The Power of Logo: The Implication of the Chinese Revolution on Pan-Africanism

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Introduction: China and Africa

In the 1840s, the Sino-British Opium Wars ended with China's defeat. The Treaty of Nanjing forced China to pay a huge indemnity to Britain for the cost of war and imposed on China a tariff on all imported goods. Since then, the Chinese civilisation was greatly contested and challenged when the well-equilibrated Chinese feudal system gradually collapsed. Unlike the downfall of previous dynasties, which did not inflict any obvious damage on the Chinese way of life and the identity of Chinese culture, the decline of the Manchu Dynasty had the whole civilisation face collapse. The causes of the decline were both multiple and complex. There were certainly a number of domestic socioeconomic factors as well as external forces which contributed to this state of affairs.

The consequences of the Opium War for China were very damaging: traditional tributaries were taken away; concessions to foreign privileges were made; the authority of the emperor, upon which the Chinese order was based, was ended; the hand-labour-based industries on which the Chinese economy depended were destroyed; and the favorable balance of trade, which existed until 1830 and which had brought an uninterrupted flow of silver from the outside, became lopsided (Kapur, 1987:2). China became indeed an international colony. The traditional social structure was finally broken down. China's customs and post offices were largely controlled by Westerners; Western ships were permitted to navigate freely in its waters, and even to demolish some of its coastal defenses; many Western troops were stationed at a number of points on a permanent basis; pieces of territory in various parts of the country were taken over as concessions. China was thus divided by Western powers into "spheres of interest" and was "carved up like a melon." This situation was very similar to what colonialism had once imposed on Africa.

Since the beginning of the 20th century, never before in history had Chinese society been so radically transformed in so short time. China underwent more thoroughgoing and dramatic changes than any other country in the world. Its state and society transformed from an imperial monarchy to a short-lived republic, from a weak and decentralised warlord authoritarianism to a centralised revolutionary

socialist state; economically it went from a state-led industrialisation based on planned economy and socialist egalitarianism to an all-round structural reform based on market mechanisms; the economy underwent repeated shift from crisis and failure to very rapid growth and modernisation; politically the Chinese society and people experienced imperialism and warlordism as well as dictatorship and class struggle; ideologically the Chinese value systems underwent transformations from feudalism to socialism and from collectivism to individualism. For more than a century, generations of Chinese revolutionaries have been striving to find answers to the dazzling puzzles: war and peace, national liberation and independence, development of productive forces and human capacities, self-reliance and equality.

The search to ensure their existence as a prosperous strong nation and political entity has been a key concern in China's modern history. Seeking a way for the transformation and revival of the Chinese nation, Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party eventually found elements of an answer in Marxist philosophy and revolutionary worldview to deal with the scope of the challenge and the pressures from internal and external forces. Depending on how one assesses its successes and failures, China was characterised as a historically unique experiment to skip over the stage of capitalism and to bring about a socialist transformation of both the social structure and the consciousness of the people (Li, 1998).

Today, China is struggling to probe its own way to find an industrialisation path to develop the nation into a prosperous great power while adjusting Chinese society strategically and practically to the existing capitalist world. A difficult task facing the Chinese people is how to promote wealth-creating aspects of the market economy while restraining its socially polarising tendencies as well as its ecological destruction (Li, 1999).

If we take the case of continental Africa, we notice that for the past century the so-called "development in Africa" has already been an global issue — Africa and Africans have not so far "developed". Contemporary Africa is beset with difficulties rooted in its inability to unite territorially, politically and economically. The consequences have been national economies incapable of developing because of geographical, economic and political reasons. On the other hand, Africa has been constantly beset with underdevelopment, poverty, endless border wars, economic domination and the dictatorship of the IMF and the World Bank.

Today, the continent is the most oppressed and exploited, the most marginal and debt-ridden, the most impoverished and war-worn, and the most corrupted and diseased in the world. Despite its abundant resources not only is Africa considered to be the least industrialised of all the developing regions, but also has it more than half of the world's economic and war refugees. The African socio-political landscape has been widely described or perceived to be one full of political oppression, human rights abuses, continuous ethnic, racial, regional and religious conflicts, endless military coups, and high illiteracy. After all, it is doomed to be a "hopeless continent" (*The Economist*, 13 May 2000). As one scholar describes:

The fact is that over the decades that Africa became independent, none of its languages, literatures, institutions, religions and systems of thought have had any impact on the social, political, economic and technological experience imposed on the continent. Islam and Christianity are recognised as religions

in all constitutions, but no African religion gets that place since anthropologists have long since reduced African religion to folklore. (Alvares, 1995:5-6)

The continent's economic situation is claimed to be the worst in the whole world. The $300 billion which African countries owe to foreign creditors represents a serious burden which fundamentally hampers progress in every sector. Africa's debt burdens, says Jesse Jackson, "are the new economy's chains of slavery" (*Los Angeles Times*, 29 September 1998). But 33 of the 41 countries identified by the World Bank as "Heavily Indebted Poor Countries" in sub-Saharan Africa spend more on debt repayments than on health care and education combined. Sub-Saharan African governments owe foreign creditors an average of almost $400 for every man, woman and child on a continent where the average annual wage for most countries is less than $400 per person. Africa carries 11% of the developing world's debt, with only 5% of the developing world's income.

In terms of social well-being, over half of Africa's population is without safe drinking water and two-thirds lack access to adequate sanitation. Africa, with about 12% of the world's population, accounts for 80% of the world's deaths due to AIDS and almost 90% of the world's deaths due to malaria.

Pan-Africanism

Historically, one of the strongest social and intellectual movements to resolve Africa's dilemma and bring new hopes to its people is the Pan-African movement. It became a positive force after two conventions in London and America in the early 1900s with great inspirations from Jamaican Marcus Garvey. In the 1950s, the movement was dominated by Jomo Kenyatta and Kwame Nkrumah, and the "father of Pan-Africanism",

W. E. B. Du Bois. In 1963 in Addis Ababa 32 independent African nations founded the Organisation of African Unity, by which time Pan-Africanism had moved from being an ideal into practical politics.

Philosophically and theoretically, Pan-Africanism is based on the belief that African people share common bonds and objectives and this commonality advocates unity to achieve these objectives. Politically, Pan-Africanism is:

the construction of a Pan-African identity through the development of a shared goal and social and historical experience of struggling to lift up Africa from its untenable status as a marginal, oppressed and largely written-off continent.... It is a process which comes by a sustained fostering of communication, conversation, deliberation, dialogue, coordination, cooperation and solidarity amongst the population in Africa as equal and different African citizens based on a sustained development of a shared African identity, conscious and interest irrespective of color, creed, racial origin, nationality, region and so on. (Mammo, 2000:1)

Still today, Pan-Africanism represents a strong political will to undertake transformative changes in the African continent. It implies the essential elements of a social-political revolution aiming to bring about fundamental changes to all spheres of the continent. Recently, some scholars even proposed an African defence and security system, which adds a new dimension to Pan-African integration (Mammo 2001).

Pan-Africanism has been conceived in varying ways. Given the common assumption that life began on the African continent, it has been applied to all black African people and people of black African descent; to all people on the

African continent, including non-black people or to all states on the African continent. As one scholar put it, "The acceptance of a oneness of all African people and a commitment for the betterment of all people of African descent" (Kodjoe, 1986: 368).

These broad concepts of Pan-Africanism contain strong political connotations on the basis that "African people all over the world could exert sufficient political clout toward liberation from slavery in the Americas and from colonialism on the African continent" (Fosu, 1999:7-8). It is the belief that "all people of African descent have common interests and should work together to conquer prejudice and oppression worldwide" (Sharp, 2000: 33). Pan-Africanism has been used as a general term for various movements in Africa that have their common goal in the unity of Africans and in the elimination of colonialism and white supremacy from the continent.

However, on the concrete scope and meaning of Pan-Africanism, especially regarding such matters as leadership, political orientation, and national as opposed to regional interests, they are widely, often bitterly, divided. Is Pan-Africanism purely a wishful ideal or is it a realisable project? Are there any lessons in the world history of social transformations from which Pan-Africanism can draw some inspiration and strength?

Objectives
The overall objective of this paper is to establish a theoretical discourse relevance between the way Marxism, Mao Zedong's Thought, and the Chinese Revolution emerged, developed, and succeeded and the ongoing struggle of the Pan-African movement. It emphasises the role of consciousness (politics, goals, desires, skills, knowledge) and ideological conviction as an approach to understanding the Pan-African

movement as a "continental political project". In other words, it intends to argue that political discourses and the ideological or conscious elements in social-political life can be the driving force for societal transformations and for a specific socio-political project. It is not intended to provide the answers, rather, it aims at constructing a framework of understanding Pan-Africanism and the complexities of such a movement on the basis of historical novel forms of political, social and ideological relations.

Methodological considerations
This contribution attempts to take a novel approach to the study of discourse and its power effect on the macro-context of social, political and cultural structure. It offers an empirically and historically applicable framework of concepts and methods to analyse its applicability to the new Pan-African social-political movement, to the politics of Pan-African identity as well as to ideologies and social imaginaries that structure Pan-Africanism.

The method is an open-end discussion on the Pan-African movement based on the framework of discourse analysis. According to Alexander:

(discourse) refers to modes of argument that are more consistently generalized and speculative than normal scientific discussion. ... Discourse, by contrast, is ratiocinative. It focuses on the process of reasoning rather than the results of immediate experience, and it becomes significant where there is no plain and evident truth. Discourse seeks persuasion through argument rather than prediction. Its persuasiveness is based on such qualities as logical coherence, expansiveness of scope, interpretive insight, value relevance, rhetorical force, beauty, and texture of argument. (Alexander, 1988: 80)

Discourse is often expressed in the form of theories. And theories are constructed to generate assumptions entailing empirical facts so as to legitimise and generalise discourses. Discourse theories intend to offer a particular type of explanations that are constructed to generate assumptions to legitimise certain political and ideological ideas and conceptualisations. Discourse theories are often established at both epistemological and ontological levels.

Discourse is related to the study of important concepts such as argument, identity, relation/relationship, conflict, power, dominance and inequality, the role of the state or state institutions, and the processes of societal, cultural and ideological reconstruction or reproduction. Discourse represents both knowledge and power.

Knowledge and power

Francis Bacon's "knowledge is power" is known to most people. However, the reverse principle, "power is knowledge", is equally true but less well known. Yes, knowledge does produce power. For centuries the Western world has apparently been both a powerful producer of ideas and knowledge and a dominant enforcer and promoter of a vast corpus of knowledge about nature, human beings, societies, the rest of the world as well as itself. Less discussed is the fact that power, whether physical and non-physical, decides and defines knowledge.

Power can decide whether a certain system of knowledge is universal, scientific, creative, economic, rational, or whether it is primitive, local, irrational and backward. Over the last several centuries, knowledge, based on assumptions or empiricism, has become so imposing and de-culturalised that the West has dominated the power to decide and define everything. Not only modern Western sciences but also all its social sciences and humanities are so universalised that they become non-deniable and non-negotiable beyond any culture, creed, class and colour. It is commonly accepted that the driving force of motivation promoting continued progress of human beings is to be found in the self-propelled, inherent dynamism of the West. One of the West's key universalised explanation systems to make sense of the real world and life is economic rationality (the econocentric approach), with theological principles seen as guidelines for human behaviour and societal development.

Discourse theories: Econocentrism and Logocentricism[1]

Econocentrism

In its specific form, econocentrism refers to a belief that the economic mode of production absolutely determines a society's social, political and intellectual life. It sees the primacy of economics as a point of departure in the production and reproduction of social life due to human "rationality". In other words, it is an ideology that views economics as the key factor that determines the course of human history.

Today, the econocentric world view dominates every part of our everyday life. All theories of rational choice — major theories in politics, sociology, international political economy, international relations, development studies — are constructed based on the premises of economic analysis or within the framework of economic thinking as their primary paradigm of interpretation (Li, 2001). Most concepts which we deal with daily, such as "culture", "ideology", "nationalism", "democracy" etc., are used to serve either as residuals or supplements to econocentric models. It is generally accepted that economic structure determines all aspects of human activities and social relations, and that

economic dominance leads to political and ideological leadership.

The central concern of the econocentric model is methodological individualism in which politics is perceived as a process that "objectifies private and individual wants and desires in the form of social needs and priorities according to distributive schedules and alternative possibilities" (Apter and Saich, 1994). It can only survive in the environment of private property, individual profit-searching, innovation and entrepreneurship. The understanding of power under the econocentric systems of explanation (discourses) is associated with rationality — bargaining and compromising forms of politics in which interests prevail over principles and negotiations over confrontations.

Thus, it is obvious that Pan-Africanism can never be constructed under the norms and values of econocentrism. It will only bind Africa to the existing capitalism world system defined and run by imperial powers and institutions like the WTO, the World Bank and IMF. It also ties Africa to certain types of social relations and political systems promoting civil society and liberal democracy, which in return award an effective way for US-led Western powers to promote polyarchy in the Third World in order to complement neoliberal economic restructuring and facilitate the US global hegemonic role (Robinson, 1996).

Logocentrism
The word *logo* originated from the Greek language, meaning "word" and "speech". In its general form, *logo* is short for *logogram* and *logotype*, which refers to "a name, symbol, or trademark designed for easy and definite recognition...."[2]

Logocentrism, philosophically, is a concept used in critical theory aiming to designate the way thought systems are organised around fundamental assumptions about reality and truth. It is a key term in the thinking of Jacques Derrida (1983, 1974, 1978) and the deconstruction theory. It argues that language in terms of explanations and interpretations is composed of elements which combine with each other to produce linguistic signs which are accorded meaning (logos and symbols). Since language and texts are always tied to experience, the use of language contains perception, conceptualisation, power and position.

Logocentrism implies a process of deconstruction and reconstruction and its final aim is to reconstruct a world view, a new interpretation of the truth and reality in order to find alternative possibilities. It is a strategy applied to writing generally and to literature in particular, whereby systems of thought and concepts are dismantled in such a way as to expose the divisions which lie at the heart of meaning itself.

Politically, logocentrism can be applied to display an alternative view of the world where the search for other perspectives, for what is present, for what can be brought to light, for what can be signified, for the narrative structure of new explanations. Narratives can become the new totalising logos, which, in return, gathers multiple narratives for practical purposes.

Hence, political power may be generated through *logo* (language and symbol), i.e. through both power *behind* discourse and power *in* discourse. It is concerned less with available choices, but with *projections* on the basis of some convincing definition of necessity that specifies its own rules and theoretical principles and its own logic (Apter

and Saich, 1994). Its central goal is to reestablish social order based on a redefined and projected equity. It looks into the conscious part of human beings and emphasises learning and education as the key to power, and knowledge and wisdom as a form of truth. Power is identified with logos (discourses), with proto-religious characteristics intertwined in a secular theory of politics (Apter and Saich, 1994).

The logocentric strength of such an emphasis on political discourse and symbolic capital is that it can unleash potential energy to create a political community under conditions of virtual chaos and disintegration. The construction of alternative discourses can transcend randomness and create a logic of order so that the condition of disorder itself becomes the condition of transition and even transformation. The logocentric discourse approach cultivates a common interpretation of shared history and experiences. It offers people the idea of liberation and transformation in order to think a way out of their current predicaments, no matter how hopeless these seem to be. By reinterpretation it attempts to resolve the contradictions of historical legacy in their own favour in order to pave the way for great economic, social and cultural transformations

Logocentricism and the Chinese Revolution
The Chinese logocentricism explains the way Maoism and the Chinese Revolution emerged, developed and succeeded. The dynamic strength of logocentricism in the context of the Chinese revolution lies in its effort to generate power through an *inversionary discourse* (inversing the econocentric discourse and social order) based on its own language of conviction, together with ideological, ethnic, linguistic strands. The Chinese logocentricism can be analysed as follows:

1) *To change people's world view through reinterpretation of history and narrative reconstruction of reality in order to think one's way out of current predicaments.*

The Maoist Marxism related China's underdevelopment to the outcome of a historical process caused by the Western colonial-imperialist expansion rather than to the "stage of development" by the modernisation school or to the consequences of a specific mode of production caused by cultural barriers.[3] In the light of this view, underdevelopment is not an inborn characteristic of pre-industrial societies but a consequence of a specific historical process. It argues that even though imperialist penetration did bring elements of modern economy to China, the impact was geographically confined and sectorally skewed to serve foreign interest (Esherick as quoted in White, 1982:114).

After numerous failures in resisting Western imperialist challenges since the Sino-British Opium War in the 1840s, Confucianism as a state ideology and as ethical and political traditions obviously proved to have lost its viability during a time when China urgently needed a new analytical framework. Marxism and especially Lenin's theory of capitalist imperialism provided Chinese intellectuals with a partial theoretical framework as well as a psychological answer to their difficulties in finding the proper explanations and theories for the failures of traditional Chinese culture and for the humiliation suffered at the hands of the West (Peck, 1975: 73).

At the time when Confucianism failed to function as a state ideology, Marxism-Leninism made the Chinese intellectuals

more open-minded and internationally-oriented in conceptualising and analysing the world from different perspectives. China, as they saw, was no longer an isolated center of the globe surrounded by barbarians, but a part of the world full of different forces and ideas. The Chinese view on its role in international affairs had changed from regarding China as the center of the world and universal authority to seeing its problems as part of the world's problems and the Chinese revolution as relevant to the outside world. The attraction of Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese was that, as Kapur observed:

It was an effective ploy to criticize the West from a Western point of view; b) it gave the Chinese a new methodological framework to understand their own past and foresee the contours of their future; c) it offered a conceptualized view of international reality. Lastly, it amply proved its anti-imperialist credentials-an important source of attraction-after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution when the Soviet leaders denounced imperialism, unilaterally abolishing unequal treaties and relinquishing many privileges of tsarist Russia including extraterritoriality as well as their share of Boxer indemnities. (1987:3)

2) *To unite people based on collective individualism and a social, political and economic divide.*
    It persuaded people to associate their private narratives and personal interpretations to the collectivity. It called for individual contribution but emphasised collective consequences. Such a strategy was to analyse society

through the lens of a politic-economic and sociocultural *divide* (class divisions), which perceives human morality and consciousness in close relation to the superstructure of society. In a society in which people (human beings) are divided into different classes, all men possess certain class interests and relations. All realms relating to human beings, such as value, rights, dignity, liberty, freedom, love and hatred, humanity and inhumanity, etc., can only be correctly understood and explained through concrete historical and class analysis (Chen, 1984: 41-44). It persuades people to think in this way that all political conflicts can be interpreted in terms of this *divide*. Its power is established when the majority of members of all social strata interpret politics and participate struggle in terms of this divide.

The failure of Sun Yat-sen's Republic Revolution and the destruction of the First World War together with Japanese imperialist intention destroyed Chinese admiration for the West and Japan. So, if both Western constitutional monarchy and republicanism, as well as Japanese militarist culture could not be imitated as alternatives to save China, then what else could be an option? Early Chinese Marxists Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu argued that with or without a strong state the establishment of Chinese capitalism would eventually become the agent of Western capitalism and would not solve China's poverty and backwardness. The most forceful and comprehensive argument was put forward by Li:

.... although China itself has not yet undergone a process of capitalist economic development such as occurred in Europe, America, and Japan, the

common people (of China) still indirectly suffer from capitalist economic oppression in a way that is even more bitter than the direct capitalist oppression suffered by the working class of the various (capitalist) nations....

If we look again at the international position of China today, (we see) that other nations have already passed from free competition to the necessary socialist-cooperative position, while we are still juveniles; others have walked a thousand li, while we are still taking the first step... I fear that we will be unable to succeed unless we take double steps and unite into a socially cooperative organization. Therefore, if we want to develop industry in China, we must organize a government made up purely of producers in order to eliminate the exploiting classes within the country, to resist world capitalism, and to follow (the path of) industrialization organized upon a socialist basis. (Li as quoted in Kung, 1975: 259)

Li's argument identified China as a "proletarian nation" although it lacked a strong proletarian working class. He associated the potential of a Chinese proletarian revolution with the worldwide proletarian movement against international capitalism and imperialism. His far-reaching and insightful analytical worldview paved the way for the establishment of a populist tradition within the Chinese Communist Party, which was further developed by his disciple, Mao Zedong.

Armed with an inversionary discourse based on the conceptual power of class divisions, the Chinese Communist Party transformed the Chinese people from being "a piece of blank paper"[4] to become ideologically and politically conscious. Being a member of this inversionary revolution, one feels oneself becoming a member of decision-makers, an activist of social transformation, a master of his/her own fate, rather than an unconscious wanderer and a passive victim.

3) *To project a future based on structural transformations rather than evolutionary modifications.*
   The immediate context of logocentrism is *conflict* and *chaos*, *war* and *revolution* (not reformism or evolutionism). It rejects what the current *reality* or *truth* is, and it intends to project what is to be realised. It attempts to constitute a new hegemonic project — a *moral* economy, not a political economy — which is inversionary in object and transformational in consequence.

Some scholars argued that even though imperialist penetration did bring elements of modern economy to China, the impact was geographically confined and sectorally skewed to serve foreign interests (Esherick as quoted in White, 1982: 114). The reason why China was able to industrialise more rapidly after 1949 was because the "Communist revolution decisively broke the ties that chained China to the imperialist system" (Mould as quoted in White, 1982:114). In other words, China went straight to the roots of its historical problems and made thorough structural transformations — unique experiments to skip over the stage of capitalism and to bring about a socialist transformation in terms of both society and consciousness of the people.

For almost a half century many Chinese truly felt China to be at a disadvantage

and some of them even were ready to admit its culture to be inferior to that of the West. But with the rise of Chinese Communism, with its logocentric mobilisation together with armed struggle, this view was changed. Many later believed that the Communist party represented the progressive side of contemporary human society. Although it was a fact that not all Chinese supported the Communist party (some were even strongly anti-Communist), they could not avoid being gratified by the achievements the Chinese Communist Party had made, and that China once again started to wield an undeniable influence in world affairs, which it had not enjoyed for many, many years. Some Chinese might wish that such a result had not come about under Communist leadership, but whatever they might prefer they could not but admire the result.

4) *To continue the logocentric tradition and bring "uninterrupted revolution" into postwar development.*
   After the communist victory in 1949 and with the successful development of the socialist economy and transformation in the early 1950s, few people in the communist leadership thought of a continuous revolution through a prolonged period of contention and struggle. Revolution was mainly regarded as the act of seizing power, whereas the building of a new economy and society would require a different method. But the next three decades was to see the continuation of the Chinese revolution through a progression of several mass movements, such as the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s, and the Anti-rightist Movement and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. Mao's theory of uninterrupted revolution was practiced in these experiences and it maintained that even under socialist development the revolution must continue. Among those experiments, the Cultural Revolution was perhaps the most dramatic example of a nation in search of a development strategy that would avoid the shackles of the "old", resolve continuous contradictions and pursue an independent self-reliance development.

The meaning of "uninterrupted revolution" should be understood as referring to the preservation of some important logocentric continuities in Mao's thoughts and practices, as Selden summarises:

They include the fierce commitment to eliminate exploitation and property-based inequality; the emphasis on political mobilization, class struggle, and political and ideological transformation and their relationship to economic development; the proclivity to replace the market and the household economy by large cooperative, collective, and state institution; and the emphasis on self-reliance and the suspicion of intellectuals and technical personnel. (Selden, 1989: 54-55)

In order to fully utilise human beings as a decisive factor in the socialist development strategy Mao found it important to establish a world view in which one thinks of the part in the context of the whole. It aimed at broadening the concept of the "whole", which had been narrowed to imply loyalty to one's family, village, clan, to the consciousness of the class, the nation and beyond. The goal was to form in society a *Gong*-oriented (collective, public and broadened) outlook in contrast to the *Si*-oriented one (selfish, individual and narrow). Mao firmly believed that only collective socialism could save China and

build a strong nation, and in order to adopt such a world view one needed an uncompromisingly ethical and moralistic revolution. He very often referred to the Cultural Revolution as a movement to establish the moral foundation of socialism — collectivity, which was advocated not only in terms of public ownership as a socialist ideology but also in terms of devotion and unselfishness in the behavioral sense. *Gong* implied that socialist economic development was a process based on collective effort rather than based on *Si*, individualistic self-oriented motivation. Hence, one of his purposes in launching the Cultural Revolution was aimed at eliminating the consciousness and motivation of the old semi-capitalist society and establishing a just socialist consciousness and motivation in conformity with the new socialist economic base. It was an attempt to substitute egotistical motives (*Si*) with moral impulses (*Gong*) as incentives to increase production and development. The wage policy attempting to bridge income differences at that time reflected such incentives. In urban industries, wage differences were under control and encouraged to reduce, whereas in the people's communes, income through allotting working points was based not only on the individual physical contribution to production, but also on the level of his/her political consciousness and socialist devotion.

Implications for Pan-Africanism: the need for logocentrism

The above discussion of the Chinese Revolution is aimed not at applying the same process to various global and regional Pan-African movements. Rather, it attempts to inquire whether some of its logocentric powers can be generated in the Pan-African movements. If Pan-Africanism is to be seen as, first of all, a transformative political project, the most important element, as shown

by the success of the Chinese Revolution, is how to dismantle the structural and ideological "hegemony" in the domestic and international system and especially to overcome the dominant discourses of contemporary mythology. The effectiveness of the Chinese Revolution was its devotion to inventing a nationwide logo — common concepts, metaphors, ideologies, narratives and myths.

For Pan-Africanism to achieve a similar objective, the construction of an overriding identity of a united and emancipated Africa is the first step in such an ambitious hegemonic project. For example, a logocentric Pan-Africanism can be generated under the common glorious history of the most ancient civilisation in the world as well as the collective historical and social experiences as an oppressed people since 1500. The success of the Pan-African movement depends not only on strategic methods but also on the unity of a broad ontology.

A shared logo

Pan-African logocentrism can conceptually be identified as a project of constructing shared logos. First, a shared logo refers to a unified "African" metaphysics without which it is not possible to achieve a united front and to sustain the spirit of solidarity. It also refers to a common narrative which covers everyone who shares the African continent including those whose ancestors had left the continent in the enforced exile of the slave trade. As one scholar rightly points out:

A shared African value and vision worthy enough to shape, mediate and put in place effective mechanisms for resolving intractable conflicts and stimulate and inspire the capabilities of citizens and communities is necessary in order to achieve harmony

consistent with a shared conception of an African identity. (Mammo, 2001: 30)

There will continue to be ideological and intellectual crises in the African world until Africans understand Pan-Africanism, its value and benefits, and apply it to their many problems. The flaws of the econocentric and polyarchic approaches to Pan-Africanism is to pluralise and individualise the understanding of Africa and its problems.

A shared history

A shared logo means the common colonial history: the disruption of natural processes of nation-state and class formation; the deformation, distortion, and disarticulation of the native African ethnical and social formations; the imposition of capitalist social relations — production and accumulation patterns; the imposition of alien tastes and values; and the incorporation of Africa into a metropolitan dominated and controlled global capitalist order. These experiences require an ideological response and political will to challenge the established econocentric discourse on the development of underdevelopment of Africa. This is where the African independence movement was betrayed: the failure to fundamentally challenge imperialism, and reconstruct an African logo — the socio-political and economic landscape to reflect popular realities and aspirations, and this is where the Chinese Revolution fundamentally succeeded. Political decolonisation did not automatically include the decolonisation of cultural and ideological domination and did not unconsciously generate Africa's own logo of identity — a fundamental basis for real self-determination.

The historical relationship between Africa and the rest of the world especially the West is very unequal: people from Africa going to the rest of the world are slaves, conscripts, maids, servants, attendants, soldiers, cheap labourers, refugees, students, skilled Africans fueling the brain drain, some as migrants in search of new opportunities.

Figure: The historical relationship between Africa and the world (especially the Western world)

The rest of world's people coming to Africa are "explorers", missionaries, slave traders and raiders, imperial "civilisers", aid workers, humanitarian relief workers, investors, project contractors, consultants, settlers, tourists etc. It is important for all Africans to remember that this historical narrative is a *common* rather than an individual legacy.

The above shared historical heritage can be a valuable source for the promotion of Pan-Africanism. A "cultural Africa" and a "continental Africa"[5] can be logos for broad identity and unity. As Mammo sharply points out,

The *key to a theory of Pan-Africanism is to forge a shared value and vision worthy enough to shape, mediate and put in place effective mechanisms for resolving intractable conflicts and stimulate and inspire the capabilities of citizens and communities in order to achieve harmony consistent with a shared conception of an African identity. A shared conception of an African identity should be a universal value which is not*

detained by partial interests, cultural particularisms, state-nationisms, ethnic primordial loyalties, racial classifications and other desultory practices, capable of commanding moral and political authority, much like Christ, Mohammed and Buddha commanded religious authority. (Mammo, 2000:23)

In the context of modern China, the Chinese logo embedded in the century-long experiences of humiliation brought by Western imperialism has been one of the key elements which have kept China from disintegration. Today, Hong Kong and Macao have been handed over to China, and despite the unwillingness of the Taiwan regime to reunite with Mainland China, it feels powerless to revoke the "one China" concept, that is the "Chinese nation" and "cultural China".

Conclusion

The reason why China was able to industrialise more rapidly and to become a global power after 1949 was that the Communist revolution "decisively broke the ties that chained China to the imperialist system" (Mould in White, 1982: 114) and also broke a variety of complicated domestic confinements, such as localism, provincialism and warlordism. A new and efficient take-off could only be realised by cutting the roots of these social diseases and re-establishing an independent social, political, economic and cultural foundation.

Many people tried to study the history of the Chinese Revolution in a non-logocentric approach, but they all ended up with a dilemma. As Dirlik describes it, "students of Chinese Communism in the West, the majority of whom do not share a similar conviction in Marxism's truths, have nevertheless found in China's circumstances variegated reasons for radicals' attraction to Marxism and consequently turning to Communist politics, as the only means to resolve the problems of Chinese society" (Dirlik, 1989: 255). Therefore, to understand the transformation of China one has to understand the nature of the Chinese communist revolution and its entire discourse.

Seen from some lessons of the Chinese Revolution, it is argued here that in order to transform the idea of Pan-Africanism into a reality, a second wave of decolonisation is a must. In first wave of decolonisation, most African states stood up and achieved political independence. However, the very questions can be addressed directly to challenge the fundamental nature of "African states": are African states African? Are African states states? These questions imply that Africa has not fully achieved real "independence". It needs further decolonisation in order to build such a hegemonic project that represents a real independent Africa.

Gramsci's "war of position"[1] is believed to be a decisive strategy to the success of Pan-Africanism. Although Africa consists of vast differences in culture, language, religion and race, and despite the fact that race, nation and metaphysics do not necessarily enforce an identity, Africa can still choose, on the basis of historical experiences, and political and economic realities, what is important for Africans both now and in the future. The triumph of Pan-Africanism, the only way Africans can survive the foreign onslaught and live as a truly liberated people, will come out of the sweat and blood of the African people themselves.

NOTES

1. See Apter and Saich (1994).
2. Source: *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language,* Third Edition.
3. Friedrich Hegel, in comparing it with Western consciousness of the world which created revolutionary history, placed China in the "childhood" of history. Even Karl Marx, whose theories and insights inspired the Chinese Revolution, described China as a society "vegetating in the teeth of time", and discovered in the Great Wall of China a metaphor for the universal resistance of non-European societies to change. See Dirlik and Meisner (1989:17).
4. Max Weber also considered Chinese culture (Confucianism) and social patterns (family relations) as structural barriers to the rise of capitalism. See Weber [1904] (1976).
5. This is part of Mao's understanding of power in which ignorance and illiteracy can be a source of power. It also means that poverty and underdevelopment can be a driving force for societal transformation.
6. "Cultural Africa" constitutes all Africans including those in the Diaspora outside the continent. "Continental Africa" includes those settled in Africa from various parts of the world, despite their origins.
7. "War of position" refers to the struggle to receive broad unification of various social forces and groups under the general consent of a political ideology (Gramsci, 1971).

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The Power of Logo: The Implication of the Chinese Revolution on Pan-Africanism

Li Xing

Introduction: China and Africa

In the 1840s, the Sino-British Opium Wars ended with China's defeat. The Treaty of Nanjing forced China to pay a huge indemnity to Britain for the cost of war and imposed on China a tariff on all imported goods. Since then, the Chinese civilisation was greatly contested and challenged when the well-equilibrated Chinese feudal system gradually collapsed. Unlike the downfall of previous dynasties, which did not inflict any obvious damage on the Chinese way of life and the identity of Chinese culture, the decline of the Manchu Dynasty had the whole civilisation face collapse. The causes of the decline were both multiple and complex. There were certainly a number of domestic socioeconomic factors as well as external forces which contributed to this state of affairs.

The consequences of the Opium War for China were very damaging: traditional tributaries were taken away; concessions to foreign privileges were made; the authority of the emperor, upon which the Chinese order was based, was ended; the hand-labour-based industries on which the Chinese economy depended were destroyed; and the favorable balance of trade, which existed until 1830 and which had brought an uninterrupted flow of silver from the outside, became lopsided (Kapur, 1987:2). China became indeed an international colony. The traditional social structure was finally broken down. China's customs and post offices were largely controlled by Westerners; Western ships were permitted to navigate freely in its waters, and even to demolish some of its coastal defenses; many Western troops were stationed at a number of points on a permanent basis; pieces of territory in various parts of the country were taken over as concessions. China was thus divided by Western powers into "spheres of interest" and was "carved up like a melon." This situation was very similar to what colonialism had once imposed on Africa.

Since the beginning of the 20th century, never before in history had Chinese society been so radically transformed in so short time. China underwent more thoroughgoing and dramatic changes than any other country in the world. Its state and society transformed from an imperial monarchy to a short-lived republic, from a weak and decentralised warlord authoritarianism to a centralised revolutionary

socialist state; economically it went from a state-led industrialisation based on planned economy and socialist egalitarianism to an all-round structural reform based on market mechanisms; the economy underwent repeated shift from crisis and failure to very rapid growth and modernisation; politically the Chinese society and people experienced imperialism and warlordism as well as dictatorship and class struggle; ideologically the Chinese value systems underwent transformations from feudalism to socialism and from collectivism to individualism. For more than a century, generations of Chinese revolutionaries have been striving to find answers to the dazzling puzzles: war and peace, national liberation and independence, development of productive forces and human capacities, self-reliance and equality.

The search to ensure their existence as a prosperous strong nation and political entity has been a key concern in China's modern history. Seeking a way for the transformation and revival of the Chinese nation, Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party eventually found elements of an answer in Marxist philosophy and revolutionary worldview to deal with the scope of the challenge and the pressures from internal and external forces. Depending on how one assesses its successes and failures, China was characterised as a historically unique experiment to skip over the stage of capitalism and to bring about a socialist transformation of both the social structure and the consciousness of the people (Li, 1998).

Today, China is struggling to probe its own way to find an industrialisation path to develop the nation into a prosperous great power while adjusting Chinese society strategically and practically to the existing capitalist world. A difficult task facing the Chinese people is how to promote wealth-creating aspects of the market economy while restraining its socially polarising tendencies as well as its ecological destruction (Li, 1999).

If we take the case of continental Africa, we notice that for the past century the so-called "development in Africa" has already been an global issue — Africa and Africans have not so far "developed". Contemporary Africa is beset with difficulties rooted in its inability to unite territorially, politically and economically. The consequences have been national economies incapable of developing because of geographical, economic and political reasons. On the other hand, Africa has been constantly beset with underdevelopment, poverty, endless border wars, economic domination and the dictatorship of the IMF and the World Bank.

Today, the continent is the most oppressed and exploited, the most marginal and debt-ridden, the most impoverished and war-worn, and the most corrupted and diseased in the world. Despite its abundant resources not only is Africa considered to be the least industrialised of all the developing regions, but also has it more than half of the world's economic and war refugees. The African socio-political landscape has been widely described or perceived to be one full of political oppression, human rights abuses, continuous ethnic, racial, regional and religious conflicts, endless military coups, and high illiteracy. After all, it is doomed to be a "hopeless continent" (*The Economist*, 13 May 2000). As one scholar describes:

The fact is that over the decades that Africa became independent, none of its languages, literatures, institutions, religions and systems of thought have had any impact on the social, political, economic and technological experience imposed on the continent. Islam and Christianity are recognised as religions

in all constitutions, but no African religion gets that place since anthropologists have long since reduced African religion to folklore. (Alvares, 1995:5-6)

The continent's economic situation is claimed to be the worst in the whole world. The $300 billion which African countries owe to foreign creditors represents a serious burden which fundamentally hampers progress in every sector. Africa's debt burdens, says Jesse Jackson, "are the new economy's chains of slavery" (*Los Angeles Times*, 29 September 1998). But 33 of the 41 countries identified by the World Bank as "Heavily Indebted Poor Countries" in sub-Saharan Africa spend more on debt repayments than on health care and education combined. Sub-Saharan African governments owe foreign creditors an average of almost $400 for every man, woman and child on a continent where the average annual wage for most countries is less than $400 per person. Africa carries 11% of the developing world's debt, with only 5% of the developing world's income.

In terms of social well-being, over half of Africa's population is without safe drinking water and two-thirds lack access to adequate sanitation. Africa, with about 12% of the world's population, accounts for 80% of the world's deaths due to AIDS and almost 90% of the world's deaths due to malaria.

Pan-Africanism

Historically, one of the strongest social and intellectual movements to resolve Africa's dilemma and bring new hopes to its people is the Pan-African movement. It became a positive force after two conventions in London and America in the early 1900s with great inspirations from Jamaican Marcus Garvey. In the 1950s, the movement was dominated by Jomo Kenyatta and Kwame Nkrumah, and the "father of Pan-Africanism",

W. E. B. Du Bois. In 1963 in Addis Ababa 32 independent African nations founded the Organisation of African Unity, by which time Pan-Africanism had moved from being an ideal into practical politics.

Philosophically and theoretically, Pan-Africanism is based on the belief that African people share common bonds and objectives and this commonality advocates unity to achieve these objectives. Politically, Pan-Africanism is:

the construction of a Pan-African identity through the development of a shared goal and social and historical experience of struggling to lift up Africa from its untenable status as a marginal, oppressed and largely written-off continent.... It is a process which comes by a sustained fostering of communication, conversation, deliberation, dialogue, coordination, cooperation and solidarity amongst the population in Africa as equal and different African citizens based on a sustained development of a shared African identity, conscious and interest irrespective of color, creed, racial origin, nationality, region and so on. (Mammo, 2000:1)

Still today, Pan-Africanism represents a strong political will to undertake transformative changes in the African continent. It implies the essential elements of a social-political revolution aiming to bring about fundamental changes to all spheres of the continent. Recently, some scholars even proposed an African defence and security system, which adds a new dimension to Pan-African integration (Mammo 2001).

Pan-Africanism has been conceived in varying ways. Given the common assumption that life began on the African continent, it has been applied to all black African people and people of black African descent; to all people on the

African continent, including non-black people or to all states on the African continent. As one scholar put it, "The acceptance of a oneness of all African people and a commitment for the betterment of all people of African descent" (Kodjoe, 1986: 368).

These broad concepts of Pan-Africanism contain strong political connotations on the basis that "African people all over the world could exert sufficient political clout toward liberation from slavery in the Americas and from colonialism on the African continent" (Fosu, 1999:7-8). It is the belief that "all people of African descent have common interests and should work together to conquer prejudice and oppression worldwide" (Sharp, 2000: 33). Pan-Africanism has been used as a general term for various movements in Africa that have their common goal in the unity of Africans and in the elimination of colonialism and white supremacy from the continent.

However, on the concrete scope and meaning of Pan-Africanism, especially regarding such matters as leadership, political orientation, and national as opposed to regional interests, they are widely, often bitterly, divided. Is Pan-Africanism purely a wishful ideal or is it a realisable project? Are there any lessons in the world history of social transformations from which Pan-Africanism can draw some inspiration and strength?

Objectives
The overall objective of this paper is to establish a theoretical discourse relevance between the way Marxism, Mao Zedong's Thought, and the Chinese Revolution emerged, developed, and succeeded and the ongoing struggle of the Pan-African movement. It emphasises the role of consciousness (politics, goals, desires, skills, knowledge) and ideological conviction as an approach to understanding the Pan-African

movement as a "continental political project". In other words, it intends to argue that political discourses and the ideological or conscious elements in social-political life can be the driving force for societal transformations and for a specific socio-political project. It is not intended to provide the answers, rather, it aims at constructing a framework of understanding Pan-Africanism and the complexities of such a movement on the basis of historical novel forms of political, social and ideological relations.

Methodological considerations
This contribution attempts to take a novel approach to the study of discourse and its power effect on the macro-context of social, political and cultural structure. It offers an empirically and historically applicable framework of concepts and methods to analyse its applicability to the new Pan-African social-political movement, to the politics of Pan-African identity as well as to ideologies and social imaginaries that structure Pan-Africanism.

The method is an open-end discussion on the Pan-African movement based on the framework of discourse analysis. According to Alexander:

(discourse) refers to modes of argument that are more consistently generalized and speculative than normal scientific discussion. ... Discourse, by contrast, is ratiocinative. It focuses on the process of reasoning rather than the results of immediate experience, and it becomes significant where there is no plain and evident truth. Discourse seeks persuasion through argument rather than prediction. Its persuasiveness is based on such qualities as logical coherence, expansiveness of scope, interpretive insight, value relevance, rhetorical force, beauty, and texture of argument. (Alexander, 1988: 80)

Discourse is often expressed in the form of theories. And theories are constructed to generate assumptions entailing empirical facts so as to legitimise and generalise discourses. Discourse theories intend to offer a particular type of explanations that are constructed to generate assumptions to legitimise certain political and ideological ideas and conceptualisations. Discourse theories are often established at both epistemological and ontological levels.

Discourse is related to the study of important concepts such as argument, identity, relation/relationship, conflict, power, dominance and inequality, the role of the state or state institutions, and the processes of societal, cultural and ideological reconstruction or reproduction. Discourse represents both knowledge and power.

Knowledge and power

Francis Bacon's "knowledge is power" is known to most people. However, the reverse principle, "power is knowledge", is equally true but less well known. Yes, knowledge does produce power. For centuries the Western world has apparently been both a powerful producer of ideas and knowledge and a dominant enforcer and promoter of a vast corpus of knowledge about nature, human beings, societies, the rest of the world as well as itself. Less discussed is the fact that power, whether physical and non-physical, decides and defines knowledge.

Power can decide whether a certain system of knowledge is universal, scientific, creative, economic, rational, or whether it is primitive, local, irrational and backward. Over the last several centuries, knowledge, based on assumptions or empiricism, has become so imposing and de-culturalised that the West has dominated the power to decide and define everything. Not only modern Western sciences but also all its social sciences and humanities are so universalised that they become non-deniable and non-negotiable beyond any culture, creed, class and colour. It is commonly accepted that the driving force of motivation promoting continued progress of human beings is to be found in the self-propelled, inherent dynamism of the West. One of the West's key universalised explanation systems to make sense of the real world and life is economic rationality (the econocentric approach), with theological principles seen as guidelines for human behaviour and societal development.

Discourse theories: Econocentrism and Logocentricism[1]

Econocentrism

In its specific form, econocentrism refers to a belief that the economic mode of production absolutely determines a society's social, political and intellectual life. It sees the primacy of economics as a point of departure in the production and reproduction of social life due to human "rationality". In other words, it is an ideology that views economics as the key factor that determines the course of human history.

Today, the econocentric world view dominates every part of our everyday life. All theories of rational choice — major theories in politics, sociology, international political economy, international relations, development studies — are constructed based on the premises of economic analysis or within the framework of economic thinking as their primary paradigm of interpretation (Li, 2001). Most concepts which we deal with daily, such as "culture", "ideology", "nationalism", "democracy" etc., are used to serve either as residuals or supplements to econocentric models. It is generally accepted that economic structure determines all aspects of human activities and social relations, and that

economic dominance leads to political and ideological leadership.

The central concern of the econocentric model is methodological individualism in which politics is perceived as a process that "objectifies private and individual wants and desires in the form of social needs and priorities according to distributive schedules and alternative possibilities" (Apter and Saich, 1994). It can only survive in the environment of private property, individual profit-searching, innovation and entrepreneurship. The understanding of power under the econocentric systems of explanation (discourses) is associated with rationality — bargaining and compromising forms of politics in which interests prevail over principles and negotiations over confrontations.

Thus, it is obvious that Pan-Africanism can never be constructed under the norms and values of econocentrism. It will only bind Africa to the existing capitalism world system defined and run by imperial powers and institutions like the WTO, the World Bank and IMF. It also ties Africa to certain types of social relations and political systems promoting civil society and liberal democracy, which in return award an effective way for US-led Western powers to promote polyarchy in the Third World in order to complement neoliberal economic restructuring and facilitate the US global hegemonic role (Robinson, 1996).

Logocentrism
The word *logo* originated from the Greek language, meaning "word" and "speech". In its general form, *logo* is short for *logogram* and *logotype*, which refers to "a name, symbol, or trademark designed for easy and definite recognition...."[2]

Logocentrism, philosophically, is a concept used in critical theory aiming to designate the way thought systems are organised around fundamental assumptions about reality and truth. It is a key term in the thinking of Jacques Derrida (1983, 1974, 1978) and the deconstruction theory. It argues that language in terms of explanations and interpretations is composed of elements which combine with each other to produce linguistic signs which are accorded meaning (logos and symbols). Since language and texts are always tied to experience, the use of language contains perception, conceptualisation, power and position.

Logocentrism implies a process of deconstruction and reconstruction and its final aim is to reconstruct a world view, a new interpretation of the truth and reality in order to find alternative possibilities. It is a strategy applied to writing generally and to literature in particular, whereby systems of thought and concepts are dismantled in such a way as to expose the divisions which lie at the heart of meaning itself.

Politically, logocentrism can be applied to display an alternative view of the world where the search for other perspectives, for what is present, for what can be brought to light, for what can be signified, for the narrative structure of new explanations. Narratives can become the new totalising logos, which, in return, gathers multiple narratives for practical purposes.

Hence, political power may be generated through *logo* (language and symbol), i.e. through both power *behind* discourse and power *in* discourse. It is concerned less with available choices, but with *projections* on the basis of some convincing definition of necessity that specifies its own rules and theoretical principles and its own logic (Apter

and Saich, 1994). Its central goal is to reestablish social order based on a redefined and projected equity. It looks into the conscious part of human beings and emphasises learning and education as the key to power, and knowledge and wisdom as a form of truth. Power is identified with logos (discourses), with proto-religious characteristics intertwined in a secular theory of politics (Apter and Saich, 1994).

The logocentric strength of such an emphasis on political discourse and symbolic capital is that it can unleash potential energy to create a political community under conditions of virtual chaos and disintegration. The construction of alternative discourses can transcend randomness and create a logic of order so that the condition of disorder itself becomes the condition of transition and even transformation. The logocentric discourse approach cultivates a common interpretation of shared history and experiences. It offers people the idea of liberation and transformation in order to think a way out of their current predicaments, no matter how hopeless these seem to be. By reinterpretation it attempts to resolve the contradictions of historical legacy in their own favour in order to pave the way for great economic, social and cultural transformations

Logocentricism and the Chinese Revolution

The Chinese logocentricism explains the way Maoism and the Chinese Revolution emerged, developed and succeeded. The dynamic strength of logocentricism in the context of the Chinese revolution lies in its effort to generate power through an *inversionary discourse* (inversing the econocentric discourse and social order) based on its own language of conviction, together with ideological, ethnic, linguistic strands. The Chinese logocentricism can be analysed as follows:

1) *To change people's world view through reinterpretation of history and narrative reconstruction of reality in order to think one's way out of current predicaments.*

The Maoist Marxism related China's underdevelopment to the outcome of a historical process caused by the Western colonial-imperialist expansion rather than to the "stage of development" by the modernisation school or to the consequences of a specific mode of production caused by cultural barriers.[3] In the light of this view, underdevelopment is not an inborn characteristic of pre-industrial societies but a consequence of a specific historical process. It argues that even though imperialist penetration did bring elements of modern economy to China, the impact was geographically confined and sectorally skewed to serve foreign interest (Esherick as quoted in White, 1982:114).

After numerous failures in resisting Western imperialist challenges since the Sino-British Opium War in the 1840s, Confucianism as a state ideology and as ethical and political traditions obviously proved to have lost its viability during a time when China urgently needed a new analytical framework. Marxism and especially Lenin's theory of capitalist imperialism provided Chinese intellectuals with a partial theoretical framework as well as a psychological answer to their difficulties in finding the proper explanations and theories for the failures of traditional Chinese culture and for the humiliation suffered at the hands of the West (Peck, 1975: 73).

At the time when Confucianism failed to function as a state ideology, Marxism-Leninism made the Chinese intellectuals

more open-minded and internationally-oriented in conceptualising and analysing the world from different perspectives. China, as they saw, was no longer an isolated center of the globe surrounded by barbarians, but a part of the world full of different forces and ideas. The Chinese view on its role in international affairs had changed from regarding China as the center of the world and universal authority to seeing its problems as part of the world's problems and the Chinese revolution as relevant to the outside world. The attraction of Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese was that, as Kapur observed:

It was an effective ploy to criticize the West from a Western point of view; b) it gave the Chinese a new methodological framework to understand their own past and foresee the contours of their future; c) it offered a conceptualized view of international reality. Lastly, it amply proved its anti-imperialist credentials-an important source of attraction-after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution when the Soviet leaders denounced imperialism, unilaterally abolishing unequal treaties and relinquishing many privileges of tsarist Russia including extraterritoriality as well as their share of Boxer indemnities. (1987:3)

2) *To unite people based on collective individualism and a social, political and economic divide.*

It persuaded people to associate their private narratives and personal interpretations to the collectivity. It called for individual contribution but emphasised collective consequences. Such a strategy was to analyse society

through the lens of a politic-economic and sociocultural *divide* (class divisions), which perceives human morality and consciousness in close relation to the superstructure of society. In a society in which people (human beings) are divided into different classes, all men possess certain class interests and relations. All realms relating to human beings, such as value, rights, dignity, liberty, freedom, love and hatred, humanity and inhumanity, etc., can only be correctly understood and explained through concrete historical and class analysis (Chen, 1984: 41-44). It persuades people to think in this way that all political conflicts can be interpreted in terms of this *divide*. Its power is established when the majority of members of all social strata interpret politics and participate struggle in terms of this divide.

The failure of Sun Yat-sen's Republic Revolution and the destruction of the First World War together with Japanese imperialist intention destroyed Chinese admiration for the West and Japan. So, if both Western constitutional monarchy and republicanism, as well as Japanese militarist culture could not be imitated as alternatives to save China, then what else could be an option? Early Chinese Marxists Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu argued that with or without a strong state the establishment of Chinese capitalism would eventually become the agent of Western capitalism and would not solve China's poverty and backwardness. The most forceful and comprehensive argument was put forward by Li:

.... although China itself has not yet undergone a process of capitalist economic development such as occurred in Europe, America, and Japan, the

common people (of China) still indirectly suffer from capitalist economic oppression in a way that is even more bitter than the direct capitalist oppression suffered by the working class of the various (capitalist) nations....

If we look again at the international position of China today, (we see) that other nations have already passed from free competition to the necessary socialist-cooperative position, while we are still juveniles; others have walked a thousand li, while we are still taking the first step... I fear that we will be unable to succeed unless we take double steps and unite into a socially cooperative organization. Therefore, if we want to develop industry in China, we must organize a government made up purely of producers in order to eliminate the exploiting classes within the country, to resist world capitalism, and to follow (the path of) industrialization organized upon a socialist basis. (Li as quoted in Kung, 1975: 259)

Li's argument identified China as a "proletarian nation" although it lacked a strong proletarian working class. He associated the potential of a Chinese proletarian revolution with the worldwide proletarian movement against international capitalism and imperialism. His far-reaching and insightful analytical worldview paved the way for the establishment of a populist tradition within the Chinese Communist Party, which was further developed by his disciple, Mao Zedong.

Armed with an inversionary discourse based on the conceptual power of class divisions, the Chinese Communist Party transformed the Chinese people from being "a piece of blank paper"[4] to become ideologically and politically conscious. Being a member of this inversionary revolution, one feels oneself becoming a member of decision-makers, an activist of social transformation, a master of his/her own fate, rather than an unconscious wanderer and a passive victim.

3) *To project a future based on structural transformations rather than evolutionary modifications.*
The immediate context of logocentrism is *conflict* and *chaos*, *war* and *revolution* (not reformism or evolutionism). It rejects what the current *reality* or *truth* is, and it intends to project what is to be realised. It attempts to constitute a new hegemonic project — a *moral* economy, not a political economy — which is inversionary in object and transformational in consequence.

Some scholars argued that even though imperialist penetration did bring elements of modern economy to China, the impact was geographically confined and sectorally skewed to serve foreign interests (Esherick as quoted in White, 1982: 114). The reason why China was able to industrialise more rapidly after 1949 was because the "Communist revolution decisively broke the ties that chained China to the imperialist system" (Mould as quoted in White, 1982:114). In other words, China went straight to the roots of its historical problems and made thorough structural transformations — unique experiments to skip over the stage of capitalism and to bring about a socialist transformation in terms of both society and consciousness of the people.

For almost a half century many Chinese truly felt China to be at a disadvantage

and some of them even were ready to admit its culture to be inferior to that of the West. But with the rise of Chinese Communism, with its logocentric mobilisation together with armed struggle, this view was changed. Many later believed that the Communist party represented the progressive side of contemporary human society. Although it was a fact that not all Chinese supported the Communist party (some were even strongly anti-Communist), they could not avoid being gratified by the achievements the Chinese Communist Party had made, and that China once again started to wield an undeniable influence in world affairs, which it had not enjoyed for many, many years. Some Chinese might wish that such a result had not come about under Communist leadership, but whatever they might prefer they could not but admire the result.

4) *To continue the logocentric tradition and bring "uninterrupted revolution" into postwar development.*
After the communist victory in 1949 and with the successful development of the socialist economy and transformation in the early 1950s, few people in the communist leadership thought of a continuous revolution through a prolonged period of contention and struggle. Revolution was mainly regarded as the act of seizing power, whereas the building of a new economy and society would require a different method. But the next three decades was to see the continuation of the Chinese revolution through a progression of several mass movements, such as the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s, and the Anti-rightist Movement and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. Mao's theory of uninterrupted revolution was practiced in these experiences and it maintained that even under socialist development the revolution must continue. Among those experiments, the Cultural Revolution was perhaps the most dramatic example of a nation in search of a development strategy that would avoid the shackles of the "old", resolve continuous contradictions and pursue an independent self-reliance development.

The meaning of "uninterrupted revolution" should be understood as referring to the preservation of some important logocentric continuities in Mao's thoughts and practices, as Selden summarises:

They include the fierce commitment to eliminate exploitation and property-based inequality; the emphasis on political mobilization, class struggle, and political and ideological transformation and their relationship to economic development; the proclivity to replace the market and the household economy by large cooperative, collective, and state institution; and the emphasis on self-reliance and the suspicion of intellectuals and technical personnel. (Selden, 1989: 54-55)

In order to fully utilise human beings as a decisive factor in the socialist development strategy Mao found it important to establish a world view in which one thinks of the part in the context of the whole. It aimed at broadening the concept of the "whole", which had been narrowed to imply loyalty to one's family, village, clan, to the consciousness of the class, the nation and beyond. The goal was to form in society a *Gong*-oriented (collective, public and broadened) outlook in contrast to the *Si*-oriented one (selfish, individual and narrow). Mao firmly believed that only collective socialism could save China and

build a strong nation, and in order to adopt such a world view one needed an uncompromisingly ethical and moralistic revolution. He very often referred to the Cultural Revolution as a movement to establish the moral foundation of socialism — collectivity, which was advocated not only in terms of public ownership as a socialist ideology but also in terms of devotion and unselfishness in the behavioral sense. *Gong* implied that socialist economic development was a process based on collective effort rather than based on *Si*, individualistic self-oriented motivation. Hence, one of his purposes in launching the Cultural Revolution was aimed at eliminating the consciousness and motivation of the old semi-capitalist society and establishing a just socialist consciousness and motivation in conformity with the new socialist economic base. It was an attempt to substitute egotistical motives (*Si*) with moral impulses (*Gong*) as incentives to increase production and development. The wage policy attempting to bridge income differences at that time reflected such incentives. In urban industries, wage differences were under control and encouraged to reduce, whereas in the people's communes, income through allotting working points was based not only on the individual physical contribution to production, but also on the level of his/her political consciousness and socialist devotion.

Implications for Pan-Africanism: the need for logocentrism

The above discussion of the Chinese Revolution is aimed not at applying the same process to various global and regional Pan-African movements. Rather, it attempts to inquire whether some of its logocentric powers can be generated in the Pan-African movements. If Pan-Africanism is to be seen as, first of all, a transformative political project, the most important element, as shown

by the success of the Chinese Revolution, is how to dismantle the structural and ideological "hegemony" in the domestic and international system and especially to overcome the dominant discourses of contemporary mythology. The effectiveness of the Chinese Revolution was its devotion to inventing a nationwide logo — common concepts, metaphors, ideologies, narratives and myths.

For Pan-Africanism to achieve a similar objective, the construction of an overriding identity of a united and emancipated Africa is the first step in such an ambitious hegemonic project. For example, a logocentric Pan-Africanism can be generated under the common glorious history of the most ancient civilisation in the world as well as the collective historical and social experiences as an oppressed people since 1500. The success of the Pan-African movement depends not only on strategic methods but also on the unity of a broad ontology.

A shared logo

Pan-African logocentrism can conceptually be identified as a project of constructing shared logos. First, a shared logo refers to a unified "African" metaphysics without which it is not possible to achieve a united front and to sustain the spirit of solidarity. It also refers to a common narrative which covers everyone who shares the African continent including those whose ancestors had left the continent in the enforced exile of the slave trade. As one scholar rightly points out:

A shared African value and vision worthy enough to shape, mediate and put in place effective mechanisms for resolving intractable conflicts and stimulate and inspire the capabilities of citizens and communities is necessary in order to achieve harmony

consistent with a shared conception of an African identity. (Mammo, 2001: 30)

There will continue to be ideological and intellectual crises in the African world until Africans understand Pan-Africanism, its value and benefits, and apply it to their many problems. The flaws of the econocentric and polyarchic approaches to Pan-Africanism is to pluralise and individualise the understanding of Africa and its problems.

A shared history
A shared logo means the common colonial history: the disruption of natural processes of nation-state and class formation; the deformation, distortion, and disarticulation of the native African ethnical and social formations; the imposition of capitalist social relations — production and accumulation patterns; the imposition of alien tastes and values; and the incorporation of Africa into a metropolitan dominated and controlled global capitalist order. These experiences require an ideological response and political will to challenge the established econocentric discourse on the development of underdevelopment of Africa. This is where the African independence movement was betrayed: the failure to fundamentally challenge imperialism, and reconstruct an African logo — the socio-political and economic landscape to reflect popular realities and aspirations, and this is where the Chinese Revolution fundamentally succeeded. Political decolonisation did not automatically include the decolonisation of cultural and ideological domination and did not unconsciously generate Africa's own logo of identity — a fundamental basis for real self-determination.

The historical relationship between Africa and the rest of the world especially the West is very unequal: people from Africa going to the rest of the world are slaves, conscripts, maids, servants, attendants, soldiers, cheap labourers, refugees, students, skilled Africans fueling the brain drain, some as migrants in search of new opportunities.

Figure: The historical relationship between Africa and the world (especially the Western world)

The rest of world's people coming to Africa are "explorers", missionaries, slave traders and raiders, imperial "civilisers", aid workers, humanitarian relief workers, investors, project contractors, consultants, settlers, tourists etc. It is important for all Africans to remember that this historical narrative is a *common* rather than an individual legacy.

The above shared historical heritage can be a valuable source for the promotion of Pan-Africanism. A "cultural Africa" and a "continental Africa"[5] can be logos for broad identity and unity. As Mammo sharply points out,

The *key to a theory of Pan-Africanism is to forge a shared value and vision worthy enough to shape, mediate and put in place effective mechanisms for resolving intractable conflicts and stimulate and inspire the capabilities of citizens and communities in order to achieve harmony consistent with a shared conception of an African identity. A shared conception of an African identity should be a universal value which is not*

detained by partial interests, cultural particularisms, state-nationisms, ethnic primordial loyalties, racial classifications and other desultory practices, capable of commanding moral and political authority, much like Christ, Mohammed and Buddha commanded religious authority. (Mammo, 2000:23)

In the context of modern China, the Chinese logo embedded in the century-long experiences of humiliation brought by Western imperialism has been one of the key elements which have kept China from disintegration. Today, Hong Kong and Macao have been handed over to China, and despite the unwillingness of the Taiwan regime to reunite with Mainland China, it feels powerless to revoke the "one China" concept, that is the "Chinese nation" and "cultural China".

Conclusion

The reason why China was able to industrialise more rapidly and to become a global power after 1949 was that the Communist revolution "decisively broke the ties that chained China to the imperialist system" (Mould in White, 1982: 114) and also broke a variety of complicated domestic confinements, such as localism, provincialism and warlordism. A new and efficient take-off could only be realised by cutting the roots of these social diseases and re-establishing an independent social, political, economic and cultural foundation.

Many people tried to study the history of the Chinese Revolution in a non-logocentric approach, but they all ended up with a dilemma. As Dirlik describes it, "students of Chinese Communism in the West, the majority of whom do not share a similar conviction in Marxism's truths, have nevertheless found in China's circumstances variegated reasons for radicals' attraction to Marxism and consequently turning to Communist politics, as the only means to resolve the problems of Chinese society" (Dirlik, 1989: 255). Therefore, to understand the transformation of China one has to understand the nature of the Chinese communist revolution and its entire discourse.

Seen from some lessons of the Chinese Revolution, it is argued here that in order to transform the idea of Pan-Africanism into a reality, a second wave of decolonisation is a must. In first wave of decolonisation, most African states stood up and achieved political independence. However, the very questions can be addressed directly to challenge the fundamental nature of "African states": are African states African? Are African states states? These questions imply that Africa has not fully achieved real "independence". It needs further decolonisation in order to build such a hegemonic project that represents a real independent Africa.

Gramsci's "war of position"[1] is believed to be a decisive strategy to the success of Pan-Africanism. Although Africa consists of vast differences in culture, language, religion and race, and despite the fact that race, nation and metaphysics do not necessarily enforce an identity, Africa can still choose, on the basis of historical experiences, and political and economic realities, what is important for Africans both now and in the future. The triumph of Pan-Africanism, the only way Africans can survive the foreign onslaught and live as a truly liberated people, will come out of the sweat and blood of the African people themselves.

NOTES

1. See Apter and Saich (1994).
2. Source: *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, Third Edition.
3. Friedrich Hegel, in comparing it with Western consciousness of the world which created revolutionary history, placed China in the "childhood" of history. Even Karl Marx, whose theories and insights inspired the Chinese Revolution, described China as a society "vegetating in the teeth of time", and discovered in the Great Wall of China a metaphor for the universal resistance of non-European societies to change. See Dirlik and Meisner (1989:17).
4. Max Weber also considered Chinese culture (Confucianism) and social patterns (family relations) as structural barriers to the rise of capitalism. See Weber [1904] (1976).
5. This is part of Mao's understanding of power in which ignorance and illiteracy can be a source of power. It also means that poverty and underdevelopment can be a driving force for societal transformation.
6. "Cultural Africa" constitutes all Africans including those in the Diaspora outside the continent. "Continental Africa" includes those settled in Africa from various parts of the world, despite their origins.
7. "War of position" refers to the struggle to receive broad unification of various social forces and groups under the general consent of a political ideology (Gramsci, 1971).

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