private Employment Agencies (PEAs) and employers liable for the welfare of (Ethiopian migrant) employees and imposes stringent conditions with regard to the establishment, management and licensing, as well as the operations of PEAs.

While Ethiopia has several national laws related to migration and has adopted and ratified relevant international human and migrant rights conventions, including the Global Compact for Migration, which calls on States to "save lives and establish coordinated international efforts in relation to missing migrants" (UNGA, 2018), there are no specific policies, legal frameworks or institutions in the country that concretely and proactively deal with missing Ethiopian migrants.

b. Institutions, actors and roles

There are government actors – the Office of Attorney General (OAG), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA), Federal police; civil society and community-based organizations – community care coalitions (CCCs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and others available for migration governance in Ethiopia in general and missing migrants in particular. In the absence of clearly mandated government agencies, families of the missing migrants are more likely to interact with non-governmental organizations and community-based associations. For instance, CCCs operate at the *kebele* (village) level and have been effective at mobilizing psychosocial and economic support for destitute families who have lost their loved ones, including relatives who went missing during migration journeys. Thus, community-based associations such as *iddir* and other civil society and church groups can mobilize psychosocial and economic support for families of missing migrants.

In addition, other Diaspora and community-based associations, such as *iddir* and church organizations play a vital role in investigating and collecting data about missing and dead migrants and providing psychosocial and economic support to families left behind in Hadiya district of southern Ethiopia. Families of missing migrants interviewed in this study reported relying on *iddir* and their social networks to obtain information when looking for information about relatives who emigrated using irregular channels. *Iddir* members who reside in South Africa often have contacts with smuggling facilitators, who are often members of these groups themselves in rural areas and who can help search for the missing persons through their contacts along migration routes. Families engage in searching for their missing loved ones primarily through informal channels and networks. They may contact relevant authorities for support with the search. Family members in the Diaspora search through their networks and contact brokers for information.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinates the activities of Ethiopia's diplomatic and consular missions to ensure that the interests and rights of Ethiopians residing abroad are protected. The MFA is mandated to initiate the process to rescue, release and return any Ethiopian, found outside Ethiopia, who is a victim of trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. The MOLSA oversees the operation of PEAs, monitors the safety of legally deployed Ethiopian migrants in Gulf States and supports the repatriation of the remains of legally deployed migrant workers who died in Gulf States and the Middle East. The Office of Attorney General (OAG) is mandated to prevent, protect, and prosecute crimes related to human smuggling and trafficking in persons, and to support the victims. Law enforcement authorities are mandated to detect crimes related to human trafficking, smuggling, and irregular migration, and to investigate complaints of disappearances filed by families. Ethiopian embassies and consulates overseas may engage in searching for Ethiopian nationals missing abroad and facilitate the repatriation of remains. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also occasionally supports this process.

However, despite the large number of state and non-state institutions engaged in migration governance, very few specifically attend to the dynamic needs of families with missing relatives – including the search processes, the identification and repatriation of remains, and assistance with the legal, economic and social challenges they face as a result of the disappearance. Only a small handful of actors work directly on issues concerning missing migrants and their families, and they largely do so on an ad hoc manner. Besides the intervention of government agencies when legally deployed migrant workers die abroad, or as a reaction to large incidents of death of Ethiopian migrants when there is international media attention or involvement of influential Ethiopian Diaspora groups, there is no formal system in place to search for people who left the country irregularly.

CONCLUSION

Despite the vast size of the Ethiopian Diaspora and many migrants who have gone missing or perished in the context of their migration journeys (at least 4,000 recorded by the IOM's Missing Migrants Project and BOLSA within five years – 2015–2020), the dire needs and challenges that families of the missing face, are not proportionately represented in the policy or legal framework in the country. This is evidenced by the fact that there is not a single official body or institution with a mandate to provide assistance or support to families looking for missing migrants. State actions related to victim support are often ad hoc, and only in response to high profile cases, such as those involving a large number of deportations or deaths.

Even though Ethiopia has several government agencies and proclamations related to migration and the government has ratified important human rights and migration-related international conventions, there is a lack of the technical and financial capacity to tackle the issue of missing and dead migrants. Despite Ethiopia having an increasing number of national laws and resources dedicated to migration management and having adopted and ratified relevant international human and migrant rights conventions, the domestic legal and policy framework does not specifically and directly deal with the phenomenon of missing migrants and the needs and concerns of their families.

The Ethiopian government mobilized resources and established several institutions to manage migration and reduce the risks and violence that migrants encounter at various stages of the migration cycle. There are many achievements in migration governance. However, much of the country's refugee and migration governance and humanitarian support are still donor dependent and their roles are therefore determined by donors' priorities and procedures. There is very limited institutional and organizational support to proactively engage with the issue of migrant deaths and disappearances and that addresses the concerns and challenges of the families left behind. There is serious mistrust between families and the state. The increasing criminalization of smuggling is a barrier to families seeking state support in searching for the missing persons, knowing that they will be interrogated

and asked for information concerning smugglers, rather than their loved ones.

All families who participated in the research experienced psychosocial, economic, cultural and communal challenges, but their needs and priorities also varied across rural and urban settings and the regional government they were dealing with. Therefore, multi-dimensional, evidence-based, community-rooted approaches that better support the families of the missing persons across Ethiopia in the face of deep financial precarity and limited mechanisms of social protection, are urgently needed.

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The Dynamics of Child Trafficking in West Africa

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The phenomenon of human trafficking remains a scourge in Africa, and this continent continues to be a source and transit route for this illicit activity. The West African region has perpetually maintained the undignified position as the region with the most prevalent issues of human trafficking, child labor, and modern slavery, despite the efforts by the various national governments and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to eradicate these atrocities. This study examines the efforts of the West African states towards tackling this menace of trafficking across West African borders. The study employed a documentary research design and retrieved data from both primary and secondary materials. Findings from the study showed there is still a lacuna in the domestication of the United Nations (UN) Protocol on Human Trafficking by West African states as the West African Network of Central Authorities and Prosecutors (WACAP) against Organized Crime, saddled with harnessing the resources of ECOWAS states in combating the menace, lacks the capacity required for achieving the set goal. Also, efforts by the various states in the region have been largely reactive and legislative rather than preventive. The study thus recommends that ECOWAS states take preventive measures, like building the institutional capacities of regional and national law enforcement, as well as implementing measures that will ensure respect for the fundamental human rights of women and children in the sociocultural philosophies of West Africans.

Keywords: human trafficking, child trafficking, West African States, ECOWAS, child labor

INTRODUCTION

Human trafficking as a concept and practice is as dated as the literature on it. Such literature tends to problematize human trafficking broadly from a human rights lens and assumes a marked critique of stakeholders involved in it and governments with weak policies that feed it (Laczko and Gramegna, 2003; Cullen-DuPont, 2009; Shelley, 2010; Wheaton et al., 2010; Farrell and De Vries, 2020). However important this phenomenon and problem is, human trafficking is currently a source of conflict intractability and a source through which violent extremist groups recruit vulnerable and helpless mercenaries (Hynes et al., 2018). Another dimension is the cultural and religious driver of human trafficking (De Liévana and Montáñez, 2015; Ikeora, 2016). This is hinged on the fact that certain cultural and religious practices permit the initiation and utilization of children to advance their ideologies. For instance, the *alamajiris* of Northern Nigeria, the *mendiants* of Mali and Senegal or the street children of The Gambia and Niger are organized cults of kids answerable to a master in whose hands and on whom their destiny and survival depends (Andrew and Lawrance, 2012; Gunther, 2021; NAPTIP, 2021).

These children, often victims of poor social systems, poverty, and illiteracy join fundamentalist groups with the expectation that such group leaders will educate them out of their plight and grow them into religious, cultural or community leaders (De Liévana and Montáñez, 2015; Gunther, 2021; NAPTIP, 2021). The widely accepted belief that children sent to learn a trade from an influential person is beneficial to their families in the long run, fuels voluntary and cooperative trafficking, which is different from children seized as booties of conflicts, including Boko Haram, that currently wreaks havoc in Chad Basin today (Hynes et al., 2018; EASO, 2021; NAPTIP, 2021). This paper discusses the complexities of human trafficking with a particular emphasis on child trafficking in West Africa, its societal acceptance, and the broader impact of the practice on regional peace and security. The paper assesses the efficacy of measures taken by states and the ECOWAS regional block to deal with the scourge. Acknowledging the complexity of the issues, the paper navigates a careful line of recommendations, which suggest that human trafficking is bad for all (including its promoters).

LITERATURE REVIEW: TRAFFICKING AS A GLOBAL ILL AND HUMAN SECURITY CHALLENGE IN AFRICA

Human trafficking has over the years proven to be a global menace not limited to a specific geographical location, region, or continent (IOM, 2017; UNODC, 2021). Traceable to the 1980s, several reasons have been put forward as the root cause of global trafficking, including developments in migration trends, the AIDS pandemic, the feminist movement, child prostitution, and sex tourism – all of which characterized the 1980s and the dire economic situation of many countries (Doezema, 2002; UNODC, 2017, 2020, 2021). Globalization, which has led to the demand of

cheap labor in the industrialized climes, has also been identified as a major cause of and contribution to human trafficking (IOM, 2017; UNODC, 2017). Despite the attention and resources that this phenomenon has attracted from international and local state and non-state actors, the number of victims of human trafficking keeps increasing globally (IOM, 2017). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2020 report observes that as at 2018, global statistics on victims of human trafficking stood at 49,032 people, while victims by age and gender were at 48,748, and another 39,805 people were reported to be victims of one form of exploitation or another (UNODC, 2021).

Furthermore, while 9,429 persons had been investigated and suspected of trafficking-related crimes, only 7,368 have been prosecuted and only 3,553 have been convicted (UNODC, 2021). As identified by global reports and scholars, trafficking is carried out for the purpose of exploitation, which is classified into two forms, namely, for forced labor and for sexual exploitation (IOM, 2017; UNODC, 2017, 2020, 2021; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). Although sexual exploitation has received much attention, since many females are trafficked for that purpose, the incidence of forced labor has equally grown, due to the massive demand for cheap labor across the globe (ILO, 2012a; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). Scholars have identified three prevalent types of trafficking in sub-Saharan Africa: (a) trafficking in children for farm labor and domestic work within and between countries; (b) trafficking in women and young persons for sexual exploitation, majorly outside the region; and (c) trafficking in women from outside the region for the sex industry in South Africa (Sita, 2003; Gould, 2011; Kreston, 2014; Deane, 2017; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021).

The need for cheap domestic and agricultural labor in Africa explains the rising number of male victims, as raised by reports on human trafficking (ILO, 2017; IOM, 2017; Statista, 2021). Trafficking in persons grossly violates the fundamental rights of women and children who form the majority of trafficked persons among the vulnerable groups (Deane, 2017; ILO, 2017; IOM, 2017; UNODC, 2017, 2020). As scholars have argued, there is a thin line between trafficking, irregular migration, and smuggling in persons, as traffickers engage in irregular travel patterns across countries and continents in an attempt to evade authorities and deliver their cargoes to their destinations undetected (Deane, 2017; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021; Okunade, 2021). There have been extensive debates in the reliability of sources of data on the trends and statistics of trafficking in persons, resulting in figures usually being estimates and approximations. According to recent estimates, approximately 12.4 million people are being trafficked across the globe annually, while 80% are believed to be women, 70% of whom are trafficked for sexual exploitation (Gould, 2011; Ikeora, 2016; Deane, 2017).

Global statistics indicate that between 2008 and 2019, the estimated number of trafficked victims from sub-Saharan Africa increased from 30,961 to 105,787 (Statista, 2021) while the UNODC 2020 report states that child victims amounted to one-third of the global population of trafficked persons – taken from their countries

to within and beyond their countries for various forms of exploitation (ILO, 2012b; Kreston, 2014; UNODC, 2021). Reports also indicate that within Central and West Africa, between 200,000 and 300,000 children are trafficked for sexual exploitation and forced labor, with 99% of this number trafficked within the African region (ILO, 2012a; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). Alarmingly, more than 50% of human trafficking victims in West Africa are children (Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). According to studies conducted in 2011 on child labor in Central and West Africa, more than 1.8 million children were reportedly working on cocoa farms in Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Ghana (ILO, 2012a). Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire were reported to host the highest number of child laborers working on the farms, with a combined estimation of 1.8 million children, making West Africa the region with the highest number of child laborers in the world (ILO, 2012b; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021; UNODC, 2021). According to the Global Slavery Index, Nigeria ranks 32nd out of 167 in nations with the highest number of slaves, with an estimated 1,38 million slaves, most of whom are child laborers (Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021).

During the late 1990s, when global trafficking was rife, the United States took the lead in establishing governance measures to contain this phenomenon (Gozdziak and Collett, 2005). This led to the establishment and promulgation of protocols aimed to protect trafficked victims. Such measures include the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000 and the Trafficking Victims Protection Re-authorization Act of 2003, regarded as the major tools for combating human trafficking globally and locally (Gozdziak and Collett, 2005). Mexico is known as a country of source, transit and destination for trafficked persons for the purpose of sexual exploitation and forced labor (Gozdziak and Collett, 2005; IOM, 2017). However, the country has contributed little to the efforts aimed at combating this scourge locally and within North America. The Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report indicated that the Government of Mexico defaulted in observing the minimum standards for combating trafficking (Thompson, 2003). In South Asia, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka are major source countries for trafficking while India and Pakistan are the major destination countries, while they also serve as transit points for some countries in the Middle East (Ali, 2005). Women and girls are trafficked to countries in the Persian Gulf (Ali, 2005). In Bangladesh, women and children are trafficked purposely for forced labor, sexual exploitation, camel jockeying, domestic service, sale of organs, and forced marriage (Bangladesh Counter Trafficking Thematic Group, 2003).

Africa – and specifically the West African region – has not escaped this menace, as reports and statistics show that many West African states serve as countries of source, transit and destination for trafficking in persons, thus increasing the rate of the activity within the sub-region (Obokata, 2019; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021; Okunade, 2021). As already noted above, West Africa accounts for the highest number of trafficked humans and child laborers in sub-Saharan Africa, according to reports by the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations (UN)

and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Trafficking takes different forms depending on the countries involved and the demands made (Deane, 2017). For instance, in the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, and Senegal, child trafficking is carried out for purposes of labor, prostitution, street begging, and child pornography (UNODC, 2020; Gunther, 2021), while in other West African countries such as Benin, Ghana, Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, and Nigeria, child trafficking takes place majorly for the purpose of child labor (HRW, 2019; UNODC, 2020).

Several factors have been adduced for the phenomenal increase in trafficking in persons across the continent. According to studies on this social menace, poverty and increased unemployment levels are fundamental factors leading to increased TIP in Africa generally and in West Africa specifically (Gould, 2011; Kreston, 2014; ILO, 2017; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021; UNODC, 2021). The US Department of State also noted that poor economic conditions provide fertile ground for traffickers and smugglers to lure vulnerable people by making false promises of higher salaries and better working conditions in foreign countries (USDoS, 2013; Okunade, 2021). Directly linked to this, is the non-existent welfare support system in most African countries that makes it difficult for parents to adequately meet the economic and welfare needs of their families (Gould, 2011; Kreston, 2014; Deane, 2017). The result of these poor economic conditions in many African countries is that parents are compelled to either offer their children for sale, or to exchange them for debts to traffickers to pay back debts, in their attempts to escape poverty (UNODC, 2020, 2021).

The lack of education – characteristic of many African countries – that has resulted in the multiplication of out-of-school children with little or no socioeconomic value, has also contributed in no small way to child trafficking (Mensah-Ankrah and Sarpong, 2017; USDoS, 2021). Major towns and cities across African countries reportedly host large numbers of such out-of-school children who eventually become street beggars, hoodlums, street urchins, etc. with adverse socioeconomic implications for society (Mensah-Ankrah and Sarpong, 2017; USDoS, 2021). Cultural and religious practices have also been identified a playing an active role in fostering trafficking across the world, especially in African countries (Sawadogo, 2012; Deane, 2017; USDoS, 2021). As noted by researchers, the cultural belief of family solidarity and tribal affiliation practices put many children at risk of being trafficked because this system encourages parents to willingly hand over their children to close and distant relatives and friends with little or no access to the welfare of these children (Sawadogo, 2012; Deane, 2017).

The leeway created by this traditional and cultural interaction, allows for many children to be trafficked with relative ease, especially when children are taken to destinations far from their parents (UNODC, 2021; USDoS, 2021). Scholars acknowledge that this practice is rampant in most West African nations (Sawadogo, 2012; Deane, 2017; Dajahar and Walnshak, 2018). Studies also revealed that in some African countries like Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Ghana, there are several misplaced

cultural beliefs that have gendered implications. For example, the belief that having sex with virgins serves as an antidote to diseases such as HIV/AIDS, usually leads to young girls becoming victims of trafficking, sex slavery and early marriages (Ikeora, 2016; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021).

The porosity of national borders, coupled with corrupt border security personnel have also been identified as major contributors to the increase in trafficking in persons in Africa (Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021; Okunade and Oni, 2021). The West African region in particular, and the African continent at large, are notorious for their very porous land and maritime borders, making the influx of transnational criminal networks and related actors rampant in the region (Mensah-Ankrah and Sarpong, 2017; Dajahar and Walnshak, 2018). Traffickers and smugglers have mastered the art of manoevering these porous borders either through the numerous illegal routes or with the assistance of the border guards who are usually technically and professionally ill-equipped for their job roles (Ikome, 2012; Onogwu, 2018). Reports by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2021) also observed that security personnel and immigration officers have equally aided the free passage of trafficked victims along major air routes, which explains the European authorities' awareness of the entry of some trafficked persons into Europe, through the airports (EASO, 2021).

Trafficking in persons is one of the biggest sources of revenue of organized crimes, hence the proliferation in the number of traffickers and the consolidation of trafficking and smuggling syndicates and networks around the world (Sawadogo, 2012). Recent data puts the trafficking industry in Africa at a financial value of $13.1 billion per year (Okenyodo, 2020; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). Furthermore, reports indicate that successfully trafficking a woman to Europe from Africa for sex-work purposes, may cost about $2,000 which is used for procuring travel documents, bribing key officials, and transportation (UNODC, 2021). However, on getting to the intended destination in Europe, the trafficker may get up to $12,000 for every trafficked female (Sawadogo, 2012; UNODC, 2021). Reports also show that for children – depending on the source country, destination and purpose – a trafficker may earn between $50 and $1,000 for every child delivered to buyers in Europe (Sawadogo, 2012; UNODC, 2021). Sawadogo (2012) further observes that in the United States, a trafficker earns between $10,000 and $20,000 for every African child successfully delivered to buyers.

TRENDS, SOURCES AND FORMS OF TRAFFICKING IN WEST AFRICA

The West African sub-region is a major trafficking region in sub-Saharan Africa with trafficking networks spanning countries within and outside the sub-region (Deane, 2017; Okunade, 2021). As a result of this, wide links involving transnational criminal syndicates in Europe, and trafficking networks within the West African sub-region to Europe have become increasingly sophisticated and continue to thrive, with several major cities and towns – such as Benin City in Southern Nigeria – dubbed as notorious trafficking hubs (UNICJRI, 2003; Shelly, 2014; HRW, 2019). Victims

of these sophisticated criminal networks, which reportedly include migration and border officials, are then ferried to Europe through the various land, sea, and air corridors in major cities across West African states (UNICJRI, 2003; Deane, 2017; EASO, 2021; Okunade, 2021). According to Gunther (2021), Mali serves as a major prostitution hub as well as a transit country for traffickers and illegal migrants from West Africa. The same transit routes for illegal migrants and human traffickers have been established in countries like Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso, amongst others (HRW, 2019; UNODC, 2020; Gunther, 2021).

The literature has further established that women and girls are the major victims of trafficking in the West African sub-region, as they are mostly forced into sex slavery and prostitution (UNICRU, 2004; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021; UNODC, 2020, 2021). Women trafficked from Sierra Leone and war-ridden Liberia are victims of forced prostitution and sex slavery in neighboring Mali while women in Mali are trafficked to Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and eventually to France for similar purposes (Gunther, 2021). These women are trafficked through the land and maritime borders within West Africa either to northern Africa where they are shipped through the Mediterranean Sea, or smuggled through airports to Europe where they are delivered to brothel owners (Sawadogo, 2012; Mensah-Ankrah and Sarpong, 2017; Okunade, 2021). The trajectory of these illegal journeys from West Africa through the North African cities is fraught with risks for trafficked persons – traffickers could get stranded in the Maghreb region for four or more years on their way to Europe, especially when they run out of resources or when law enforcement agencies intensify their investigations and tracking of such criminal groups (EASO, 2021; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021; UNODC, 2021; USDoS, 2021).

Similar trafficking in persons has also been reported in Ghana where both women and children are victims of trafficking networks (Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). Trafficking along this region takes place in both external and internal directions; while some victims (women and children) are trafficked within the country and the West African region (Anarfi, 1998; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021; USDoS, 2021), others are trafficked to Europe for prostitution and forced labor (ILO, 2017; IOM, 2017; UNODC, 2021). Ghana also serves as a transit route for Nigerian women trafficked to Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands for prostitution (HRW, 2019; USDoS, 2021). Other forms of internal trafficking known to occur within the West African sub-region, are Togolese young women trafficked for prostitution to the neighboring countries of Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Gabon and externally to Lebanon (Taylor, 2002; USDoS, 2021). In the same vein, reports also indicate that Senegal serves as both a source and transit country for trafficked women from other West African countries to South Africa, Europe, and the Gulf States solely for prostitution purposes (Gould, 2011; Kreston, 2014; Deane, 2017).

Perspectives on the trafficking of children, women and vulnerable groups in West Africa

Along with the trafficking of women and girls, reports show that child trafficking

is on the rise in West Africa (EASO, 2021; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021; UNODC, 2021). According to recent statistics by the ILO, there were about 1.8 million children trafficked in the last five years from West Africa, despite global efforts against this menace (Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). Trafficked children are mostly sourced from the rural areas where the people are naïve and desperate to escape economic hardship and predicament and strive to provide better living options for their offspring (Deane, 2017; Okenyodo, 2020). These poor economic conditions put desperate parents in a vulnerable state, especially for those in rural areas where the necessary information on the dangers of trafficking is not available (Sawadogo, 2012; Mensah-Ankrah and Sarpong, 2017). It is important to note that, according to the ILO (2017), in collaboration with the Walk Free Foundation, parents do not give their children away with the intention of selling them, even though it eventually turns out to be the case for many who may never see their children again. Most parents give their children to recruiters with the belief that they are ensuring a good life for the children and themselves, which explains why some parents accept money from recruiters with the understanding that they will receive a monthly remittance (ILO, 2012a; USDoS, 2021).

Mlambo and Ndebele (2021) identified six forms of child trafficking in Central and West Africa. These include, abduction of children; payment of sums of money to poor parents who give their children away, based on the promise that they would be treated well; bonded placement of children as debt reimbursement; placement for a token sum for specified period; for gift items; and enrolment for a fee by an agent for domestic work at the request of the children's parents (Sawadogo, 2012; ILO, 2012a, 2017; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). Mlambo and Ndebele (2021) note that in the sixth form, parents of the domestic workers are lured into releasing their children after being assured of their enrolment in schools, and trade or training institutions; meanwhile, they end up as domestic servants and street vendors. Another factor recognized by the United States Department of State that aids the release of children by their parents and even the victims themselves, is the 'smooth-talking' ability of trafficking and smuggling agents that makes it easy to convince potential victims and their parents to take custody of their wards (UNODC, 2021; USDoS, 2021). According to Dottridge (2002), traffickers have mastered the art of getting into the psyche of their victims by painting scenarios of beautiful lives in foreign cities for potential victims. This way, trafficked and smuggled women are sourced, with promises of job opportunities and better lives in Europe and in the Gulf States (Okunade, 2021).

Another avenue for attracting and adopting children for trafficking from various states in Africa and in particular the West African sub-region, is through civil unrests, armed conflicts, and civil wars that are rampant within the sub-region (Dajahar and Walnshak, 2018; Okenyodo, 2020). The displacement and chaos arising from armed conflicts, civil unrests, and other internal and regional security challenges – such as the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, the political unrests in Mali, and Guinea, amongst others – also serve as opportunities for child traffickers

who take advantage of the chaos to adopt, lure, and smuggle children (Okenyodo, 2020; USDoS, 2021). Children are trafficked for various reasons, ranging for domestic reasons to child labor, which are rampant in West African states (ILO, 2012a, 2012b, 2017; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021; Okunade, 2021). Although there are international and national legislations in many West African countries guiding the enforcement of measures against child abuse and child labor, the evidence shows that many nations within the sub-region continue to subject minors to child labor (Mensah-Ankrah and Sarpong, 2017; Aniche and Moyo, 2019). The primary trafficking source countries in the region, such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Mauritania, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cote d'Ivoire, Congo, and Togo still record considerable numbers of children trafficked within and beyond their countries for domestic work purposes (HRW, 2019; Gunther, 2021). Specifically, Togolese girls are trafficked for both sexual exploitation and forced labor within the country and to the neighboring countries of Benin, Nigeria, Niger, and Gabon, while boys are trafficked for labor in plantations across Benin, Nigeria, and Cote d'Ivoire (Sawadogo, 2012; HRW, 2019). On the external flow of child trafficking from the West African sub-region, the Human Rights Watch (2019) notes that children from Nigeria have been trafficked to European nations such as France, the Netherlands, Spain, and some Gulf States. On the continent, Senegal has been identified as a destination country for children trafficked from Guinea Conakry, and Mali (Gunther, 2021; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). In summary, Figure 1 below encapsulates the trajectories on the sources of child trafficking in West Africa.

Figure 1: Major sources of child trafficking in West Africa



Child trafficking in Africa and in particular in the Western sub-region has its attendant effects on trafficked children and the sub-region at large, ranging from exposure to crime, drug abuse, and loss of cultural values – which form the basis of core African belief systems – to exposure to health hazards and diseases, and gross abuse of their fundamental human rights (Sawadogo, 2012; Mensah-Ankrah and Sarpong, 2017; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). Trafficked children eventually lose family support systems, which puts them in a vulnerable state – a situation which traffickers and their bosses exploit (ILO, 2017; IOM, 2017; UNODC, 2021; USDoS, 2021). This process breeds fear in the victims, eroding their courage to report the traffickers and turn themselves in to the appropriate authorities for help (UNODC, 2020, 2021). This is compounded by the fact that traffickers are well connected, as they have informants and support from some government officials (EASO, 2021; UNODC, 2021). Furthermore, child trafficking jeopardizes parental control and the attendant transfer of knowledge and cultural values to children, considered the cornerstone of many African societies (Sawadogo, 2012; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). There is also the potential of exposing trafficked children to vices such as crimes, alcoholism, and drug abuse which eventually result in many West African young people (primarily males) becoming drug peddlers, street beggars, and armed robbers (ILO, 2017; UNODC, 2021) which add to the social unrests already bedeviling the region.

Another crucial concern, is the danger of health hazards, emanating from the exposure of trafficked persons and children to harsh working conditions and poor nutrition (ILO, 2012a, 2017). For women and children who are sexually exploited, the exposure to sexually transmitted infections and diseases such as HIV/AIDS, is an ever-present threat to their health (ILO, 2012a; Aniche and Moyo, 2019). According to the UNODC, some trafficked children experience sexual abuse by their traffickers en-route to their destination cities/countries or by their hosts, making them vulnerable to various health hazards; others are exposed to similar health hazards by being prostitutes and street kids (Mensah-Ankrah and Sarpong, 2017; UNODC, 2021). Fitzgibbon (2003) maintains that trafficked children and child laborers in Africa are prone to suffering sunstroke; abnormal heart rhythms; and poisoning from inhaled chemicals and dust from factories, sawmills, mines, etc., all of which lead to stunted growth that makes them susceptible to malaria and other ailments.

The fact remains that these are the kinds of jobs that trafficked children are used for in West Africa. While it is unclear why any parent would be comfortable having their child hawking in the street at night, this bears evidence of the desperation experienced by vulnerable families.

In essence, child trafficking is a great violation of children's fundamental rights, especially as they are mostly dependent on their guardians for protection and provisions (ILO, 2017). Studies show that some of the instances of harsh working conditions that trafficked children are exposed to in West African countries, include, the harsh working conditions of child laborers in plantations in Ghana and Cote

d'Ivoire, and in mines in Burkina Faso, Liberia and Sierra Leone where it is alleged that children are forced to work between 10–20 hours daily without the required nutritious meals (ILO, 2012b; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). This denies them access to education in their formative years – opportunities which may never present themselves again in their lifetime.

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AGAINST HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Human trafficking, especially in women and children, became a priority for the UN General Assembly and the Commission of Human Rights in the early 1990s and this led to the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna and the World Conference on Women in Beijing in the 1990s (Gozdziak and Collett, 2005). These conferences, dedicated to addressing trafficking in persons at the global level, resulted in the promulgation of conventions and protocols, such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (CRC) and its Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children; the ILO Convention 182 of 1999; and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (United Nations, 2016; USDoS, 2021). The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially trafficking in women and children was adopted by the UN General Assembly in November 2000 (USDoS, 2021). These were soon followed by the International Labour Organization Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor; and the Protocol to the Convention of the Right of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (Gozdziak and Collett, 2005; Sawadogo, 2012). The UN Protocol on trafficking is the most comprehensive instrument globally recognized for addressing human trafficking.

Deane (2017) however, observes that the UN Protocol cannot be applied in isolation of the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime as they are both complementary in addressing human trafficking issues and transnational criminal syndicates responsible for transnational trafficking in persons globally. According to Clark (2003), the UN Protocol on trafficking is comprehensive in its explanation of trafficking as it addresses three major questions, viz., (a) "what are the acts of trafficking?" which covers issues like the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, and receipt process of trafficking; (b) "what are the means of trafficking?" which addresses methods of adopting victims, such as by threat, use of force, other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power, abuse of a position of vulnerability, and receiving or paying of benefits; and (c) "what are the purposes of trafficking?" which addresses the rationale behind trafficking, such as for exploitation, prostitution of others, other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices like slavery, servitude, and the removal of organs (Clark, 2003).

In Africa, there is no specific protocol that directly addresses human trafficking; hence, there is heavy reliance on protocols that deal with fundamental

human rights (Mensah-Ankrah and Sarpong, 2017; Aniche and Moyo, 2019). The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights of 1981 is the document that specifies some basic rights which are in many ways useful within the context of human trafficking (Mensah-Ankrah and Sarpong, 2017). For instance, articles 4, 5 and 18(13) of the African Charter on Human Rights, all point to the right of the individual to personal liberty, dignity, and the abolishment of all forms of exploitation such as torture, slavery, inhumane treatment, and punishment and above all, the elimination of discrimination against women and the protection of their rights and those of children (Mensah-Ankrah and Sarpong, 2017; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). Similarly, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (Charter RWC) of 1990 also addresses issues of rights but does not properly define or give meaning to child trafficking (Donati, 2010; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). Lastly, the Maputo Protocol, known as Protocol to the Africa Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, was adopted in 2003 to consolidate the provisions of the African Charter (Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). Like the other Charters, the Maputo Protocol similarly only provides for the rights of women, as only Article 18(3) provides for the protection of the rights of women and children (Aniche and Moyo, 2019).

In West Africa, there are numerous national policies in place that define human trafficking. These include: the Transportation of Minors and the Suppression of Child Trafficking Act 4 of 2006 in Benin, which criminalizes all forms of child trafficking; the 2005 Law Related to Child Smuggling (supplemented by the Child Code of 2007) in Togo; the 2014 law that criminalizes the sales of children, child prostitution, and child pornography in Burkina Faso; the 2010 Law No 2010-272 Pertaining to the Prohibition of Child Trafficking and the Worst Forms of Child Labor in Cote d'Ivoire, which is the first to stipulate punishment for trafficking offenses; and the Trafficking in Persons Law Enforcement and Administration Act 2003 in Nigeria (Deane, 2017). Notably, of all the protocols in the West African sub-region, only Nigeria addresses and condemns all forms of trafficking while the other countries do not fully address this (Deane, 2017). The subsequent sections discuss how these policies have been implemented and deployed in addressing the menace of trafficking in West Africa.

DISCUSSION

Consistent with the phenomenon and trends of human trafficking, as well as the conventions emplaced that (in)directly attempt to address this violation of human rights, this section presents a critical discussion of the efforts by ECOWAS and the West African states. International law generally provides that states have the onus to prevent and fight against human trafficking (Obokata, 2019), as evident in Article 35 of the 1989 UN CRC, which urges state parties to "take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent the abduction, the sale, or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form" (UNICEF, 2002). At the international level

therefore, the UNODC has been and continues to promote initiatives that aim at assisting West African states to confront human trafficking at regional and national levels. Among its many initiatives, was the Vienna 2017 training workshop which aimed at fostering regional cooperation among West African states that are also members of the West African Network of Central Authorities and Prosecutors (WACAP) against Organized Crime, to build capacity and work toward combating human trafficking, exploitation, and migrant smuggling within and across West African states (UNODC 2017).

Considering the depth of trafficking in persons across West African and African territories with international criminal syndicates (UNODC, 2020; US Department of State, 2018), tackling this menace effectively must necessarily involve collaborative efforts between local and international agencies and institutions of government and law enforcement. To this end, Sawadogo (2012) appraises that not only have non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and inter-governmental organizations been pivotal in helping West African states address human trafficking, but their interventions have contributed significantly to the enactment of national action plans as well as the establishment of a regional security structure. In exploring the efforts and responses engaged so far, note is taken that ECOWAS' 2002 to 2003 Initial Plan of Action against Trafficking in Persons was anchored on criminal justice response strategies with calls on states in the region to implement the criminalization of human trafficking offenses into law (ECOWAS, 2001). In line with this plan, states at their national levels were obliged to enact laws that aim to protect trafficked victims and establish regulatory frameworks that accord victims opportunity for recompense (ECOWAS, 2001).

Undergirding this plan was also the goal to raise awareness, gather, and cooperatively share national information on the processes and methods employed by traffickers, especially traffickers of women and children, as well as on the circumstances, nature, and financial dealings involved in the perpetuation of the trafficking crimes (Andrew and Lawrance, 2012). Reinforcing ECOWAS' legal response and focus against the trafficking of persons, is the WACAP initiative which promotes and facilitates mutual legal and judicial cooperation in combating organized crimes like human trafficking in the different ECOWAS member states (WACAP, 2013). Putting the anti-trafficking laws and policies to action, joint Interpol operations in the West African countries of Senegal, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania in 2017 resulted in the rescue of almost 500 people, of whom 236 were children (Reuters, 2017). This intervention also led to the apprehension of 40 traffickers accused of child abuse and victimization, forced labor, and violation of human rights (Reuters, 2017). While these strides are being made, bringing the perpetrators to full justice remains a challenge that cuts across all West African countries where the odious crimes of human trafficking are committed.

While most African countries now have proper laws in place, some do not enforce them, reporting no investigations or prosecutions. Considering the

anti-human trafficking measures at the individual country levels, the table below summarizes a few responses undertaken by governments and organizations of some six randomly selected West African States where the human trafficking rates are noticeable. Furthermore, Table 1 specifies some of the factors impeding the anti-trafficking responses being engaged by these bodies.

Table 1: Anti-trafficking measures and challenges by major West African source countries

West African Countries	Anti-human Trafficking Measures and Challenges to Response Efforts
Benin	In efforts to continually address the issue of human trafficking, especially of children, the government of Benin as noted by the United States (US) Department of State (2018) have engaged several measures, such as: ❒ Liaising with NGOs and international bodies to develop a formal inter-ministerial committee and a national action plan to counter trafficking and its ills. ❒ Implementing various strategies to tackle trafficking, such as a national action plan for forced child labour for the years 2019-2023 and national policy to combat human trafficking for the years 2019-2025, along with an action plan. ❒ Identifying and referring children who are vulnerable to all sorts of trafficking, of which over a thousand children susceptible to and likely to be trafficked were referred to provisional care services in 2018. ❒ Locating child victims, prosecuting, and convicting perpetrators of child trafficking, whereby thirteen child traffickers were prosecuted and convicted by six different Courts of First Instance in 2017. ❒ Strengthening relationship with neighbouring countries to coordinate actions that would deter the trafficking of adults to countries abroad. While the laws of the country criminalised child labour and sex trafficking of children, not so much was done to proscribe the trafficking of adults as per the 2018 report. In most instances, trails relating to adult trafficking cases back then were either suspended or concluded as mistrials due to flaws in the legal system (United States Department of State 2018). However, this changed in as Benin's new human trafficking law makes labour and sex trafficking in children and adults illegal (UNODC 2020). Cases of government officials involved in human trafficking are often not investigated, prosecuted, or convicted (US Department of State 2018).

Burkina Faso	The government of Burkina Faso and its Ministry of women's anti-trafficking efforts have been geared towards addressing trafficking in all its forms. Some of the efforts as reported by the US Department of State (2018; 2019) and UNODC (2020) comprise of: ❒ The identification of trafficked children forced into child labour as street beggars and small-scale mining labourers and employment of inspectors to rescue the trafficked children ❒ Referral, transfer, and provision of trafficked victims and survivours, most of whom are children with medical care, legal support, and safe shelter facilities. ❒ The adoption of human trafficking law that encompasses all aspects of human trafficking as described by the UN Protocol on Trafficking in Persons. ❒ The Ministry of Women heading the government's anti-trafficking ventures, embarked on awareness programmes to remove trafficked children from the streets. ❒ The government joining forces with religious leaders to condemn the trafficking of children as street beggars by their Quran instructors ❒ Criminalising sex and labour trafficking in the penal code with varying prison terms of five to twenty years and/or fines from one to ten million CFA francs depending on whether the offense for child or adult trafficking. Deterring some of the measures being taken is the fact that the government did not emplace a national action plan on human trafficking; corruption in the investigation, prosecution, and conviction of human traffickers especially those involving government officials (United States Department of State 2019). Similarly, the government's budgetary funding for care programs for trafficked victims and survivors was insufficient, and service providers lacked the resources and expertise to better support wellbeing, recovery, and reintegration of victims.
Ghana	Reports by the UNODC (2020) and The Borgen Project (2020) on anti-trafficking measure in Ghana indicate that: ❒ In 2017, the Ministry of Gender registered more than one hundred cases of human trafficking, while eighty-two cases were reported in 2018, and ❒ Individuals accused of human trafficking had been tried, resulting in the conviction of six men and five women in 2017, then four men and six women in 2018 (UNODC 2020). ❒ The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has several projects in different regions of Ghana that are aimed at educating and raising awareness in communities about the menaces of trafficking in persons and the laws emplaced; improving community relations and efforts towards the provision of proper care to vulnerable and trafficked victims; denouncing and preventing human trafficking; and ensuring traffickers are in fact prosecuted for their crimes; and ❒ In cooperation with local NGOs, the government of Ghana have been able to reduce the rate of human trafficking crimes (from 113 through the joint efforts of its trained law enforcement and immigration officials, as well as public (The Borgen Project 2020). Even with the efforts, there is still an increase in human trafficking for sex and labour domestically and internationally (The Borgen Project 2020) Other factors impeding measures to curb human trafficking are: interruptions and deferrals in investigating detected cases faced by law enforcement authorities due to limited financial resources; and shortage of proper recovery facilities which impact on efforts to rescue alleged trafficked victims (US Department of State 2019).

Mali	In efforts to address the problem of human trafficking in Mali, the government as noted by the US Department of State (2019) and Gunther (2021) has so far: ❒ Signed a number of treaties against slavery and human trafficking and approved a National Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Persons for the years 2018-2022. ❒ Classified human trafficking in terms of sex and labour exploitation as criminal offenses punishable by jail terms and fines ranging from two years and five hundred thousand CFA francs upward. ❒ With the assistance of its Ministry of Justice and other international bodies trained a wide range of law enforcement personnel (labour inspectors, judges, gendarmes, magistrates, police, etc.) across several region in Mali on how to identify trafficked victims, investigate trafficking cases, and prosecute offenders. ❒ Relied on NGOs to provide victims of human trafficking with adequate counselling, housing, and food, as well as reintegration and vocational training. Although attempts are being made to combat sex trafficking, a lack of resources to support anti-trafficking operations by law enforcement officers, as well as their inadequate training and expertise on how to deal with the crime, and the government's inability to prosecute its officials and militant groups that recruit children for child soldiering, continue to be obstacles to effective responses (US Department of State 2019).
Nigeria	The government of Nigeria together with local and international NGOs have taken steps towards addressing the heinous crime of human trafficking. For example: ❒ More than a thousand cases of human trafficking, including women and children, were registered by NAPTIP in 2018 (Semprebon 2020), and their recent interventions culminated in the release of twenty-one children who were being trafficked from Kaduna State in Nigeria to other parts of the country (NAPTIP 2021). ❒ Sex and labour trafficking is considered a criminal offense with prison term ranging from two years and 250000 Naira for fine upward (US Department of State 2020). ❒ With the support of NAPTIP and international sponsors, the government set up a 'Victims of Trafficking Trust Fund' and established nationwide guidelines for the referral, prevention, and assistance of trafficked victims (Human Rights Watch 2019). Through NAPTIP and in collaboration local and international NGO, the government has emplaced measure to ensure shelter facilities, counselling, vocational training, and health care services are provided for trafficked victims alongside reintegration assistance (Human Rights Watch 2019). The fact that government and military officials, and members of the Civilian Joint Task Force are seldom investigated or prosecuted for human trafficking, especially of children as child soldiers, poses a challenge to these responses. Also, not only does corruption in the law enforcement institutions slow down and impact prosecution and conviction processes, but judges appear to be unversed and inexperienced with the anti-trafficking statute provisions (US Department of State 2020). Insufficient resources in operationalising anti-trafficking measures as well as the gross mismanagement of shelters and aid services, in terms of lack of basic provisions and medical and psychosocial support to victims and survivors, makes them vulnerable to being trafficked again and challenges response efforts (Human Rights Watch 2019).

Findings from recent data and reports on the trends of the phenomenon of human trafficking and child labor, tend towards the fact that the efforts by the various West African nations and ECOWAS have not fully yielded the desired results (EASO, 2021; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021; UNODC, 2021; USDoS, 2021). For instance, despite

establishing legislation against trafficking in persons since 2003, Nigeria still ranks very low in countries with modern slavery index in the world (Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). Furthermore, recent reports and media coverage of the plights of young Nigerians stranded and subjected to torture in transit countries and destination countries in Europe have increased (EASO, 2021), thus questioning the ability and efficiency of NAPTIP in handling and eliminating these trafficking cases in the country. Aside from Nigeria, reports by the UNODC have also identified Ghana, Mali, and other West African countries as major trafficking in person sources and transiting countries (ILO, 2017; IOM, 2017; Mensah-Ankrah and Sarpong, 2017; UNODC, 2021), regional initiatives notwithstanding. While the adoption of various national strategies for addressing the menace is commendable, active results and roles of the ECOWAS in harnessing the national resources at its disposal to help reduce the very high numbers of trafficking in the sub-region, are still very much lacking.

Furthermore, the number of rescued victims of trafficking recorded by the WACAP in comparison with the number of trafficked victims, both within and beyond the sub-region, does not reflect efficiency or success in the endeavors. For instance, joint operations by the nations of Mali, Niger, Senegal, Chad, and Mauritania in 2017 were reported to have rescued a total of 500 victims of human trafficking while an annual report on the number of trafficked persons from the sub-region within the same year amounted to more than 4,799 victims (UNODC, 2021). These statistics do not reflect efficiency in tackling or discouraging human trafficking in the region. While national and regional efforts are necessary for tackling the menace of human trafficking in the region, the synergy and utility of the cooperation provided by the WACAP cannot be said to have been utilized to its full potential, as child labor and other forms of exploitation are still recorded in the sub-region. Sadly still, the West African region not only hosts the highest number of child laborers in sub-Saharan Africa but the region also records the highest number of trafficking in persons, illegal migrants, and modern slavery, with children, boys, girls, and women accounting for the majority of the victims in these various categories of menaces (ILO, 2012b, 2017; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021; UNODC, 2021).

While it could be argued that certain domestic and regional factors have worked against the successful implementation of the African Charter on Child and Women's Rights in the region, partnerships with the international community and organizations such as the European Union (EU) would have at least set the region on the path of success in the area of eradicating child labor. At the present however, issues of law enforcement corruption, border porosity, and the lack of tools and equipment to enforce and prosecute the various legislations on human trafficking are still grappled with across the sub-region (Aniche and Moyo, 2019; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). Furthermore, the regional body and framework for enforcing the measures designed for the elimination of human trafficking and enhancing child rights in the region, WACAP, is still largely ill-equipped and unable to keep up with the

growing cases of trafficking in persons in the region, especially the victims of sexual exploitation. As Obokata (2019) asserts, the regional and national governments in the West African region seem to be more concerned with initiating legal frameworks than implementing and enforcing these frameworks. This is because, as Aniche and Moyo (2019) recognize, while acts and legislations exist, the institutional capacity for enforcing these legislations is lacking in countries in the region.

While it is recognized that the fight against human trafficking takes on many forms, the national and regional strategies tend to be more focused on legal proceedings against perpetrators than actually preventing the menace (Sawadogo, 2012). According to Britton and Dean (2014), international responses and efforts tend toward prioritizing preventive measures and support for trafficked victims and survivors rather than reactive measures. There is no doubt that West African states are sincere in their efforts to address and combat the menace of trafficking in persons especially with the bad press that accompanies it, and this dedication is evident in the national strategies and signatories to national and international human rights and anti-trafficking conventions (Mensah-Ankrah and Sarpong, 2017; Aniche and Moyo, 2019; Mlambo and Ndebele, 2021). An assessment of the strategies and efforts of the regional and national strategies however, reveals operational and strategic loopholes. These responses are majorly reactive and not preventive. Reactive strategies primarily respond to the activity after trafficking of victims have been done and this is evident in the fact that victims are either discovered in their destination countries and measures are put in place to return them to their homes or are stranded on the journeys after being discovered by international interventions (Sawadogo, 2012; Shelly, 2014; Deane, 2017). The problem with this strategy, however, is that victims may already have been subjected to the different trafficking hazards before they are rescued (ILO, 2012a, 2012b, 2017; IOM, 2017; UNODC, 2021). On the other hand, preventive measures – which are currently not adequately engaged by the WACAP and nations in the West African sub-region – make trafficking impossible and preventable. These include addressing socio-economic and socio-political issues of West Africans, addressing insecurity, and focusing on rural orientation strategies aimed at enlightening people on the phenomenon and dangers of human trafficking. Current evidence, however, suggests that these preventive strategies are hardly engaged across communities and towns in the sub-region, as is evident in the continual gullibility of rural parents and young persons (UNODC, 2021; USDoS, 2021).

It is important therefore, for states within the West African sub-region to not only focus on the various national strategies that react to human trafficking but ensure the implementation of legislations and strategies that protect the rights of women and children ¬– particularly girls – in the sub-continent (ECOWAS, 2008; Aniche and Moyo, 2019). Until these fundamental structures are inculcated in the cultural and traditional practices of West Africans and Africans at large, the approaches to combating the menace of human trafficking in the region would be merely reactive with little success. Building institutional capacities for addressing

these issues is also central to the strategic preventive measures that will put the sub-region in the position to adequately address the human trafficking and child labor issues bedeviling it.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Trafficking in persons disrespects human rights and constitutes a crime against humanity. In West Africa, the use of multiple routes for human trafficking, compounded by the involvement of government officials in the different trafficking networks, exacerbates the crime, especially as society looks to them for solutions. In addressing the crisis of human trafficking, therefore, most West African countries have enacted anti-trafficking national action plans and policies, thus raising awareness on how to fight the crime and its impact on society. Additionally, anti-trafficking legislations in some of the West African states encompass all forms of trafficking identified in the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol. However, effective implementation remains an issue which is further worsened by the corruption that clouds investigations and prosecutions, as well as the previously described challenges. Likewise, the national plans as well as other strategies adopted by governments and organizations, have, in most instances, also fallen short of addressing the different dimensions of human trafficking. Noticeably, these challenges persist despite demands for domestic legislation in compliance with the UNCRC and the ILO Convention (No. 182) and Recommendation (No. 190) on 'the Worst Forms of Child Labor' to ensure adequate prosecution, trial, and punishment of traffickers (Andrew and Lawrance 2012). This study stresses that long-term solutions to human trafficking are an imperative, hence the recommendations below. To this end, this study recommends that:

a) The effective domestication of international treaties as well as coordination in the implementation of national policies, would, among other measures, address the underlying problem of human trafficking in West Africa. Enacting domestic legislation to prioritize and lend support to the rights of citizens not to be trafficked, the government's duty to uphold the law, and protect its citizens from all forms of harm and violation of their human rights, will be needed to localize international laws. Since these are realized through the creation of national plans, promoting consensus for their effective implementation demands that all relevant stakeholders be consulted to enable them to recognize the value of the policies and their operational frameworks. Coordination in the enforcement of these laws and policies will also imply delegating various duties to relevant law enforcement divisions or units, supplemented by adequate training in anti-trafficking operative measures. Doing this will provide and enable governments to build capacity and respond to trafficking cases more effectively.

b) Governments in collaboration with NGOs need to develop and implement robust and supportive outreach, early warning, and awareness programs

for communities that are susceptible to and at risk of human trafficking. Having such community projects may propel communities to create support networks that look out for everyone in the community, as well as provide the platform for empowerment, involvement, and confidence-building to report suspicious activities of human trafficking.

c) Coordinated and joint efforts by border guards of member states at reinforcing border security and control will also make a difference in monitoring, preventing, and limiting the movement of people across the borders.

d) Government should also perform its basic duties in the border communities by providing basic amenities needed for daily survival, which many of the communities lack.

e) Government and various stakeholders like the NGOs should synergize with the traditional institutions in those communities. This would go a long way in knowing the plight of the people, and also help to expose and identify various trafficking syndicates that infiltrate those communities to source for children and use those routes for their nefarious activities.

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